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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research is to investigate the way strategies are formed in a public 
sector organization and to assess the role of the Board-members in shaping and 
developing strategies. 
The project consisted of the following distinct steps: (1) The collection and processing of 
background information concerning the enterprise under study. (2) The collection and 
analysis of the Board's past decisions over a period of nine years. (3) The interview 
accounts of the members of the Board (4) The analysis of the interviews at the individual 
level and the construction of cognitive maps. (5) The testing of the validity of the 
cognitive maps of the previous stage by employing a quantitative technique in which the 
interviewees scored on matrices and identified the influence between elements of the 
strategy, the external, and the organizational environment. (6) The identification of 
patterns in the cognitive structure of each individual, resulting from both the qualitative 
(interviewing) and quantitative (matrix scoring) approaches. (7) The attempt to build 
theory by integrating the different sources of data and generating propositions grounded 
on data by relating the findings of this study to the existing literature. 
The major findings concerned the notion of strategy according to the Board-members' 
accounts. Thus, the majority of Board-members perceived strategy as something that 
occured outside them, something over which they had little control. The Board-members' 
role, as revealed in the strategy-areas studied, was a legalistic role concerning mostly 
ratification of proposals without active contribution to initiating and developing new 
strategies. It is also argued that this Board's composition, structure and processes 
exhibited deficiencies. The real strategist of the organization was the new General 
Manager who succeeded not only in creating an integrated strategy but also in getting it 
institutionalized (that is in establishing commitment among the people of the 
organization). 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. I. THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study is to add to the understanding of how strategies are formed in 
a public sector organization which is implementing a Strategic Plan; in particular to 
assess the role of its Managing Board in the selection and implementation of these 
strategies. This purpose is achieved: 
(1) By understanding how individuals make sense of strategy, that is, which 
decisions made and actions taken they perceive as strategic; and 
(2) By looking into how the specific series of decisions/ actions converge into 
patterns, over the period of the Strategic Plan's implementation. Inferences are 
drawn accounting for the impact of the strategists' notion of strategy on patterns 
identified. Thus, the forms of strategy will be highlighted and the degree to which #-1 
6.7 
they are shaped by deliberation and control or service characteristics will be 
evaluated. 
1.2. THE IMPORTANCE FOR CONDUCTING THIS STUDY 
Conducting this research is important for two reasons: 
First, there are few studies concerning strategy development in a public setting; among 
them one may cite: 
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(1) A recent study in England (Pettigrew et al., 1992) which investigated 
processes of strategic change in the National Health Service when a major change 
occurred, concerning the introduction of general management within it. The study 
concluded that, in the public sector, there is now an increasing interest in moving 
from a focus on "policy to one on "stratejDl', implying a greater concern with 
securing action around espoused policies. 
(2) The Quinn et at. (1988) studies concerning (i) the National Film Board in 
Canada and (ii) a university setting; they investigated how decisions are made and 
how strategies evolve; and 
(3) The Hickson et al. (1986) study on top strategic decisions which investigated 
a considerable number of decisions in private and public firms; yet, these decisions 
were distinct, they did not concern a process of changing. 
Second, public sector firms are worth studying because: 
(1) They play an important role in the economy of a country, in terms of the 
investment allocated and the manpower employed; they also play an important role 
in society, in terms of the way in which they set forward the concept of public 
interest. 
(2) It is important to study the external context of these firms, in terms of the 
political-econornic system and its influence on the firms themselves. In countries 
with different political-economic systems, the pressures exerted on the public 
enterprises may probably be of differing nature; this is important to be assessed. 
The same would probably be true when the political/economic orientations within 
the same country are changing. Finally 
(3) The constituency of a public firm's Board, as representative of the 
stakeholders' group, is revealing of how different stakeholders may provide a 
distinctive account of the process of change when rationalizing about actions and 
referring to reactions and interactions that preceded them when negotiating 
around proposals for change. The study of a heterogeneous top management team 
is also important because much controversy exists between researchers even of 
private firms as to the impact of Board characteristics on its functioning and, 
ultimately, on performance. There are studies that argue that employees' 
participation on Board (like the German co-determination studied by Benneli et 
al., 1987) has no effect on the firms' economic efficiency, whereas others argue, on 
a theoretical base, about how the heterogeneity of a Board in terms of its 
composition, may contribute to improving the quality of decision making. 
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1.2.1. The Study's Context and the Key Themes 
For many years, especially after World War 11, rail transport in Greece confronted 
problems, the most serious of which relate to the industry's low earnings and to the 
diminishing market share. The costs of producing rail services have risen much more 
rapidly than operating revenues. The deficit, which according to the legislation is to be 
covered by the State, is ever increasing since governments, being unable to cope with it, 
provide a declining proportionate share of operating assistance. 
The public nature of railways' ownership emphasizes the important role played by 
governmental officials in the setting of organizational goals and the supervision of the 
enterprise's activities. On the other hand, the employees' unions also possess 
considerable power; the long history, the large size of the enterprise and the special 
legislation usually protecting employment, all have established solid practices to confront 
management efficiently, especially on the grounds of rewards (salaries and promotion). 
The role of leadership deserves special attention in a public enterprise context. General 
Managers follow the fortunes of the political party in power and sometimes their tenure 
in office is too short in order to be judged against outcomes. The role of politics is 
sometimes overwhelming. The press repeatedly points out the dangers for the economy 
from the use of large state enterprises by politicians as reservoirs of slack resources, to 
be exploited for political or private purposes. Granting employment positions for 
patronage, steering investments for maximizing votes, or even awarding contracts on bids 
in return for contribution, all these limit to the utmost managerial authority. One may 
then wonder about the issue of organizational control since, under such circumstances, 
attempts to accomplish change fade away when the organization is forced to respond to 
these "necessities" 
When this study was undertaken, although the enterprise was operating in an era of fiscal 
restraint, a major modernisation plan was being implemented concerning the renewal of 
infrastructure, that is, the doubling of track, the installation of new 
sign alling/telecommunications systems and the acquisition of new rolling stock. The 
revival of European railways, due mainly to the introduction of high-speed quality 
services, has induced new perceptions in the public authorities and the public at large; 
this has resulted in investments for the creation of modern railway infrastructure. 
During the period of the Plan's implementation, several changes occurred in the firm's 
external environment, such as a change in the government in power, and new legislation 
concerning public sector firms and imposing pressures for rational allocation of 
resources, aiming at the enterprise's functioning as a commercial undertaking. Yet, at 
the same time, the enterprise had to comply with norms concerning service rates and 
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service levels, that is to realize what is broadly understood as the "social" role of the 
state-owned railway. A major change (required by the new legislation) was also 
introduced to the enterprise's Managing Board. Employees' representatives were for the 
first time appointed to take seats on this Board, and this happened to occur in a period 
where a strict economic policy imposing retrenchments and cutbacks on budgets as well 
as freezing of wages was launched by government. The new Managing Board consisted, 
therefore, of governmental officials, senior managers and employees' representatives. A 
major issue is raised, consequently, related to the firm's pursued rehabilitation. That is, 
given the major changes in its context, which way did the firm take forward the process of 
implementation? Specifically, which way did the firm -in terms of specific actions- 
decide to pursue its objective and by which means it achieved to implement change? 
Perceptions of decision-makers about how these actions came about, which of them are 
considered as strategic, which are the different "world views" that may be espoused, 
would all be highlighted and evaluated since it is assumed to be a crucial input for finally 
understanding what is strategy and how it emerges and develops in a public firm. 
1.3. THE AUTHOR'S INTEREST IN CONDUCTING THIS RESEARCH 
The implementation phase of the Rail Modernization Plan started in a low pace, almost 
ten years ago. The author of this thesis joined the railways as an engineer seven years ago 
and served at different posts ranging from studying and supervising works in the track 
modernization projects to designing investments proposals and programmes measuring 
productivity, as she moved up the hierarchy. During this time, she experienced 
difficulties because seldom she had a clearly defined goal to meet and many times this 
was expressed openly by other colleagues as well. Especially, in periods when limited 
funding, mainly of operating activities, was at issue, the attitude on the part of seniors 
managers that "things come the way they come and nothing can be done about 
changing them", was conveying to lower levels of management. This, in turn, impeded 
any creative response to an environment which de facto was perceived as hostile and 
deterministic. 
During this period, a new institutional scheme was inaugurated in the public sector 
enterprises. Employees' representatives were appointed to the enterprise's Managing 
Board and a Supervisory Board was established in which major constituencies 
participated. Despite the fact that the new scheme was introduced in a period of severe 
fiscal restraints, employees expectations regarding its success were high. It was believed 
that with the aid of the Supervisory Board the firm would be able to establish clear and 
measurable objectives. It was also believed that the new scheme would provide the basis 
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for structuring the activities of the enterprise around an integrated and organization- 
wide orientation towards new markets, since the variety of the stakeholders involved 
would constitute a strong supportive framework for the interests of both the community 
and the enterprise. 
The award of a State scholarship for conducting research in the domain of railway 
management gave, finally, the author the impulse to conduct research into the field of 
strategic management in a public firm. 
1.4. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As described in the first section, central in the study's consideration of the organizational 
strategy is the concept of decision-making as substantiated by members of a managing 
Board, in the context of the implementation of a strategic plan in a public-sector firm. In 
terms of the terminology used throughout the study, the Strategic Plan, which aims at 
providing high-speed train services, refers to the rail modernization activities comprising 
technical projects, procurement of new rolling stock units, installation of new systems and 
establishment of procedures and behaviours to improve relations with labour. Strategists 
are the decision -makers, members of the Managing Board responsible to guide the 
enterprise's activities. 
(1) The unit of analysis is the Board and the strategists within it. However, since the 
strategy formation is examined and decisions are the means by which this process is 
materialized, it follows that, in order to study the way in which strategy develops, the 
Board's decisional activity over time must be depicted and analysed. The first grouping 
of questions should be related to delineating this longitudinal activity. These are: 
- Which are the decisions made by the Board and how can they be classified into 
categories? 
- How can these categories (called hereafter decision-areas) be designed and which 
are the associated patterns of decisions over time, depicting their frequencies, 
across different decision-areas? 
(2) In order to understand how members belonging to various stakeholders' groups 
rationalize about decisions made, the second grouping of questions is presented which 
investigates their disaggregated views: These are: 
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- How strategists rationalize about decisions made and especially about the ones 
they identified as strategic? 
- What factors are contained in their reasonings and how are they related to each 
other? 
- Which are the relationships among strategic decisions themselves? 
(3) In order to identify the causes that shaped consistent patterns in specific decision- 
areas as well as the reasons that inhibited the consistency of decisions in other areas and 
shaped other patterns, the study attempts, by articulating strategists' rationales and 
decision outcomes, to account for the phenomenon investigated. The third grouping of 
questions refers to it. These are: 
- Given the strategists' rationales, how can the patterns associated with various 
decision-areas be explained? 
- Is there a relationship between consistency in decision patterns and shared views 
about strategic decisions? 
- How can other decision patterns (cyclical, emerging, sporadic) be explained in 
terms of the respective strategists' rationales? 
- Do the latter reveal differences in perceptions? Where can the source of these 
differences be allocated? 
- Is the contribution of the members of the Board to developing, implementing, 
and refining strategies important or does it not exist? 
- Which way are decisions made within this Board? Which way are strategies 
formulated and/or changed in this enterprise? 
- Which are the Board roles in this process? Are the strategists determined to cope 
with difficulties and strive to make the enterprise achieve its objectives or a 
legalistic role appears as dominant (decisions should be ratified at this level) and 
results in draining strategic management's time and creativity? 
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1.5. THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
As stated previously, the study's objective is the understanding of the strategy-making 
process as substantiated through (1) an analytical perspective centring on the decisions 
made by the Board; and (2) a behavioural-political one based on the rationales about 
strategy (and the environment) of the Board-members. Examining these rationales and 
especially how they interrelate and interact and how they might have shaped the pattern 
of decisions would reveal a good deal about managerial processes and Board's 
functioning. 
The study comprises three main phases. 
(1) The first phase concerns collection and analysis of data deriving from archival 
evidence. The foHowing steps summarise the way in which the tasks undertaken to 
answer the first grouping of the study's questions were carried out: 
(i) The Board's decisions were collected from the official organizational 
documents. These decisions were made over a period of ten years and cover the 
whole period of the implementation of the plan. 
(H) Decision-areas were derived, using a classification scheme which helped 
reduce the cumbersome number of decisions into a manageable number of 
decision-areas. 
(iii) Patterns depicting the frequency of decisions across the identified decision- 
areas were produced, as well as a list containing the titles of all the decision- 
areas. 
(2) The second phase refers to the empirical evidence collected through interviews with 
the Board-members. The following steps summarise the way in which the tasks 
undertaken to deal with the second set of questions were carried out. 
(i) The members of the Board were interviewed in depth; during the interview, 
they were presented with the list containing all the decision-areas, and were 
asked to comment on them, to define the decision-areas they considered as 
strategic, to identify the factors influencing and/or being influenced by them, that 
is to explain the way in which these decision s/action s, by being implemented 
further down in the hierarchy, produced concrete results. These semi-structured 
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
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(H) The strategists' rationales were analysed and their cognitive structure was 
depicted individually along the so-defined strategic decision-areas, on a certain 
type of cognitive map, named influence diagram. The maps contained three areas 
(namely the environment, the organization, and the strategic decisions); along 
these maps, the concepts derived from the interviews were classified, and links 
Wustrating the impact of various factors on strategic decisions as well as the 
influence of strategic decisions on other factors were traced. 
(iii) Because of the differences revealed in the influence diagrams, another 
cognitive map (a matrix map) was designed by the author of the thesis, based this 
time on the majority of the decisions identified by all strategists as strategic, and 
strategists were asked to fill in scores denoting the existence and the perceived 
strength of relationships between strategic decisions and factors from the inner 
and outer environment of the firm. The aim here was (1) to measure the 
perceived strength of the relationships identified and, (2) to investigate whether 
a different methodological tool would render more homogeneous their responses. 
The response, on the part of strategists was much smaller than in the interview 
phase, thus definite inferences cannot be drawn concerning similarities and 
differences between the two types of cognitive maps. Yet, some findings that are 
considered important are reported in Chapter 7 which deals in detail with the 
analysis of cognitive maps. 
(3) The third phase of the research deals with the integration of all the evidence. It is an 
interplay between (1) the data and the analysis carried out so far, and (2) the 
interpretation of them; it is specifically concerned with the third and four groupings of 
the study's questions. 
(i) First, an investigation of the relationships between the strategists' cognitive 
structures and patterns of strategic decisions is undertaken. By means of 
theorizing, the way decisions are made within each strategic decision-area is 
presented and it draws on relative findings from the literature. 
(ii) Then, the new findings are presented and propositions accounting for the 
unique facets of the processes studied are generated for further inquiry. 
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1.6. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Information about specific details in the analysis 
process aa well as results are presented in seven appendices. The content of each chapter 
is summarised below. Chapters dealing with data analysis also summarize briefly the 
major findings. Thus, 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on Strategic Management and Decision-Making 
Processes and presents referenced material pertinent to the thesis themes. The chapter 
is organised around six major units: 
(1) The issue of strategic management is examined alongside its two principal 
dimensions as identified in literature (content and process), as well as specific 
characteristics of strategic management in public enterprises. 
(2) The issue of strategic change, its meaning, classification and modelling, as well 
as the identification of the forces which influence the occurrence of change are 
discussed. 
(3) The third unit deals with strategic decisions (characteristics of strategic 
decisions, types of organizational decision processes, political characteristics, 
psychological context, consensus in the strategy process). 
(4) The fourth unit examines the issue of cognition and interpretation of the 
process of change (organizations as interpretative systems, tools for research in 
human culture). 
(5) The fifth unit examines the strategic role of Boards of Directors (theoretical 
perspectives of the Boards' role, Boards' functioning and performance, Boards' 
demographics and composition). 
(6) An attempt is made to highlight the gap identified in the strategic decision- 
making literature, that is to understand and explain the nature of strategic choices 
and how these are formed, by blending two data sources, namely patterns in 
streams of decisions and patterns in "opera tionalizing' the concept of strategy. 
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Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical framework that led to the choice of this type of 
research (Background to the Research Design) and argues for its relevance to the 
purposes of this study. 
(1) The chapter describes qualitative research, its most used methods, and argues 
about the legitimacy to employ this type of research in terms of the study of 
processes of change in context. 
(2) The chapter also deals with the specific method employed -the case study- and 
sets the criteria for selecting this particular enterprise. 
(3) The final part of this chapter is devoted to the theory-building process 
employed in this study, and to the method of inferences -analytic induction- used 
to achieve it. 
Chapter 4 (Research MethodologY) outlines the six steps of the data generation and 
analysis process, namely: 
(1) The collection and analysis of the Board's past decisions over a period of nine 
years. 
(2) The conducting of interviews with the members of the Managing Board of the 
enterprise. 
(3) The analysis of the interviews at the individual level via the construction of 
cognitive maps. 
(4) The testing of the validity of the cognitive maps of the previous stage, by 
employing another type of cognitive maps (in which quantitative techniques can be 
applied), that is by asking, at a later phase, the interviewees to fill in matrices of 
strategy-elements. 
(5) The identification of patterns in the cognitive structure of each individual, 
resulting from both the qualitative (interviewing) and quantitative (matrix scoring) 
approaches. 
(6) The inference of propositions that would account for the phenomenon under 
study and which would also draw on relative findings of other pieces of research. 
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At each step, a description of the methodological tool employed is offered. together with 
a presentation of its advantages and shortcomings, identified in previous research. 
Chapter 5 (Board's Decisional Activity Over the Period of the Plan's 
Implementation) is concerned with (1) analysing all decisions made by the Board 
during the implementation of the Strategic Plan, and (2) depicting their patterns in 
terms of the frequency of decisions within each decision-area. The chapter develops in 
two parts. 
(1) The first part deals with the categorisation of almost 1400 decision-events 
made by the Board over a period of 10 years in 49 decision-areas. 
(2) The second part depicts patterns of decision-areas and comments on the 
tendencies revealed in them. 
Additionally, Appendix A (Organizational Background), provides information on the 
characteristics and the performance of the studied enterprise; Appendix B 
(Implementing the Strategic Plan) offers details on the plan under implementation; and 
Appendix D (Coding Information from Archival Evidence) provides detailed 
information about the categorisation process. 
What this chapter revealed, was that Board's decisions covered a wide area of 
organizational activities. These were ranging from resources' allocation for 
modernization projects to approvals of special tariffs for freight customers, or from 
decisions concerning structural rearrangements to decisions referring to legal matters. In 
total, 49 decision-areas were distinguished. Further, the patterning of decisions within 
the various decision-areas exhibited much variety. There were consistent patterns, 
cyclical patterns emerging patterns and, finally, sporadic ones. This showed that in some 
areas there was a constant flow of activities, in others decisions exhibited a propensity to 
converge yet this was never achieved, while in some areas an ever-increasing number of 
decisions denoted an area of importance (or a situation denoting a problem or an 
opportunity). 
Chapter 6 (Analysing Data at the Individual Level), based on empirical evidence 
derived from interviews and scores on matrices, deals with mapping the strategists' 
rationales in terms of the strategic decisions as identified by them and the influence 
upon these decisions, stemming either from the organizational or the external 
environment. The analysis is a first evaluation of the results and consists of two steps that 
refer to the different data-sources used. Thus: 
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(1) The first phase entails the analysis of retrospective interviews by means of 
influence diagrams; and 
(2) The second phase provides a tabulation of the matrices' scores and investigates 
further the type of the relationships between two cognitive elements, by analyzing 
direct relationships between strategic decisions influencing other factors or being 
influenced by them. 
Influence diagrams revealed differences between the strategists as far as the location of 
factors (to which sector they belong) and the influence perceived (direction and sign) are 
concerned. However, the differences seemed to be accommodated when looking at 
stakeholders' groups. For instance, managers and employees' representatives generate 
the bulk of their concepts in the organizational sector, the environment being perceived 
as exercising a negative impact on decisions, while administrators tend to balance 
organizational and environmental sectors. Yet, despite similarities between managers 
and employees, the numbers of factors in the environmental sector the latter perceive 
differ sharply, ranging from being equal with the ones in the organizational sector to 
being only a few. Also, the nature of factors pertaining to the organizational sector and 
related to strategic decisions differs considerably. 
Cognitive maps derived from matrices compared to the ones based on interviews, 
present similarities as well as differences. Similarities concerned the negative impact of 
the external environment (where government is the determinate factor) on the 
implementation of the Rail Plan as well as the impact of financing on modernization 
projects. Differences concerned the case of employees' representatives that fined low 
scores concerning the organizational cause of performance monitoring and of 
organizational structure in an idiosyncratic function in relation to their influence 
diagrams (apart from one case that exhibited remarkable consistency). Managers 
exhibited striking differences between them on causes of performance monitoring the 
same also applies to the organizational structure. 
The contents of Appendix C (Influence Diagrams), Appendix E (Rationale for Links), 
Appendix F (Scores from Matrices), and Appendix G (Groups: Drawing Composite 
Maps) are relevant to this chapter. 
Chapter 7 (Explaining Individuals' Data: Looking for Patterns) takes one step 
further the analysis of influence diagrams by dealing with the task of tracing the meaning 
of strategy in context, that is, according to each strategist. Afterwards, the chapter 
proceeds to uncover patterns across the maps (both the influence diagrams and those 
derived from matrices) in order to compare then and discover similarities/differences. 
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The individual analysis of the strategy concept in context revealed different definitions. 
Thus, for the General Manager, an extroverted perspective is illustrated, whereas 
administrators represented views that could, more or less, be described as submissive to 
government's directives. The various perspectives contained in employees' 
representatives definitions are also striking and the same applies to managers as well, 
who developed a perspective that might be defined as frustrated. 
The detailed analysis of patterns, based on the structural configuration of influence 
diagrams, intensified the observations that stemmed from the first evaluation 
undertaken in the previous chapter. Thus, the General Manager locates the greater 
number of factors -exhibiting a great diversity as well- in the environmental sector, 
whereas managers and employees in the organizational one, looking at structures and 
processes. Also the perspective conveyed by the diagrams was different. Either decisions 
were seen mostly as means, or, other times, as ends, while others are balanced between 
ends and means. The length of chains of reasoning (including strategic decisions) is 
striking. Administrators tend to exhibit shorter argumentations, while longer chains of 
reasoning of managers and some employees' representatives tend to be associated to 
performance. Overall, a small set of decisions impacts directly or indirectly on 
performance. 
Patterns derived from the algebraic manipulation of matrices showed that, the strength 
of the perceived relationships was based on personal grounds. Therefore, the concept of 
strategy and the associated factors cannot be related to magnitude of factors, at least if 
using the same methodology and/or methodological tools. 
Chapter 8 (Theory Development) aims at integrating the two data sources used in this 
study, namely the archival evidence concerning the decisions' outcomes, and the Board- 
members' notion of strategy. By means of inferences, it accounts for the way strategies 
develop in this public organization and reveals the role of the Board-members. Apart 
from the introduction, the chapter develops in six sections each of which attempts the 
following: 
(1) To examine the concept of strategy across the Board-members; to discuss its 
main characteristics; and to argues about similarities and differences of these 
characteristics by reference to the respective ones that were traced in the 
literature. 
(2) To examine the Board's attributes; to reveal problems originating in the 
Board's composition, structure and processes. 
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(3) To address the role of the Board-members in the strategic areas studied, in 
terms of their involvement, commitment and consensus to change. 
(4) To generate a typology capable of integrating the major findings of the thesis. 
(5) To highlight the role of the General Manager as the only strategist on this 
Board; to discuss the way strategies develop in this enterprise. 
(6) To build on the new findings of this research in order to propose lines of 
further inquiry. 
CHAPTER 2 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, the objective of this research is: (1) To examine the 
way in which the Board-members' operation alizations of the notion of strategy impacted 
on the patterns of the decisions they made, during the implementation of a company's 
Strategic Plan; and (2) To evaluate the degree of their influence on strategy formation. 
The theoretical background and the major research findings, both examined in this 
chapter, may assist in offering insights as to which themes and ideas, pertinent to the 
research topic, have been dealt with in literature. Thus, a limited empirical evidence in 
the examined topic may be spotted and the importance to conduct research may be 
demonstrated. The chapter develops in six parts. 
(1) First, the concept of strategy is highlighted, along with work of researchers on 
how strategies form in organizations; then, the issue of strategic management is 
examined, alongside its two principle dimensions as identified in literature 
(content and process). Concerning the process of strategic management, the 
distinction between synoptic and incremental models is highlighted and discussed. 
The development of strategic management is further discussed, as well as the 
specific characteristics of strategic management in public enterprises. 
(2) The second part of this chapter deals with the issue of strategic change. It 
discusses the meaning of strategic change and offers a classification and modelling 
of changes in strategy. It concludes with an identification of the forces which 
influence the occurrence of change. 
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(3) The next part deals more specifically with strategic decisions. It examines the 
characteristics of strategic decisions as well as the types of organizational decision 
processes. It discusses both the political characteristics and the psychological 
context of strategic decision-making and examines the issue of consensus in the 
strategy process. 
(4) The fourth part examines the issue of cognition and interpretation 
associated with the process of change, by discussing the organizations as 
interpretation systems, and the way in which managers construe key 
organization al/environmen tal events, and by examining tools for research in 
human culture. 
(5) The fifth part examines the strategic role of Boards of Directors by 
discussing the theoretical perspectives of the Boards' roles (legalistic, resource 
dependence, agency theory), the Boards' functioning and performance, and the 
Boards' demographics and composition (labour participation). 
(6) Finally, in the synopsis of this chapter, the shortcomings of past studies, as 
identified in the literature review, are summarised and the thesis objective is 
evaluated, in relation to these shortcomings. 
2.2. THE STRATEGY CONCEPT AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
It is generally accepted that an organization's strategy determines the extent of match 
(or alignment) between its external environment and its internal processes and structure. 
Although this alignment may be the product of a formal planning process, it is just as 
likely that a firm's strategy, at any point, reflects the aggregate of numerous decisions or 
behaviours that have taken place over a period of years (Fredrickson, 1983). 
Bourgeois (1980) offers two hierarchical definitions of strategy: (1) the domain 
definition strategy which "refers to the organization's choice of domain or change of 
domain that occurs when for example a firm diversifies into or exits from particular 
products or markets" (p. 27); and (2) the domain navigation strategy which "refers to 
competitive decisions made within a particular product-market (e. g industry) or task 
environment' (p. 27). Bourgeois notes that once a domain or competitive arena has 
been determined by primary strategy, then the organization is subject to environmental 
constraints which are the central focus of the contingency school. Also, he advises 
researchers to make explicit which level of strategy they investigate, and points out that 
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sometimes the weight of several secondary decisions has a cumulative effect and may 
give rise to a primary strategy. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985), subscribing to the view of Fredrickson, define strategy 
as the identified patterns or consistencies in streams of organizational actions. They 
further develop the following typology of organizational strategies: 
(1) The planned strategy, where the leaders formulate strategy which is followed 
by its implementation; the environment is assumed rather predictable or the 
organization is quite powerful to impose its plans on it. 
(2) The entrepreneurial strategy, in which one individual in personal control of 
the organization can impose his vision on it through his personal control of its 
actions in an environment considered as cooperative; though these types of 
strategy usually apply to young or small firms, sometimes they can be found in 
larger organizations which -in conditions of a crisis- follow the direction of a 
leader who has vision and will. 
(3) The ideological strategy, when members of the organization adopt a vision 
and identify so strongly with it that they pursue it as an ideology, in an 
environment that plays no important role "since the purpose of ideology is to 
change it or else to insulate the organization from it" (p. 262). 
(4) The umbreHa strategies, where the leaders define broad guide-lines for 
behaviour and let other actors to specify details within them; these strategies 
usually apply when leaders have partial control over other actors in the 
organization or when the environment is complex, out of control (thus 
unpredictable) and many actors must be able to respond to it. 
(5) The process strategies, which are appropriate when the leader wishes to 
control the process of strategy-making and leaves the content of it to others. 
(6) The unconnected strategies, which occur when an organizational unit that is 
loosely connected to the rest and which has considerable discretion is able to 
realize its own pattern in its stream of action. 
(7) The consensus strategy, which exists when different actors naturally converge 
on the same pattern so that it becomes pervasive in the organization without the 
need for any central direction or control. And, finally, 
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(8) The imposed strategy, when the environrnent exerts such a control, that the 
organization is forced into a pattern of actions. 
According to Johnson (1987), strategic management is concerned with deciding on 
strategy, and planning how that strategy is to be put into effect. It can be thought of as 
having three main elements within it: 
(1) Strategic analysis, in which the strategist seeks to understand the strategic 
position of the organization. 
(2) Strategic choice, which is concerned with the formulation of possible courses 
of action, their evaluation and the choice between them; and 
(3) Strategy implementation, which is concerned with planning how the choice of 
strategy can be put into effect. 
In practice, these stages do not take a linear form. It is very likely that, far from being 
separate, the stages are very much involved with each other; it is quite possible that one 
way of evaluating a strategy would be to begin to implement it, so strategic choice and 
strategy implementation may be carried out together. It is also very likely that strategic 
analysis will be an on-going activity and so it will overlap with the implementation of 
strategy (Johnson, 1987; Mintzberg, 1990). 
According to Huff and Reger (1987), the discipline of strategic management traces its 
origin to the works of Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), and Andrews (1971). 
However, these books were among the first to propose formally the distinction between 
the process of strategic management and the content of strategy. This distinction has 
tended to divide research ever-since: researchers study content or they study process. 
Schendel and Hofer (1979) further solidified these categories by suggesting that this 
and other sub-divisions would facilitate research progress in the field. 
It has been argued that the distinction between process and content, which seems so 
reasonable on the face of things, is now becoming an impediment to progress in strategic 
management research (Huff and Reger, 1987). Other researchers have noted that the 
content-process dichotomy is a disciplinary and methodological artifact. Usually, 
behavioural scientists focus on how decisions are made, whereas economists are 
concerned with what decisions are made (Bourgeois, 1980). 
Strategy research characterized as content research has focused on the subject of the 
strategic decision itself. In the last decade, considerable attention has been devoted to 
learning more about merger, acquisition, and divestment strategies; entry, exit, and 
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mobility barriers; product/market differentiation; turn-around; vertical integration and 
similar subjects. Content research has focused on linking specific decisions and broader 
economic structures to performance outcomes. It has also given considerable attention to 
defining similarities and differences among strategic units within the firm, among 
strategic groups within industries, and among firms in similar circumstances, such as 
growth or decline in demand (Huff and Reger, 1987). 
Process research, in contrast, has been defined as research primarily focused on the 
actions that lead to and support strategy. Research in this area has included prescriptive 
and descriptive work on planning methods and decision -making, with attention directed 
toward the effectiveness of alternative means for generating and implementing strategy 
(Huff and Reger, 1987). The impact of individual and group characteristics and 
organizational structure on the formation and implementation of strategic decisions and 
on organizational performance have also concerned researchers in this area (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Greiner and Bhambri, 1989; Noel, 1989; Murray, 1989; Dess and 
Origer, 1987). 
2.2.1. The Content of Strategic Management 
In the early 1980s, researchers noted that the outcome of the descriptive work on strategy 
processes up to that time lacked any predictive power; as a result, a shift in interest 
occurred, away from the process of strategy formulation. Topic of inquiry became the 
implemented strategy rather than strategy implementation and the interest was 
centred on the content of business strategies (Huff and Reger, 1987). 
Bourgeois (1980) distinguished two levels of strategy in a hierarchical order: (a) the 
domain definition strategy refers to the organization's choice of what particular 
product/market should the firm provide/serve; (b) the domain navigation strategy 
concerns the competitive decisions made within a particular product/market or task 
environment. 
Porter (1980,1985) asserted that each firm has to select one of three generic strategies 
in order to achieve above-average performance in an industry: cost leadership, 
differentiation and focus (the latter strategy being either cost focus or differentiation 
focus). Porter emphasized that the notion which underlines the concept of generic 
strategies is that competitive advantage is at the heart of any strategy; to achieve it, a 
firm must make a choice about the type of competitive advantage it seeks to attain and 
about the scope within which it will attain it. 
Hambrick (1980) found an analogy between Porter's typology of generic strategies and 
that developed by Miles and Snow (1978). Thus, 
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-A "prospectoe', who innovates early in the face of product/market opportunities, 
is pursuing a particular type of differentiation strategy. 
-A "defendei", who maintains a stable offering, may choose to exploit its stability 
in the form of low costs (cost leadership), product quality (another form of 
differentiation) or some combination of them. 
- On the negative side, Porter's "stuck in the middle" and "reactors" of Miles and 
Snow are placed. Hambrick (1980) asserted that these low-performance strategies 
indicate either a mismatch between the business and environmental demands or 
unsuccessful attempts to mimic the industry's successful strategies. 
Other researchers argued that elements of strategy cohere with elements of structure, 
strategy-making processes, support systems, cultures in common configurations (Miller 
and Friesen, 1984; Miller, 1986) which are themselves intertinked, in that there are 
natural congruences between particular strategic, structural and environmental 
configurations, appropriate to particular widely encountered situations called contexts. 
According to Quinn, Mintzberg and James (1988), one may find: 
- The entrepreneurial context, which encompasses situations where a single 
individual directs an organization with a clear and distinct vision who makes 
strategy and modifies actions rapidly -if necessary- as events unfold. 
- The mature context, which refers to a machine-like bureaucracy with mass 
production or mass provision of services which usually favours cost leadership as a 
strategy. Strategy emanates from the strategic apex where power lies and 
perspective is broad. 
- The diversified context, which includes organizations with distinct structural 
divisions to deal with each distinct business. Here corporate strategy involves more 
than the choice of a good portfolio; it seeks synergies among the business-units and 
with the corporation. 
- The innovation context, that is one in which the organization often must deal 
with complex technologies under conditions of dynamic change where a strategic 
leadership usually establishes the types of processes in which specific actions win 
grow of their own accord around individual innovations. 
- The professional context, which concerns organizations that depend on experts 
to get their work done but this work though complex is not dynamic; it is rather 
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stable in nature and slow to change. Coordination is based on the standardisation 
of skills and its associated parameters, training and indoctrination, while control 
over his work is exercised by the professional himself. 
Quinn, Mintzberg and James (1988) note that power in this approach lies in that 
configurations are predictive, because they are composed of mutually supportive 
elements, where the presence of certain elements can lead to the reliable prediction of 
the remaining ones. 
There are also researchers who advocated the need of contingency approach to 
organizational strategy. By means of modelling techniques, they attempt to establish 
general associations between the characteristics of organization, their structures and the 
environment in which they operate. Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985) developed an 
analytical scheme delineating the domain of contingency approaches to strategy; this 
scheme focuses on the following dimensions: 
- Input, referring to environmental dimensions. 
- Process, concerning organizational dimensions, and 
- Output, referring to various performance criteria. 
This model indicates that beside organizational and environmental contingencies, the 
level of performance dictates a range of strategic options available to a business. 
Ginsberg and Venkatraman (1985) further argued that though strategy is seen as a 
response to the above three major types of contingencies, the choice of strategy itself 
serves as an important contingency for many administrative decisions such as 
organizational structure and management systems. Thus, the viewing of strategy as the 
exogenous variable that influences the organizational context of performance adopts an 
implementation perspective. Inversely, the treatment of strategy as a dependent variable 
emphasizes a formulation perspective. 
In general the value of contingency studies diminished as their findings could not be 
secured. Pettigrew (1992) notes that apart from a consistent finding that size was 
positively related to the rate of innovation other findings did not exhibited robustness. 
He further asserts that when contingency theorists moved on from structural factors to 
non structural ones (considering social and cultural characteristics of the settings 
studied) then, their findings' strength was enhanced. 
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Finally, as researchers noted, the main appeal of looking exclusively at strategy content is 
that no attention need be given to management's goals or "intended' strategies nor to the 
political activity inherent in arriving at strategies; thus the academic researcher can rely 
almost on secondary data source (Bourgeois 1980). The content approach shed light to 
the description of strategic outcomes and their contribution to economic performance 
but it ignored the processes through which these outcomes were realised. The next 
section deals with strategy-making as a process that lends itself to a scientific inquiry. 
2.2.2. The Process of Strategic Management 
The literature of strategic decision process (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Mintzberg, 
1973; Nutt, 1976; Quinn, 1980) has been dominated by two alternative approaches. 
Following Fredrickson (1983), these are referred to as the synoptic and incremental 
models. 
Synoptic models assume a rational approach to strategic decision -making. Strategy 
formulation is characterised by comprehensive analysis aimed at an entire strategic 
problem. Strategic goals and methods are sequentially identified. Choice among 
alternative methods is based on their contributions to goal attainment. Strategy 
formulation is followed by a distinct implementation phase that involves a variety of 
administrative tactics (Nutt, 1987). 
Conversely, incremental models portray strategic decision-making as a rational but 
action -oriented, reiterative process. This view is grounded on three assumptions: (1) 
that decision-makers have a limited capacity for processing information (Lindblom, 
1959; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984), (2) that organizations are political entities 
(Narayanan and Fahey, 1982), and (3) that strategy often results from autonomous 
initiatives at operational levels of the organization (Burgelman, 1983). Strategy 
formation occurs in a piecemeal fashion through a series of limited comparisons between 
alternative actions and the status quo (Lindblom, 1959). Actions are chosen that satisfy 
a specific remedial need, that clear political hurdles, and that can be rationalized to fit 
top management's concept of corporate strategy (Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; 
Burgelman, 1983). 
Whether the model is synoptic or incremental, strategic process theories generally 
identify a sequence of decision-making stages. Synoptic models describe a set of 
cognitive activities that include goal identification, alternative generation, analysis, 
evaluation and choice (Andrews, 1971). Incremental models portray the process in 
more political and behavioural. terms (Quinn, 1980; Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; 
Burgetman, 1983). Narayanan and Fahey (1982), for example, describe a political 
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process composed of five stages: activation, mobilization, coalescence, encounter and 
decision. 
Pure synopticism and incrementalism are theoretical extremes that "form the poles of a 
continuum along which we would expect real-world strategies to fait' (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985; p. 257). Both Fredrickson (1983) and Mintzberg (1973) observe that 
organizations "mix modes" of strategy-making. Fredrickson (1983) argued that 
organizations use elements of both synoptic and incremental processes in a single 
decision. In addition, Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) suggested that strategic 
decision processes are organization -level phenomena that persist as organizations 
change and evolve. Thus, an organization may be said to have a synoptic or incremental 
approach across a range of strategic decisions. 
Fahey (1981), detecting inter-relation ships between the two perspectives on strategy- 
making, concluded that, in its early stages, predominantly political behaviour occurs and 
that for many individual decisions the evaluation and selection phase (the choice among 
alternatives) may be of less significance than the search for and development of 
solutions. Specifically, it is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty; the criteria 
applied to the selection of alternatives at the early phases of a decision process are of a 
"soft" nature (perceptions of higher management level reactions, incongruity with 
technological capability, etc. ); they are often not explicated or expressed in the open but 
they can be just as significant as those applied to the alternatives that survived. 
In the same vein, Anderson (1983) emphasized the social character of a decision- 
making process as opposed to the information processing view which considers decision- 
making as an intellectual act, in which goals are identified, alternatives sought, 
consequences predicted, alternatives evaluated and choices made. He notes that since 
managers spend the bulk of their time in face-to-face meetings and information is 
couched in the form of arguments supporting a course of action, then decisions become 
signs and symbols to the members of the organization. 
Anderson's major research finding was that decision-making processes revealed three 
notable characteristics: alternatives of non-competing courses of actions stimulate 
arguments, that lead to the discovery of the goals (or constraints that should be 
considered in parallel with the global goal) which then influence the choice of 
alternatives. He called this process "decision-making by objection" and noted that 
decision makers concern is rather with avoiding failures (making matters worse) than 
with achieving successes (solving the problem). This finding is similar to that of Hickson 
et al. (1986) who stressed that many strategic decisions are not so wide-open to 
alternatives. They defined this process as " quasi- decision-making' and noted that a lot 
of decisions are "simple-minded" in so far as all sorts of more speculative alternatives 
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are not attended to , and a comparative 
few which are not so different to what has been 
done before are weighed up. 
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) developed five process approaches to advance the art 
of strategy implementation. There is the "commandeirj' model which contains a strong 
centralized direction in which a single leader takes forward both formulation and 
implementation processes. The "change" model deals explicitly with strategy 
implementation and stresses how structure and systems can be used to facilitate the 
execution of strategy. The third approach refers to group decision-making at senior levels 
and involves top management in the formulation process to secure commitment; this is 
called the "coflaborative" model. The "culturaP model describes the process by which 
strategy is implemented through the infusion of a corporate culture throughout the 
organization. The final approach examines strategy issues using the principal/agent 
model and draws on managers' natural inclinations to want to develop new opportunities 
as they see them in the course of their day-to-day management. Since this involves 
"growing' strategy from within the firm this model is called the "crescive" model. 
In addition to the rationalistic and incremental views of strategic management, Johnson 
(1987), commending on the rationalistic model of strategy decision -making, noted its 
inefficiency to addressing such issues as the interaction of managers and stakeholders in 
the location and definition of strategic problems and the management of strategic change 
at an inter-personal level. He identified a third category, i. e. the interpretative view, in 
which strategy is seen as the product of individual, or coflective, sense-making about the 
organization and the environment in which it operates. Here the emphasis is not so 
much on rational analytic interpretation of complexity as on the cognitive and symbolic 
bases of interpretation that characterize the lived world of managers. 
2.2.3. Strategic Management in Public Enterprises 
State owned enterprises have often been plagued with low profitability and accused of 
inefficiency. On the other hand, they usually represent a significant portion of a country's 
economic activity. In 1987, nationalized industry accounted for some 5.5 per cent of total 
U. K. output employing around 800.000 people, just under 4 per cent of total employees. 
In Greece, in 1989, the public sector accounted for almost 9 per cent of the country's 
economic activity. 
Researchers have stated several reasons explaining why, in terms of strategy 
management, public enterprises have distinct features from the private ones. In public- 
sector enterprises, managers are often expected to satisfy higher expectations than in 
private firms, and the government has a greater say than shareholders do in private 
firms. At the same time, managers are subjected to multiple fuzzy goals, reflecting 
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divergent economic and non-economic objectives, stated and pursued objectives 
(Aharoni 1986). 
In their studies of decision-making in public and private firms, Hickson et al. (1986) 
found that governmental influence on the firms was surprisingly weak and much lesser 
than the influence exerted by customers or clients. They argued that this was the 
"syTnptom of government" in a pluralistic society "wrestling with a recalcitrant 
economy whose decision-makers do not leap to do its bidding" (p. 67). Yet, they noted 
that even though government does not exert a greater amount of influence (than that 
exercised on private firms) on any one decision, it exerts influence on more decisions. 
They also noted that government is most effective in this form of influence when its 
departments and agencies intervene in particular circumstances beyond the usual run of 
subsidising and regulating. 
Hafsi and Thomas (1986) argued that the study of the strategic decision-making 
process in larger firms of the private sector does not mention the owners as significant 
actors except in rare and unusual circumstances; in any case their intervention is mostly 
indirect, fragmented and generally ineffective. Moreover, the environment is reduced to 
its technical-economic dimensions, and intervenes in the process in a highly impersonal 
way as a set of constraints for the technical-economic definition of the decision-making 
process. However, they argued, in the cases where the government is the prime owner, in 
most cases, major decisions made cannot be understood without studying what happens 
in the firm's global environment, i. e. the political, social, as wen as technical-economic. 
Yet, they found that, generally, processes that take place inside the firm and those that 
take place at the boundaries of the firm (i. e. with the representatives of its relevant 
constituents and of government) tend not to mix. Therefore, to be able to capture the 
overall process of strategic decision they used a framework that included and integrated, 
yet distinguished, both the core process and the boundary process. 
Aharoni (1980) highlighted the important effects of "social pressures" on the decisions 
and argued that the political relationships of the firm's managers with the relevant actors 
of their environments may be, in some cases, much more influential than the dominant 
Plra tional" culture would drive us to believe. 
Smith, Ring and Perry (1985), reviewing strategic management in US public and 
private organizations, noted that the difficulty of public sector strategic management is 
such that, whilst likely to be found inadequate in private sector terms, when judged 
against standards grounded within the public sector different conclusions may be drawn. 
For them, public service managers experience more ifl-defined policy directions than 
their private sectors equivalents, greater constraints on their actions caused by greater 
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openness in decision -making, more direct and sustained contact from interest groups 
seeking to influence them, and more artificial time constraints on their actions. 
Biggart (1977) studied the process of organizational change in the US Post Office 
Department. Biggart asserted that it is only in the birth of a new organization or in a 
reorganization of revolutionary proportions that routine survival processes are revealed 
fully. The newly restructured organization faced with attack in its unstable youth, 
retaliated by destructive actions against what it perceived to be the most debilitating 
aspects of the former organization: the formal structure, the ideology, the leadership, the 
opposing alliances and the power bases. Destruction took place at the same time as the 
new organization was engaged in the constructive activities of creating new work 
methods, building new facilities, developing technological improvements and creating 
alliances. 
Other researchers studied the managers' role in a public sector setting. Ackroyd, 
Hughes and SoothW (1989) pointed out that public services exhibit similarities which 
are so sufficient that they help create a relatively homogeneous group, where 
management style revolves around the residual role of defending customary forms of 
provision rather than securing major change. 
Finaffy, there are researchers that attempt to overcome the debate that public and 
private sectors are so distinct that only different theories may pertain to them. In the 
British context, Pettigrew et al. (1992) identified at least three possible sources for 
commonality between private and public sector firms which could underpin the 
development of a more generic approach. Thus, (1) there are some more generic issues 
such as human resource management which are important in both sectors; (2) there are 
also forces in the general political-economical context that trigger changes in structures 
in both sectors; and (3) there are common man agerial/organ ization al processes and 
competencies such as strategy making, networking and political skins. As Pettigrew et 
al. (1992) noted "there is both an intellectual challenge to link these possible sources 
of commonality together and a pragmatic one of building the capacity to manage 
particular changes involving these three elements" (p. 13). 
2.2.3.1. Managerial Orientation 
Within most public-sector organizations, the lack of trust and confidence in managers at 
lower levels prevents senior management from decentralizing power and authority. As 
many transactions between a public firm and its constituents are of an obligatory or 
social welfare nature, the absence of a market mechanism to assess managerial behaviour 
inhibits the setting of performance criteria. Consequently, a market form of control is 
replaced by a bureaucratic one, characterized by vertical lines of responsibility and 
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strong hierarchical control over decision -making. In the bureaucratic form, managers are 
held accountable for the performance of their subordinates; however, without the 
objectives of a market mechanism, subordinates' performance is difficult to measure, is 
subjective at best, and at worst arbitrary, political and capricious (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 
1984). As a result, in many of these organizations, there is an unwillingness to delegate 
too much autonomy to subordinates. 
2.2.3.2. Distinction between Planningand Control 
Young (1988) asserted that, while planning is analytically complex (gathering 
appropriate data, thoroughly analyzing them, assessing benefits and costs, occasionally 
quantifying some inherently non-quantifiable benefits, ordering priorities, imposing 
political realities, considering funding constraints), control in public firms is much more 
difficult than planning itself. Control involves the sense of implementation and the need 
for action, ensuring that the organization is accomplishing its objectives (through plans) 
or, if necessary, changes the plan or the budget in accordance with environmental or 
other realities. Especially when these realities refer to unique external, political 
influences and/or interventions that deprive managers of authority and incentives, then 
the issue of control coincides with managerial abdication of responsibilities (Allison, 
1983; Seidman and Gilmour, 1986; Rainey, 1989). 
2.2.3.3. Absence of Market Forces 
Young (1988) noted that the presence or absence of legislative (and in particular 
budgetary) support of a given organization is frequently conditioned by factors that lie 
considerably outside that organization's control and are largely dictated by the public's 
needs and wants, and the extent to which these needs and wants are communicated to 
legislative representatives. If this does not happen, then legislative bodies that make 
funding decisions may severely curtail budgets, even of efficiently and effectively ran 
organizations, because of other priorities. As Young (1988) argued, legislative priorities 
do not necessarily coincide with organizational effectiveness. 
2.2.3.4. Barriers to Management Development 
Banner (1988) recorded the constant obstacles which are specific to public 
administration and which always resist the attainment of optimum performance. First, 
public officials are neither paid nor promoted on a performance basis; nor are they 
dismissed for non -performance. Second, centralization of decision-making precludes any 
kind of personal responsibility ethic. Third, the dependence of public administration on 
clients and politicians militates against clearly defined objectives and hence against 
effectiveness. 
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2.2.3-5. Control Philosophy 
Young (1988) pointed out that control philosophy within public firms appears to suffer 
in three respects: (1) public sector managers have limited knowledge of the concepts of 
management control and the ways in which management control systems can be designed 
to assist them in attaining their firm's objectives; (2) there are not rewards associated 
with control; though there are encumbrances prohibiting them from spending in excess 
of the budgetary levels they have been allocated, there are no rewards associated with 
less spending when accomplishing a given set of objectives; and (3) there is adherence to 
budgetary-line items instead of measurement of results or the achievement of goals. 
Rainey (1989) argued that there is no well documented managerial theory regarding 
public enterprises; even the meaning of what is public management is often debatable. 
He pointed out to the lack of empirical studies in the field and argued that public 
management research is important for three reasons: (1) there are too many managers 
in these firms who abdicate their managerial responsibilities due to administrative 
constraints and interventions; (2) public administration literature is too much 
preoccupied with political processes and philosophical issues and pays too little attention 
to management; and (3) there are conflicting views in the evidence concerning the role 
of public managers. 
Aharoni (1986) notes that government controllers often do not have sufficient 
information to control these enterprises effectively. As a result, control of state-owned 
enterprises has often been ad-hoc and inefficient, reflecting parochial interests and not 
necessarily the interests of the state-owned enterprises. i 
2.3. STRATEGIC CHANGE 
2.3.1. Introduction 
Theories of strategic management increasingly reflect the focus on organizational change 
(Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; Lorange, Scott Morton and Ghoshal, 1986). 
Empirical research, however, appears to have become more and more preoccupied with 
cross-sectional designs that examine the synchronic rather than the dynamic aspects of 
organizational strategy (Galbraith and Schendel, 1983). The difficulties of conducting 
large-scale, hypothesis-testing longitudinal research, and the relative ease of access to 
Postatic" data bases, have exerted an important influence on this trend. Pendleton, 
Warren and Chang (1980) pointed out that measurements of change and formations of 
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longitudinal designs have opened up a "Pandora's Box" of dispute and controversy 
among social scientists because they challenged conventional practices and assumptions. 
With regard to the measurement of strategic change, Snow and Hambrick (1980) 
raised a controversial question: "At what point does an organizational response to 
environmental change represent a change rather than an adjustment in strategy? " 
Ginsberg (1988) argues that, partly because of such conceptual and methodological 
issues, research findings on changes in strategy have not evolved into a coherent body of 
knowledge. Thus, it is not clear that widespread premises, such as the assumption that 
astute executives alter their firms' strategy to capitalize on environmental opportunities, 
are supported by empirical evidence. Any attempt to provide a shared understanding of 
the scope and findings of research on changes in strategy should first clarify what is 
meant when referring to such changes. 
2.3.2. The Meaning of Strategic Change 
According to Ginsberg (1988), by definition, "change" involves becoming different in 
some particular. However, the "particular" that must become different for an 
organizational change to be defined as strategic is a subject of some controversy. The 
"particulars" that become different when a strategic change occurs have been described 
both in terms of the content of strategy, i. e. the specifics of what was decided in terms of 
goals, scope, and/or competitive strategies, and in terms of the process of strategy- 
making, i. e. the enduring norms that reflect an organization's overall approach to 
managing its relationship with the environment. In contrast to the single-loop learning 
reflected by changes in content, changes in process reflect double-loop learning (Argyris, 
1976). Not surprisingly, questions about whether or not such changes are strategic evoke 
debate. 
Ginsberg (1988) has shown that, in discussing strategic change as a chan e in strategy 46W 9 
content, authors have focused on shifts in both corporate- and business-level strategy. 
Those focusing on changes in corporate-level strategy define strategic change as a 
realignment of a firm's selection of product/market domains and allocations among 
them (Ansoff, 1965). Those focusing on changes in business-level strategy define 
strategic changes as alterations in competitive decisions within particular 
product/market domains, e. g. alterations in price, or quality associated with a product 
(Rumelt, 1974). 
In discussing strategic change as a change in strategy-making process, researchers have 
focused on shifts in formal management systems and structures as well as 
transformations of organizational culture (Ansoff, 1979; Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985). According to this view, unless the organization modifies its overall orientation to 
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the environment in a way that substantially alters the strategy-making process, it has 
made a strategic adjustment rather than a strategic change. As argued by Snow and 
Hambrick (1980), "the distinction between change and adjustment may be subtle, but 
it is important to theory building. If most or all domain and structural changes are 
regarded as strategic changes, then theories can only be fragmented and ephemeral. 
But if these same modifications are viewed as adjustments, researchers can then look 
for consistencies in how an organization interacts with its environment" (p. 529). 
Ginsberg (1988) argues that although Snow and Hanbrick's point is strong, accepting a 
definition of strategic change that is more narrow than prevailing definitions of 
organizational strategy which include both content and process approaches (Bourgeois, 
1980; Ginsberg, 1984) seems unnecessarily restrictive. Moreover, fundamental shifts, or 
strategic reorientations, may occur incrementally as changes in strategy context (Quinn, 
1978). Since they often result from the ordinary workings of day-to-day processes, such 
shifts are often not discovered to be fundamental until after they have taken place 
(Pondy and Huff, 1985). Hence, as Mintzberg (1988) has pointed out, whether an 
organizational change is defined as strategic or not "depends not only on where you sit, 
but when you sit: what seems tactical today could prove strategfc tomorrow" (p. 17). 
2.3.3. Classifying Changes in Strategy 
According to Ginsberg (1988), since the term "strategic change" evokes unresolvable 
controversy regarding the importance of the change that occurred, it may be less 
confusing and more useful to refer to "changes in strategy' rather than strategic changes. 
If this term is used then one is directed to classify changes in terms of the way he or she 
defined strategy, and may in turn examined the consistencies within and across 
investigations of different types of change. By explicating and using the various 
definitions of strategy that can be found in the literature, we can eliminate much of the 
confusion in the field that stems from contradictory and ill-defined uses of this term 
(Mintzberg, 1988 p. 20). 
Various definitions of the term "change in strategy can be better understood if they are 
classified along two fundamental dimensions (Ginsberg, 1988): 
The first dimension distinguishes between conceptualizing strategy (1) in terms of a 
position that is reflected in the choices of product/market domains or competitive 
advantage through which firms define their relationship to the environment (Bourgeois, 
1980), or (2) in terms of a perspective that is reflected in the integrated sets of ideas 
through which problems are spotted and interpreted and from which streams of decisions 
flow (Hedberg and Jonnson, 1977). While those who define strategy as a position look 
outward, seeking to locate the organization in its external environment, those who define 
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strategy as perspective look inside the organization, seeking to understand the 
"collective mind" (often referred to as "culture", "ideology', or P'paradigm") that shapes 
the organization's enduring relationship with its environment (Mintzberg, 1987). 
The second dimension distinguishes between conceptualizing change as (1) changes in 
degree or magnitude (e. g. Miller and Friesen, 1983), or (2) changes in state or pattern 
(e. g. Galbraith and Schendel, 1983). 
2.3.4. Forces Influencing the Occurrence of Change 
Ginsberg (1988) argues that like other kinds of organizational changes, shifts in strategy 
occur when forces creating pressure for change overcome forces that create resistance to 
change (Bigelow, 1982; Lundberg, 1984). However, changes in strategy primarily 
reflect the decisions of General Managers to respond to changes in environmental 
threats and opportunities. These decisions may result either from intentional rationality 
and learning or from mimetic processes (Singh, House and Tucker, 1986). 
The question of how often firms tend to undergo changes in strategy is rooted in a 
central debate in organizational theory regarding the relative influence of inertial forces, 
environmental feedback or feedforward, and strategic choice on activity patterns over 
time (Romanelli and Tushman, 1985) The predominance of inertial forces in 
organizations may explain the observation that periods of changes in magnitude tend to 
be interspersed with periods of discontinuous changes in pattern (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Nevertheless, the frequency and 
duration of different types of changes may vary across different external and internal 
conditions or environmental changes. As Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) have 
observed, cycles of incremental and revolutionary changes in strategy appear to be of 
shorter duration in some organizations and more balanced between change in magnitude 
and change in configuration, while in others they are of longer duration with an 
emphasis on changes in magnitude that are interrupted by occasional, brief, and 
disruptive changes in direction or gestalt. 
This relationship between pressures for, and resistance to, changes in strategy is a 
function of the General Managers' continual need to minimize two kinds of costs: those 
of being mismatched with the economic and socio-political environment, and those of 
changing to avoid this mismatch (Miller and Friesen, 1984). Hence, the appropriate 
nature of change can only be decided with reference to a particular set of internal and 
external conditions that determine the outcomes of decision-making processes (Friesen 
and Miller, 1986). Whether they encourage or block changes in strategy, external and 
internal forces provide answers to three fundamental questions: 
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- Is there something wrong with the current strategy? 
- Is there a need for a new strategy? and 
- Does the organization have the resources to implement a change in strategy? 
Therefore, from the perspective of organizational adaptation, the central question 
regarding changes in strategy is with identifying and explaining the key external and 
internal variables and associations which characterize the forces which either signal 
disequilibrium in the firm's behaviour or stimulate movement toward more effective and 
efficient behaviour (Ginsberg, 1988). 
Changes in the firm's external and internal environment may increase both pressures for 
and resistance to change. Performance outcomes may influence changes, by providing 
feedback that indicates whether or not the current strategy is effective or efficient. Since 
performance outcomes may increase resistance to change if they are either exceedingly 
poor or exceedingly good, it is likely that they will create the greatest pressure for change 
when they are at intermediate levels (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1986). 
Fornbrun and Ginsberg (1990) argued that a strategy crystallizes from the longitudinal 
deployment of a firm's resources over time. As such, strategy represents the cumulative 
effect of the year-to-year allocations made by a firm to such functional uses as marketing, 
manufacturing, and R&D. Once initiated, resource allocations have two consequences. 
On the one hand, inertial forces emerge as firms grow larger and commit to a course of 
action (Aldrich, 1979). These organization al-level forces act as inhibitors, i. e. they 
reduce a firm's flexibility in deploying its resources. On the other hand, previous 
performance and environmental uncertainty also play a feedback role: they act as 
inductors in triggering changes in organizational activity patterns (Cyert and Marsh, 
1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Hence, inhibiting forces and inductive forces both 
influence the longitudinal deployment of corporate resources. 
2.4. STRATEGIC DECISIONS 
According to Pettigrew (1973), one of the most general statements that can be made 
about the theories of organizational decision-making is that they fan into two broad 
classes: (1) Normative mathematical-economic theories, and (2) Behavioural theories. 
It is the second of these two approaches that he examined. The interest here is in tracing 
decisions empirically to find out what actually happens rather than what is ideally 
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expected to happen. In this connection, the work of March and Simon (1958) and 
Cyert and Marsh (1963) offers the most material assistance. In spite of its 
interdisciplinary aims, the main point of March and Simon (1958) is that the 
interrelation of motivation and cognition must be of central concern for organization 
theory. 
Pettigrew (1973) considered the organization as an open political system. The division 
of work in an organization creates sub-units. These sub-units develop interests based on 
specialized functions and responsibilities. Although such sub-units have specialized tasks, 
they may also be interdependent. This interdependence may be played out within a joint 
decision-making process. Within such decision-making processes, interest-based 
demands are made. Given heterogeneity in the demand-generating process and the 
absence of a clearly set system of priorities between those demands, conflict is likely to 
ensue. Sub-units with differential interests make claims on scarce organizational 
resources. The extent of the claims is likely to be a reflection of the unit's perception of 
how critical the resources are to its survival and development. The success any claimant 
has in furthering his interests will be a consequence of his ability to generate support for 
his demand. 
It is the involvement of sub-units in such demand- and support-generating processes of 
the organization that constitutes the political dimension. Political behaviour is defined 
as behaviour by individuals, or, in collective terms, by sub-units, within an organization 
that makes a claim against the resource-sharing system of the organization. 
In his recent work concerning the management of strategic change in both the private 
and the public sector (Pettigrew, 1985; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Pettigrew et al., 
1992) he enhances his earlier view and addresses a processual (an emphasis on action as 
well as structure), contextual (operating at a variety of different levels with specification 
of the linkages between them), historical (considering the evolution of ideas and stimuli 
for change), and pluralist (a description and analysis of the often competing versions of 
reality seen by main actors in the change process) design for studies of organizations. 
2.4.1. Characteristics of Strategic Decisions 
Strategic decisions are concerned with: (1) the scope of an organisation's activities; (2) 
the matching of an organization's activities to its environment; (3) the matching of the 
activities of an organization to its resource capability; (4) the allocation and re- 
allocation of major resources in an organization; (5) the values, expectations and goals of 
those influencing strategy; and (6) the direction an organization will move in the long- 
term. Implications for change throughout the organization are therefore likely to be 
complex in nature (Johnson and Scholes, 1988). 
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According to Nutt (1984) considerable work in decision-making has been directed 
towards the development of normative processes (Churchman, 1979; Ackoff, 1981; 
Mason and Mitroff, 1981). Somewhat less attention has been directed toward how 
managers go about making decisions. A few key studies provide touchstones. 
Soelberg (1967) divided the decision process into equal increments and studied the 
type of activity in each increment, finding that most of the activity took place at the 
beginning and the end of the process. 
The Cyert and Marsh (1963) studies showed how managers imposed their views on the 
process. Alternatives were pruned according to their conspicuousness and the clout of 
their proponents, not according to expected differences in performance. 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) classified patterns found in decision 
processes. They called the key phases recognition, diagnosis, development (in the form of 
design or search) and selection (comprising choice procedures and authorization). The 
design and search steps were used to create custom-made and modified solutions, to 
identify a ready-made solution and to sanction a fully developed solution that was 
available when the process began. This study made a major contribution by identifying 
key phases of decision-making and external factors that influence the process. However, 
a twenty-five-case data base was too limited to probe more subtle characteristics such as 
sub-phases and tactics. As a result, Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) 
concluded by noting that little is known about how managers engage in the critically 
important activities of diagnosis and solution development. More studies with larger 
data bases that deal with a new set of topics are needed, in order to understand and 
appreciate the decision processes used in organizations. 
Nutt (1984) used an approach called "process reconstruction" to identify process types. 
Multiple case studies of projects were profiled using interviews that identified critical 
events, determined the sequence of these events and fit the events and their sequence to 
a generic representation of activities thought to be essential in decision -making. 
Common patterns in these cases were content analyzed to determine how decision- 
making was conducted in organizations. 
Grandori (1984) defined five decision models and specified the domains of their 
applicability in terms of uncertainty about cause and effect relations and conflict of 
interests; They were: (1) optimizing, (2) heuristic (satisficing), (3) incremental, (4) 
cybernetic, and (5) random. She used a set of procedures that allowed conditions of 
uncertainty to be dealt with. Choice rules were associated with the way alternatives were 
generated; search rules produced acceptable rather than optimal solutions; learning rules 
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referred to a posteriori rationality that linked outcomes and objectives in a way that was 
an alternative to a ph . on or 'Pcalculatecfp rationality. Grandori noted that these models 
had domains of applicability that were included in one another. Thus, a random strategy 
was always feasible, while a cybernetic one required that observable relations should be 
defined between actions and outcomes. An incremental strategy required that the 
decision makers should define at least one attribute for comparing an alternative course 
of action with the existing one, and a heuristic required that the decision makers should 
define aspiration levels that an alternative must satisfy. Finally, an optimizing strategy 
necessitated that the decision makers were able to compare all relevant alternatives, 
considering all relevant attributes. 
2.4.2. The Psychological Context of Strategic Decisions 
According to Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) managerial decisions are made by 
individuals or groups that confront an array of situational and psychological influences; 
they are not impersonal or isolated events. The decision-making process is dependent 
not only on objective information and rationality but also on decision makers' cognitions 
about the world (Mitchell, Rediker and Beach, 1986; Simon, 1976; Weick, 1979). 
Moreover, each managerial decision typically is an episode in a series of decisions. 
Organization strategy, for instance, arises through a stream of decisions and reflects an 
aggregate pattern of behaviours that occur over time (Fredrickson, 1983). This view 
indicates that in many instances strategy represents a composite of sequential decisions 
and leads Fredrickson (1983, p. 571) to recommend that strategic process researchers 
should "adopt a decision-making perspective (as opposed to a planning one) and 
concentrate their efforts on developing and utilizing methodologies that study how 
organizations make and combine individual strategic decisions". This perspective 
* 
was 
further supported by the theoretical arguments of Mintzberg (1978), Quinn (1980) and 
Bourgeois (1980) who treated strategy formulation as a decision-making process. 
Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) attempted to build on this view of strategic formulation 
process as a series of decisions by developing and testing a model of contextual 
influences on strategic decisions. The model rested on two related assumptions: 
(1) The model adopted an incremental perspective of strategy formulation. 
Strategic decisions are not discrete and independent of one another; rather they 
represent steps in an overall process designed to move the organization further 
toward a goal or set of goals embraced by the strategic decision makers. 
(2) Strategic decisions are shaped by a variety of contextual influences arising from 
past events, presents circumstances and perspectives on the future. For example, 
most decisions are embedded in a history (March 1981; MitcheU, Rediker and 
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Breach, 1986; Neustadt and May, 1986), and strategic decision-makers 
themselves have experienced success or failure with past decisions. Furthermore, 
decision-makers must examine current issues facing the firm such as organization 
resources and the competitive environment. Finally, strategic decision-makers 
usually consider their goals and those of the organization, as wen as their 
subjective evaluation of the future. 
Thus, a given strategic decision is typically an episode in a series of incremental 
decisions that constitute the strategy of the organization. Like human behaviour in 
general (Lewin, 1951), strategic decisions are influenced by forces and events in the 
past, the present, and those anticipated in the future. These forces and events combine to 
create the psychological context for each decision in the overall. process. 
2.4.3. The Issue of Consensus 
According to Wooldridge and Floyd (1989), research has not demonstrated a 
consistent relationship between consensus in the top management team and 
organizational performance (Bourgeois, 1980,1985; Dess, 1987; Grinyer and 
Norburn, 1978; Hrebiniak and Snow, 1982). This is surprising since much of the 
literature in strategic management has emphasized the importance of gaining consensus 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984; Tilles, 1963). 
Dess (1987) suggested industry context as an important consideration in the 
performance-consensus relationship. He hypothesized that within a fragmented, 
intensely competitive industry, consensus on both company objectives and competitive 
methods is needed. His results however did not confirm this. While consensus on 
objectives and consensus on means to achieve them were each moderately associated 
with organizational performance, the two consensus measures were not correlated as 
expected. In other words, each contributed to performance independently but not jointly. 
2.4.3.1. The Characteristics of Consensus 
Dess and Origer (1987) reviewed previous research linking consensus to performance 
(Bourgeois, 1980; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Dess, 1987; Grinyer and Norburn, 
1978). The focus of these studies was on the degree or level of consensus among the top 
management team. However, there are at least two more dimensions of consensus that 
are particularly relevant in a process context: the scope of consensus and the content of 
consensus. 
Scope refers to who participates in consensus. Both the strategic management and 
organization theory literatures support the belief that strategy is formulated by consensus 
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among the chief executive officer and the top management team (Ansoff, 1965; 
Hambrick and Snow, 1977; Thompson, 1967). Studies of organizational culture (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982), the Japanese style of management (Ouichi, 1981) and 
incremental decision processes (Quinn, 1980), however, suggest that it is often 
necessary to expand consensus on strategy beyond the top management team. 
The content of consensus refers to what decision-makers agree about. Consensus on 
means and ends, the focus of previous studies, seems relevant during the latter stages of 
synoptic strategy formulation (Fredrickson, 1983). In earlier stages of the process and 
for incremental strategy formation, consensus content may concern matters other than 
ends and means. 
Finally, when assessing the degree of consensus, prior research has focused on consensus 
as shared understandings about ends and means. Consensus has been operationalized by 
asking top managers to describe the organization's goals (ends) and strategies (means) 
(Bourgeois, 1980; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Dess, 1987) and measuring the extent 
to which these descriptions agree. As Dess (1987) noted, however, consensus also 
includes commitment to strategy. Understanding without commitment may result in 
"counter effort' and negatively affect performance (Guth and MacMiffan, 1986). 
2.4.3.2. The Strategy Process and Consensus 
As an outcome of strategy process, consensus is a function of the character of strategic 
decision-making . After briefly reviewing alternative process descriptions, their effects 
on the scope, degree, and content of consensus are traced, and research propositions that 
summarize likely process-consensus relationships are presented. 
Dess (1987) argued that a review of the literature in strategic management reveals a 
lack of empirical research regarding the relationship between organizational 
performance and the extent of consensus or agreement among the top management team 
on strategy for an organization. This lack of attention to consensus among strategic 
decision-makers is surprising, since much of the normative literature in management has 
either imphcitly or explicitly emphasized the importance of consensus in decision- 
ma ng. 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) viewed strategic decision-making as a series of means- 
ends decisions beginning with the determination of long-term, global objectives (ends) 
and the development of short-term, more local actions to obtain these objectives. They 
developed a model that used the twin principles of limited rationality and minimum 
intervention by which managers are presumed (and advised) to act. Limited rationality 
assists in breaking down strategy into successively smaller, more actionable pieces with 
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shorter time frames, while minimum intervention is prescribed to cure the bias to change 
everything (change structure, fire people, redeploy people and assets without regard for 
impact, consequences or previous commitments). 
Stagner (1969) among the first to investigate consensus in organizations, analyzed 
responses from top managers in 109 firms among the Fortune list of the 500 largest 
American corporations. He studied 52 pairs of respondents from within the same firms 
for similarities in their patterns of responses on goals and means and found the range of 
correlations was from +0.79 (rather high agreement) to +0.01 (no agreement at an). 
Although top managers of the same firm were found to agree more in their responses 
than were managers from two different firms, Stagner did not relate his findings to 
performance. 
In a laboratory study of the strategic decision-making process, Whitney and Smith 
(1983) concluded that in the strategic decision-making process, normative pressure to 
arrive at a consensus is likely to lead to decisions which are suboptimal to the 
organization. 
Grinyer and Norburn (1978) investigated the relationship between consensus on 
organizational goals and performance. They found that for the highest performing firms, 
consensus on goals was negatively related to performance. Similar findings were obtained 
in a study of consensus on alternative means for obtaining goals in 168 Belgian firms (De 
Woot, Heyvaert and Martou, 1978). 
Hrebiniak and Snow (1982) examined the relationship between organizational 
performance and top managers' agreement on the strengths and weaknesses of their firm. 
They found a positive relationship between measures of organizational performance and 
consensus among top managers on the strengths and weaknesses of the firm. 
Bourgeois (1980) conducted the first empirical study which simultaneously studied both 
consensus on goals and consensus on means and their relationship to performance. He 
found that consensus on both ends and means did not yield the highest firm performance. 
Instead, the highest-performing group had consensus on means but not on ends. 
However, further analysis of the same data (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983) revealed that 
the presence of slack resources in the environment seemed to promote goals consensus 
among top managers. 
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2.5. COGNITION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
2.5.1. Organizations as Interpretation Systems 
Daft and Weick (1984) studied the interpretation behaviour of organizations. Based on 
the assumption that "the environment is not only there waiting to be discovered', they 
developed a four-category classification scheme. They used two dimensions: (1) the 
assumptions about the environment, i. e. whether it is analysable or not; and (2) the type 
of organizational intrusiveness into the environment, being either passive or active. 'Mus 
(p. 228): 
- The enacting mode reflects both an active, intrusive strategy in an un-analysable 
environment; the organizations construct their own environments and are highly 
activated. 
- The discovering mode represents an intrusive organization, looking for a correct 
answer in an analysable environment. 
- Organizations assessed as conditioned viewing assume an analysable 
environment but are not intrusive. They develop interpretations based on 
traditional boundaries and they perceive the environment as objective and 
benevolent. 
- Undirected viewing is a similar passive approach but here the organizations do 
not rely on hard objective data because they see the environment as un-analysable. 
Managers act on limited soft information to create their perceived environments. 
2.5.2. How Managers Construe Key Events 
Among the most challenging events to which organizations must respond are those that 
become the contexts for substantial change and adaptation. According to Isabella 
(1990), these events are rarely static or contained within a discrete time frame. 
Unfolding over time, they demand continual adjustment and present unending challenge 
for all concerned. Although many studies have elaborated upon the concrete and 
observable behaviours and actions connected with these changes, few have tried to 
identify and understand the interpretations and cognitions associated with them. Recent 
research on selected changes (Bartunek, 1984; Gephart, 1984; Sutton, 1987) and the 
literature on organizational change reviewed by Van de Ven (1980) have suggested that 
a substantial amount of cognition and interpretation accompanies the process of change: 
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ff'rv. 
1hansitions are themselves transitional. As they evolve, different emphases on a 
different combination of values and assumptions may be required When a change is 
initiated, existing patterns are disrupted and this results in a period of uncertainty 
and conflict. If key people accept and support the change, novelty turns to 
confirmation and eventually the innovation is routinized As the process unfolds, 
managers are required to take on different orientations and styles " (Quinn and 
Kimberly, 1984; p. 303). The same amount of cognition and interpretation may in turn 
influence organizational outcomes, decision -making, strategy or structure (Daft and 
Weick, 1984). 
In other words, as a change unfolds, different assumptions and orientations are required 
at different times in the process. Managers involved in a change need to undergo an 
alteration of their cognitive structure that facilitates and supports the need to change, the 
process of changing, and the maintenance of what has been changed. The frame of 
reference, i. e. the perspective through which people view an event, shifts (Starbuck, 
1976). 
The precise nature of these different and changing managerial cognitions and 
interpretations, however, has yet to be fully explicated. Although researchers have 
suspected the cognitions shift, no one has revealed a pattern associated with the change 
process. Some authors have suggested that understanding the cognitive basis for 
responding to change would enhance the effectiveness of organizational responses 
(Gioia, 1986). 
Strategic-level managers formulate the organization's interpretation. Even if managers 
may not agree fully about their perceptions, the thread of coherence among them is what 
characterizes organizational interpretations. Weick (1979) advocated that meaning is 
always given to actions after they are completed. Criticizing the preoccupation of people 
in organizations with planning, forecasting and predicting, he noted that organizations 
formulate strategy after they implement it, not before, because meaning is imposed after 
elapsed actions are available for review. Other researchers argued that in the absence of 
shared meaning, organized action is made possible by socially shared repertoires of 
communication mechanisms (Donnelon, Gray and Bougon; 1986). They noted that 
group members use these repertoires of communication behaviours while in the process 
of developing equifinal meanings for their joint experiences. Tlius, organized action does 
not require that the meaning held individually by members be coincident; equifinal 
meanings are sufficient. 
Attempting to explain differences in interpretations, Isabella (1990) developed a model 
that accounted for managers' interpretative tasks. She noted that the culmination stage is 
the one within which reconstruction occurs. Managers are actively reconstructing their 
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environments by deciding what to retain and/or what to alter. At this time, more than 
ever, there could conceivably be varied and multiple individual realities and divergent 
interpretations as individuals attempt to make sense of the changes experienced. 
Weick (1983) noted that within the interpretative perspective strong emphasis has been 
placed on the cognitive theme, that is the brain's capacity to store and process 
information and the associated behaviour -whether it is rational, intuitive or creative. He 
argued that cognitive schemes and environmental stimuli should be seen as inter-twined 
concepts; action (in terms of decision -making) is the interpretative scheme (the 
mediating concept) by which thinking processes are created and reconfirmed. 
Other researchers define interpretative schemes as the set of assumptions and beliefs 
which form part of the organizational culture. They are held relatively commonly 
throughout the organization and usually are taken for granted. They can be found in the 
stories of organizational history and in the explanations of events. They help managers 
make sense of the situation they are faced with and provide a basis for formulating 
strategy (Pettigrew, 1988). 
The recipe (another term of interpretative schemes) is something more than the set of 
beliefs and assumptions. It is something embedded in an organizational specific cultural 
web which comprises the power structure, the organizational structure, routines and 
control systems, rituals, myths and symbols. They emphasized the need for the strategist 
to understand what beliefs and assumptions are included in it, what mechanisms in the 
cultural web preserve it and how the recipe can be challenged sufficiently when perceived 
that it constrains the behaviour the strategy calls for (Johnson, 1987). 
Etzioni (1975) noted that participants in a given organization differ in their orientation 
to this cultural system. Some, usually the elites, accept it more fully than others do and 
tend to represent it in their interactions with both insiders and outsiders. Others accept 
it partly, while others oppose to most of its elements and attempt to maintain a sub- 
culture of their own. It is found that in organizations the higher ranks tend to support it 
while other in the lower ranks vary widely in their orientation towards it. 
Bartunek (1984) investigated the existence of a relationship between interpretative 
schemes, actions and structure. She noted that "during a period of second-order 
(discontinuous) change in interpretative schemes, structural properties enter into a 
reciprocal relation with interpretative schemes and actions that is similar to the 
relationship between the interpretative schemes and actions. The actions 
organizational members take on the basis of their evolving understanding affect the 
organization's structural properties which in turn limit andlor enable the expression 
of particular interpretative schemes and actions based on them" (p. 366). Thus, she 
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concluded, structural properties, interpretative schemes and actions are an modified in 
interaction with each other. 
Silverman (1985) used the term "ideolog3l' to describe the way managers articulate 
concepts to justify actions and behaviour. Meaning is then derived by deciphering those 
articulations and the particular circumstances they apply, that is the actors that 
addressed them and the historical context in which they took place. However, as 
Johnson (1987, p. 42) pointed out, "whilst researchers have noted such phenomena, 
there is little explanation of just what beliefs and assumptions actually constitute 
management ideologies at an industry, organization or individual level'. 
2.5.3. Tools for Research in Human Culture 
Lenz and Engledow (1986) asserted that cognitive models constitute one of the 
five alternative models for environmental analysis that exist in research on 
organizational environments, the other being: (1) industry structure models, (2) 
organization field models, (3) ecological and resource dependence models, and (4) 
era models. To their view, top management's collective understanding of its 
environment is assumed to be embodied in a cognitive structure which comprises 
interconnected sets of understandings, consisting of implicit views of one's own 
interests, concerns and tasks. These cognitive structures serve as a context for 
formulating corporate strategies and are sustained by those with requisite power 
and influence (Pettigrew, 1988; Lenz and Engledow, 1986). Thus, strategies are 
assumed to be ways in which organizations interact with reality. Consequences of 
these interactions provide experiences that become inputs for organizational 
learning and subsequent strategic decisions. 
Stubbart and Ramaprasad (1990), drawing on research in anthropology and linguistics, 
asserted that there are elements in these two disciplines that could be encompassed into 
a common agenda with cognitive science. All these disciplines are interested in 
knowledge that sustains a culture. Natural language and its study presents the most 
accessible path towards understanding human culture. They noted that cognitive science 
lacks any ecological facet and needs to be put back in the context of cultural thought. 
Tbus, researchers must study cognition in a social linguistic context where historical 
circumstances are not ignored. 
The same point is taken up by Pettigrew et al. (1992); they noted that the cultural 
perspective on organizational change deals with a set of issues having to do with 
symbolism, rituals and language. In their view "shifting language systems are 
themselves interesting objects of study as theyprovide order and coherence, describe 
cause-effect relationships (rationales) in times of confusion and transition and 
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because there may be competing language systems trying to define the same situation 
in different terms" (p. 22). 
These two last paragaphs develop a point that this thesis embraces and around it builds 
the chapters that examine the board-members' rationales about strategy. 
2.6. THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
2.6.1. Introduction 
Research on the role of Boards and the extent to which Boards undertake each role has 
been guided by alternative theoretical perspectives. These perspectives differ 
meaningfully in their views of what Board-members should do, which Board attributes 
influence company performance, and which criteria should be used to assess the Board's 
contribution to company performance. Zahra and Pearce (1989) identified the 
following three alternative theoretical perspectives of the Boards' role. 
2.6.2. Theoretical Perspectives of the Boards' Role 
2.6.2.1. The Legalistic Perspective 
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), the legalistic approach suggests that Boards 
contribute to the performance of their firms by carrying out their legally mandated 
responsibilities. Advocates of this approach posit that corporate laws vest considerable 
powers in Board-members to enable them to fulfil their roles. According to this 
approach, Boards are responsible for corporate leadership without actual interference in 
day-to-day operations, which are duties of the General Manager. The role of the Board is 
viewed as including responsibility for selecting and replacing the General Manager, 
representing the interests of the firm's shareholders, providing advice and counsel to top 
management, and serving as a control mechanism by monitoring managerial and 
company performance (Nussbaum and Dobrzynski, 1987; Carpenter, 1988; Brown, 
1976; Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983). Thus, by performing these activities, Boards can 
enhance the performance of their companies. 
The legalistic perspective posits that Board attributes (i. e. composition, characteristics, 
structure and process) determine a Board's performance of its two primary roles: service 
and control. Service role involves strengthening company reputation, establishing 
contacts with the external environment and giving counsel and advice to executives 
(Carpenter, 1988; Louden, 1982). The control role requires evaluating both, company 
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and General Manager's performance to ensure corporate growth, protection of 
shareholders' interest and greater corporate accountability (Chapin, 1986; Louden, 
1982; Glaberson and Powel, 1985). 
Performance of the two Board roles of service and control depends on two factors. The 
first is ownership concentration. If company stock is held by a small number of owners, 
these owners or their representatives on the Board are likely to be actively involved in 
performing the control and service role. These individuals win have a vested interest in 
ensuring the survival and effectiveness of their firms, to maximize their wealth. The 
second contingency is firm size. In smaller firms, Boards tend to be manipulated either 
by the owners or General Managers. (Castaldi and Wortman, 1984). However, these 
Boards can play a major service role that enhances a firm's legitimacy. As firms become 
bigger, the control function becomes vital. Large organizational size is often associated 
with complex operations that require careful integration. As a result, a Board becomes a 
major instrument of control as companies become larger. 
Research following the legalistic approach suggests that Board attributes influence Board 
roles. The effect of Boards on company performance, however, is indirect. By performing 
their service and control roles, the Board-members shape managerial strategic choices or 
actions. According to this perspective, a Board is not expected to initiate strategies or 
develop policies. Instead, it is responsible for reviewing and approving managerial 
initiatives that will, in turn, determine company performance. 
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), the legalistic perspective adopts a broad view 
of organizational performance, emphasizing financial, systemic and social criteria. 
Financial criteria relate to creating shareholders' wealth. These are usually measured 
using accounting-based performance measures, such as return on assets, return on equity, 
and dividend per share (Vance, 1978), and market-based criteria. Systemic performance 
criteria centre on a firm's survival and growth (Daft, 1989). Social performance revolves 
around corporate response to changing societal expectations. Zahra and Stanton's 
(1988) study reported positive association between the proportion of outsiders on the 
Boards and measures of corporate social responsibility. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that the legalistic perspective has sparked considerable 
empirical research as well as public debate over the past five decades. Its findings show 
that Board-members do not always fulfil their legally mandated responsibilities 
(Epstein, 1986; Koontz, 1967; Louden, 1982). Boards do not ask top managers 
discerning questions about company goals and performance, do not evaluate thoroughly 
the General Manager's performance, and do not review managerial decisions before 
approving them. As a result fights are spreading and shareholders suits against corporate 
officers and directors are increasing (Glaberson and PoweU, 1985). 
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From this perspective, Boards' failure to fulfil their roles is often explained by the fact 
that Boards function on information provided by the General Manager (Aram and 
Cowan, 1983). Also general managers are thought to play a most significant role in 
director recruitment and selection (Foster, 1982). Accordingly, it is argued that most 
general managers do not want a strong Board that will challenge their power and 
authority. (Rosenstein, 1987). As a result, loyalty to the general manager, and not 
competence, becomes a major criterion in selecting, retaining, and compensating Board- 
members (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Managerial domination of Boards is seen as having resulted in inadequate attention to 
Board processes. Often, Board-members function on information provided by the 
General Manager. The flow of information between the General Manager and the 
Board-members is often inadequate (Aram and Cowen, 1983). Thus, in the absence of 
reliable data, Board-members are not in a position to challenge the General Manager's 
analyses or recommendations. 
Board observers have noted that Board decision-making is also ineffective. Meetings are 
infrequent, short, and too superficial to result in insightful discussions of issues at hand 
(Patton and Baker, 1987). Lack of attention to effective Board process is presumed to 
have resulted from the fact that the majority of Boards have chairs who also serve as the 
General Managers, making it difficult for the Board to evaluate executive performance. 
Hence, the effective system of checks and balances envisioned by the legalistic approach 
does not exist. Counterproductive managerial domination of boards is widespread, and 
results in weak boards that function as rubber stamps of managerial choices (Nader, 
1984; Mizruchi, 1983). 
Researchers note that in recent years external pressures for greater corporate 
accountability and greater board involvement in corporate decision-making have 
intensified. According to them three institutional forces function as the catalysts for this 
change (Judge and Zeithaml 1992). First, because a board is a legal entity governed by 
law this greatly affects board behaviour and is reflected in directors' perceptions that 
they might be exposed to legal action if they are not involved in strategic decision- 
making. Second, the managers of pension funds because of funds increasing size press 
boards to increase their involvement. Third, the market for corporate control through 
hostile takeovers that remove control from incumbent executives and directors. 
Other researchers suggested changes in the way Board-members should be selected, in 
the liability of Board-members for corporate failure, and in separating the position of 
the General Manager and Board chairs (Mueller, 1979). Reform efforts focused on the 
sources of Board inefficiency to transform Board-members into true partners in 
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governance. The debate on the role of the organization in society also stirred calls for 
Board reform. Widely perceived as the apex of corporate power, reform efforts aimed to 
broaden the representation of different stakeholders on Boards, with the desired result 
of enhanced corporate role by large corporations. 
These factors, i. e. concern over Board effectiveness and interest in the social role of the 
firm, led to significant changes in Board composition and rising interest in how Boards 
make their decisions (Patton and Baker, 1987). Overall, the findings from this 
perspective have catered for a search for better ways to design effective Boards. 
Despite the important contributions of the legalistic approach, Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) noted some shortcomings of this approach. Among them, one can cite the 
following: 
1. First this approach has tended to ignore the important contribution Boards can make 
in coopting the external environment or in developing and implementing strategies. 
2. Second, researchers have shown interest in composition variables without sufficient 
attention to Board structure and process. Thus, though normative theory emphasizes 
Board composition, structure and process, only composition is emphasized in empirical 
studies. 
3. Third, as Mizruchi (1983) has noted, research following this tradition has been 
fraught with confusion about the nature of corporate control. The thesis that General 
Managers dominate their Boards has not been studied in a systematic fashion. Yet, most 
researchers start their analysis taking this assertion as a given. Mizruchi's (1983) own 
interpretation of the literature shows that Boards control General Managers and not vice 
versa. 
4. Fourth and finally, in conducting their empirical work, scholars following this 
approach tend to over-emphasize the direct link between Board attributes and corporate 
performance criteria. The effect of Board attributes on company performance is indirect, 
occurring through its influence on roles. This lack of attention to appropriate causal links 
among Board attributes and roles may explain the contradictory findings reported in the 
literature. 
2.6.2.2. Resource Dependence 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) have noted that grounded in sociology and organizational 
theory, the resource dependence perspective views Boards as important boundary 
spanners that make timely information available to executives. Furthermore, because of 
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their prestige in their professions and communities, Board-members are able to extract 
resources for successful company operations. These activities are believed to enhance the 
firm's legitimacy in society and to help it achieve goals of efficiency and improved 
performance (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980). 
Research by economists and sociologists on Board interlocks provided empirical support 
for the resource dependence perspective. These researchers viewed Boards as viable 
entities whose contribution lay mainly in establishing and strengthening mutually 
beneficial interorganizational relationships. Board-members not only provided vital links 
to other companies, but they also ensured favourable transactions among these firms. 
The net effects of these actions were increased co-ordination among organizations, 
reduced transaction costs, and improved access to vital information and resources 
(Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983). 
Researchers in the resource dependence perspective observed that interlocks had a 
strong favourable effect on company performance because of the many advantages of 
interlocking directorates. These included horizontal co-ordination among firms along the 
same value chain, vertical co-ordination, and enhancing corporate reputation through 
networking (Penning, 1980; Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin, 1981). These three 
advantages were viewed as having helped to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
corporate operations, enhanced the status of the firm in the business community, and, on 
occasion, reduced transaction costs. Board-members absorb environmental uncertainty 
by providing information, thus enhancing company performance. 
Scholars following the resource dependence perspective stressed two Board attributes as 
antecedents of Board roles, i. e. composition and characteristics (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). However, by highlighting a strategy in addition to the service and control roles, 
these scholars view Board roles more broadly than legalistic researchers. The resource 
dependence perspective suggests that Board-members may be actively involved in the 
strategic arena through counsel and advice to the General Manager, by initiating their 
own analyses, or by suggesting alternatives. However, Board-members may not develop 
or execute strategies because these activities are within the purview of the General 
Manager. 
A Board's performance of its roles depends on three contingencies. The first is the 
nature of the external environment. When the environment is uncertain and threatening, 
creating favourable links with external stakeholders becomes an important part of the 
service role. The second contingency is the phase of company life cycle. Though the link 
between the Board role and company life cycle is yet to be clearly defined, Boards are 
expected to perform qualitatively different roles at various points of the cycle as 
exemplified by the different way a Board performs its control function in an 
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entrepreneurial firm as opposed to a well established, mature corporation. The third 
contingency affecting Board role is the type of firm (i. e. profit vs. non-profit). In profit- 
seeking firms, Board-members are held legally liable for their decisions. Hence, these 
Board-members may be hesitant to be actively engaged in performing their strategic role. 
In not-for-profit companies, however, these Board-members are not legally liable and, 
therefore, may become deeply involved in shaping the strategic direction of the 
organization (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Other theorists have noted that Board influence on company performance occurs 
through its impact on the strategic initiatives of executive choices. From the resource 
dependence perspective, Board-members can shape these initiatives directly by 
proposing new business concepts or initiating their analyses. Resource dependence 
scholars allude to a multidimensional definition of company performance, encompassing 
the financial, systemic, and social components noted under the legalistic approach. Yet, 
published research following this approach has stressed only the financial component of 
organizational performance. To capture the effect of Boards on company financial 
performance, scholars following the resource dependence research tradition use change 
measures of organizational performance (Provan, 1980; Pfeffer, 1972). These studies 
were designed around the theme that Boards which fit the firm's external environment or 
aid in absorbing uncertainty enhance company performance. 
This perspective has three limitations : First, it does not define or even theorize about 
the processes by which Board-members develop their strategies to link the firm and its 
environment. Second, it ignores the dynamics of power associated with changes in Board 
composition and change. Boards do not just exist or match environments; rather, Boards 
are designed and developed to achieve this fit. By overlooking processes and individuals 
associated with changes in Board composition, this approach gives the impression that 
designing effective Boards is a simple, straightforward task. Analyses associated with 
testing this approach ignore the dynamic nature of organizational adaptation to 
environment. This task has been described as attempting to "shoot a moving target" 
(Thompson, 1967). What do changes in the firm's environment-firm links mean for 
Board membership and process? This question, too, has escaped examination. The 
limited number of studies published to date makes it difficult to determine how Board 
composition and characteristics vary within different environmental settings. They also 
fail to provide an adequate test of the perspective's central thesis that companies whose 
Boards meet the demands of the environment experience superior performance. Third, 
despite its implicit recognition of the firm's social role, this approach has failed to assess 
empirically the links between Board variables and corporate social performance. Despite 
the strong theoretical underpining of the resource dependence approach, little effort has 
been made to articulate its managerial implications for improving governance practices 
and structures (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
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2.6-2.3. Agency Theory 
Once considered the exclusive domain of finance and economic research, agency 
approach is among the most recognized in research on the contribution of Boards 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). This perspective argues that agency relationships should be 
the focal point in analyzing and studying corporate governance. Agency theorists believe 
that owing to dispersion of corporate ownership, executives (called "agents") possess 
considerable freedoms and powers. Left alone, these executives are believed to pursue 
objectives that may contradict the goals of the principals ("owners"), hence stakeholders' 
wealth maximization may be overlooked (Masson, 1971). Within this context, Boards 
perform the critical function of monitoring and rewarding top executives to ensure 
maximization of shareholders' wealth. In essence, the Board is seen as the ultimate 
mechanism of corporate control. 
Following this approach, Board contribution to organizational performance occurs by 
reducing agency cost arising from non-compliance of executives with established goals 
and procedures, by articulating shareholders' objectives and focusing the attention of key 
executives on company performance, and through strategic decision-making and control 
(Mizruchi, 1983). 
Agency theory offers a comprehensive definition of Board attributes of composition, 
characteristics, decision process and structure. This definition is similar to that of the 
legalistic approach with a notable exception. Agency theorists have shown more attention 
to Board decision-making processes than have legalistic scholars. This emphasis is 
consistent with agency theorists' interest in how Boards perform their job and how they 
monitor managerial actions to reduce agency cost. 
It is important to note that agency theory places a premium on a Board's strategic 
contribution, specifically the Board's involvement in and contribution to the articulation 
of the firm's mission, the development of the firm's strategy, and the setting of guide- 
lines for implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy. Although existing 
literature does not fully define the content of this strategic contribution, advocates 
believe that it becomes evident at those critical points, when important choices must be 
made. Examples of critical choices are acquiring a new firm, divesting a division, or 
negotiating a takeover bid (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Kosnik, 1987). 
Yet, other agency theorists argue that board involvement in strategic action (such as 
restructuring) will occur when performance reaches lower levels prior to activation of the 
market for corporate control (Johnson et al., 1993). While the market for corporate 
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control is assumed to promote shareholder value a board generally prefers to promote 
firm's efficiency without activating this market. 
Agency theorists adopt a broad definition of Board roles. Control is the more important 
Board task, followed by service and strategy. This order is different form the resource 
dependence perspective. The internal control is the most important of the three roles, 
according to agency theorists. 
Despite its popularity, the agency perspective has three shortcomings (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989): First, the agency notion is founded on some questionable assumptions 
about the "agent's" (i. e., the General Manager's) values and motives (Kaen et al., 1988). 
Agency theorists start their analyses with the assumption that General Managers, driven 
by self-interests, will deviate from the shareholders' mandate. By accepting this 
assumption without debate, agency theorists ignore rival and more contemporary 
theories of the firm. These theories posit that companies must contribute to the quality 
of life in their communities and societies. Failure to perform this important social 
responsibility role may undermine shareholders' long-term interest. Therefore, in 
balancing conflicting demands on the firm, General Managers' deviation from short-term 
wealth maximization may be prudent (Goodrich, 1987). 
Second, like the legalistic scholars, agency theorists have thus far failed to document the 
extent to which Board-members perform their different roles and how they make 
decisions. Thus, the assumption that Board-members do a credible job in monitoring 
General Manager and senior executives' performance lacks support. 
Third, although the agency perspective emphasizes the crucial importance of the Board's 
strategic role, little documentation of this role exists. Also, and perhaps more serious, 
Board critics charge that Board strategic contribution is too infrequent to make a 
significant difference in company performance. These critics suggest that General 
Managers do not want Board-members to participate in designing or implementing 
strategies that are considered to be within the General Manager's domain (Rosenstein, 
1987). These critics also suggest that poor Board-member selection and ineffective 
Board decision-making processes handicap the Board-members' strategic contribution. 
2.6.2.4. Boards' Functioning and Performance 
In combination, the described perspectives identify three important Board roles: 
service, strategy, and control. The review conducted by Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
disclosed a wide gap between the normative literature's recognition of these Board roles 
and empirical documentation of the extent to which each is performed in reality. For 
instance, though the control roles are well recognized in the normative literature 
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(Vance, 1983; Waldo, 1985), and the premise that, a healthy balance between the 
general manager and board powers is required to ensure effective company performance 
(Pearce and Robinson 1987) is stressed, research has shown that many Boards fail to 
monitor General Manager's performance or evaluate General Manager's decisions, such 
that Board analyses of corporate performance are often perfunctory (Goold and Quinn, 
1990). Tbus, Boards' performance of their control role is often inadequate. 
Research support for the service role is strong (Vance, 1983) but equivocal. Critics 
charge that Boards have failed to develop appropriate codes of conduct for their 
executives and employees (Leibowitz, 1978). In essence, Board-members have failed to 
reflect changing societal values in shaping corporate identity because Boards lack 
requisite power to bring about desired changes in the role of the corporation. 
Similarly, despite the perceived need to involve Boards in the strategic arena 
(Rosenstein, 1987; Tashakori and Boulton, 1983), empirical evidence is that the 
contribution in this regard has been very limited (Henke, 1986). However, a growing 
recognition of the importance of Board-members' professional expertise in developing, 
implementing, and refining strategies within their own firms has prompted much new 
research (Estes, 1980; Kreiken, 1985; Rosenstein, 1987). Among recent findings are 
that Board-members function as boundary spanners who have access to information vital 
to the diagnosis of opportunities and threats. Therefore, Board-members can aid 
managers by mapping or reviewing strategic actions (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
Harrison, 1987; Kreiken, 1985; Tashakori and Boulton, 1985; Waldo, 1985). It has 
also been argued that the performance of the fiduciary responsibility vested in Board- 
members requires attention to strategic concerns. Executive performance cannot be 
evaluated reliably without an appreciation of the strategic issues facing the firm 
(Kreiken, 1985; Waldo, 1985). 
Empirical research on the strategic role of Boards needs further development. 
Preliminary results show that Board-members are not so actively involved in the strategic 
arena as agency theorists have assumed. 
The tentative nature of empirical evidence on performance of the three Board roles may 
be partially explained by the shortcomings of past research. These research efforts have 
often been limited in scope, based on convenience samples, and inconsistent in 
operation alization of Board variables. Moreover, the bulk of this research has focused on 
the direct associations between Board attributes and company performance, thus 
ignoring the indirect path (through roles and strategic initiatives) discussed by the 
theoretical perspectives. These limitations suggest that caution is advised in interpreting 
empirical findings on the relationship between Board roles and company performance 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
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Recent research emphasizes the importance of understanding the General Manager's 
views as a means to improve efforts on Board reform. Most reform efforts have been 
established on the assumption that the General Manager's self-interest is an obstacle to 
having an effective Board. However, the results of those studies questioned this view and 
highlighted the need to improve the incorporation of General Manager's opinions into 
Board reform efforts, for the latter to be fruitful (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Concluding this section, one may pinpoint that external environmental forces and 
internal organizational factors may play an important role in terms of Board involvement 
in strategic decision-making and the General Manager's power position. Do Boards 
become more or less involved when the perceived environment becomes volatile? To 
what extent the internal factors are perceived by the Board-members as affecting a 
strategy being implemented? It seems evident that these are areas not dealt with in the 
literature and answers to these questions could be useful in assisting the understanding 
of corporate governance. 
2.6.3. Board Demographics and Composition 
Primary emphasis is placed by research on observable Board characteristics as indicators 
of the givens that a Board-member brings to an administrative situation (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Numerous studies have documented the direct consequences of Board 
attributes on the effective execution of Board-members' roles. Board size and type of 
membership have been found to influence the service (Mace, 1971), strategy 
(Baysinger and Zeithaml, 1986; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), and control roles 
(Kesner et al., 1986). 
Concerning the service role, research indicates that without appropriate Board 
composition Board-members may fail to help the firm in achieving its goals. For 
example, Boards that have a majority of their members as outsiders are in a position to 
establish viable links with different sectors of the external environment. Given the 
diversity and breadth of their expertise, outside Board-members are in a position to 
provide counsel to management. Outsiders are also conducive to successful fund raising 
in not-for-profit firms because of their connections and professional personal reputation. 
In case of profit-oriented firms, these outsiders are crucial in ensuring essential 
resources for the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These observations indicate that 
effective Board composition is essential to successful performance of the service role. 
However, there are opposing views indicating that if the organization's own norms and 
values are well-adapted, introducing outsiders with different values will reduce efficiency, 
since they would introduce different non-adaptive values. This would increase the 
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likelihood of misunderstanding and mistrust and would elevate the level of conflict 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
Composition also plays an important role in enhancing the performance of the Board's 
control role. Larger Boards are not as susceptible to managerial domination as their 
smaller counterparts. They are also more likely to be heterogeneous in members' 
background, values and skills. Thus, they are likely to resist managerial domination and 
to present shareholders' interest. Moreover, apart from the issue of managerial 
domination, heterogeneous groups, by generating greater conflict, can assist in shaping 
better solutions to the problems of environmental adaptation. Resolving the conflict 
associated with a heterogeneous group (having diverse skiffs and outlook characteristics) 
would increase the adaptability of the group and impact on long-term performance 
(Murray, 1989; Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Bourgeois, 1985; Tjosvold, 1987). 
Therefore, these Boards would be more actively involved in monitoring and evaluating 
General Manager and company performance, normally through specialized committees. 
Finally, composition is important for the performance of the Board's strategic role. 
Larger Boards, the presence of a majority of outsiders, and the representation of 
minority groups (and also "the weaker socialization process operatingin groups whose 
members have been together for shorter periods", Murray, 1989; p. 138), all these are 
presumed to be more conducive to debate and discussion of the firm's mission, goals, and 
appropriate strategy. Such debates enlarge the basis of expertise, force management to 
consider a wide range of options, and clarify constraints within which strategy 
implementation should proceed. Thus, composition variables may determine the level 
and nature of Board strategic role. 
Research has shown that specific Board characteristics are essential for the effective 
performance of the Board's three roles. Each role requires distinct skills and abilities. 
For instance, Board-members' professional competence and prestige are necessary for 
legitimating the firm's service. Evidence indicates that age and tenure with the firm and 
with the Board have a stronger impact on adaptation and long-term performance than 
occupational and educational backgrounds do. Thus, socialization processes within the 
group have a greater impact on group capabilities than does the sum of the capabilities 
of the individual members (Murray, 1989). A healthy balance between external 
effectiveness and internal efficiency is necessary for a strategic role. Independence from 
management is necessary for the control role (Mo1z, 1988). 
Effective structure is also a major condition for effective Board roles in service, strategy, 
and performance. To perform the service successfully, appropriate committees should be 
established (Jemision and Oakley, 1983). Committees such as public policy and social 
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responsibility make it possible for the firm to identify major societal concerns that are 
likely to influence company performance (KohIs, 1986). 
Specific features of Board structure are also important for performance of the strategic 
role. The existence of long-range planning (Brown, 1981), technology (National 
Association of Corporate Directors, 1982), and public policy/social responsibility 
(Kohls, 1986) enable Board-members to study issues in depth, and offer specific 
suggestions for managerial action. At a minimum, these committees enable Board- 
members to evaluate managerial initiatives. 
2.6.4. Labour Participation in Corporate Boards (Co-determination) 
Legislation requiring corporations to grant employees' representatives voting power on 
their governing Boards has been experienced in many European countries (Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Austria, Norway, Sweden). Yet the effects of legally mandating 
these co-determination rights on corporate operations and performance are still 
surrounded by much debate. 
Researchers have listed numerous arguments. On the supportive side, co-determination 
is seen as enhancing employees' self-development and self-esteem, humanizing the 
corporate system, and making it politically more acceptable. Furthermore, it is assumed 
to improve communication within the firm, as it overcomes informational problems and 
contributes to more harmonious co-operation of employees and management. Sizable 
productivity gains are experienced. On the opponents side, there are arguments ranging 
from the expropriation of the firm's owner to the reduction of investment incentives and 
the worsening of the working environment (Benneli, Loderer and Lys, 1987), because 
an initial failure of a co-determination process would result in further regulation and 
control by the State, given the interventionist political climate. 
Though some researchers (e. g. Benelli et al., 1987) found little evidence that co- 
determination had any economic effects on firms in Germany, they attributed this lack of 
impact to the absence of a common objective among employees. Unlike shareholders, 
employees cannot agree on wealth maximization because their financial claim on the 
firm is not tradable. "Given different endowments, time horizons and tastes for on- 
the-job consumption, utility maximization by employees will result in different and 
probably contradictory maximization conditions. Even Jay-offs, which are commonly 
thought to be opposed by all firm employees, may face a divided constituency, 
because those who expect to keep theirjobs mayin fact end up better-off (Benelli et 
al., 1987; pp. 573-574). 
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Others (Taylor and Sparkes, 1979; Hawkins, 1979) spot the danger of alienating 
employees-directors from the work force, since the idea of employees-directors ignores 
the fundamental division of interests between management and employees. Also, 
employees-directors would create a channel of communication and representation 
separate from (and probably in conflict with) the established machinery of collective 
bargaining, i. e. the trade unions. In organised firms, this might result in weakening the 
loyalty of the work force to the union; in unorganised ones, workers-directors might be 
used as a covert method of keeping collective bargaining at bay. 
In firms where trade unions are well-established, workers-directors would come under 
strong pressure from union organization to represent trade-union interests in the Board- 
room. This would result in turning Board meetings into bargaining sessions and decision- 
making would become prolonged and difficult. Under such conditions, it would be 
unlikely to stimulate the kind of joint problem-solving approach to strategic decisions, 
which from a managerial viewpoint is the raison (: f etre of workers' participation in the 
Board-room. As evidenced in some countries, though originally designed as a method of 
electing worker-directors, this scheme has become increasingly dominated by trade- 
unions' representatives (Taylor and Sparkes, 1979; Hawkins, 1979). 
2.7. SYNOPSIS 
Regarding the research objective, that is to investigate how strategies were formed in the 
focal organization by looking into Board-members' rationalizations about strategy and 
evaluating how the mix of these perceptions influenced strategic choices and 
implementation, the following points must be emphasized in relation to the conclusions 
drawn from the literature review: 
1. Strategic leadership has been studied along different characteristics of the 
leaders, such as age, tenure, educational and functional background, knowledge, 
skills, personality and cognitive style. However, the latter has not been studied in 
the collective context of a Board. 
2. Studying cognitive styles in a Board's context would provide sufficient 
description of important Board attributes, especially structure and process which, 
so far, are under-researched. 
3. Top management team research has developed along different theoretical 
schemes which stress the importance of alternative roles for the members of such 
teams. Conflicting results have been reported, regarding the influence of the 
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characteristics, composition and structure of a Board on the company's 
performance. This suggests that further variables, such as external factors, internal 
contingencies, or the ownership of the firm, should be incorporated into the 
analysis. 
4. The nature of Board processes over time has not been studied. The majority of 
studies concern cross-sectional samples and relied on samples drawn from data 
banks. In this thesis, processes would be looked into along two lines of inquiry: (i) 
By studying how the Board-members' cognitive styles interact and interrelate; this 
would provide explanations about what they thought about strategy and how they 
communicated and interacted; and (ii) By depicting the patterns of organizational 
decisional activity across different decision-areas, over time; this, would highlight 
the exact nature of decisions that the Board has made. 
5. By taking into consideration the cognitive styles of Board-members and their 
interactions and patterns of organizational activity, it would become possible to 
determine (i) when Boards exercise their powers, and (H) how their members may 
influence the direction an organization follows; that is, to determine the way in 
which the Board-members contribute to the making of strategic decisions. 
6. The large majority of studies have focused on the Fortune 500 population. Yet, 
exclusive attention on these companies probably ignores the nature of Boards in 
different types of firms. For instance, the role of Boards in smaller, medium-sized, 
and non-for-profit firms has not been examined in a systematic fashion. Very few 
studies for this type of firms may be traced in the strategic management literature. 
7. Related to the above argument is the fact that public firms have often been 
studied by political scientists and economists but rarely by organizational 
researchers. If this happens because political authority constrains organizational 
activity to the degree that no choices regarding the company's future can be made 
by the public managers, then certainly this domain of inquiry concerns other 
disciplines. But if there is a certain domain of discretion, as researchers have 
argued, then it would be revealing to investigate how people at the top perceive 
this authority, what values (and why) they assign to decision -outcomes, and which 
reasons they cite for any outcome considered as crucial for the organization's 
survival. Especially, when different stakeholders are involved in decision -making, 
then a deeper understanding of how change gains legitimacy might be achieved. 
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believe that the use of numbers provides more accurate information and that the 
development of measurement procedures leads to the precise definition of new concepts 
capable of being used in the scientific theory. Widely used methods to conduct this type 
of research are survey questionnaires, demographic analyses, inventories, and statistical 
tools, and they are applied in order to prove relationships between defined variables. 
The second stream, which may be described as interpretative (e. g., Schwartz and 
Jacobs, 1979; Denzin, 1978; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975), stresses the importance for 
developing ways of gaining access to the life-world of other individuals. In this view, the 
focal point of interest is the individual "actor" in the context of his daily life. 
Researchers within this stream aim at knowing what actors (people within the social 
setting they investigate) know, and understand what they understand. They attempt to 
describe actors' vocabularies (rhetoric), their ways of looking, their sense of the 
important and unimportant. Their most important preoccupation is to capturing the 
meanings or "understanding' of the social individual actor. 
There is, however, a number of researchers believing that these two seemingly different 
approaches could be reconciled. Some of them argue that a new paradigm -a paradigm of 
choices- should replace the debate and competition between the two above perspectives. 
This new paradigm recognizes that issues of selecting methods should be based on 
carefully evaluating the situations under study (Patton; 1980). Different methods are 
appropriate for different situations. Others take a mediating position; while valuing the 
insider's point of view they also suggest the consideration of "social settings" as the 
context in which forms of interaction occur (Silverman, 1985; Pettigrew, 1985). 
These recent recommendations constitute an important perspective which this study 
aims to follow in order to explore effects of social context upon individuals (all 
envirnmental and organizational stimuli) through their perceptions concerning the 
strategic choices they made during the implementation of a strategic plan. 
3.2.2. Qualitative Methods 
3.2.2.1. Definition, Aims and Techniques 
As Denzin (1978) has noted, too often the social scientists' preconceptions prevent the 
subjects studied from telling things as they see them. The task for the qualitative 
methodology is to provide a framework within which respondents represent their 
thoughts, their experiences and their basic perceptions, in a single phrase their points of 
view about the phenomenon under study in their own words. 
CHAPTER 3 
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the theory of the type of the research chosen and demonstrates 
its relevance to the purposes of this study. The chapter describes qualitative research, its 
most used methods, and argues about the legitimacy to employ this type of research in 
terms of the conceptual model that is to be built, in order to explain the relationships 
between actors' rationales and the processes of change as revealed in decision patterns. 
The chapter also deals with the specific method employed -the case study- and sets the 
criteria for selecting this particular enterprise. The final part of this chapter is devoted to 
theory building which is the desired outcome of this study and argues about the method 
of inferences -analytic induction- used to achieve it. 
3.2. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
3.2.1. The Main Sociological Paradigms 
In social sciences, and management science is considered as such, there are two main 
streams that advocate different notation systems for describing the world, differing about 
in what meaning they assign to the word "science" and thus using radically different 
activities to attain to it. 
The first stream, named as positivism seeks the facts or causes of social phenomena 
with little regard for the subjective state of individuals; it assigns numbers to qualitative 
observations (Schwartz and Jacobs; 1979) and thus produces data by counting and 
"measuring" things. There are no restrictions about the nature of the things measured; 
they can be individuals, groups, whole societies and so on. Quantitative researchers 
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What people say, constitutes one of the dimensions that qualitative research bears on 
(i. e. the perceived facts). Alongside, there are three more dimensions: (1) the pure 
description of people, activities and interactions; (2) direct quotations from people; both 
what they speak and what they write down; and (3) getting close to the people and the 
situation being studied to be able to understand what is fundamental or central to the 
people under observation (Lofland, 1971; Patton, 1980). 
According to Bogdan and Taylor (1975), qualitative research is more frequently 
concerned with the identification of concepts in the data and with the development of a 
theory which incorporates them, than with the determination of how many such concepts 
there are. This of course does not exclude the qualitative researcher from the need to 
acquire a knowledge of the empirical and theoretical research likely to impinge upon the 
research issue. This should be applied to identify pertinent issues that might be 
illuminated by research but care should be taken not prematurely to foreclose potentially 
fruitful lines of enquiry. 
Walker (1985) argued that the techniques termed "qualitative" tend to be less 
structured than the respective quantitative, in order to be made more responsive to the 
needs of respondents and to the nature of the subject matter. Usually they are based on a 
limited number of individuals and bring onto the stage the context of data gathering. By 
defying the rigidity of methods used in quantitative research, Walker (1985) subscribed 
to the view that social phenomena should let reveal their intimate life which in no sense 
is to be taken at "face value". On the contrary, they have to be explored, their 
contradictions have to be explained and deviant cases should be incorporated in the 
explanations. 
There is a large and growing repertoire of qualitative techniques; case studies, depth 
interviews, group interviews, documentary evidence, participant observation and 
projective techniques. While, according to Walker (1985) or Denzin (1978), 
observation is considered to be the archetypal qualitative method, it contrasts with the 
others in that the research subjects are studied in their own "sociar' or "naturar 
environments. In all other methods the interaction is essentially artificial. 
The methods described above can be used in conjunction with each other or with other 
methods such as surveys and documentary source analyses, to cross check the hypotheses 
generated and to provide a better understanding of the context (Pettigrew, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1987). 
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3.2.2.2. Applications of Qualitative Research 
Most writers on the subject argue that the choice of qualitative techniques as the main 
approach during the principal phase of a project frequently depends on the research 
topic (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). Maybe the topic 
is complicated or sensitive, concerned with relationships or interaction, or with processes 
of change. Perhaps the phenomenon is not measurable. The choice may be conditioned 
by the research subjects who may have limited communication skills or, alternatively, 
require "VIP-status treatment' which prohibits the use of standard measurement 
techniques that "require the 'subject' to perform operations or gfve responses which 
may seem at best mystifying or at worst humiliating' (Walker, 1985, p. 21). The 
research population might be extremely small, difficult to locate, or discrete. This can 
sometimes lessen the concern about representativeness and inference, and thus tip the 
balance away from an interest in measurement. As Walker (1985) argued, the choice of 
qualitative methods may reflect limitations in the state of the quantitative art or a 
philosophical stance in which quantification is inappropriate. 
3.2.3. Legitimacy of Qualitative Methods 
3.2.3.1. The Issue of "True" 
Positivist scientists rely upon statistical significance and levels of certainty in order to 
validate their findings. However, it has been argued that this methodology does not 
totally resolve the problem of causality. Even if variables prove to be statistically 
correlated, the final causal explanation relies basically on the grounds of plausibility. 
Mitchefl (1983) quoted an example in which scientists could not accept the explanation 
of the relationship between two characteristics of a phenomenon being studied, while 
they may well have accepted that the experimental results were produced with an 
unimpeachable method. 
Qualitative researchers claim that seeking the truth expresses a faith in the existence of 
an objectively factual social world (Johnson, 1975; quoted in Patton, 1980, p. 270). They 
claim that research findings involve always a personal perspective. Patton (1980, p. 272) 
substantiates it in the question: "What is truth? Is it unitary, objective, outside of the 
being of individuals? Or is it multiple and varied, coloured by our layers and layers of 
experiences ? Or is it both 2"' To him "the ]a tter 'feels' better". 
Others have replaced the concern for truth with other concepts for evaluation of the 
research findings. There is always a trade-off between practical utility and level of 
certainty (Smith, 1978; quoted in Patton, 1980, p. 273). By determining the level of 
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certainty desired in a specific case one could more easily choose appropriate methods. 
Naturalistic descriptions provide greater certainty in our understanding of processes 
than randomised controlled experiments, ýbut less certainty in the knowledge of the 
strength of a particular effect. "Our first concern should be the practical utility of our 
knowledge, not its ultimate truthfulness" (Smith, 1978; quoted in Patton, 1980, 
p. 274). 
Treating the concern for truth as concern for science, Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) have 
argued that when understanding "science" as positivist science, reality reconstructions 
put in the front stage by the qualitative methodologists are in shaky grounds. They 
emphasise that currently there is no science of subjectivity. In their view, scientists 
within this paradigm are invoking common-sense knowledge vested in scientific rhetoric 
and still there is no answer to the question whether these scientists know more or less 
about the world than their positivist Counterparts. 
However, their approach is not one of a pessimist. Although they cannot prove that the 
concept of the "insidei" is analytically a scientific useful category or that insiders 
experience the world in general similarities or that outsiders and insiders have sharp 
differences in the way they experience and know social phenomena, they believe in the 
benefit of the insider point of view. They conclude that eventhough no-one knows how 
the inside point of view is created and sustained, it is useful for the researchers to look 
into it because it exists. Since qualitative methods do not constitute a scientific 
achievement, the researchers are faced with the choice either of adopting the actors' 
views or devising a scientific way to study social life, in which the insider/inside would 
probably disappear as thought-constructs. 
3.2.3.2. Evaluation of Qualitative Research 
Walker (1985) proposed the following scheme in order to judge research findings 
according to their validity (accuracy of the findings) and their reliability (whether the 
same findings would have been produced by another researcher) . 
First, he considered descriptive validity which involves asking whether each incident, 
event, act, or indicator is really what it is thought to be by the researcher. He found 
similarities between descriptive validity and measurement validity in quantitative 
research to the degree that both pay attention to what perspective most conditions the 
description of an incident and with what consequences. 
Second, he defined conceptual validity which concerns the extent to which the concepts 
used fit the data. Questions related to the correspondence of the contents of categories 
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with their description and the nature of the categories defined (saturated or emerging) 
belong to this type of validity. 
Third comes theoretical validity that relates to the way in which concepts are handled 
and the coherence of the resulting theory is tested. He categorised the following 
questions as being related to it: 
- What is the intended relationship between data and theory and the balance 
between building and testing of theory? 
- How are concepts and categories merged? 
- What are the relationships between concepts and how are they defined and 
determined? 
- Do the relationships stand in a logical relationship to one another or are they 
empirically determined? How well are empirical relationships established? 
- Which concepts and relationships are least supported in logic or evidence and 
how significant are these for theory as a whole? 
Fourth, he defined external validity as the concern with the scope and generalisability 
of the theory and largely dependent upon the nature of the sample used. His definition 
bears resemblance to the usefulness and level of certainty that other authors consider for 
the purpose of conducting qualitative research (refer to the previous section). 
Finally, reliability refers to the extent to which results are reproducible. He advocated 
the fact that other persons could be involved in the research process to enhance 
reliability. He considers the reader of the report as playing a role through the process of 
discounting, inaugurated by Glazer and Strauss (1967). According to them, the reader 
validates the theory proposed by correcting, adjusting and proving inapplicable parts of it 
that do not fit structures the reader himself has experienced. 
Denzin (1978) considered as criterion of validity a method of generalization known as 
analytic induction. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983), Mitchell (1983) and 
Silverman (1985) subscribed to this view by recognizing its strength in the development 
of theory. Denzin (1978) argued that this method enables fact, observation, concept, 
proposition and theory to become closely articulated. To this issue, the final part of this 
chapter will devote a detailed analysis. 
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3.2.4. Theory Generation as Desired Output 
In their influential work, Glazer and Strauss (1969) have pin-pointed to the need for 
the researchers to generate theory. While verifying existing theories is an absolutely 
legitimate and vital task, they assert that the generation of theory through comparative 
analysis both subsumes and assumes verifications and accurate descriptions, but only to 
the extent that the latter are in the service of generation. According to them, accurate 
evidence, the kind of evidence as well as the number of cases studied, are not so crucial 
in the attempt for generating theory. If, from the data in hand, the researcher could 
indicate a general conceptual category or property for general and specific situations and 
problems, then theory development is achieved. They defined two sorts of theory; 
substantive theory applied to an empirical area of sociological inquiry, and formal 
theory, applied to a formal or conceptual area. They named both as "middle- range" 
theories because they are positioned in between the "minor working hypotheses" of the 
everyday life and the "granct' theories. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) also emphasized the need to acquire a higher level 
of abstraction in the analysis of findings. According to them, "concrete descriptions 
cover many different facets of the phenomenon they describe, they give a rounder 
picture, and open up all manner of theoretical possibilities. Theory development 
involves a narrowing of focus and a process of abstraction. Theorized accounts give a 
much poorer representation of the phenomena with which they deal. On the other 
hand, assuming the theoretical ideas are well founded, they begin to give us much 
more knowledge about how a particular aspect of social process is organized and 
perhaps even why events occur in the patterned ways they do" (p. 177). However, in 
order the transition from data to theory to be obtained, it should be described by the 
linking process that would display the unity of data and the outcome produced, 
demonstrated in a logical and acceptable manner. In the research terminology, this 
linking process is often called interpretation. Interpretaýion is the search for the broader 
meaning of the research findings. It leads to the establishment of explanatory concepts 
and displays the continuity in social research through establishing the connection 
between the results of the study to those already found in the literature. 
Glazer and Strauss (1969) have proposed the use of both codified procedures and the 
constant comparative method. In their view, "since the analyst is forced to make 
theoretical sense of each comparison" the probability of an integrated and clear theory 
to emerge is enhanced. 
An interesting issue arises at this point if someone wants to question the term "clear 
theory that Glazer and Strauss (1969) used in their argument. Is this theory free of 
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any influence which might implicitly guide the research up to its ultimate phase? There 
are researchers claiming that everyone brings into the research field a theoretical 
predisposition, either explicitly or implicitly stated (Patton, 1980). Such theoretical 
predispositions constitute basically the researcher's world view and refer usually to a 
macro-level theory. Kuhn (1970) has described just how second nature these 
perspectives can become: "Scientists work from models acquired through education 
and through subsequent exposure to the literature, often without quite knowing or 
needing to know what characteristics have given these models the status of 
community paradigms... That scientists do not usually ask or debate what makes a 
particular problem or solution legitimate tempts us to suppose that, at least 
intuitively, they know the answer. But it may only indicate that neither the question 
nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their research. Paradigms may be prior to, 
more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be 
unequivocally abstracted from them". 
Pettigrew (1985) developed from the beginning of his research a theoretical framework 
relating to the specification of the model of man. "Within this research on change, 
strong emphasis will be placed both upon the man's capacity and desire to adjust to 
social conditions to meet his ends, and the part played by power relationships in the 
emergence and ongoing development of the processes being examined. This view of 
man, contained within the means-end schema of social action theory, avoids the hard 
determinism identified in some of the radical structuralist perspectives on 
organizations. Instead of some higher-level variable (e. g., the world system) or state 
determining some lower-level phenomena, the relationship between higher and lower 
is now analysed through a variant of causalism in which actors play parts in bounded 
social processes" (p. 36). 
R. -I- ight from the beginning of their influential book, Bogdan and Taylor (1975, p. 1) 
defined methodology as "the process, principles and procedures by which we approach 
problems and seek answers. In the social sciences the term applies to how one 
conducts research. As in everything we do, our assumptions, interests, and goals 
greatly influence which methodological procedures we choose. When stripped to their 
essentials, most debates over methods are debates over assumptions and goals, over 
theory and perspective". 
This research is based on a set of principles derived from the sociological theory of 
realism. These principles will be guiding the development of theory, the objectives of 
which have already been discussed. The principles on which the theory will be grounded 
are: (1) There is no need to limit explanations to actors' own understanding. Although 
laws are inappropriate to the social world, there are circumstances when social structures 
can be as coercive as natural laws. (2) Social structures do not exist independently of 
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human activity, but are not produced by it. (3) People do not create social structures, for 
they always pre-exist them and are a necessary condition for their activity. (4) Rather 
society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions, which 
individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist, unless they do so 
(Bashkar, 1979; quoted in Silverman, 1985, pp. 33-36). 
3.3. EMPLOYED TYPE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
3.3.1. The Case Study 
3.3.1.1. Definition 
Case-study or case-history is a research strategy that is used for uncovering the effects of 
external events upon the internal experience of the individual (Schwartz and Jacobs, 
1979). Miller (1983) argued that this type of research is concerned primarily with 
processes and patterns under investigation of a single group, institution, organisation or 
community. Emphasis is on the social structure, i. e. interrelationships of parts of the 
structure and social interaction which are taking place. It attempts observations of social 
interactions or investigates thoroughly the reciprocal perceptions and attitudes of people 
playing interdependent roles. The same view is taken on by Pettigrew (1985). 
Criticising the ahistorical, acontextual and aprocessual character of much of the research 
in the organisational. field he emphasised the importance of historical analysis and the 
significance of antecedent conditions in explaining the dynamics of change. Further, he 
used the case study method to build a multi-level and processual analysis of 
organisational. phenomena, what he calls "a holistic, contextualist approach". 
Pettigrew (1985) described the multi-level as the vertical form of analysis and the 
processual as the horizontal form of it. The vertical level refers to "the 
interdependentness between higher or lower levels of analysis upon phenomena to be 
explained at some further level, for example, the impact of a changfng socio- 
economic context on features of intra-organizational context and interest group 
behaviour; while the horizontal level refers to the sequential interconnectedness 
between phenomena in historical, present and future time" (pp. 35-36). 
Giddens (1979) argued that the separation of function (relations between "parte of a 
"whole") from seriality (happenings in time) cannot be sustained; a functional relation 
cannot even be stated without implied reference to temporality. He introduced the 
notion of structuration as the true explanatory locus of structural analysis. To study 
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structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions which govern the continuity and 
dissolution of structures or types of structures. 
According to the arguments put forward by these authors, synchronic analysis of a 
phenomenon must be coupled with its diachronic evolution. A good deal of data are 
needed to support such a holistic analysis which can reveal trends and forces as well as 
relationships, actions and behaviours between groups and individuals. However, the most 
significant inducement for conducting case studies is the argument pin-pointed by 
Weick (1976). He discussed the problems confronted by an observer and remarked: 
"Our attention tends to be drawn to things that vary the most and things that vary 
little, thus have low visibility. The most obvious and visible coupling within 
organizations may not necessarily be the most critical to an understanding of 
organisational change, especially if the really important events occur infrequently. 
The remedy to this problem is a thorough immersion into the affairs of the 
organization, coupled with knowledge of the way things work in other organizations" 
(p. 16). 
Mitchefl (1983) defines the case study as the detailed examination of an event, or a 
series of events, which in the researcher's opinion exhibit the operation of some 
identified general theoretical principle. This principle forms the basis on which 
inferences will be drawn. Mitchell also suggests that the researcher is sufficiently close to 
the phenomenon under investigation, in order to understand it. 
3.3.1.2. Nomothetic-Idiographic Approaches to Life Histories 
There are two basic orientations to life-histories or case histories within the social 
sciences. 
The nomothetic approach contends that theoretical generalizations should be applicable 
to many individuals or entities and should derive through systematic experimentation 
usually involving the use of statistical validation. This approach regards the case study as 
an excellent pedagogic aid for learning theoretical constructs and as function to generate 
new concepts (Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979). Beyond this, the uses and contributions of 
the case study diminish since it is considered that it is scientifically impossible to 
generalize from single cases. 
The idiographic approach stresses the legitimacy of investigating and researching the 
life of a single individual or entity (should it be a community, organization, programme 
or concept) and is concerned only secondarily with the frequency or nature of a variable 
outside the realm of that individual or entity. This view asserts that it is scientifically 
valid and methodologically correct to study the behaviour of one single entity and to 
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perceive it not only as a representative of a group but also as an independent totality 
from which generalizations may be drawn. It further contends that the true goal of social 
science is to understand behaviour, not to quantify, classify or dissect behavioural 
patterns. Idiographists believe that this is best accomplished through the use of the case 
study method since this allows one to study the totality of a single entity on a gestalt level. 
Von Bertalanffý (1968), the founder of the General Systems Theory, also acknowledged 
these two widespread conceptions in relation to the study of social systems (from small 
groups like the family, over innumerable intermediates of informal and formal 
organizations, to the largest units like nations, power blocks and international relations). 
According to his view, (1) there are atomistic conceptions which neglect the study of 
"relations" and (2) there are conceptions neglecting the specificity of the systems 
concerned such as "social physics" or "social engineering'. He further stressed the need 
to form a link between social sciences and history. Although the techniques in sociology 
and history may look entirely different (polls, statistical analysis against archival studies, 
internal evidence of historic relics, etc. ), the object of study is essentially the same. Thus, 
social sciences endowed with the "Jongitudinal" perspectives of history could generate 
fruitful insight, since social sciences and history have not fundamentally different 
philosophies. 
Von Bertalanffy (1968) questioned the possibility whether, apart from the mere 
description of happenings, a theoretical history is possible which can establish laws based 
on the fact that events in nature are repeatable and recurrent, because if history has 
occurred only once it can only be idiographic (a description of events which have 
occurred in a near or distinct past). Although the orthodox and predominant perspective 
of historians is of an idiographist nature (it argues that human events are of enormous 
complexity in causes and outcome and can only describe more or less satisfactorily what 
has happened in the past) and condemns constructs of history as "intuitive", "contrary to 
fact", "arbitrary', Von Bertalanffy (1968) made a strong argument against it. He 
reported that orthodox historians have written about Napoleon (his character and 
career) a dozen or so different interpretations, all based upon "fact' (the Napoleonic 
period happens to be one of the best documented) and all flatly contradicting each other 
and further commends: "If even a figure like Napoleon not very remote in time and 
with the best of historical documentation can be interpreted contrarily, you cannot 
well blame the "philosophers" of histor for their intuitive procedures, subjective y 
bias, etc.. What you have in both cases is a conceptual model which alwap wiU 
represent certain aspects only and for this reason will be one-sided or even lop-sided 
Hence the construction of conceptual models in history is not only permissible but as 
a matter of fact is at the basis of any historical interpretation as distinguished from 
mere enumeration of data" (p. 109). 
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In discussing whether historical investigation can be considered research and/or 
scientific, Best (1970) pointed out the following limitations of the technique: 
1. Although the purpose of science is prediction, the historian cannot always generalize 
on the basis of past events. Because past events were often unplanned or didn't develop 
as planned, because there were so many uncontrolled factors, and because the influence 
of one or a few individuals was so crucial, the same pattern of factors is never repeated. 
2. The historian must depend upon the reported observations of others, often witnesses 
of doubtful competence and sometimes of doubtful objectivity. 
3. The historian is much like a person trying to complete a complicated jig-saw puzzle 
with many of the parts missing. On the basis of what is often incomplete evidence, he 
must fill in the gaps by inferring what has happened. 
4. History does not operate in a closed system such as may be created in the physical 
science laboratory. The historian cannot control the conditions of observation nor 
manipulate the significant variables. 
He then attempted to counter these arguments with the following points: 
1. The historian delimits a problem, formulates hypotheses or raises questions to be 
answered, gathers and analyzes primary data, tests the hypotheses as consistent or 
inconsistent with the evidence, and formulates generalizations or conclusions. 
2. Although the historian may not have witnessed an event or gathered data directly, he 
may have the testimony of a number of witnesses who have observed the event from 
different vantage points. It is possible that subsequent events have provided additional 
information not available to contemporary observers. The historian rigourously subjects 
the evidence to critical analysis in order to establish its authenticity, truthfulness, and 
accuracy. 
3. In reaching conclusions, the historian employs principles of probability similar to 
those used by physical scientists. 
4. Although it is true that the historian cannot control the variables directly, this 
limitation also characterizes most behavioural research, particularly nonlaboratory 
investigations in sociology, social psychology and economics. 
While Von Bertanlanffy (1968) stressed the acceptance of both methods and Best 
(1970) advocated for the acceptance of the historical investigation as a valid scientific 
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instrument which has limitations as any other instrument does, Schwartz and Jacobs 
(1979) argued that these two orientations need not to be in conflict. Indeed they may 
complement each other: "One may in the course of applying the idiographic approach 
acquire a set of data to which one may then apply a nomothetic approach" (p. 69). 
It could be said that this is the case in this study. Acquiring and analysing the perceptions 
of the stakeholders' groups of the Board of the enterprise, the research will be looking at 
uncovering patterns between them, in relation to either the internal and the external 
environment of the firm, as well as at tracing the way they interrelate and interact, thus 
form an interpersonal reality. 
3.3.2. Criteria for Selecting the Specific Case 
According to Yin (1984) a case selection should display the following properties: (1) be 
representative; (2) be revealatory; and (3) be an extreme case. 
Silverman (1985) argued that methodological issues could be an incentive for research. 
Large scale quantitative studies have incorporated the public sector enterprises 
performance in order to look at macro implications of several economic indicators. 
These studies have used mainly an input-output model of the enterprise and they have 
excluded direct studies of processes that take place into this "black box", between the 
input and output phases. Furthermore, strategic management literature admits a lack of 
this type of research topic in the area of public sector enterprises (Shrivastava, 1987). 
This study adds to the list of properties proposed by Yin (1984) two more properties 
considered: (1) to be a different methodology within a field tested with other research 
apparatus; and (2) to be in an unexploited area of management research. Therefore, the 
criteria for selecting the specific case study design are the following. 
3.3.2.1. Case Study as an Extreme Case 
The case of the Greek Railways (OSE-CH) tends to constitute an extreme case, 
according to at least two points of view. 
Greek Railways are probably the least developed railway network within the European 
Community. Since "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link", rail transport 
efficiency, within the community, is to some extent determined by the efficiency of the 
least effective partner. Though the geographical position of Greece in the continent may 
render this argument exaggerated, it should be emphasized, that this country provides 
physical, and other links between the rest of the community and major markets in the 
Asian and African continents. Recently the main axis Patra-Athens-Thessaloniki- 
Idomeni of the network has been included in the European High Speed Network, giving 
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thus the opportunity of considering Community's resources, as an alternative source of 
funding. 
Because of their bad financial position, Greek Railways are one of the most problematic 
public enterprises in the country. Though this reality is the outcome of historical 
conditions, discussed in several parts of this thesis, it highlights both, the managerial 
dilemma regarding decisions on priorities between today's and future needs, and the 
environmental uncertainty within which these decisions are made (Paradissopoulos, 
1989). 
3.3.2.2. Case Study as a Representative Case 
Despite the extreme character of its performance, the focal firm shares with state-owned 
firms common issues. Although, the list of issues relating to public enterprise activities is 
virtually without limit, this section will provide a brief summary of four broad categories 
that are often presented in literature. 
Issues of objectives arise when there is no clear distinction between 
fin ancial/nonfinancial and commercial/noncommercial objectives. Because, setting 
objectives involves agreements between political policy-makers and public enterprise 
managers, often these objectives, being the outcome of a compromise, are in specified 
and conflicting. 
Issues of control are related to the methods and the extent by which control is exercised 
by the government, and may vary from a general policy guidance to direct control of the 
quantities and prices of the output produced. 
Issues of sources of finance concern the sources and types of finance used in relation 
with the activity being financed, and consequently are related to sources and type of 
credit for the public enterprises, the balance of payments and foreign exchange 
availability. 
Issues of pricing arise when output prices do not reflect the fun costs of inputs 
employed, with the result that consumption of the output is subsidised. The cost of the 
subsidy may be financed by the government directly or increased resort to credit by the 
public enterprise may be offered. 
In the case examined, a decision was made almost ten tears ago to invest heavily in the 
modernisation of the network and the company. Although, such modernisation has been 
fragmented by the implementation of only engineering projects and rolling stock 
acquisition, its continuation is in threat when considering that it takes place in a context 
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defined by: (1) the absolute (until recently) reliance on government funding, through the 
Public Investment Budget; (2) the almost complete dependence on foreign technology 
influencing both, the availability of required materials/equipment as it directly affects 
the balance of payments and the ability to comprehend and make the most of advanced 
technological products, designed, produced, and utilised in much different environments; 
and (3) the absence of short term payoffs which could both, result in substantial political 
profits on behalf of any ruling party and justify to the public opinion the large 
expenditure involved (Paradissopoulos, 1989). 
3.3.2.3. Case Study as a Reveala torY Case 
The unique characteristic of the Greek Railways, in comparison with the other European 
Networks, is that a major structural and strategic change was introduced in 1986 
concerning the participation of employees' representatives in the enterprise's main 
Board. Of the nine members of the Board, three, are elected employees' delegates 
through an electoral system that is designed to allow for the larger representativeness of 
trade unions balance of power. The French network (S. N. C. F) bears a certain 
resemblance to the above case but the percentage of employees in the Board is smaller 
and the procedure of their appointment is different (Gentil, 1984). 
3.3.2.4. Case Study as an Alternative Methodology 
Public enterprises in all countries play an important role in shaping the economy. 
Economists have tended to concentrate upon the monopolistic character of them 
especially those in the public utility field, and have tended to use analytical tools 
developed from models of the competitive market (Vernon and Aharoni, 1981). 
Interactions between the state owned enterprises and the political structure to which they 
are responsible are studied by other researchers (Anastassopoulos, 1981; Grassini, 
1981). The relationship between public enterprises and political system in power results 
in creating a different reality for them; they should hold down prices and forgo profits in 
periods of inflation, should favour domestic supplies, should hold on to their workforce 
in periods of slump. On the other hand they have access to subsidised capital, guarantees 
against bankruptcy, exception from import duties, preference in governmental purchases. 
The way, however, the things just mentioned are seen by the interest groups involved (the 
managers, the civil servants, and the labour force) is not being studied extensively. 
Moreover, when the firm under study is in the course of implementing a strategic plan 
that is vital to its survival, the way these different groups perceived and respond to such 
imperatives, needs to be looked into, in a more detailed and sensitive approach. As 
Vernon (1981, p-21) remarked, "What will be much slower in coming and what is 
much more urgently needed for the intelligent formation of public policy is an 
I. ntimate understanding of what actually drives the many different varieties of state 
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owned enterprises... so will longitudinal studies of individual firms as they move 
from their early acquisition by the State to a more routine relation, or as they move 
from an innovative role to one that is more humdrum, or as they move from a period 
of losses to a period of profits. " 
3.3.2.5. Case Study in an Unexploited Area of Management 
Researchers have recently recognized that there is a gap in the area of strategic planning 
and management studies in the public sector. As Bryson (1988, p. 23) pointed out, "it 
should be noted that careful test of corporate-style strategic planning in the public 
and non profit sectors are few in numbers". Shrivastava (1987), assessing the rigour 
and usefulness of a sample of research programs in the field of strategic management, 
conducted an extensive review in the literature. He reported that in the areas classified 
as strategic management of non-profit organisations and public policy no research 
program was found (Wortman, 1988). 
When employing the term "societal strategy', introduced by Ansoff (1984), the case 
study of a public enterprise firm provides a unique opportunity to unveil its domain of 
application. Societal strategy, is defined as the combination of the aspirations of 
different powerful groups, within the firm, and of environmental pressures. Such an 
approach to strategy requires a method that is equipped to provide an understanding of 
the perceptions of business of the people involved, the political process by which these 
are implemented, of socio-political trends that have impacted on the firm. In Ansoffs 
words: "Dealing with societal problems is very different from dealing with business 
opportunities. On the level of understanding this requires a recognition of the many 
different perceptions, points of view, and different ideologies which different 
influential groups bring to their interaction with the firm" (Ansoff, 1984, p. 150). 
The five criteria mentioned indicate that the case selected fits into the nature of the 
research questions. This public firm in which strategy is defined and elaborated by an the 
power groups involved offers a unique inducement to describing and explaining a 
complex phenomenon in context. 
3.3.3. Revealing Processes of Change 
As Pettigrew (1985) has pointed out "when strategic change does occur it tends to 
occur in radical packages -revolutionary periods interspersed with long periods of 
absorbing the impact of the radical changes, of further periods of increment 
adjustment and then a period of education, persuasion and conditioning leading up 
to the next revolutionary break' (preface xix). Therefore, time itself sets a frame of 
reference within which changes are perceived and explained. 
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Moreover, social processes are not sequential routines, where linear relationships could 
model a causal explanation. Behind them, a variety and mixture of causes of changes is 
concealed. Thus, to explore some of the conditions and contexts under which these 
mixtures occur, requires a longitudinal design and a carefully planned data collection 
from both the external and the internal environment of the firm. In this sense, strategy 
implementation, being itself a process, is seen and analysed over time at three different 
but interrelated levels. 
(1) At the level of outcome. The strategic plan implementation is seen, here, as a 
stream of decisions which triggered a continuous interdependent sequence of actions. All 
the decisions made by the Board over the examined period of nine years were gathered 
and classified chronologically. It should be noted that there was a small set of decisions 
that were not followed by immediate action. The execution of such decisions that 
required ratification at a higher (ministerial) level was usually considerably delayed. 
Wherever possible, these lags between decisions and the relevant actions were identified 
and commended upon. 
(2) At the level of the decision -makers. The decision -makers' perceptions of the 
strategic decisions, and their interpretations, are the focus at this level. The factors 
(organizational or environmental) which influenced the strategic decisions are to be 
mapped in order to display their articulation, and then analysed in order to decipher the 
rules of their combination. 
(3) At the level of the business/socioeconomic environment. An attempt is made 
here to present the variability of conditions in terms of principal business, political, 
social and economic factors, over the period studied. It is recognised, that the task is 
complicated, for, political social and economic factors are interrelated, thus, their origin 
seems sometimes blurred. However, it is these external conditions, their dynamics, and 
their perceived impact on the part of the firm's strategists, that provide one of the poles 
of the present study. 
3.4. THEORY BUILDING 
3.4.1. Connecting the Micro and Macro Levels 
The case study used two sources of data; interview accounts, and archival evidence on 
decisions made, enriched with organizational and other information. The aim of this 
final phase is to form hypotheses which would lead to the building of an explanatory 
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theory accounting for the phenomenon under study. This theory should specify the 
relationship among a set of variables or concepts identified in the data. Silverman 
(1985, p. 70) developed an argument with four related strands that reconciliates macro- 
and micro-perspectives which should be addressed in a research: 
1. The opposition between macro- and micro-perspectives (between sociology of 
large-scale social structures and of interaction respectively) has been fundamental 
to how many sociologists have conceived and located their work. 
2. It is misleading to assume that a fundamental choice must be made between 
these perspectives. While research data are often mainly gathered at either a 
structural or at an interactional level, sound analysis and intelligent 
conceptualization requires that both levels (and their relations) should be 
addressed. 
3. The rapprochement between macro- and micro-perspectives cannot be 
achieved by approaches which assume that micro-phenomena can be reduced to 
macro-structures or vice versa. Nonetheless, although the levels cannot be 
reduced to one another, each presupposes the other. 
4. As argued earlier, there is no future in "pure" sociologies of meaning or of 
structures. Individual elements need to be identified but analysis always centres 
on their articulation within a network of relations. 
In this study, a proper understanding of actors' meaning of strategy (based on the set of 
identified strategic decisions) is to be followed by identifying the processes of 
interpretation through which the strategists reproduce "social structures" 
(socioeconomic factors, balance of power) and sometimes change them, in line with 
Pettigrerw's (1985) "contextualist approach" for studying social processes in context: 
"This approach recognizes that processes are both constrained by structures and 
shape structures, either in the direction of preserving them or altering them". In the 
past, structural analywes emphasising abstract dimensions and contextual constraints 
have been regarded as incompatible with processual analyses stressing action and 
strategic conduct. Here an attempt is being made to combine these two forms of 
description and analysis. First of all, by conceptualising structure and context not just 
as a barrier to action but as essentially involved in its production (Giddens, 1979; 
Ranson et al. 1980), and second by demonstrating how aspects of structure and 
context are mobilised or activated by actors and groups as they seek to obtain 
outcomes important to them" (Pettigrerw, 1985, p. 37). 
75 
The guide-lines along which this study will be seeking to explain the phenomenon under 
study are the following: 
First, a classification of decisions made by the board is to be produced. This 
classification led to a list of 42 decision-areas encompassing an decisions 
analysed. The collection and investigation of this formal documentary evidence 
will provide hints upon which the questions of the interview phase will be based 
at least in its beginning. Also maps will be produced depicting the patterns of 
decisions-areas over time. 
Second an illumination of strategists' perceptions of the "strategic" decisions (via 
cognitive mapping) will take place and their perspective in viewing strategy will 
be articulated. The relationships among the different groups that constitute the 
Board of the focal enterprise (management, labour force, and government) win 
be identified, as well as other characteristics of the boardmembers will be 
detected in an attempt to sensitize the analysis by creating guidelines along which 
it may proceed. 
Third, the above two data sources will be used to generate concepts on which 
propositions will be based. Finally a conceptual model about strategies and 
strategists is to be built implementation process and the strategists' rationales. 
The means for achieving this task is analytic induction and is presented in the following 
section. 
3.4.2. Analytic Induction 
As described by Denzin (1978), analytic induction is a method of analysis which is used 
to make inferences. Analytic induction means that the patterns, themes categories, and 
finally relationships identified between the concepts involved, all have derived from the 
data. Denzin (1978, p. 195) established the following sequence of stages to incorporate it 
to the research design. 
1. A rough definition of the phenomenon to be explained is formulated. 
2. An hypothetical explanation of that phenomenon is formulated. 
3. One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis with the object of 
determining whether or not the hypothesis fits the facts in that case. 
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4. If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is formulated, or 
the phenomenon to be explained is redefined, so that the case is excluded. 
5. Practical certainty may be attained after a small number of cases has been 
examined, but the discovery of negative cases disproves the explanation and 
requires reformulation. 
6. This procedure of examining cases, redefining the phenomenon, and 
reformulating the hypothesis is continued until a universal relationship is 
established, each negative case calling for a redefinition or a reformulation. 
Bogdan and Taylor (1975) argued from a different perspective that the existence of 
non-supportive cases is not in and of itself sufficient cause to discard an hypothesis. 
According to their view, "coding procedures and criteria are by nature imprecise and 
impressionistic. Thus, it is not unreasonable to learn that some items contradict 
others. Moreover, people are often inconsistent in what they say or what they do as 
they move from one situation to another" (p. 87-88). They suggest that when non- 
supportive cases are carefully scrutinised initial contradictions may not be seen as such 
once proper attention is paid to the situational nature of subjects' perspectives. 
Analytic induction expresses a holistic approach to data evaluation. That is to say, that it 
is not looking for simple statements or for linear relations of isolated variables pulled out 
of their context. This context has always to be referred to, every time a new case is 
examined, is continually present in the process of analysis. Patton (1980, p. 325) has put 
it like that: "It is the ongoing challenge, paradox and dilemma of anaýytic induction 
that we must constantly moving back and forth between the phenomenon and our 
abstractions of it, between the description of what has occurred and our analysis of 
those descriptions, between the complexity of reality and our simplifications of those 
complexities, between the circularities and interdependencies of human activity and 
our need for linear, ordered statements of cause effect". 
Analytic. induction emphasizes two processes that should be present in order valid and 
sound outcomes to be achieved. 
First, when patterns are described, linkages identified, and accompanying explanations 
are furnished, it is essential to look for competing or rival themes or explanations. When 
considering rival hypotheses, there is no need to rush to disprove them. Instead, a more 
fruitful approach is required. Looking for data that support the rival hypotheses, might 
open to the analysis an unexplored path. But even when these data are not there, other 
ways of organising the data should be looked into. It may occur that another 
classification scheme sustains the rival hypotheses. When both are being studied, i. e., 
CH"TER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The second chapter pointed out that, despite the plethora of writings on the role of the 
Board, it is stiff unclear what Boards actually do and how their work is evaluated by 
different groups of stakeholders such as governmental officials, executives, employees, 
and others. To map out Board's decisional activity over a significant time period when a 
major change is getting implemented in the organization would in practical terms help 
highlight the nature of its role. Also the disaggregated type of analysis of views on 
strategy of different Board-members may offer various perspectives concerning this 
concept. Thus, by focusing on the concept of strategy along different decision-areas and 
across different stakeholders, by exploring the dynamics of the relationships between 
them, one would delineate the nature of the Board's strategic contribution and ultimately 
how strategies are actually formed in a public enterprise. 
The chapter consists of two parts: The first part includes a description of the seven stages 
followed by the research in order to achieve its purpose. The second part discusses the 
methodological implications of the research findings. 
4.2. STAGES OF THE PROJECT 
The project involved seven stages which are outlined in this chapter. At each stage, the 
theoretical background is offered, followed by the applied methods and techniques. A list 
of these stages as well as a brief statement of the purpose of each stage is offered below: 
First stage: Background Information (pre-field work): This stage involved the 
collection of information concerning the enterprise's Strategic Plan, that is, the plan 
itself and organisational. reports commending upon the progress of the Plan as weR as 
additional information from external sources. 
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thinking about all logical possibilities that could be considered, and looking for other 
ways of organising data, then the final set of findings will have been tested against a 
rigourous scheme that lends credibility to the explanations yielded. 
Second comes the search for negative cases. By considering instances or cases that they 
do not fit into the pattern already identified, analytic induction rules out hasty 
conclusions and forces for new propositions to be formulated and tested. In Denzin's 
own terms: "In the search for universal propositions, the user of this method seeks 
cases that more severely test a theory, and until the propositions cover every case 
examined, the theory remains incomplete" (Denzin, 1978, p. 27). 
Analytic induction substantiates the logic of theory development. Therefore it was 
assumed that such a method would assist the move from "sensitizinf interview accounts 
to the level of theoretical synthesis described above. The way this method has woven the 
data from the two different sources used is to be presented in Chapter 8. 
3.5. SYNOPSIS 
The present chapter has argued about the appropriateness of the selection of the case 
study method to achieve the research purpose. 
Thus, the case study was selected because two types of processes were to be investigated: 
First, the sequence of events, over a long period, pertaining to the strategy development 
process; and second, the role of the Board-members and their influence on strategy 
development. The latter implies an emphasis on in ter-relation ships and interactions, 
things that were considered important for studying this phenomenon. 
Finally, the ultimate purpose of the research, that is theory-building, concerns the 
organising of the data so as to preserve the holistic and unitary nature of the 
phenomenon being studied. The case study is the technique that best applies to this 
purpose. 
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Second stage: Analyzing Board's Past Decisions: It involved: (1) The classification of 
all the decisions made by the Board and recorded in organizational archives (over the 
period 1980-1988); this classification resulted in a list of 49 decision-areas. (2) The 
construction of histograms, to illustrate the frequency of decisions within these decision- 
areas (streams of actions) over the study's period. The histograms themselves and the 
patterns revealed characterised the flow of the organization's activity in each decision- 
area over time. Strategies were seen as patterns or regularities in these streams and a 
first attempt to trace their origins, the actors involved, and specific details of their 
content was made. 
Third stage: Interviewing the Members of the Board: Over a period of a month, 8 
out of the 9 members of the Board were interviewed. The interviews produced a total of 
20 hours of tape-recorded information. The accounts produced by interview data were 
not to be treated as a simplistic "face-value" information. A further stage in the analysis 
process assisted in the assessment of the validity of the information provided and is 
outlined below. 
Fourth stage: Cognitive Mapping: The understanding of how strategies are perceived 
by the Board-members in a public organization -by analysing strategic thinking in 
context- necessitated the construction of individual maps. An aggregated map comprising 
all the Board-members arguments would not display the richness and the uniqueness of 
the presented individual arguments. Thus, the Board-members' cognitive maps were 
constructed and analysed individually. 
Fifth stage: Matrix Mapping: Most data regarding "strategic" decisions, as they had 
been defined by the decision -makers, were encoded in a format suitable for the 
application of a matrix technique. In a f6flowing meeting, strategists were presented with 
this matrix and were asked, to fill. in values best representing the strength of the 
perceived relationships between the elements involved. It was hypothesized that the 
analysis of these two sources of data (stages 4 and 5) at the strategists' micro-level would 
reveal information (1) about the way in which actors defined their world and 
comprehended important issues, and (2) about the validity of the methodological tool 
employed for the representation of the actors' schematic knowledge. 
Sixth stage: Explaining Individual Data; Looking for Patterns: Stages Four and Five 
dealt with (i) presenting the strategists' cognitive maps at the individual level, (ii) 
revealing the structure of the causal assertions used to identify strategic decisions, and 
(iii) defining the meaning of strategy according to each member of the Board. This sixth 
stage involved: (1) The tracing of patterns across maps, both influence diagrams and the 
maps derived from matrices; (2) Comparisons to reveal similarities and differences. 
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That is, in order to describe what strategists thought about strategy, the chains of 
reasoning depicted in the influence diagrams were used, as well as the cause-effect 
relationships deriving from the matrices. These two data sources were combined and an 
attempt was made to go deeper from the stated rationales to the hidden assumptions 
behind them, to understand why some very important issues to some strategists were 
ignored by other. This aim was based on all empirical evidence in hand, to reveal the 
meaning each strategist assigned to the concept of "strategy'. 
Seventh stage: Theory Building: The case study used two types of data, that is (1) 
Interview accounts, and (2) Documentary sources against background information from 
within and the outside of the enterprise. The aim of this final stage was the building of 
an explanatory theory based on this material. This theory would specify the relationships 
among a set of variables or concepts identified in the data, and would help to advance 
our understanding of the way in which strategies are formed in a public sector 
organisation. 
4.2.1. About Methods 
Methods are the instruments adopted to identify and analyse aspects of the phenomenon 
under study; the value of methods "exists in their suitability in helping achieve this 
task' (Blurner, quoted in Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 6). This research uses a 
variety of methods in order to achieve its objective to understand and explain strategy 
formation processes in a public enterprise. 
Strategy formation will be looked into in relation to what principal actors (the Board- 
members) think about strategy, and what the organization Vicf' in terms of decisions 
taken to implement a major change. Thus processes of change win be analysed "in 
context". These processes will explain why and how the content of particular decisions 
was seen by the members of the main Board as strategic, in relation to factors of the 
business, economic and political environment which characterized the context of this 
particular enterprise over a period of nine years. The important and unusual feature of 
the main Board was the membership of its participants. Senior managers, governmental 
officials and employees' representatives all contributed to making decisions concerning 
the implementation of strategy and it was their perceptions, interactions, as well as 
endeavours for power and control that played an important role for the attainment of any 
results which were sought on the part of the enterprise. 
In detail, the study will explore two linked continuous processes. First, all the decisions 
made by the Board (comprising those referring to the implementation of the strategic 
plan), are examined over a period of nine years (1981-1989). This period was marked by 
substantial changes in the company's internal and external environment, such as changes 
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of political party in power, introduction of a supervisory Board to the enterprise, and the 
participation of employees' representatives in the main Board. Second, patterns of 
strategic decisions, as seen through the eyes of the members of the Board, rationalising 
why some decisions are defined as strategic, will be depicted and analysed. These two 
data sources will be linked in the final stage of the analysis and a number of propositions 
about strategies and their formation will be drawn. 
4.2.2. First Stage: Background Information (Pre-Field Work) 
The first stage involved the collection of background information. Once the research 
problem had been formulated, material concerning the Strategic Plan itself, the 
associated Business Plan, and studies produced over the years for the enterprise by 
external consultants, was collected from the organization's library (employees have free 
access to it). Organisational reports commending upon the progress of the Plan, 
distributed to organization's departments through the Department of Planning and 
Organization were available to me since I was involved with investments proposals 
(concerning the track modernization). 
Information was also obtained from external sources in order to sensitize the research to 
potentially fruitful lines of inquiry during the interpretation of the findings. These 
sources were: 
-A conference organised by the Technical Chamber of Greece in which Board- 
members, officials of the enterprise, representatives of various administrative 
bodies, academics, and the union of transportation engineers, highlighted issues 
facing the firm and stressed the importance of the modernisation of the railway. 
The conference took place towards the end of the pre-field work (April 1989) and 
was tape recorded. 
- The proceedings of a meeting organised by the Department of National Economy 
in which members of the representative bodies and the main Boards of the three 
bigger public enterprises participated, in order to discuss the progress of 
socialisation, its shortcomings and to make proposals for required modifications in 
the existing institutional framework. 
- Some informal interviews with people related to the setting, either in the past or 
during the period of the study; they were either ex-Board-members or 
governmental consultants. 
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Summarised information concerning the enterprise and its strategic plan is contained in 
Appendix A (Organizational Background) and Appendix B (Implementing the 
Strategic Plan). 
4.2.3. Second Stage: Analyzing Board's Past Decisions 
4.2.3.1. Purpose 
The creation of histograms illustrating the frequency of Board's decisions over the 
study's period, concerning different decision-areas, would enable the identification of the 
organization's activity in each decision-area over time. Strategies may be perceived as 
patterns or regularities in these streams of decisions. When existing patterns were 
disrupted, this might indicate that change was initiated. Whether this change was 
intentional, random, or imposed by an external constituent would be inferred in relation 
to how key-people accepted and supported it and turned it to confirmation that 
eventually was indicated by a routinised pattern. This would be further discussed with the 
members of the Board at the interview stage. 
4.2.3.2. Theory 
Conducting an analysis of the Board's decisional activity is directly related to the actions 
the organisation has undertaken. This is because the Board is by law responsible to 
formulate and implement strategy and additionally, in principle, has a perspective broad 
enough to see all the functions in terms of the enterprise's overall aim. The problem is 
that there are also decisions made and actions taken by the Board pertaining to its legal 
responsibilities and ties with administrative bodies. Which way, therefore, can someone 
disentangle strategies from this activity, when it is known that it is through the making of 
the specific decisions that strategies evolve and develop? 
As some researchers and theorists have argued, organization strategy arises through a 
stream of decisions and reflects an aggregate pattern of behaviours that occur over time 
(Mintzberg et al., 1988; Quinn, Mintzberg and Waters, 1988; Fredrickson, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1990). Thus, if strategy is viewed as a composite of sequential decisions, 
then, methodologically, a strategic process research should "concentrate its efforts on 
how organizations make and combine strategic decisions" (Fredrickson, 1983 p. 571). 
Therefore, a method of illuminating graphically the way in which groups of decisions 
(decision -areas) unfolded over time could provide additional hints, as to whether the 
peaks and valleys of these graphs had any correspondence with major events in the 
organizational and external environments. as Mintzberg (1990, p. 184) puts it, "the 
organizations must function not only with strategy, but also durin periods of the 
formulation and reformulation of strategy which cannot happen instantaneously'. 
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Mintzberg's view is that strategy does not appear at a point in time, My formulated and 
ready to be implemented. Rather important aspects of strategy formation, including 
incrementalism and emergent strategy, need to be elaborated in various contexts. 
Furthermore, as Pinfield (1986) has argued, where there are multiple issues and 
participants, adaptation will occur more as a consequence of application exercises that 
expose norms, which then guide the thousands of small actions that constitute regular 
operations. He notes that "for example, if in any one year there are approximately 300 
staffing decisions in a senior executive group, each represents a small opportunity to 
reflect marginally changed norms. Coflectively, over one or two years, the effect could 
be substantial -even though no overt decision was made to accomplish such a change" 
(p. 384). 
4.2.3.3. The Applied Technique 
Permission to use the records of the Board's decisions was granted easily, due to the help 
given to the author by the Assistant General Manager. 
All the decisions made by the Board and recorded in organizational archives (over the 
period 1980-1988) were classified in two sequential stages. First, the decision headings as 
taken from the documents were used and this produced a set of 98 decision headings. At 
the second stage, these decision headings were classified into decision-areas. A set of 39 
decision-areas was thus constructed. 
There were several reasons for using this specific documentary evidence to examine 
whether it exhibits patterning: (1) These documents are provided for organizational use 
since they render Board's executable decisions; thus, they are strictly accurate since they 
will be subjected to a great deal of organizational scrutiny. (2) They have a standardized 
format which consists of: (a) the date in which a certain decision was taken; (b) the 
decision -heading; (c) a brief description of its content where there is mentioning of the 
department(s) that initiated it; (d) the decision outcome, that is the ratification or the 
rejection of the proposal; and (e) authorization to the General Manager or to Heads of 
Departments for further actions. (3) These documents could be considered as "neutraf' 
since no causal reasoning is included and they do not aim at convincing external parties 
(Government, the public, etc). 
As said before, the classification of decisions proceeded in two stages. The criteria for 
this second classification derived from the system of authorization which described the 
accountabilities and responsibilities of Departments and Boards in the enterprise. To 
strengthen the reliability of the second classification, a second coder (a PhD student at 
the Cranfield Centre for Transport Studies) performed the same task. The intercoder 
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re 'ability reached a level of 80%. Because of the differences encountered, a decision was 
made to increase the final set of decision-areas by also including those over which no 
agreement was achieved. The result was a list of 49 decision-areas which in a simple form 
was to be presented to the strategists during the interview phase (stage three) of the 
project, in order to extract the ones that each Board-member perceived as strategic. 
Histograms were created to illustrate the frequency of decisions within the identified 
decision-areas (streams of actions) over the study's period. The histograms and the 
patterns revealed characterised the flow of the organization's activity in each decision- 
area over time. Strategies were seen as patterns or regularities in these streams and a 
first attempt to trace their origins, changes in their patterns, and specific details of their 
content was made. It should be pointed out that the decisions examined did not only 
refer to final choices but usually included all the development activity that preceded (i. e., 
set up a committee to gather information on a topic, etc. ). When existing patterns were 
disrupted, this might indicate that change was initiated. Whether this change was 
intentional, random, or imposed by an external constituent would be inferred in relation 
to how key people accepted and supported it and turned it to confirmation that 
eventually was indicated by a routinised pattern. 
The issue of making decisions is presented here in terms of different areas involved and 
of different patterns of activities within these areas. The outcome of this stage of the 
project is contained in Chapter 5 (Analysing information on the Board's decisions; 
Interpreting the Board's functioning). Appendix D (Coding information from the 
Board's records) contains the processed material. 
4.2.4. Third Stage: Interviewing the Members of the Board 
4.2.4.1. Purpose 
Purpose of this stage was to address the meanings attached to strategic decisions by the 
Board-members. This stage adopted an interpretive perspective of organizational 
decision-making and presented the way in which interviews with the Board-members 
were conducted. 
4.2.4.2. Theory 
4.2.4.2.1 'Tracing the Meaning of Actors' Perceptions 
The qualitative research literature, by depicting the actors' point of view, stresses the 
importance of revealing the actors' personal worlds and describing them. Numerous 
studies support the argument that the meaning of a concept is not inherent in it; rather, 
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the actors actively construct their reality by selectively attending to some issues while 
ignoring other. Those selected are subsequently interpreted and infused with meanings 
(Kielsler and Sproull, 1982; Daft and Weick, 1984; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
First-hand contact with people and setting concerned is a valuable undertaking. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) argued about the expressive power of language in 
providing descriptions, explanations, and evaluations of almost any aspect of this world. 
Although they defined context only in terms of the account's context (who produced it, 
for whom and why), they emphasized the importance of commitment to the use of 
accounts which would reveal not only information about their content, but, also, the 
perspective through which they have been brought up. In their own terms: "Accounts are 
also important, though, for what they tell us about those who produce them. We can 
use the accounts gfven by people as evidence of the perspectives of particular groups 
or categories of actors to which they belong. Indeed, knowledge of these perspectives 
may form an important element of the theory being developed.. Separating the 
question of the truth or falsity of people's beliefs, as currently assessed, from the 
analysis of those beliefs as social phenomena, allows us to treat participant 
knowledge as both resource and topic" (p. 106-107). 
The assumption that underlies this stage of the research is that the Board-members' 
accounts are real. In the same vein, Silverman (1985) regarded interview data as 
"displays of cultural realities". His position is grounded on "realism" that considers the 
"social context" and individuals' perceptions as entities that are not reducible to one 
another. The accounts of persons whose experience is under investigation exhibit the 
patterning or combinations of elements stemming from their own cognitive universes. 
Insiders' knowledge would reveal cultural forms and their functioning and provide a 
ground from which to look further for other social norms or practices. 
This study, dealing with the Board of a public organisation, deals in essence with 
individuals that may have multiple characteristics. These characteristics may vary 
significantly across members (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), either because of their 
different occupations within the same organization or because of the kind of training 
they have experienced (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). Given their individuality, the 
Board-members may bring somewhat unique perspectives to processes used to guide the 
organisation (Ireland et al., 1987). 
4.2.4.2.2. Problems Associated with Actors'Accounts 
Though participant-recall is the dominant method for studying decision-making 
processes, Wolfe and Jackson (1987) noted that strategic decisions are difficult to 
grasp because they are protracted, are often made in groups of shifting sizes and 
compositions, and are often the results of a series of other decisions made in different 
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parts of the organization. Schwenk (1988) and Huber and Power (1985) have outlined 
several invalidating features emanating from either the interviewee or the interviewer in 
the data-gathering stage. Within the interviewee's memory process, there lies a tendency 
to simplify, invent, rationalize and conventionalize past actions. Subjects use to simplify 
the pictures or word-stories to which they were exposed while adding unique material 
that brings their final remembrances into agreement with pre-set attitudes and beliefs. 
The ambiguities, complexities and time-spans involved in the strategic decision-making 
process render those tendencies even more exaggerated. The strategic decision -maker's 
environment is far less deterministic than the one faced in the organization's operating 
level and any number of known, unknown and emerging causal relationships can exist 
within an organization. Wolfe and Jackson (1987), reviewing the literature, noted the 
following features attributed to strategists' recall: (1) They restructure their recollections 
to enhance their own positions while weakening the positions of their opponents. (2) 
They over-estimate their efficacy (unless they fail). (3) They engage in wishful thinking. 
(4) Their recollections are influenced by the phenomena of inconsistency, reduction, 
causal simplification, imaginative reconstruction, and pure memory failure. 
Considering the interview as a type of social interaction, Jones (1985) argued that the 
actions the respondents take (what data, for example, they give the researcher) depend 
on the meaning and significance they attribute to the particular research situations they 
are in. In the same way, people develop over their lives a personal framework of beliefs 
and values with which they selectively and subjectively build meaning and significance in 
events. It is this framework or schema and its "real consequences" for action that the 
qualitative research is interested in learning about. 
Thus, she suggested that a central part of the theoretical framework a researcher applies 
when preparing for, and indeed analysing, depth interviews, must be the awareness of the 
factors which affect the data the interviewees provide. Human beings present different 
personae in different situations, to different audiences. In the giving of accounts to 
others, they are concerned not only with "inteffigfbility -making their actions 
comprehensive- but also "warrantibility' -the legitimation of action and the presentation 
of a credible and legitimate "self'. She described possible interviewees' behaviours 
ranging from masking the important issues or treating the researcher with a defensive 
and antagonistic manner, to presenting an image of dutiful intelligent citizen that pleases 
the researcher by saying what they think (s)he wants to hear. She recommended essential 
skills on the part of the interviewer in order to overcome these difficulties. Expression of 
interest, encouragement and warmth by eye contact or facial expression coupled with 
enough time and space for answering so the respondents may feel confidently 
(Spraddley, 1979). 
87 
Moreover, by listening to what seems to be significant to the respondents in the research 
topic and explore this further, the researcher is well equipped to positively respond to 
unforeseen situations. Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, call it "the reflexive 
interviewing' and argue that the researcher should be aware of the data that alert he or 
she has misread significance and could change the line of probing. It is needed to know 
how to judge when someone is getting data that are off the track of what is interested in, 
be sure that one is not just making this judgement on the basis of his own preconceptions 
and missing data that are relevant to the research topic as construed by the respondents; 
and then how to bring them back gently. It is necessary to check meaning when one is not 
sure that has understood and not assume too quickly that has understood. And finally, to 
think very carefully about the types of people that are to be interviewed, the likely range 
of their experiences and possible responses and adapt the approach and self-presentation 
appropriately. 
Interviewing "elites", that is people with power, presents additional difficulties. Such 
people (and this is the case in this specific study) being appointed or elected to their 
posts have considerable social and political skills and are often unwilling to reveal 
personal and political data to others. As Cannell and Kahn (1968) argued, getting 
access to and being taken seriously by such persons is clearly helped by being of equal 
status and/or by appropriate self-presentation by the researcher. 
4.2.4.3. The Applied Method. Asking Questions 
4.2.4.3.1. Sample Design 
In this study, the whole population of the decision-makers concerned with the 
implementation of the strategic plan was selected. This population consisted of three 
different groups; employees' representatives, senior managers, and governmental 
officials. The sample size (nine people) permitted a detailed analysis to be conducted at 
the individual level (Chapter 6). Because of the high status (in terms of organisational 
hierarchy) of the people involved, a decision was made to conduct individual, in depth, 
semi-structured interviews instead of group discussions or group interviews. A further 
consideration was that the research project was undertaken during a highly sensitive pre- 
electoral period which might have influenced the arguments expressed in a group 
discussion and turn them into statements stemming from political confrontation or 
ideological differences. 
4.2.4.3.2. Background Knowledge, and Interviewees Identity 
The preliminary interviews conducted in the field (with the Assistant General Manager), 
that is before beginning the actual data collection phase, helped the author to generate 
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many cues as to how to design the interview process with the strategists. It was then that 
she decided to conduct individual interviews since she understood that political tensions 
were great in the outset because of the forthcoming elections and the accusations against 
the political party in power. A rough idea about the characteristics of those to be 
interviewed was also shaped, based on the Assistant General Manager's comments about 
them. His comments were centred mostly on the employees' representatives and their 
negative role on the Board and this was surprising since his position in favour of this 
institution (before it got established) was well known. In the rare cases he mentioned 
state officials, he spoke about them in a rather favourable view, though he did not 
provide details about specific activities they had undertaken as members of the Board. 
On the other hand, referring to the acting General Manager, he noted his strengths and 
weaknesses and pointed out to the benefits that the organization might acquire if the 
General Manager's initiative would finally get through. In the preliminary interviews it 
was found that what seemed to bother the Assistant General Manager at most was the 
selection, on the part of trade unions, of the employees' representatives (to be included 
on the voting list) which was -in his view- below any expectations, as far as their 
competencies were concerned. 
The Assistant General Manager's views were not taken for granted. However, they 
alerted the author to inquire about roles of the various groups, as well as about 
interactions between them, in order to delineate the Board's behaviour and decision- 
making conduct and to improve her knowledge of the setting. 
Being an insider and having the Assistant General Manager's agreement on conducting 
this research, the author was introduced by him to the General Manager who showed the 
same positive attitude towards it. All these, helped the author to gain access to 
organizational archives and, in a way, to strategists, though it did not automatically 
increase co-operation with governmental officials nor with employees' representatives. 
The author had to overcome difficulties similar to those encountered by any other 
interviewer and reported in the literature, and had she not been equipped with ways to 
cope with various situations, the interview would have exhibited serious flaws. 
4.2.4.3.3. The Selection of the Physical Setting 
Because the physical setting might influence the data collected, and because one of the 
author's intentions was to make the respondents feel at ease, she arranged for the 
interviews to be undertaken individually, in settings familiar to them. For managers and 
employees' representatives it was the organization's headquarters, while for 
administrators their offices in ministries or consultancy firms. As it turned out, 
interviews with employees' representatives proved the most difficult of all since there 
were too many interruptions, on the part of other employees who frequently entered the 
89 
room asking for some favour or discussing some organizational matters casually. 
Employees' representatives seemed to consider these interruptions -despite their 
frustration shown sometimes openly- as necessary, part of a process that offered them 
recognition of their status as well as an opportunity to get informed on issues that 
otherwise would remain unknown to them. However, the type of problems that they were 
dealing with was so narrow, that one might wonder whether this was an appropriate 
conduct for a decision-maker participating in the enterprise's Board or for a unionist 
looking not to dissatisfy his electorate. In one case, as a result of this situation, the 
interview had to be repeated in the same place on a Sunday morning. 
4.2.4.3.4. GettingAccess 
The issue of getting access in the setting was resolved easily as far as meetings with 
managers and employees' representatives were concerned. On the other hand, both 
governmental officials held a rather "closed' attitude in the author's first attempts to 
approach them, invoking various reasons for not granting access. The author had to ask 
to be introduced to them by organizational members that were associated with them. For 
instance, an organizational member -with whom the author had a very good collaboration 
when conducting a technical study- who was participating on the Board of the Technical 
Chamber of Greece (one of the governmental officials was also a member on that Board) 
introduced the author to him and gave strong references. After that, the author managed 
to arrange for a meeting with him quite easily. 
One of the explanations for the administrators' attitude might be the sensitive period in 
which the research was carried out. As stated before, the government had come under 
attack from a considerable part of the press accusing it of involvement in economic 
scandals. State officials may have feared that questions asked by an "unknown" 
researcher and on an unknown topic might have been troublesome. Therefore, they 
necessitated those references on the part of the people that asked for their collaboration 
with the author. 
This draws attention to a particular problem of access to high-status people who 
represent powerful constituencies and shows how matters that are outside the 
researcher's control may intrude, and affect the process of getting access. 
4.2.4.3.5. Conducting the Interviews 
Over a period of a month, eight out of the nine members of the Board were interviewed 
and all but one accepted to have their interviews tape-recorded. The interviews produced 
a total of 20 hours of tape-recorded information. 
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(i). Gaining Acceptance and Communicating Research Objectives 
Having obtained access to the setting, the'author proceeded to the interview design. 
When entering the interview phase, she had two objectives in mind: (1) To state the 
research purpose in clear, though not wide, terms; and (2) To let strategists develop 
freely their arguments and to be able to follow tines of inquiry that might be revealed 
from them. Necessary condition for all these was the establishment of a rapport with the 
strategists that would create an atmosphere conducive to openness. 
To achieve this, the author had to gain their trust and to minimize her influence on the 
production of data by monitoring it, and as far as possible, by bringing strategists' 
reactivity under control (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). 
Also, the author was equipped with two things when she started conducting interviews: 
(1) She had a list containing 49 decision-areas, that is the list which derived from the 
analysis of the Board's decisions. (2) She had a list of issues to be discussed; this list was 
a result of (a) the study of the organizational plans and reports, and (b) some informal 
meetings she had with the Assistant General Manager. 
In order to deal with the first objective, when conducting the interviews, the author 
stated from the beginning the aim of her research in wide terms, because she felt that it 
would confuse things if she stated her interest in studying the way organizational 
strategies form; thus, the author decided to inform them that she was studying the 
implementation of the modernization plan inaugurated in 1980 and she concentrated her 
attention on decisions taken by the Board. She also thanked them for giving her, in the 
past, the opportunity to start to conduct this research and, now, the possibility to 
conclude it by studying the implementation of a real plan in the under-researched public 
sector. 
Establishing rapport with the strategists was facilitated by the expression of the author's 
gratitude for offering her the opportunity to conduct postgraduate studies in the railway 
management field (aH leaves, either educational or other, have to be granted by the 
Board). The casual exchange of information on the progress of the author's studies 
helped "break the ice" and created a friendly atmosphere. 
(j . i). Asking Questions 
Dealing with the second objective, the author followed the following process. In the 
beginning of the interview, the questions were of a general nature, such as: 
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-" Co uld yo u describe a typical session of th e Boa rd ?' 
-" What does the agenda usually contain 2"' 
"W T' ho usuafly introduces the decisions to the Board? In which waY 
"W hich way the Board reaches a decision? Is consensus desirable 2"' 
"W hat do you think, in general, about the Board's reorganisation and the 
employees' participation ?" 
The aim was to enable Board-members to talk about what was of concern to them, 
without forcing them to respond to the author's preconceptions or interests. Thus, when 
an issue that seemed to be especially sensitive arose, then the inquiry centred its interest 
to it as well. As the interview was proceeding the questions became more specific and 
focused on the list containing the 49 decision-areas which was presented to them. The 
following questions illustrate this point: 
- "Could you give me an idea what these decision-areas are concerned with? ' 
- "Would you say that a decision-area contributed positively or otherwise to the 
entire process of implementation? ' 
- "In your opinion, which decision-areas are the most important ones, the ones that 
you would define as strategic, and why? ' 
hat are the factors that most influenced the strategic decisions you identified "W 
earlier7' 
-"Would you say that a (certain) factor is located in the organization's environment? " 
hich do you think are the repercussions of a (certain) decision-area "W 
The following sections describe in detail the problems experienced by the author, when 
facing the problem of reactivity, and argue that sometimes this cannot be eradicated; 
instead, it should be reflected upon and further steps in the data collection phase should 
be undertaken, providing additional tests on them. 
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hi) Problems Encountered During Some Interview Processes 
(a) Controlled Phases of the Interview. The Issue of Inequality 
One of the state officials seemed reluctant to discuss in length and deliberately resisted 
to detail her short answers. Though she answered most of the questions directly, she 
preferred to close up the interview rather quickly, recommending the author to meet 
other people from within the ministry, specialised in strategic planning. Despite the fact 
that the author explained to her that it was not the opinion of experts that interested her 
but of people involved in the real process of making decisions, she hardly changed her 
attitude. Since this case was the only one encountered, warrants further discussion. As 
the nature of the questions that were asked did not touched the private world of this 
respondent, one may assume that this sense of alienation was due to a fear that her 
statements could be monitored by someone whose knowledge in the field could be 
superior to hers and who was also an organizational member too. The fact that the 
author was conducting doctoral studies in the field might have created an atmosphere 
where one party (of the same gender too) felt unequal, because the author had not 
expressed any opinion about her statements during the interview. The problem of 
inequality was also raised by Denzin (1977) who noted that these feelings during 
interaction between an interviewer and a subject may create sources of invalidity. The 
final section of this chapter describes the way the author used to deal with this issue. 
(b) On Vague Statements and Loose Interest 
There were times that vague statements were received on the part of the respondents. 
That occurred when strategists tended to end suddenly a line of inquiry -especially when 
modernization works were at issue- by saying "Oh! All that is already known to youlf, 
meaning probably that the author's occupational and professional background were 
enough to help her understand it. At this point, she had to stop and make clear the fact 
that it was their view that was essential to her and not anybody else's, and that surely 
their perspective might be different since they had a wider view of the organization. 
Other times, when other topics were involved, the author asked more questions, in order 
to clarify their statements, or she pin-pointed to contradictions (in a gentle way), in 
order not to let strategists provide forged explanations. 
Other times, the strategists were losing interest in some questions. This occurred when 
financial topics were involved, that is budgets and procurement policies. It seemed that a 
routine process was at issue which did not attract any more their attention. The author 
used to leave the question unanswered at this point though she attempted to motivate a 
reply in a later point of the interview, by slightly paraphrasing it. 
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4.2.4.3.6. Other Features that Might Have Invalidated the Data 
(1) On Recall Validity 
Researchers have outlined several features that might invalidate the evidence collected. 
Within the interviewee's memory process there lies a tendency to simplify, invent, 
rationalize and conventionalize past actions (Schwenk, 1985). Also, interviewees tend 
to "simplify the pictures and word stories to which they were exposed while adding 
unique material that brought their final remembrances into agreement with their 
pre-set attitudes and beliefs" (Wolfe and Jackson, 1987: p. 124). Moreover, this 
tendency can be more exaggerated when people attempt to remember how strategic 
decisions were made, because of the ambiguities, complexity and time spans involved in 
the process (Wolfe and Jackson, 1987). 
To compensate for memory failures and distortions, this study incorporated into the 
interview design questions covering a wide range of factors that might have affected 
strategy ("aided recall", in Wolfe and Jackson's term) which with a special caution (not 
in the form of leading questions) were asked to the strategists. Evidence collected 
through the organizational archives, the preliminary interviews with the Assistant 
General Manager, all helped create a pool that catered for these research questions. 
(ii) On JustificationslExplanations 
Reasoning processes represent an unknown combination of attempts for justification and 
explanation (Bettman and Weitz, 1983). The difficulty consists in that one should 
disentangle the two when looking for accurate attributions. In this study, there were two 
reasons that might have helped to overcome the problem. The first was that because the 
author was an insider, the desire to be accurate on the part of strategists may have 
prevailed, since they thought that her knowledge of the organization (derived from her 
previous experience and her engagement in the research) would subject their attributions 
to scrutiny, might have functioned as an alert to them. Furthermore, because the author 
informed the Board-members, in the beginning of any interview, of her intentions to 
interview the whole Board, this might made them aware of the likelihood that their 
statements might be contradicted by others, leading thus to accurately gauging the causes 
of the strategic decisions. 
Yet, by the same token, one may argue that awareness that their attributions might be 
subjected to scrutiny, either by the researcher or other members, is likely to have given 
rise to a concern to ensure the plausibility of the causes given in their self-serving 
attributions. In other words, the strategists might have used lines of reasoning that 
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alleviated them from responsibilities (ego-defensiveness plays an important role in that 
case). 
To deal with this possibility, when the author judged intuitively whether a justification 
was provided, she paraphrased the question and asked it again in a later instance. When 
the same answer was given, this enhanced the chances that what had been given in the 
first place was an explanation. Otherwise, the topic concerned and the answers provided 
were treated as a field of inferences about roles and behaviour. 
4.2.4.3.7 Checks on the Data 
This final section concerning the interview phase deals with the checks the author 
carried on the strategists' accounts that she considered as inefficient or short. Analysing 
data for the effects of the researcher is not a simple matter since the impact that any 
other audience the actor might be addressing consciously and subconsciously should be 
included (Harnmersley and Atkinson 1983). The author concentrated her attention on 
the interview account produced by the state official who exhibited the lesser receptivity. 
Because the account produced was too short she looked for another source of 
information as a means to comprehend this issue. She used the Board's minutes of the 
two preceding years which transcribed the Board's sessions. As revealed, the contribution 
of this Board-member to the discussions on the Board was minimal. In the rare 
instances, she addressed an issue, she usually followed the Assistant General Manager's 
proposals. Therefore, the short answers of her interview were not taken as an invalid 
characteristic of the interview; they were rather seen as a characteristic of decision 
making-processes which occurred on this Board. 
4.2.4.3.8. Evaluating the Recorded Information 
The accounts produced by interview data were not treated as a simplistic "face-value" 
information (Patton, 1980; Jones, 1985; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). A further 
stage in the analysis process assisted in the assessment of the validity of the information 
provided. The rationales about strategic decisions and their context were presented in 
cognitive maps that enabled the author to deduce the ways in which biases of one kind or 
another may have intruded in this source of information. Cognitive maps, given the 
number and the positioning of concepts within chains of reasoning, help to decipher the 
meaning of the strategy concept by focusing on the study of their articulation. Thus, by 
treating respondents' knowledge both as resource and topic along the dimensions of 
providing information and unfolding "perspective" analysis, this study assessed two 
separate lines; (1) people's beliefs, and (2) the analysis of those beliefs as social 
phenomena (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). 
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The outcome of this third stage of the project is summarised in Appendix E (Rationale 
for Links) and constituted the material to be processed for the construction of the 
cognitive maps that followed at the next'stage. An "in context' explanation of the 
individuals' data (that is an explanation in which the Board-members' background is 
highlighted as weU as further information not represented in the maps but stemming 
from the interviews) is offered in Chapter 7 (section 7.2). 
4.2.5. Fourth Stage: Cognitive Mapping 
4.2.5.1. Introduction 
So far, the preceding sections of this chapter have examined the processes of obtaining 
secondary data, entering the field, and gathering primary data from in-depth interviews 
(Figure 4.1). In this and the following section, the techniques (tools) used for analysing 
these data are described. It should be emphasised that in this case "data analysis and 
interpretation" are intertwined concepts which aim at making sense out of the evidence 
in hand. This results in identifying themes by highlighting relationships between 
concepts, as they are suggested by the data. Stages Four and Five deal with the 
techniques adopted and argue about their appropriateness. Stages Six and Seven refer to 
the results of the analysis. 
4.2.5.2. Purpose 
The purpose of this stage was to understand how strategies are perceived by the Board- 
members in a public organization. This involved analysing strategic thinking in context 
and was made possible by the construction of individual cognitive maps. As researchers 
have noted, in a quantitative technique, this stage would correspond to the statistical 
operations applied on data that has been classified using a particular codification 
(Cossette et Audet, 1992). 
4.2.5.3. Theory 
4.2.5.3.1. Introduction 
Cognitive maps are graphic representations providing frames of reference for what is 
known and believed (Fiol and Huff, 1992), locating people in relation to their 
informational environment. Researchers argue that a cognitive map is not intended to 
reflect the way of the subjects' thinking (Eden, 1992; Cossette et Audet, 1992), but 
rather to structure and simplify thoughts and beliefs, to make sense of them, and to 
communicate information about them (Fiol and Huff, 1992). 
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A cognitive map is a serniotic product and not the expression of an objective reality to 
which an individual's account corresponds. Also, it is a product that is partial since an 
individual has a limited cognitive capacity (Axelrod, 1976; Weick, 1979) and partisan 
because the aspects of this reality that are unknown to him are dependent on the 
characteristics of this individual and on the schemata of interpretation and expression 
that he already possesses (Cossette et Audet, 1992; Rol and Huff, 1992). 
STRATEGISTS' ACCOUNTS 
(interviews and matrices) 
strategist A 
strategist B 
strategist Z 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
- strategic plan 
- decisions of the Boardmembers 
DATA BASE 
What the strategists say in 
terms of the strategic decisions. 
What influential factors they 
perceived as impacting upon them. 
-How strong these factors were. 
ORGANIZATION 
- Performance 
- Structure 
- Resources 
Figure 4.1: Fitting data-sources and questions into the studys framework 
Huff (1989) pointed out to the wide range of topics in strategic management that have 
been explored through cognitive mapping and suggested that the focus should be on the 
subjects for which cognitive maps provide the greatest insight. According to her view, 
this technique is suitable for studying topics that are intrinsically cognitive and for 
explaining variance that is unexplained by other methods. 
Apart from the use of cognitive mapping in management science, other disciplines also 
recognise the need to depict relationships between elements of interest. Modern 
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linguistics, a scientific discipline interested in the relations (articulations) of words 
(elements) in a language (system), rejects the view that language should be concerned 
with the correspondence between individual words and their meaning and it favours a 
relational view stressing the system of relations between words as the source of meaning. 
Mental representations of problems, issues, choices, and organizational environments, 
have been the subject of attention in psychology (Kelly's repertory grid is a widely used 
technique) and political science (Axelrod; 1976). 
Researchers interested in the nature of processes of change (whether they are stable and 
routine processes or disorderly ones) have simultaneously considered three themes: (1) 
The contribution of multiple actors to decision -making; (2) The simultaneous existence 
and potential interaction of many different issues requiring the decision -makers' 
attention; and (3) The changing nature of "what's at issue", as the decision context itself 
evolves over time (Huff and Pondy, 1984). Their methodology was based on cognitive 
mapping and the final outcome can be seen as a depiction of "whole chains of logic" and 
the changes in the structure identified provided the basis to draw conclusions. 
Other researchers (Eden et al., 1979; Eden et al., 1992) argued that cognitive mapping 
is a strong tool that may assist consultants explore policy-makers' thinking (that is, all the 
beliefs they have about the world in which they are making policy) and then to alter this 
cognitive reality. Models created permit the policy-maker to scrutinise his theories at 
three consecutive levels, leading finally the analysis to the exploration of "matters of 
interest' rather than to events and their consequences. 
While Eden et al. (1979) used cognitive mapping to base their self-learning activity, 
Mason and Mitroff (1981) argued that cognitive maps may constitute a framework for 
argumentation analysis. Drawing on the work of Toulmin (1958), this framework would 
aim at surfacing the strategic assumptions (held by different stakeholders) and 
challenging them. Their main point was that in most organizations the structure of an 
argument is not contained within a single person. Thus, one dominant individual or 
group may literally own or control some of the backings or warrants (e. g. a belief in 
certain underlying business principles or expertise in statistical or accounting 
procedures); another group may control the data (e. g. market research data) while still 
another may control the claims (e. g. preferred policy outcomes) that derive neither from 
the data nor from the warrants of the other groups, e. g. the Board of directors. In their 
view, the proposed framework can serve as a paradigm for studying topics such as 
organisational communication, information flow, and power. 
Researchers interested in the practical concerns of managers develop cognitive maps 
that may assist the latter in examining and improving managerial judgement over time. 
Most important, graphic representations help to divorce ideas from specific speeches, 
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making them more accessible to debate and modification (Fiol and Huff, 1992). Thus, 
actors make sense of changing environments and update the context in which decisions 
will have to be made. "The maps in that case are the means by which change is 
detected or are the intervention tools that facilitate this change in appropriate ways" 
(Fiol and Huff, 1992; p. 274). 
Other researchers study decision makers' cognitions and motivations and their impact on 
the processing of issues and the types of organizational actions taken in response to 
them. Linking individual cognitions to organizational actions assumes that the 
perceptual and interpretive processes of decision-makers are consequential for 
determining organizational level actions (Dutton and Jackson, 1987). The degree of 
consensus among decision-makers strengthens the link between individual cognitions 
and organizational action (Schwenk, 1984). 
Weick and Bougon (1986) describe organisations as "cognitive maps" which, if 
transformed, could induce organizational change. Cognitive mapping in this case 
represents an "epistemological structure" around which individuals organize their 
experience. 
Isabella (1990) noted that understanding the cognitive basis for responding to changes, 
requires understanding interpretations and interpretative phenomena. She pointed out 
that studies concerned with those issues have aligned roughly mainly into two groups, 
each of which has a different and distinctive interpretive thrust: 
(1) There is one group that has examined interpretations in light of theory-driven 
cognitive constructs with an emphasis on imposing order on past or present events. 
Attention, recall that begins the process through which people label and attend to 
salient information, and pattern recognition are some of the significant findings of 
this stream (Schwenk, 1985; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). 
(2) The second group has examined the order and structure of specific 
interpretations through cognitive maps, prototypes and scripts. 
She asserted that only a few studies have examined interpretations overtime, identifying 
not structural properties but similarities in points of view that guide the attribution of 
meaning and significance to specific organizational events. In her view, interpretation is 
defined not as imposing structure but as translating events and developing frameworks 
for understanding. 
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Thus, the focus in this interpretative stream of research is the articulation of 
organizational members' collective views (cognitive logic threading) on particular 
organizational occurrences. 
As argued in the preceding paragraphs, these functions of a cognitive map reveal the 
cognitive processes of key decision-makers and may represent an important mechanism 
for organizational decision -making. The graphic representation of the Board-members' 
perceptions about strategy may depict the factors on which decision-makers focus their 
attention and identify their articulations, which, in turn, may influence the ways 
decision-makers dealt with and reacted to different decision settings. The present study 
will look into individual maps. Of course, it is unlikely that people win share identical 
maps. A lack of complete agreement across individual maps opens up the possibility for 
another important function of cognitive mapping in organizations. That is, if collective 
maps partially overlap, they may provide the grounds for revealing the unity and diversity 
in group decision processes (Fiol and Huff, 1992). The degree to which diversity among 
a top management team either contributes to improving decision-making or is highly 
dysfunctional will be investigated, as well as their impact on organisational outcomes. 
Delineating the various components of cognitive maps related to strategy and their 
interrelationships, and highlighting similarities and differences, will prompt the research 
to further investigate decision-making in top teams and the role of these teams in 
relation to the nature of organizational strategies. 
4.2.5.3.2. The Specific Type of Cognitive Maps Used-Influence Diagrams 
Diagrams often used in physical sciences, and especially in engineering, are wen known 
for their ability to render interrelationships between specific variables more 
comprehensible. A wide range of representations, where in the one end stands the graph 
(where only two variables are involved), and in the other the network (where relations 
among several variables are identified) offer themselves for choice when a more visible 
and succinct tool is needed. 
Influence diagraming focuses explicitly on influences among elements, and is a 
qualitative adaptation of systems dynamics modelling, introduced by Forrester (1961), 
the founder of the industrial engineering discipline, and the signed digraph methodology 
invented by Roberts (1973). According to Diffenbach (1982), "Influence diagraming 
modelling is a qualitative rather than quantitative methodology. One cannot 
ascertain from the diagram the net results of a network of influences. This because 
factor level or rates are not specified, influence relationships are not expressed as 
quantified functions, and time dimensions of influences are not specified Thus, the 
technique is only a partial approach, that must be supplemented with other analysis. 
Its value is that it forces a systematic consideration of the key factors and the 
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interrelationships among these factors, in a way that can reveal overlooked 
considerations, as well as, offer clues to possible counterintuitive consequences. It is 
amenable to the inclusion of social and political factors that are often difficult 
otherwise to consider systematically' (p. 134). 
(i) Basic Components 
Figure 4.2 displays an influence diagram. A, B, C, D, E, and F are the factors (concepts) 
identified. 
LB 
__ ýI __ 
I 
ID 
_HE1 +C ___ 
Figure 4.2: An influence diagram 
The direction of causality between two concepts is indicated by arrows called links, while 
a chain is a sequence of links such as A. B. C. D. E. F. A closed chain, that is one that has 
the same factor as origin and end, is called a loop (e. g. B. C. D. E. B). A more detailed 
description of the basic components of the influence diagrams is provided in Appendix 
C. 
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(ii). Interpreting the Influence Relationships 
Diffenbach (1982) proposed eight guide-lines along which an interpretation of the 
influence relationships can commence. These guide-lines were followed in this research 
and are presented below in a condensed form. 
(1) Isolated factors: A factor not linked to any other factor should prompt two 
questions: Have all important links and factors been identified ? Is the isolated factor 
truly relevant to the strategic issue represented in the diagram? 
(2) Influencing-only Factors: A factor that influences other factors but is not itself 
subject to influence of other factors, should prompt two questions: Is the factor not 
actually influenced by one of the other factors in the diagram ? Has a factor been 
overlooked that would influence the subject factor and in turn be influenced by one or 
more of the other factors? 
(3) Influenced-only Factors: A factor that is influenced by another factor, but does not 
influence any factors itself should prompt similar questions as noted above for 
influencing-only factors. 
(4) Secondary and Higher-Order Consequences: Chains suggest possible secondary 
and higher-order consequences of a change in a given variable. 
(5) Indirect Influence of A on B: Chains can reveal potentially significant indirect 
influences of one factor on another. Such indirect relationships, especially the longer 
chains, could be difficult to identify without the use of a diagram. 
(6) Multiple Influences of A on B: It is not uncommon for a factor to influence 
another in more than one ways. The multiple influences could be direct (link), or indirect 
(chain). They could be of the same or opposite signs. The latter are often overlooked, in 
mental conceptualizations of an issue. 
(7) Self-Regulated Loops: A negative loop is called self regulating. Successive cycles of 
influences result in counteracting pressure. 
(8) Vicious Cycles: A positive loop behaves as vicious cycle. Because it is unlikely that 
vicious cycles operate endlessly, unresisted by countervailing forces, one should look for 
one or more negative loops, that are interrelated with the positive loop by means of a 
common factor. 
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StrengthslLimitations of the Use of Influence Diagams 
As Huff (1989) stated, influence diagrams exhibit internal consistency, predictive power 
(future decisions follow logically from them), and intercoder reliability (when 
documentary evidence is used and two coders are assigned the task to classify the 
concepts). These unchallenged qualities make influence diagrams useful tools for 
researching strategic management issues. 
However, all cognitive maps have certain limitations as stated by Eden et al. (1979). 
Because of the limitations of human cognitive capacity, one cannot at any particular 
moment think of all the possible consequences or explanations he believes could flow 
from a particular event. This is usually explained through the notion of "mental set', by 
which a person's thinking on a particular occasion will follow the lines on which he starts 
off. Also, the influence diagrams do not cope with the strength of beliefs. When one says 
that a concept leads to another, the relationship that he is describing is often not meant 
to be one-over-one causality. Thus, there should be a notion of strength indicating to 
what extent one event will cause another. Furthermore, Eden et al. (1979) claimed that 
since individuals tend to impose order on recollected events, these maps may display 
overly rationality. 
As Huff (1989) pointed out, one of the most crucial questions is that of objective 
validity that looks at the relationship between cognition and cognitive maps. According 
to her view, the map-maker must be aware that all of the data available on internal 
cognitive processes are in fact secondary external artifacts, at least one step removed 
from the phenomenon of interest. She claimed that the issue of whether the strategists' 
thinking follows certain patterns or is the map-maker that creates them, is yet 
unresolved. Huff (1989) recommended the presentation of a cognitive map as a 
depiction of perceptions that may be constructed and analysed without the necessity of 
judging the objective validity of their content. Moreover, she stressed that cause-mapping 
has the disadvantage of equating causal reasoning associated with old and new frames of 
references, because most of the concepts central to strategy are likely to change as the 
organisation and its environment alter. 
The final shortcoming of cause-maps refers to two weaknesses of the type of the causal 
relationships between elements: (1) they don't reveal levels of certainty, that is there is 
no way to distinguish among relations taken on faith and relations that have proven 
themselves over time as a result of feedback of controlled activities, and (2) conditional 
statement and non-monotonic causation (e. g. "if A then B" or "initiation of the new pay 
scheme" caused an "increase in company's operational deficit") cannot be 
distinguished in cause-maps. 
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Through loops that are one of the basic constituents of the influence diagrams, one can 
overcome some of the limitations described. By carefully identifying loops, a systems 
dynamic presentation of the organization is obtained which in turn serves to comprehend 
organizational complexity and guide directed change (Bougon and Komocar, 1990). 
In the next section, the maps representing strategists' cognitive schemes are described 
which may help distinguish the varying levels of organizational and environmental 
complexity faced by those seeking to achieve the goals they set for their organization 
4.2.5.4. Applied Method 
4.2.5.4.1. Characteristics of the Maps Used 
The strategists' maps were divided into three sections: (1) The environmental section, 
containing the concepts referring to the company's task environment and macro- 
environment (in public sector enterprises there is not a clear distinction between these 
two terms); (2) The decision-area section, containing the decisions identified as 
strategic by the Board-members; and (3) The organizational section, comprising all 
cognitive elements pertaining to the firm's inner environment. The rationale for this 
structure is analysed in detail in Chapter 6. 
4.2.5.4.2. The Selected Type of Cognitive Map 
Huff (1989) has grouped the mapping methods into five generic categories. Depending 
upon the purpose of the map there are: (1) Maps that assess attention, association, and 
importance of concepts; (2) Maps that show dimensions of categories and cognitive 
taxonomies; (3) Maps that show influence, causality, and system dynamics; (4) Maps that 
show the argument and conclusion; and (5) Maps that specify schemata, frames, and 
perceptual codes. 
Rol and Huff (1992) add one more category to this classification. They note that 
identity maps (which capture the less rational aspects of cognition) form an important 
category since identity is a key element in linking rational and non-rational aspects of 
cognitive maps to other outcomes. They believe that, without a grounding in identity, 
categorization and causality sub-maps are purely mental exercises. 
According to this study's purpose, maps that depict causal reasoning were chosen. 
Based on the assumptions about cognition, i. e. that (i) causal associations are the major 
way in which understanding about the world is organised, and (ii) causality is the 
primary form of post hoc explanation of events, influence -diagrams 
(i. e. a type of the 
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third, according to Huff (1989), generic category) of strategists' reasoning about 
strategic decisions were constructed. 
The outcome of this fourth stage of the project, i. e the construction of the strategists' 
cognitive maps, is contained in the first part of Chapter 6 (Analysing data at the 
individual level) and is supported by the material offered in Appendix E (Rationale for 
Links). 
4.2.6. Fifth Stage: Matrix Mapping 
4.2.6.1. Purpose 
In order to investigate whether the type of the cognitive maps used would convey the 
same sort of information concerning strategic decisions as a more structured map, a 
second type of mapping was employed to perform the same task, that is matrices. If the 
same results were to be obtained, then one could assert that cognitive maps can 
adequately depict the strategists' schematic knowledge. If not, then comparisons could 
provide valuable insights as to the appropriateness of the methodological tool employed, 
its strengths, and its limitations, as well as the domain of its application. 
Moreover, the priority up to now, was in the analysis of the decision -makers' cognitive 
maps in context; the use of influence diagrams to study the articulation of elements of 
these schemes provided such a possibility. However, although the network of relations 
between concepts has been outlined, nothing has been said about the concepts 
themselves, except that they were influential factors stemming from the organizational or 
external environment. For instance, the rate of acquisition of resources, the level of 
satisfaction with the decision-making system of the organization, were elements 
contained in the maps. An important point that should be stressed then, is that these 
concepts are continuous variables that exhibit themselves in degree only (thus the 
inclusion of rate or level in their definition), whereas links are treated as dichotomies 
(either exist or not). These links represented the influences among concepts, and were 
only illustrated, in the maps, by arrows pointing to a specified direction. The magnitude 
of this linkage-influence was not designated. Hence, it would become difficult to test 
whether the perceived equivalent influences were seen as such to the same extent 
(degree) by the decision -makers. 
In order to overcome this limitation, the analysis incorporated a quantitative technique 
which constitutes the fifth stage of the project. It is a technique based on a theory from 
cognitive social psychology and makes use of matrices which are algebraically 
manipulated. 
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4.26.2. Theory 
4.2.6.2.1. The Purpose of Quantifications 
So far, the research design has deployed the qualitative methods to establish and explain 
the "strateg)l' perceptions of the decision -makers, regarding the implementation of the 
modernization plan. However, deficiencies (as already argued) could be detected related 
to the nature of the data. As Schwenk (1985) has argued, the framing of questions by 
the interviewer, the subjects' selective recall of information, especially when ambiguous 
events are concerned (or perceptual distortions arising from the need for cognitive 
consistency, that is compatibility of information received to prior beliefs), and the salient 
events that are most likely to be recalled, all are shortcomings of the use of participants' 
recollection in the modelling of organizational decision processes. 
4.2.6.2.2. Quantifýing the Perceived Strength of Influences 
The employed technique was based on principles of the congruity theory which was first 
introduced by Osgood and Tannenbaum (quoted in Eiser, 1980; p. 38). They were 
concerned with the specific question of how a person's attitude changes if he is exposed 
to a message or communication. The variables considered were: (1) The individual's 
attitude towards the source of the message; (2) The individual's attitude towards the 
concept evaluated by the source; and (3) The nature of the evaluative assertion about the 
concept contained in the message. 
Both, the source and the concept were defined in terms of a single evaluative scale of 
approval-disapproval from -3 to + 3. The assertion was treated simply as associative (the 
source approves of the concept) or disassociative (the source disapproves of the 
concept). In the basic formulation, both source and concept were referred to simply as 
elements of judgement and are treated as equivalent, as far as evaluations of relations 
were concerned. Thus, if one wanted to interchange source and concept and apply the 
same procedures (s)he could observe the reverse phenomenon, although the attitude 
effects would be probably different. 
Researchers have applied this principle in different research problems. Ramaprasad 
and Poon (1985) incorporated it into a five phase construct to mapping influence 
diagrams for complex business policy and planning problems. Stubbart and 
Ramaprasad (1988) used it to map strategists' cognitive schemes in the steel industry in 
the United States. Eden et at. (1979) used this method in order to explore the decision- 
makers'ramified consequences of one cognitive element over another. 
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4.2.6.3. The Applied Method 
The objective at this stage was to encode most data regarding "strategic" decisions, as 
they had been defined by the decision -makers, in a format suitable for the application of 
the technique just described. The data, elicited from the interviews, were: (1) Elements 
representing the strategic decisions; (2) Influential elements from the organizational 
environment; and (3) Influential elements from the external environment. 
A square matrix was created, and all three categories of elements were listed along the x 
and the y direction (Figure 4.3). Elements belonging to the strategic decisions category 
first, organizational elements next, and environmental elements last. 
In a following meeting, strategists were presented with this matrix and were asked, to fill 
in values best representing the strength of the perceived relationships between the 
elements involved. All the information needed for the completion of this task was 
provided in a separate leaflet. The author was present when the strategists were 
accomplishing this task, in order to provide additional explanations, if required. 
The employed scale had values ranging from -3 to +3. The seven points on the scale 
indicated the following, regarding the relationship between two elements A and B: -3: 
very strongly negative, -2: strongly negative, - 1: negative, 0: no relation; + 1: positive, + 2: 
strongly positive, and +3: very strongly positive. Negative values implied inverse 
relationships (increase in A will decrease B), while positive values were assigned to 
direct relationships (an increase in A will increase B or a decrease in A will decrease B). 
A null entry in a cell would express that no perceived relation existed between elements. 
The algebraic manipulation of these matrices offered answers to questions such as: 
- What elements affect strategic decisions directly? 
- Which sector they belong to? 
- What elements are affected by a strategic decision? 
- Which sector they belong to? 
- Are strategic decisions directly related to each other? 
- Which is the strength of the overaU effect in each of the above cases? 
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Figure 4.3: Quantifying the perceived strength of influences 
It was hypothesized that the analysis of these two sources of data at the strategists' 
micro-level would reveal information about: (1) the way in which actors defined their 
world and comprehended important issues, and (2) the validity of the methodological 
tool employed, to illustrate the actors' schematic knowledge. 
The outcome of the fifth stage of the project constitutes the second part of Chapter 6 
(Analysis of matrices) and is supported by the material offered in Appendix F (Scores 
from matrices). 
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4.2.7. Sixth Stage: Explaining Individual Data: Looking for Patterns 
4.2.7 1. Purpose 
Stages Four and Five dealt with: (i) presenting the strategists' cognitive maps at the 
individual level; (2) revealing the structure of the causal assertions used to identify 
strategic decisions; and (3) defining the meaning of strategy, according to each member 
of the Board. 
Purpose of this sixth stage was: (1) To trace patterns across the maps, both the influence 
diagrams and the maps derived from matrices; and (2) To draw comparisons in order to 
reveal similarities and/or differences. 
4.2.72. The Applied Method 
In order to describe what strategists thought about strategy, the chains of reasoning 
depicted in the influence diagrams were used, as well as the cause-effect relationships 
deriving from the matrices. These two data sources were combined and an attempt was 
made to go deeper from the stated rationales to the hidden assumptions behind them, to 
understand why some very important issues to some strategists were ignored by others. 
This aim was based on all empirical evidence in hand, to reveal the meaning each 
strategist assigned to the concept of "strategy'. 
Simple rules of interpretation were used, in order to identify: (1) Patterns in the 
structural configuration of influence diagrams; and (2) The perspective conveyed by the 
notion "strategic", based on the positioning of strategy concepts in the chains of 
reasoning as well as on the links among them. 
Special attention was paid to the types of concepts that constituted the maps, their 
interrelations, the nature of chains of reasoning (horizontal or vertical) and the number 
of links included into these chains. Here, the evaluation of the relative importance of 
strategic decisions was undertaken, and the articulation of strategic decisions in the 
strategy sector was depicted. According to the literature (Eden et al., 1983; Weick, 
1979), the number of factors to which the same concept is related directly or indirectly, 
either as an influencing or an influenced factor, constitutes a measure of the importance 
of the concept. Eden et al. (1983) developed a way of measuring the importance of each 
concept in a cognitive map. In addition to accounting for the total number of concepts, 
influencing or influenced, directly or indirectly, the average length of all the paths linking 
one concept to others, in the same cognitive map, is calculated. Thus, the structural 
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characteristics of the maps are used to further deepen the analysis and to reveal how the 
decision-makers judged the importance of strategy, while speaking about it. 
4.2.72.1. Patterns in Structural Configuration of Diagrams 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the type of tables that were constructed to reveal patterns in the 
strategists' individual maps (influence diagrams). The six categories on the left-hand side 
of the tables referred to the structure of the maps, the number, type and distribution of 
the cognitive elements involved and the type of their in ter-relation ships. For each 
strategist, the issues involved by category were sorted and then presented in the 
appropriate columns of the right-hand side of the table. 
strategists 
a b c z 
concepts belonging to the 
environmental sector 
concept a 
concept b 
concept z 
concepts belonging to the 
organizational sector 
concept a 
concept b 
concept z 
number of 
strategic decisions 
strategic decisions 
in horizontal chains 
strategic decisions 
in vertical chains 
number of cycles 
Figure 4.4: Revealing patterns in the strategists-' maps 
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(1) The first category included the total number of concepts belonging to the 
environmental sector and its distribution according to sub-categories emerging from the 
data. (2) The second category referred to concepts pertaining to organisational issues. 
These issues were also divided into sub-categories emerging from the data. (3) The third 
category indicated the total number of strategic decisions. (4) The fourth category 
denoted the strategic decisions found in horizontal chains, that is chains of concepts 
cutting across the three sectors illustrated in the maps (environment, organization, 
strategy). (5) The fifth category referred to the vertical links/chains found in the strategy 
sector of the influence diagrams. Thus, they involved only strategic decisions. (6) Finally, 
the sixth category referred to the number of cycles (loops) identified in all sectors of the 
diagrams. 
The eight strategists would either exhibit similarities or differences in patterns 
concerning structural properties of their influence diagrams. Thus, if they placed the bulk 
of concepts in the organizational category, then structures and processes were playing the 
most important role in their point of view; on the other hand, if they exhibited more 
balanced categories (that is, environment and organization were generating almost the 
same number of concepts), then the organizational sub-categories tended, in their view, 
to be of equal importance as the environmental ones. 
4.2.72.2. The Perspective Revealed in the Influence Diagrams 
While the previous test dealt with structural properties of the concepts involved in the 
influence diagrams, this test was concerned with the perspective each strategist 
attributed to the identified strategic decision. The aim was to investigate the ways in 
which actors addressed a rather open-ended management situation that had strategic 
implications. This would probably result in understanding the way in which actors made 
sense of ambiguous situations, which, in turn, would probably assist in understanding 
strategic thought. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates the type of tables constructed in this case, to reveal the perspective 
given to. strategy by the decision -makers. For this purpose, the interpretative guide-lines 
referred to in Chapter 7 were utilized. At the left side, the tables contained the set of 
strategic decisions identified as such by each decision-maker: (1) The first column 
contained a number that defined the average length of causal chains including the 
strategic decisions under consideration. (2) Thus, strategic decisions extracted from the 
accounts as positively influencing-only elements (or positively-influencing elements) fell 
into the second column which contained the decisions perceived as having positive 
repercussions in the environment. (3) The third column included the strategic decisions 
seen as ends, that is influenced-only elements in a chain (or chains) of reasoning. These 
chains of reasoning had either positive or negative influence on the identified end. When 
ill 
positive influence was depicted, then the chain of reasoning could be assessed as 
condition (CD), whereas when negative influence was perceived the chain of reasoning 
could be assessed as a constraint (CT). (4) The fourth column contained the strategic 
decisions that were seen as means (influencing and influenced concepts in chains of 
reasoning). (5) The fifth column was related to the previous one and contained the 
strategic decisions seen as means in strategy chains of reasoning, that is chains (or links) 
that comprised concepts belonging strictly to the strategy sector of the influence 
diagrams. This would highlight whether achieving one decision was instrumental to 
achieving another. As McCrimmon (1988) has stated, this concept of instrumentality, 
where the attainment of one goal directly contributes to the attainment of another, is 
very important in strategic analysis. (6) Finally, the sixth column was showing whether 
the strategic decisions depicted on the left-hand side of the table were seen as having an 
impact on organizational performance. 
average posit ive decision decision 
length reper- decision decision perceived as having 
strategist strategic decision of cussions perceived perceived *ends' or "means" impact 
causal in the as as in strategy on 
chains environment end' means' chanin performance 
decision al 
a 
decision a2 
decision az 
decision bI 
b decision b2 
decision bz 
decision cl 
c decision c2 
decision cz 
decision zj 
z decision z2 
decision zz 
Figure 4.5. - Revealing perspective in the influence diagrams 
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4.2 7 2.3. Patterns in Cognitive Maps Derived from Matrices 
The matrix used (Figure 4.6) was divided into nine sub-sectors. Four of these sectors 
were selected to be presented and further analysed at this stage, and were the ones 
denoting: (1) The impact of strategic decisions on a strategic decision; (2) The impact of 
environment on strategy; (3) The impact of organization on strategy; and (4) The impact 
of strategy on environment. The following indices were considered: (i) Sector Density, 
which was the number denoting the percentage of identified relationships over the 
potential relationships of the sector. (b) Sector Strength, which was the number 
denoting the percentage of strong relationships (2,3 values) over the overall number 
of identified relationships of the sector. (c) Number of cycles: When the structural 
matrices (that is, matrices derived from the scores matrices when all cells containing 
non-zero values take value equal to one (1), indicating that a relationship exists) were 
squared, the new squared structural matrix contained in its diagonal the number of loops 
(cycles). 
t t i t 
potential 
entries 
Identified 
relationships 
strong 
relationships 
s ra eg s 
(no) 
no. 
% 
(density) no. 
% 
(strongtH 
loops 
a 
b 
c 
z 
Figure 4.6: Patterns derivingfrom matrices 
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If the sector density of the strategists' matrices did not vary very much, one could say 
that the strategists attained approximately to almost equal cognitive variety. On the other 
hand, if the sector strength exposed a large diversity, one might assume that the strength 
of the perceived relationships was based on personal grounds. Finally, the number of 
loops would provide an index of measuring dynamic effects and cognitive strain. 
The analysis of the matrices' indices might prove that the strategists' cognitive maps 
derived from matrices often illustrated a different reality from the one depicted in the 
influence diagrams. This might be explained by the fact that the strategists, when asked 
to score on matrices, thought for the first time about some relationships, as pointed out 
by other researchers who used this technique to map the strategists' cognitive frames 
(Stubbart and Rarnaprasad, 1988). 
The outcome of the sixth stage of the project constitutes Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
4.2.8. Seventh Stage: Theory Building 
4.2.8.1. Introduction 
The case study used two types of data, that is interview accounts and documentary 
sources against background information from within and the outside of the enterprise. 
The aim of this final stage was the building of an explanatory theory based on this 
material. This theory should specify the relationship among a set of variables or concepts 
identified in the data. Chapter 3 deals in detail with analytic induction (a method of 
analysis used to make inferences), which aims at identifying categories, and finally 
relationships between them. Analytic induction expresses a holistic approach to data 
evaluation. Rather than looking for simple statements or for linear relations of isolated 
variables pulled out of their context, it stresses the importance of the context by drawing 
on it, every time a new case is examined. 
4.2.8.2. The Applied Method 
Having acquired the analytic categories (strategic decision -areas), the patterns 
associated with them and the strategists' rationales that concern them, the analysis 
proceeded to the final stage that of integrating all these elements into a theoretical 
scheme. A typology was created to account for both patterns in organisational actions 
and for the role of Board-members in the strategic decision-areas studied. The means by 
which links between the concepts were found and new concepts were identified and 
included in the analysis was based on a systematic comparison between slices of data. 
First, categories were established and each slice of data was examined and its relevance 
to one or more categories was noted. Then, it was compared with other slices of data that 
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fell into the same category. In this way the variation and range of any given category 
could be mapped in the data, and such patterns could be explored in relation to other 
categories. Thus, the mutual relationships and internal structures of categories would be 
established and identified. 
When "deviant" cases were encountered (that is cases that lacked features in common 
with other cases of the same category) then there were two alternatives; either to alter 
the list of common features so as to accommodate the "deviant" case, or to modify the 
scheme for classifying cases. 
The outcome of the seventh stage of the project is contained in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
Appendix G (Drawing Composite Maps) informed the final stage of the research. 
4.3. METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The advantages and disadvantages of each instrument are discussed in this section and 
the degree to which they helped to advance the research purpose is highlighted. 
4.3.1. Decisions Categories (Decision -Areas) - Frequencies 
The categories in terms of which archival evidence was organized referred to the Board's 
overall activities. Hickson et al. (1986) noted that this activity has been screened from 
outsiders and there has been no systematic knowledge about top decisions, since the few 
strategic decisions examined in the literature -before the publication of their research- 
were "here and there with no connection between them" (p. 28). Yet, their research 
centred on the study of 150 top decisions of various organizations while in this study a 
Board's overall activity was the main focus of the first phase of the research. 
The identification of categories was an important element in the process of analysis 
since categories were the links between the two stages of the research, that is the archival 
evidence collection phase and the interview phase. Thus, much attention and time were 
devoted to it. The list of categories could not undergo major changes in later stages since 
subsequent stages of the research were to be based upon them. Since the categorization 
was based only on the topic of the decision (and not on decisions' implications nor on 
difficulties of their implementation), few ambiguities were encountered when classifying 
them and this is something that other researchers have pointed out (Hickson et al., 
1986). 
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As sai n the previous section, the universe of decisions concerning the Board's activity 
was analysed and illustrated graphically. Thus, decisional activity over time functioned as 
the historical context for each decision: -area. When explanations supporting the 
propositions generated were provided in the final stage of the study, these have taken 
into consideration the identified pattern. Embedding strategists' rationales in an 
historical perspective helped to validate them and to strengthen, consequently, the line of 
interpretation. 
4.3.2. On Cognitive Maps 
Cognitive maps helped to extract from the body of the interview material that was 
relevant to the research questions and to present it in a systematic manner which also 
facilitated further analysis. Yet, subtlety and informational asides were lost by 
considering only statements leading to strategic decisions. However, this is something 
that all research tools, used to categorize data from qualitative research, cannot avoid 
loosing. In exchange, the coding created a capacity to look into the evidence in a quick 
way and allowed for comparisons to be made across individual maps of decision -makers, 
based on the same decision-areas. Also, maps revealed gaps in information or reasoning. 
In this research. these gaps generated questions about whether the strategic decision 
included into the reasoning adequately accounted for a decision outcome (Fiol and 
Huff, 1992). 
The structure of the influence diagrams helped to organise concepts around major 
sectors. The environment appeared as an overwhelming concept, causing uncertainties 
and resulting in negative implications for the firm. In those cases, the strategic decisions 
took on a negative significance, that is they were thought of and denoted as negative (the 
environmental impact was so strong that the firm had to comply with it, though what was 
done was below expectations). Cognitive maps depicted an over-presentation of the 
negatives and an under-representation of the positives, on the part of some strategists. 
This finding took on an important meaning since it provided a hint about involvement 
and commitment of strategists in performing a strategic role. 
Hickson et al. (1986) noted that decisions that would be more strategic than others 
must be "the more novel, the more consequential and the more precedent setting' 
(p. 35). In that case, causal maps are the appropriate toot since they depict linkages 
concerning implications of and in ter-relation ships between strategic decisions. Yet, the 
produced cognitive maps illustrated few of these structures and this was -as explained in 
the final chapter- due to the way in which the strategists perceived their role. 
The understanding of cause and effect relationships of strategic decisions as well as of 
the in ter-relat ion ships of strategic decisions themselves proved difficult at the individual 
116 
level. Such difficulties were overcome when chains of reasoning referring to a certain 
strategic decision (extracted from the strategists' cognitive maps), were aggregated and 
analysed in context (how each one interrelated and interacted with the others). 
Concluding, it can be said that, so far, empirical evidence on the use of causal maps was 
mostly based on documents on public speeches (Fahey and Naryanan 1989; 
Rarnaprasad and Poon 1988), and the main interest was rather on strategy formulation 
than strategy implementation. This study looked at causal maps from an implementation 
perspective and, furthermore, it produced maps that contained concepts derived through 
interviews and not through documents that might address a different public. 
Additionally, because cause-effect relationships of strategic decisions were studied and 
mapped out at an individual level, looking at their similarities and accounting for their 
differences (the latter signalling important messages) might shed light to the role of the 
Board, since Boards are not necessarily consensual entities. 
On the disadvantages side lay the great complexity derived from the bulk of statements 
found throughout the interview and which were related to the specific strategic decision- 
area. The key-problem was the efficacious reduction of data. Also, the identification of 
nodes some times proved difficult, especially when static concepts such as organizational 
structure were involved, and when some types of causal relationships (conditional, non 
monotonic causation) that strategists sometimes used in their interviews, could not be 
included into the maps and thus they had to be taken off. However, it should be stressed 
here that these hypothetical relationships that strategists used to raise in relation to 
strategic decisions, alerted the author to investigating in subsequent instances what was 
the real role the strategist played on the Board, by asking him questions mantled in the 
identified hypothesis. 
4.3.3. The Interpretation Stage 
4.3.3.1. On the Validity of the Propositions 
In the final stage of the research, which is presented in the final chapter where the author 
aggregated the two different data sets -that is the decisions' patterns and the 
explanations provided by the strategists about strategy-, she tried not to cast a simple and 
linear logic on what proved to be complex, often non-rational, and many times multi- 
faceted. The differences in rationales revealed that different actors invoked different 
reasons for the same phenomenon as Bogdan and Taylor (1979) have pointed out; 
therefore, there was not a single logic to follow. Instead, the different slices of 
information about the same decision-area were juxtaposed, compared and then 
synthesized to form the hypotheses explaining strategy-formation processes in this 
setting and the role of the Board in shaping them. 
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In moving between data and concepts, the author took great care to note plausible 
alternative links to those made in the emerging theory. Also, concerning the propositions 
generated, she made explicit all the assumptions to which strong challenges might be 
made (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). 
Moreover, the presentation of findings in the analysis/interpretation stage, in the last 
chapter, with sufficient detail, aimed at displaying how the different methodological tools 
were integrated and how theory was generated. Thus, the reader too may participate in 
the process of validating the theory, by weighing the influence. 
Finally, a theory cannot be proved valid for ever. As Harnmersley and Atkinson (1983; 
p. 20) pointed out, there is always the possibility that new facts may appear in the future 
that will disprove it. 
4.3.3.2. On the Representativeness of Findings 
One of the limitations often noted in connection with the design of a research as a single 
case study, is that this constantly threatens its representativeness. 
Yet, qualitative research studies certain general social processes in any single setting or 
through any single subject. The main aim is to understand how these processes occur and 
which are the circumstances that shaped them. Some processes that appear in bold relief 
under such circumstances appear only faintly under others. Therefore, some aspects of 
life can be best studied in each setting or through each subject because there it is best 
ifluminated. 
These circumstances -or, in another terminology, the context- were given considerable 
attention and they were taken into account when displaying how the theoretical 
propositions were generated 
The study of a single case appears as threatening the representativeness of the findings 
and it is true that the more cases studied in which similar results are obtained the more 
confident we are about our conclusions, though statistical sampling techniques do not 
resolve the issue. As argued extensively in Chapter 3, in terms of the research purpose, a 
selection of a critical case may be more fruitful instead of the study of randomly selected 
sample of cases. 
The present study aimed at understanding strategy formation, in the implementation 
period of a Strategic Plan in a public organization. It explored the nature and processes 
of strategic decisions (the emphasis on processes) taken by the managing Board 
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(emphasis on the people acting as strategists) and looked specifically into how the 
strategists' perceptions (emphasis on the cause-effect relationships) about strategy 
influenced the processes identified. 
Concluding, the author cites what other researchers have noted, in terms of this duality 
between wide representativeness and in-depth study. In their view, there are always 
limitations in methodologies and no theory can "at the same time be generalizable, 
accurate and simple. Scientific inquiry is an ongoing process and is seldom 
completed with a single research effort" (Fredrickson, 1983; p. 572). 
4.4. SYNOPSIS 
In this chapter, a description has been offered of the methodological stages of the 
project. Each stage will be taken on, in detail, in subsequent chapters. 
Cognitive mapping will constitute the technique to illustrate the concepts used by 
strategists in their rationalizations of strategy. These concepts were defined by strategists 
themselves. Yet, mapping might reveal differences among strategists either in terms of 
concepts identified or links among them. To validate the employed technique, more 
structured maps will be built, based on the same concepts, and strategists' links among 
them as well as the perceived strength of the relationships would again be identified, but 
now on a common basis. Outcomes from both techniques will be compared and 
differences will be commended. Inquiring the same phenomenon using two different 
tools poses an additional interest since it appears for the first time and provides ideas as 
to the suitability of the technique used or the nature of the phenomenon itself (strategy- 
strategists). 
Furthermore, though patterns of causal reasoning have been used in several streams of 
organizational research in planning, its nature had a prescriptive orientation, aiming at 
improving managers' thinking, or was concerned with one decision or a unique 
organizational area . Patterns of causal reasoning concerning a group of 
interacting 
people were never studied, nor their effects on the change process were examined. Thus, 
the employed methodology expands on the appropriateness of cognitive mapping in a 
new domain of application. 
Comparisons will be drawn in the final phase (between the different slices of data) 
during which biases of particular people and methods tend to accommodate themselves 
as the underlying causes of variation are discovered. Hypotheses will be generated that 
would incorporated categories and their properties supported by the data all accounting 
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for aspects of the phenomenon under study, that is how strategies are formed in a public 
enterprise. 
CHAPTER 5 
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and categorize the documentary evidence 
concerning decisions made by the under-study Board over the period of the plan's 
implementation. The outcome of this process is concerned with: (1) the classification of 
decisions across different categories, termed decision-areas; and (2) the detection of 
patterns illustrating frequencies across the identified decision-areas. 
In terms of the research objectives, as described in Chapter 1, this chapter aims at 
tracing the Board's decision outcomes in major organizational areas and illustrating their 
patterns within the context of the Strategic Plan. Using and analysing historical data, this 
chapter will focus on "pertinent, reliable and verifiable facts" (Lastrucci, 1963) that 
will provide one of the two major sources of data to be used in this study. Moreover, 
when the testimony of the decision-makers who have observed events from different 
points of view will come into the stage, the research will subject the evidence to further 
analysis, in order to answer the stated research questions. 
5.2. ANALYSING INFORMATION ON THE BOARDS DECISIONS 
This chapter deals with the decisions made by the Managing Board of the Enterprise 
over the period 1980-1988. The intention is to depict the actions of the organization 
through the decisions made, and then to look at consistencies or not that these actions 
may display. The section concludes with a first attempt to understand how and why the 
identified patterns developed and changed. 
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The employed methodology has been described in Chapter 4. In summary, the Board's 
minutes over the period 1980-1988 were examined and the decisions made during each 
meeting were recorded and classified. Thus, a list of 98 decision-areas was constructed 
and is displayed in Figure D1 (Appendix D). The same figure illustrates the 
aggregation of the 98 identified decision-ares into 49 broader decision -categories. A 
table of the numbers of each type of decisions made for each category over the period 
examined was constructed and is displayed in Figure D2 (Appendix D) in the form of 
annual distributions. The same figure also displays the relevant percentages. On the basis 
of this information, histograms for each of the 49 decision -categories were drawn, 18 of 
which, i. e. those mostly mentioned by the strategists during the interviews which followed 
(Chapter 7) are displayed in Figures D3-D20 (Appendix D). 
5.2.1. Decisions on Acquisition of Equipment and Infrastructure 
The functions of construction and maintenance of way and structures are generally 
referred to as engineering. Their purpose is to provide the facilities on which the railway 
operates as a supply or service activity. This includes construction of new lines, ongoing 
maintenance, and improvements of the physical plant of the railway. The amount spent 
in any particular year for these functions depends on the stage of development the 
railway is in, the extent to which previous investment in improvements or preventative 
maintenance have been made and the extent to which deferred maintenance is practiced. 
Moreover, within the engineering function, Board's decisions concern the approval of a 
long-term plan and design work, the setting of specifications, the tender approval, the 
resolution of disputes between the sub-contractors and the engineering departments, and 
the approval of substantial (over 50%) deviations from the budgeted costs of projects. 
Figure D12 (Appendix D) shows the distribution of Board's decisions concerning 
engineering projects over the examined period. In general, an almost stable pattern is 
evident, except for the 1985-1986 period where a reduction in issues related to 
constructions may be assessed and related to the initiation of the Government's strict 
financial policy (Summer 1985). This pattern is depicted as strategy in Figure 5.1. 
The other half of the supply side of the railway activities is equipment, that is 
locomotives and cars (or multiple units). As demonstrated in Appendix A 
(Organizational Background), the enterprise faces a serious problem regarding the high 
percentage of its equipment in "bad-order" condition. The causes of this problem 
(multiplicity of types of locomotives, poor planning of the rolling stock sub-system, 
inadequate organization, etc. ) have been discussed by Paradissopoulos (1990), through 
a comparison with other European railways. 
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Figure 5.1: Engineering Strategy 
ROLLING STOCK STRATEGY 
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Figure 5.2: Rolling Stock Strategy 
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In 1983, a major change in rolling stock acquisition policies was initiated and implied a 
program for the domestic manufacturing of a large part of the company's new rolling 
stock (passenger suburban, freight wagons) in association with foreign manufacturers. At 
the same time, an order was placed for the purchase of 12 sets of modern diesel intercity 
train-sets from Germany. In 1985, a decision was made for the purchase of a number of 
second-hand reconditioned diesel locomotives from the German Federal Railway (1985), 
to cover the company's needs until the introduction of electrification. Figure D16 
(Appendix D) plots the percentage distribution of the Board's decisions concerning 
rolling stock. Figure 5.2 depicts the resulting strategy. 
5.2.2. Decisions on Financial Matters 
Railway budgets are of two kinds: (1) capital investment budgets which include the 
renewal of rolling stock (locomotives, coaches and wagons), the electrification of existing 
routes, the purchase of land and the construction of new lines (or the doubling of existing 
ones), and the provision and renewal of operations buildings and installations and 
administrative facilities (including computers); and (2) operational budgets which 
correspond to the means that have to be made available in order to carry on day-to-day 
operations, that is train and terminal operations, equipment and installations routine 
maintenance (wages, fuel, spare parts, materials, etc. ). 
Both budgets have to be approved by the Board before they are submitted to the 
Departments of Transport, National Economy and Finance for governmental approval. 
Usually, each July a modification of the operational budget is being made; in some cases, 
one or more modifications have followed. It should be noted that because the National 
Investment Plan does not always cover the capital investment requirements of the 
company, loans are negotiated to provide for these extra needs. The pay-offs of these 
loans are included as expenses in the Operational Budget while the payment of interests 
is included in the annual investment Programme of the enterprise. 
Figure D6 (Appendix D) presents the annual distribution of the Board's decisions 
concerning capital investment. The resulting Figure 5.3 illustrates the depicted pattern; 
while a stable pattern is traced through the period 1980-1985, a peak appears in 1986 
which gradually phases out in the following year; this peak may again be associated with 
the restrictions imposed by the Government's strict financial policy, initiated in 1985. 
Figure D5 (Appendix D) shows the distribution of annual decisions concerning 
operational budgeting and Figure 5.4 the pattern associated with it. An almost stable 
pattern may be traced over the examined period. 
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Figure 5.3: Financial Strategy Capital Investment 
OPERATIONAL BUDGETING 
Mo JIM 1=2 1*9310" 1084 j"S6 JIM 11998 
YEAR 
Figure 5.4: Financial Strategy: Operational Budgeting 
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In parallel with the two other figures of this section, Figure D8 (Appendix D) presents 
the distribution of the Board's decisions related to loans. While until 1985 loans were 
mainly negotiated for investment requirements, the change of the Government's 
financial policy resulted in a number of loans contracted in order to cover as well 
operations deficits. Figure 5.5 depicts the loans curve which mirrors the deterioration of 
the company's financial situation, especially when the latter is related to the company's 
performance, illustrated in Appendix A. 
LOANS 
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Figure 5.5: Financial Strategy: Loans 
5.2.3. Decisions on Management Control Issues 
A peak and valley pattern illustrating the attempts to resolve the problem of 
specialization and coordination, since the undertaking of such a task (the modernization 
plan) imposed new demands, seemed to be declining until the year 1983, when again 
efforts to accommodate these demands began to multiply (it is at that time that long- 
term contracts were signed with rolling stock suppliers and new organizational units, with 
the task of supervision of these contracts, were created). This evolving pattern reached a 
peak in 1986, when new members of the Board were appointed, a top sub-committee was 
created, and a new organizational structure was designed, but, as already stated, was 
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never implemented. As the plan was progressing and new activities arose, details of job 
descriptions were worked out (Figure D, Appendix D). Also, proliferating rules 
concerning the various occupational classes within the railways were formed, as a result 
of the changing work conditions. At the end of 1988, a new organisational structure was 
designed by the new General Manager and was finally implemented at the beginning of 
the following year. 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION STRATEGIES 
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Figure 5.6: Performance Evaluation Strategies 
Figure D13 (Appendix D) illustrates this increased Board's dealing with organizational 
issues over the period 1984-1987, whereas Figure 5.6 depicts the resulting strategy. 
However, the structure introduced, instead of granting independence and autonomy to 
the local operating and commercial units, resulted in a greater centralization. 
Figure D14 (Appendix D) illustrates the distribution of Board's decisions concerning 
performance monitoring which in the company, at Board's level, is of the following three 
types: (1) budgets' development monitoring, (2) construction /acquisition projects 
progress monitoring, and (3) discussion on periodical statistical information presented 
to the members by the General Manager. According to the Law governing the Board's 
functioning, every trimester, or earlier if judged necessary, the Board is informed by the 
General Manager about the above described areas of interest. though this may appear as 
routine-based activity -however important it is- the cyclical appearance of strategies in 
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this area (Figure 5.7) reflects the fact that, at times, decision s/action s showed a definite 
propensity to converge, that is to exhibit patterning. Yet, this periodic convergence 
tended rather to stabilize itself into reiterating cycles. 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
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Figure 5.7. Organisational Strategy 
5.2.4. Decisions on Commercial Activities 
Commercial activities incorporate selling, pricing, customer services, market 
development and entry into specific markets (specific shippers or industries). The 
passengers fare structure in a public enterprise is regulated by the State. This includes a 
process in which the enterprise proposes according to cost elements a fare structure to 
the higher authority (Departments of Transport and Commerce) and afterwards it 
ratifies the increases in the fares set by them. While this may be understood as a routine 
process displaying stable patterns, in the case examined the pattern displays a peak in 
two consecutive years (1986 and 1987) as may be seen by Figure D15 (Appendix D) 
and the resulting strategy pattern (Figure 5.8). The reason of this peak may be 
attributed to the intervention of the newly established supervisory body (ASKE) which 
according to the law was responsible for the approval of the fare structure proposed by 
the company. 
Figure D17 (Appendix D) shows the percentage of annual Board's decisions 
concerning the construction of new sidings to industries. 
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Figure 5.8: Fares Strategy 
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Figure 5.9: Commercial strategy: Sidings 
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Figure 5.9 depicts the associated strategy in which no pattern may be evidenced. 
Relatively increased efforts to improve this marketing and sales policy were made in the 
years 1982 and 1986. 
Railway selling incorporates also the attempt to secure attractive rates for classes of 
passengers or shippers. Specifically its actions imply that price is the primary and 
overpowering selling influence. 
CMMERCIAL STRATEGIES, PASSENGER 
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Figure 5.10: Commercial stra tegy. - Special customers, passenger 
Figure D19 (Appendix D) shows the percentage distribution of decisions concerning 
fare reductions for specific passenger groups (both domestic and international journeys) 
and Figure 5.10 depicts the implied strategy, according to which the Board progressively 
is less engaged in decisions concerning this type of activities. 
Finally, Figure D20 (Appendix D) shows the percentage distribution of decisions 
concerning fares for major shipper of freight traffic (both domestic and international 
trips). The more important cycles are depicted as strategies in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11: Commercial strategy Special customers, freight 
5.2.5. Decisions on Enhancing Organizational Capability 
Decisions that fell into this field included personnel training and the reward/ incentive 
systems. Concerning personnel training, Board's decisions referred only to approvals of 
educational leaves of absence. These decisions exhibited a sporadic pattern, since the 
applications were submitted to the organisation by employees who wished to conduct 
postgraduate studies and were very rare. All other decisions concerning employees' 
training-were made by the Assistant General Manager and the General Manager (they 
did not fall into the Board's jurisdiction) and substantiated a programme that aimed to 
enhance personnel's technical and other skills. This programme was set up in 1986 and 
was stiH on in 1989. 
Concerning the reward/ i ncen tive systems, decisions that fell into this area referred to 
board's activity associated with promotions to the post of the Head of Department. The 
decision graphs exhibited a peak and valley pattern, the peaks being quite low and the 
valleys not very deep. Figure D20 (Appendix D) shows the percentage distribution of 
decisions concerning top personnel promotions while Figure 5.12 depicts the implied 
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strategy. Appointments of Heads of Departments occurred quite often and this may be 
attributed to the system of seniority for personnel's promotion that existed in the 
organization. This means that candidates for these posts had gone up all the hierarchical 
ladder and were often near retirement. thus, their tenure varied from several months to 
few years. 
Figure 5.12: Reward and Incentive Systems: Top Personnel Promotions 
5.3. SYNOPSIS 
The main purpose in this chapter was to illustrate the way in which the enterprise 
developed its strategies over the period of the plan's implementation. Strategies here are 
the consistent patterns of decisions in the various decision-areas. What the chapter 
revealed was that Board's decisions covered a wide area of organizational activities. 
They were ranging from resources' allocation for modernization projects to approvals of 
special tariffs for freight customers, or from decisions concerning structural 
rearrangements to decisions referring to legal matters. In total, 49 decision-areas were 
identified. The patterning of decisions within these decision-areas exhibited much 
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variety. There were consistent patterns, cyclical patterns, emerging patterns, and, finally, 
sporadic ones. This showed that, in some areas, there was a constant flow of activities, in 
other areas, decisions exhibited a propensity to converge, yet this was never achieved, 
while in some areas, an ever-increasing number of decisions denoted an area of 
importance (or a situation denoting a problem or an opportunity). 
CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSING DATA AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the methodology chapter, the research was planned against a background of 
premises which involved the following: 
1. Using and analysing sources of data demonstrating change, process, or stability 
(archival evidence, publicly presented documents concerning major organizational 
issues, organizational reports, etc. ) that are related to the phenomenon inquired, in 
particular to the implementation process of the Strategic Plan. 
2. Understanding the perspectives or "attitudes" of the decision-makers in terms of 
their operation alization of strategy, illustrating which concepts have been 
associated with it and how they were related to each other. 
3. Linking the strategists' perceptions with the specific context in which they 
occurred. 
4. Combining results arising from these different data- sources in order to account 
for the way in which strategies were formed in a public organization and for the 
role of Board-members in shaping their formation. 
The main objective is to study strategy formation as an historical, contextual process. So 
far, only the first area was dealt with (Chapter 5). The purpose of this chapter is to 
understand the meaning that the Board-members attached to strategy. The chapter, 
based on empirical evidence from the in-depth interviews with Board-members, is 
concerned with mapping the strategists' rationales in terms of the definitions of strategic 
decisions and the influences upon them, stemming either from the organizational or the 
external environment at the individual level. Cognitive maps are the graphic 
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representations of sets of discursive representations made by the Board-members with 
regards to strategic decisions (Cossette and Audet, 1992) and are constructed by the 
researcher. 
The analysis consists of two steps that refer to the different data-sources used. Thus, the 
first step entails the analysis of retrospective interviews by means of influence diagrams; 
and the second step provides a tabulation of the scores on matrices and investigates 
further the type of the relationships between two cognitive elements by analyzing square 
matrices. 
6.2. KEY CONCEPTS GOVERNING THE ANALYSIS 
6.2.1. Environments 
Aldrich (1979) asserted that there are two streams in current theorizing and research in 
relation to the way the term "environment" is used: 
The first approach, centres on theories of perception, cognition and decision- 
making, focuses on the environments as seen through the eyes of organisational 
members. The "environment' thus consists of information serving as raw material 
and acted on by sentient actors. Variation in information about the environment, 
as filtered through members' perceptions, is the major factor explaining 
organizational change. 
The second approach relies heavily on theories of the firm as defined in macro- 
economics, and argues that competition for the level of resources as well as the 
terms under which they are made available are the critical factors for 
organizational change. 
Aldrich 
* 
recognised that these two views are identified with the natural and rational 
selection models of the organizations. Further, he noted that a link between them could 
be originated if in a research design decision -makers' perceptions of dependence are 
treated as playing a part in determining an organization's response to a situation of 
dependence. 
Daft and Weick (1984) built a model of organizations as interpretative systems of the 
environment, expanding thus Weick's previous work on the same topic. Though Weick's 
(1979) central argument was that organizations create and constitute the environment to 
which they react and that the environment is put there by the actors within the 
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organization and by noone else, there was no confrontation of the issue raised by the 
different perceptions of actors concerning the environment. Whether such differences 
were due to actors' structural positions, experience, or idiosyncratic factors was left 
unanswered. The model proposed by Daft and Weick tackles this issue in a different 
manner. It is based on four assumptions: 
The first is that the organizations being open social systems process information 
from the environment and then base organizational action on it; 
The second concerns the distinction between individual and organizational 
interpretation process and states that the latter is something more than what 
occurs by individuals; 
The third is that strategic level managers formulate the organization's 
interpretation because it is at this level that participants are informed on issues 
pertaining to the organization as a whole; and 
The fourth states that organizations differ systematically in the process by which 
they interpret the environment and these differences are due to organizational as 
well environmental characteristics. 
As it can be inferred from the above assumptions, the authors subscribed to an 
organizational interpretation shared among strategic actors who constitute the 
interpretation system. Whether their assumption that managers converge on an 
approximate interpretation holds true needs to be supported by analytical evidence and 
this is what the present thesis aims to provide and evaluate. 
Furthermore, the environment will be treated as information made available to the 
strategists but also as information the strategists missed, either they sought or took for 
granted. Or as Hambrick (1989) asserted, "in the face of the complex, multitudinous 
and ambiguous information that typifies the top management task, no two strategists 
wi. 11 identify the same array of options for the firm; they will rarely prefer the same 
options; if by remote chance they were to pick the same options, they almost certainly 
would not implement them identically'(p. 5). However, this knowledge is only possible 
by reference to the independent information (not coming from decision -makers' views) 
evaluated in the previous chapter and Appendices A and B of this study. 
There are three questions to be asked at this phase: (1) Which are the judgmental 
processes of the decision makers revealed through their cognitive maps, focusing on one 
or more segments of the relevant environment rather than others? (2) How are different 
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ecis ons influenced by those perceived environments? and (3) Which are the 
relationships among strategic decisions themselves? 
The patterns in strategic decisions examined may be systematic, in the sense that 
interrelations are depicted among different strategic areas, or discontinuous, in the sense 
that strategic areas seem disjointed or isolated. The number of influences attended to by 
the decision-makers may vary from one individual to another. The next section discusses, 
therefore, the necessity for a disaggregated analysis. 
6.2.2. Roles Assumptions 
According to Quinn's (1980) political-incremental view of strategy-making, skilled 
strategic level managers guide their organization toward intentionally vague objectives by 
taking advantage of opportunities that move it incrementally in the desired direction. 
Specific strategies, tactics and solutions emerge from within the organization as 
operational managers respond to their respective environments. Top management 
selects, refines and melds these responses into a coherent strategic thrust, an overall logic 
stemming from a srategic vision. Communication and cohesion (shared understanding of 
the strategy and its implications) help develop consensus and commitment and enhance 
management's ability to coalesce around an emerging strategic vision affecting thus the 
outcome of strategy making process. 
However, the factor that would homogenize strategists' experiences and values and 
reduce the tendency to identify with organizational divisions and subcultures (Etzioni, 
1975) is the issue of much controversy. As many authors pointed out, decision makers' 
perceptions of the environment differ in terms of the motives/objectives of the interest 
groups involved in the process, the nature of the environment perceived (complex, 
dynamic, uncertain), and the number and type of organizational units (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967, Bacharach, 1978, Tung 1979). As evidence in boards' studies has 
revealed (Chapter 2), conflicting results and recommendations are obtained and this 
may be due to the variety of roles board-members often play. This calls for a 
disaggregated view of the organization -environ men t interaction, where each strategist's 
rationalization about strategy could be highlighted in its own terns. 
Decision -makers' assumptions about their roles stemming from the divergence of their 
interests, occupational heredity, previous organizational experience and ties to principles 
derived by their association with political parties have to be taken into consideration. 
The composition of the Board under study (consisting of managers, state officials, and 
employees' representatives) calls for the identification of major sources of consensus or 
conflict over priorities, values, and goals. Questions of whether members in different 
roles and hierarchical levels perceive the same organizational reality have to be drawn 
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upon and attention has to be paid to the relation between participants' structural 
position and their perceptions. 
It could, therefore, be interesting to reveal what people in boundary-spanning roles (roles 
linking an organization to external units) feel about their position, and about that of 
their counterparts. The time and the actual process by which they were appointed play 
also a central role and delineate the conditions under which members' discretion can 
have a significant impact on change. How often these conditions rise should be examined 
and an attempt to interweave them with the perceptions in hand must be made. In line 
with Child's (1972) thesis that environment, technology and size are not totally 
responsible for organizational change or stability, organizational elites and other 
members of powerful coalitions possess a wide range of discretion and autonomy for 
decision-making and thus occasionally have the power to manipulate and control their 
environments. It is essential therefore to highlight their perceptions and evaluations of 
events as an important intervening link between environments and organization's 
actions. 
Concluding, the first step of the analysis aims at providing configurations in terms of the 
concepts that operationalize strategy according to each strategist. Identification of 
concepts is only the first step; the second one is to discover the rules of their articulation, 
if any, as well as, to "sense" what is not included, either being concealed or taken for 
granted. The ultimate aim is to embed these cognitive structures in a social context and 
then look at how these structures have impacted the implementation of the strategic 
plan. 
6.3. CONSTRUCTION OF THE COGNITIVE MAPS 
6.3.1. Introduction 
As described in the methodology chapter, a causal cognitive map offers a graphic 
representation of the web of interrelationships bearing on an issue (Diffenbach, 1982; 
Huff, 1989). It focuses on influences among elements and in this specific case among 
concepts leading to the definition of a decision as "strategic". The following section 
describes the process by which the strategists' cognitive maps were constructed. For the 
research purposes, a split of the graphs into three distinctive areas was undertaken; the 
strategic decision area, the area that includes the external influences and the area of 
organizational variables/intervening variables. 
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The basic components of the causal cognitive maps were also illustrated. Factors 
(cognitive elements), links, chains, loops, and the way they have been derived and 
incorporated into each map is described in detail in the following section. 
6.3.2. The Process Followed for the Construction of the Maps 
The foUowing five steps describe the process by which cognitive maps were produced. 
Step 1: Illustration of the strategic decisions and related areas 
The diagram is partitioned into three areas that display the focus of the research 
interest: the strategic decisions area, the internal environment of the firm, and the 
external impact. 
Step 2: Specification of the key elements involved concerning strategic decisions 
From the transcripts of the strategists' interviews a list of all the factors, perceived by the 
strategists as having influenced the strategic decisions, was produced. All other elements 
that were not related by any means to the chains of reasoning of strategic decisions were 
omitted. 
Step 3: Turning elements into variables 
Each element was expressed as a variable representing the level or rate of something. For 
example an element described as "we feel uncertain about the reliability of statistical 
data that are collected to measure traffic load' was transformed into the "level of 
reliability of statistical data concerning traffic load. It should be stressed here that 
this task was one of the most time consuming in the data analysis process since whole 
sentences found in different points in the interview transcripts but having a common 
thematic content, had to be condensed into one single box (depicting graphically a 
variable). The definitions of variables used by each strategists are provided in the 
respective influence diagram. The rationale for the links between these variables, based 
on the transcripts, is included in Appendix E. 
Step 4: Specification of the interrelationships among the variables. 
Lines were drawn connecting the variables for which a perceived influence was 
expressed in the strategists' accounts. Arrows at the ends of these lines indicated the 
direction of the influence and two kinds of mathematical signs (+), (-), were used to 
define whether there was a direct relationship between two variables or an inverse one. 
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The influence diagrams constructed in the manner described above are presented and 
analysed in the following section 
6.3.3. The Influence Diagram of STRATEGIST I 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.1. Strategist 1 was the acting General Manager of 
the enterprise. 
6.3.3.1. Chains Including Strategic Decisions 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
LOEG + ROI 15 + QMSG + RTI + LNE ............................................................... (positive chain) 
LOEG+RO115+QMSG+PROE ....................................................................... (positive chain) 
LOEG + ROI 15 + QMSG + RTI + LUC ............................................................... (positive chain) 
RGIIMP + ROI 15 + QMSG + RTI + LNE ............................................................ (positive chain) 
From the General Manager's point of view, there was a strong positive influence between 
the level of funding either from E. E. C. or the Government, and the ultimate benefits to 
stakeholders. Stakeholders were considered to be both the users and non-users of the 
railway services and benefits to them were translated into both concrete economic terms 
(National Economy) as well as into more abstract social ones (environment, comfort). 
The means to achieve those benefits was railway development, substantiated by the 
railway development plan. 
Commercial Policy: Fares Structure 
FDETU+IFS-LOD-LNE ..................................................................................... (positive chain) 
The General Manager considered the present pricing policy to be unfair to the tax-payer 
at least for the sections of the network he defined as commercially viable. The argument 
commonly advanced in favour of low rail fares was that transportation is a social service 
and as such it should be available to all incomes. The General Manager's view was 
different and indicated that a proper pricing policy would exert a positive influence on 
the National Economy by reducing the level of deficits. 
Annual Budget: Investments/Financing 
RGIIMP+ LA13-LOD+ LOGS ............................................................................ (negative chain) 
RGIIMP+LAB-LOD+LOB ............................................................................... (negative chain) 
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Figure 6.1: Strategist I (General Manager) 
Influence Diagram of Strategic Decisions 
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The negative chains depicted above indicate that an increase in the rate of Government's 
investing in the modernization plan would lead to a downward pressure on the level of 
Government's subsidies and on the level of borrowing. Thus, a strong political will was 
needed, to decide upon large and timely investment in the railway's modernization. 
Divestments from Activities 
RIRSPC+CPRS+DOA ....................................................................................... (positive chain) 
The implementation of the contract 294/83 concerning the domestic manufacturing of 
rolling stock could enhance the domestic manufacturing/maintainance capabilities 
which, in turn, could lead the organization to divesting from these activities. 
6.3.3.2. Conclusions 
Summing up, Strategist's 1 influence diagram articulates the notion of strategy in the 
following scheme: 
After a constant rate of funding is secured, the company has to stress its mission as a 
transport company, to enhance its credibility in the eyes of its customers, to operate 
commercially in the financially viable railway sections, enhancing its credibility in the 
eyes of its creditors, and to make divestments moves. Two issues important for this 
accomplishment, though not included in the strategic-decisions set were connected to the 
relevant chains of reasoning: (1) personnel training (rather meaning here re-educating to 
the degree that the new mission necessitates new attitudes and behaviours never 
practiced in the past), and (2) intensive use of information systems. 
There are some remarks to be made in relation to both the links identified in the 
diagram and concepts totally avoided to be mentioned: 
1. Strategist's 1 conceptualizations of the strategic decisions were straightforward 
and mostly included in positive chains. There was no perception of various 
destructive or advantageous loops of causality that would provide insights to a 
dynamic behaviour of a system. Furthermore, the chains identified developed 
mostly horizontally, whereas vertical links were not present. 
2. Efficiency seemed to be neglected; it was not mentioned at all. That is, the pay- 
off of the large-scale investment was left to be assessed at a later stage. In the mean 
time, costs would arise if not proper attention was devoted to them. 
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3. It is not so easy to assume that a commercial policy like the one advocated by the 
General Manager could find its way without opposition from administrative 
sectors, eventhough on the General Manager's side lied a strong argument, related 
to the common transport policy and associated legislation when European Market 
will be integrated; however, these conditions were far from being established. 
4. Divestments could give rise to "traditional reacting' on the part of trade unions 
protecting thus their right to work, or even managers of powerful units feeling 
threatened by this major change. There was no reasoning concerning how to 
achieve consensus and/or how the already done restructuring of the organization 
had promoted a different power base. 
6.3.4. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 2 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.2 Strategist 2 is the Assistant General Manager of 
the Enterprise responsible for the Permanent Way, Installations, Signalling and 
Telecommunications systems. 
6.3.4.1. Chains Involving Stra tegfc Decisions 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
DGWPR+R015+RO115 ..................................................................................... (positive chain) 
DGWPR-DBA+DCSF-RO115 ........................................................................... (positive chain) 
According to the Assistant General Manager's view, the more the Government is 
interested in promoting railway development, the more secure and constant are the vital 
funding sources for the 15-year Rail Plan. He explicitly stated that the implementation of 
this Plan is directly related to the completion of three 5-year business plans to the degree 
that the Government incorporates them - 
into the State's 5-year National Development 
Plan assigning thus financial resources from the Public Investments Programme. 
Effectiveness of the Supervisory Board 
QGAB-DPOM + RAGED + CDDCG + IOSB ................................................... (negative chain) 
QEAB-DPOM + RAGED + CDDCG + IOSB ................................................... (negative chain) 
People appointed by both the Government and the employees, by not having the status to 
exercise their role (lack of knowledge, lack of interest in the post, lack of ability to debate 
publicly) led to the Supervisory Board's ineffectiveness. 
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Personnel Policies - Career Development System 
IEIP + DBEAC-QCDS-DOS ................................................................................ (positive chain) 
IEIP+DBEAC-QCDS+LOP 
.............................................................................. (negative chain) 
Managers' inability to evaluate personnel's performance affects destructively the 
institutional forms of the organization and diminishes the level of organizational 
performance. 
Personnel Policies - Personnel Training 
DGWPR-UALF-LPT ............................................................................................ (positive chain) 
The more certain and secure is the level of Government's funding the more certain the 
enterprise feels about the accomplishment of its goals, providing thus its personnel with 
more incentives and opportunities for training. 
Performance Monitoring - Control 
DGWPR-UALF-LCHL+ QCDS+ LOP ............................................................. (positive chain) 
When the uncertainty about the level of funding increases by means of Government's 
unwillingness to fund railway development, then the level of control within the 
organization, lowers significantly. Thus, performance deteriorates. 
Structural Deficiencies 
LISL-DAMA+DOS+CDTH .............................................................................. (negative chain) 
GPPDI+DAMA+DOS+CDTH ........................................................................ (positive chain) 
The more the Socialization Law gets established in the organization, the less the 
negative effects are on the organizational structure and the less the concentration of the 
decisions on the top of the hierarchy. 
Government's pressures to promote domestic railway industry caused problems in the 
organizational process of decision-making leading thus to an increase in decisions to be 
made at the top ranks. 
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6.3.4.2. Conclusions 
The set of strategic decisions and their chains of causality could delineate Assistant 
General Manager's view of strategy. Funding is vital for the implementation of the Rail 
Plan. Delays in budgets approvals as well as budgets' truncations lead to distortive 
phenomena in the control function, which in turn partially affect the personnel's career 
paths. Managers' limited capacity to evaluate personnel's performance contributes 
negatively to the career development system. He considers personnel's training as central 
to the implementation of the Plan but under conditions of certainty about the level of 
funding. Overall, an organizational climate stagnates the management development 
systems and personnel training deserves attention only if there are clearly stated 
commitments on the part of the Government. 
There are some remarks to be made in relation to the diagram presented above: 
1. All strategic decisions are included into horizontal chains having as an initial 
influencing variable one representing the Government as an external constituency. 
2. There are no loops, thus no dynamic effects of the issues are identified. 
3. There are some direct links between strategic decisions, namely control/careers 
system and 5-year business plan/15-year Rail Plan. 
4. There are two important direct links that have to be highlighted, that win be 
utilized in the analysis of the second stage: (1) a communication problem regarding 
the distribution of information and knowledge transmitted among the different 
hierarchical levels (RDK+QCDS) (and a possible association with the inefficient 
control processes), and (2) a variable registered as organizational belief in success 
which is directly related to the organization's ability of long-range planning 
(LOB+CLTP). 
6.3.5. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 3 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.3. Strategist 3 is a Boardmember appointed by the 
Government (Governmental representative 1). 
6.3.5.1. Direct Links Involving Stra tegfc Decisions 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
RGF + ROI 15 
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ROEF + ROI 15 
NRSP + ROI 15 
RCNTC + ROI 15 
RDCRS + ROI 15 
RDNOS + ROI 15 
The increase in the rate of Government's funding leads to an increase in the rate of 
Plan's implementation. Alternatively, when a new source of funding is considered, 
because of the inadequacy of Government's funding, this rate is enhanced. 
The Rail Plan is fully implemented to the degree that projects and plans concerning track 
construction, rolling stock acquisition, new operation systems, and hiring of specialists in 
planning are deployed in parallel. 
Organizational Structure 
CSL+COS 
Tul-cos 
The more the organization attempted to conform with the Socialization Law, the more 
changes in its structure were planned to be initiated. 
Trade Unions' opposition to the changes decided upon, led to their inactivation (the 
final approval being halted at the Superior Court). 
6.3.5.2. Chains Involving Strategic Decisions 
Supervisory Board - Performance Monitoring 
SIED-VSC+LESB+LOPM ............................................................................... (negative chain) 
The increase in stakeholders' detachment in their duties diminishes the value of social 
control and this reduces the effectiveness of the Supervisory Board. As a result a 
lowering in performance monitoring occurs. 
Rewards System 
GOSPF+SPI+PAFB+CAOG ............................................................................ (positive chain) 
The increase in the gap between the salaries offered by the organization and those of 
other public enterprises led to improvements in the salary system. Yet, these 
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improvements generated problems as to whom some fringe benefits could be allocated 
and this resulted in conflicts among different occupational groups. 
Pricing Policy 
GPKFL-DPP+DR ................................................................................................ (negative chain) 
RINPO+DPP+DR ................................................................................................ (positive chain) 
The more pressures the Government is exerting on the company to keep fares low, the 
less the company is able to design a clear pricing policy and reduce deficits. 
The more modernized sections are incorporated into the network, the more the company 
will be able to determine its own pricing policy and the more a reduction of deficits will 
be achieved. 
6.3.5.3. Conclusions 
The set of strategic decisions of Government's Official introduces the following concept 
of strategy: 
Government's funding is central for the implementation of the Plan, though recently the 
possibility for a new source emerged. The organizational restructuring in alignment with 
the Socialization Law was blocked because of trade unions opposition. The Supervisory 
Board did not succeed in its mission thus organization's performance auditing never 
took place. Although personnel salaries improved there were problems in assigning 
fringe benefits and thus conflict surfaced among different organizational groups. The 
absence of a concise pricing policy because of Government's directives increases the 
level of deficits. 
The following remarks refer to the diagram analysed above: 
1. The implementation of the Rail Plan and performance monitoring are 
influenced only by other factors, but do not influence any factors themselves. 
2. Reasoning about control contained only concepts pertaining to the supervisory 
Board and not to the level of control within the enterprise (unless these two were 
related implicitly). 
3. Changes in organizational structure and changes in work rules and regulations 
belonged to two direct links of opposite signs. 
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4. There are no links among the defined strategic decisions. Only horizontal chains 
were mostly depicted. 
5. There are no loops, either positive or negative, other than a few very obvious. 
6. All the external bodies influencing strategic decisions are related to Government 
policies or State legislation. 
7. Given the overwhelming role of Government, the belief that degree of network's 
modernization would define pricing policy is questionable since no other links are 
apparent with other strategic decisions. 
6.3.6. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 4 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.4. Strategist 4 is a Boardmember appointed by the 
Government (Governmental representative 2). 
6.3.6.1. Links Including Strategic Decisions 
Annual Budget 
ROGF+LA-B 
SGEP-LAB 
The unique source of funding is Government. The more severe Government's economic 
Policy becomes the less funding the organization gets. 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
LAB + RIMP 
The more money the company gets from government the higher the rate of 
implementation of the modernization plan. 
Pricing Policy 
GPKFL-DPP 
The more pressures are exerted by Government on the enterprise in order to keep fares 
low, the less the enterprise is capable to define a pricing policy that will fit its needs. 
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Rolling Stock Acquisition 
LAB + RRSA 
The level of the annual budget determines the rate of rolling stock acquisition. 
6.3.6.2. Chains Involving Stra tegfc Decisions 
Performance Monitoring 
ROGF-DPQRDF-DEGCE+LPM ..................................................................... (positive chain) 
The higher the level of funding, the less the deviations between budgets and accounts 
submitted, thus the higher the degree of effectiveness of Government's control over the 
enterprise's performance which, overall, contributes positively to the increase in the level 
of performance monitoring. 
6.3.6.3. Conclusions 
According to Strategist's 4 rationale, strategy refers to acquisition of financial resources, 
which can be converted into construction projects, and rolling stock acquisition 
programmes. Performance monitoring is related to the degree of compatibility between 
budgets and accounts submitted quarterly. This compatibility also signifies how effective 
Government's control was, and also how well the enterprise was functioning. Pricing 
policy is essential to the degree that it is the only one that affects the enterprise's 
revenue, but has to follow Government's directives thus it is kept at low levels. 
The remarks below, sensitize the reader to reveal possible paths of explanations. 
1. The number of intervening variables related to the organizational context is 
minimal. The enterprise is like a "black box"; only government is identified in the 
environmental sector. 
2. Most of the defined strategic decisions are influenced-only variables, whereas 
the influencing-only ones lie within the external constituents sector. 
3. There are many direct links; only one chain was identifie 
4. There are no loops; thus, dynamic effects are not perceived. 
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5. The annual budget is influenced by two opposing variables; the need for railway 
modernization affects Government's funding rate positively, whereas the 
severeness of National Economic Policy leads to its reduction. 
6. Few strategic decisions are interrelated with each other. 
6.3.7. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 5 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.5. Strategist 5 is a Boardmember appointed by the 
employees (Employees representative 1). 
6.3.7 1. Chains Involving Strategic Decisions 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
R0115+LRC+NEG .............................................................................................. (positive chain) 
The more the Rail Plan gets implemented the more the position of the railways renders 
competitive and thus it contributes to national economic growth. 
Divestment from Rofling Stock Activities 
RDRSA + NLTDCA + RSH + RSR + LOP .......................................................... (positive chain) 
An increase in the rate in which the organization divests from rolling stock activities 
increases the number of long term construction agreements. This contributes to rolling 
stock standardisation and enhances the reliability of rolling stock units, increasing, thus, 
the level of organizational performance. 
Pricing Policy 
GPKFL-CDPP-PDRB ........................................................................................... (positive chain) 
Supervisory Board 
NOP+IOSB-LOC ................................................................................................. (negative chain) 
IOM+IOSB-LOC .................................................................................................. (negative chain) 
NIBE+IOSB-LOC ................................................................................................ (negative chain) 
The bigger the number of participants in the Supervisory Board the more ineffective it 
becomes. 
153 
strategic decisions intervening variables extemal bodies 
R0115 LRC 30- NEG 
tau of InDlalwAstion level of rGlIvvy's 
)lo- 
kiwtlarm I 
w( M-Vvor rail plan 
+) Coommodo Wft*, Wt i LOB LDRSP 
level (of level of domwatle (+ r*uim Owok Ores'"ton 
LAB OF RGF 
Irml ef 
+) 
1.41te of 
N, rLml bLdpt 
RSR LOP 
JAP_ 
rolllr, q stank + level Of 
r*110111"y of qu 1"UN"I Wto"WIN 
RDRSA M GPPRS 
rau of Ov"UMIL fra --q Ik ftw '& proostm*t om rallway 
rellIng Stook eativttl" to Ou of 04ruin ty"s of 9.9%0ý* 
I RSH 
rollirV 6LO* 
.4 (- NLTDCA 
mmw Of lwwt*m 
CDPP 
doommale cautructian 4qr*~t& 
clear dollnitim of a r 
PrIcIrv Polley --q 6 GVDRM 
PDRB ' 8overroment a v*gLn dofirdtion 
s of deficit with of rellwaV*& cbj*41ves 
roopeat to 
GPKFL 
*~ aw 'a presus" to %NO 
far" low (806161 00110y) 
IOSB 2 NOP 
ireffes, Uveroft *f W* ruber of Satf-doary Bard W-Ucljw" 
L 
LOC lom 
level of Caltral triftimpArwy of 
ever Ila anterprims, 
LSO LEP M NIBE Mf 
l f low of l mmw of leads ava o LSSP solar too; offered OpIopm WIN- 
be MmIrold 
lovol 
of Asply of NLA IRTU 
GOT rt~ of labas imprevemory" in rolorug" 
qualltv of 46ro-nts 
I 
:+ 
i1th ved. . d. 
tralnere Im 
DOPT 
GBARS PTMTA 
'Nor" of parsonva trainiM gop totwomin GCUAI and remewso, to mormomort, to all- 
l U rewired aid Us ". ou%aturq, ard regu a sts 
Figure 6.5. - Strategist 5 (Employees' Representative 1), 
Influence Diagram of Strategic Decisions 
154 
The less frequent the Board's meetings the bigger the ineffectiveness of the Board. 
The more issues on the agenda the bigger the ineffectiveness of the Board. 
The bigger the ineffectiveness the less control is exercised over the enterprise. 
Relations with Trade Unions - Specialists Hiring 
IRTU+NLA+LSO+LSSP ................................................................................... (positive chain) 
Improvements in relationships between management and trade unions lead to labour 
agreements which increase the level of salaries offered; thus, more specialists express an 
interest in being employed by the organization. 
Pricing Policy 
GVDRM-CDPP-PDRB ....................................................................................... (positive chain) 
The more the Government is pressing the company to keep fares low the less able the 
company is to define a clear pricing policy and the bigger the percentage of the deficits 
with respect to the social budget. 
A vague definition on the part of the government about railway's mission diminishes the 
possibility for a clearer definition of their pricing policy, and further contributes to the 
increase of operational deficits. 
6.3.7 2. Direct Links Involving Strategic Decisions 
Annual Budget 
RGF+LAB 
LOB+LAB 
Government's funding leads to the increase in the level of annual budget; when the 
amount cannot cover existing liabilities, then borrowing is the only alternative. 
Personnel Training 
QOT+DOPT 
GBARS+DOPT 
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The more qualified the trainers are to accomplish their duties the more effective 
personnel training will be. 
The bigger the gap between actual and required skills to implement the Plan, the bigger 
the degree of required personnel training. 
6.3.73. Conclusions 
Summing, Strategist's 5 view of strategy may be expressed according to the fouowing 
framework: 
The Government has absolute discretion to allocate financial resources to the Plan's 
implementation. Rolling stock acquisition policies create problems of service reliability; 
thus, divestment from rolling stock repair/ main ten ance activities should be preferable if 
the organization is going to strive for a higher level of overall performance. Though 
pricing policy is in Government's hands, a clearer definition of railway's mission would 
reduce deficits incurred in the social budget. Various problems rendered ineffective the 
functioning of the Supervisory Board, lowering thus the level of control over the 
organization. Emphasis has to be placed upon the maintenance of good relationships 
with trade unions and upon personnel training. The degree to which offered salaries are 
satisfactory may attract a number of specialists to the organization, assisting thus in the 
plan's implementation. 
There are some remarks to be made on this diagram: 
1. Strategic decisions are rather isolated on the left hand side of the diagram. 
There are no links among them. Horizontal links and chains were identified. 
2. Rolling stock activities (acquisition, repair, maintenance) are subject to a dual 
opposing influence; i. e., to governmental pressures to follow bilateral trade 
agreements and to the enterprise's wish to divest from these activities. 
3. The ineffectiveness of the Supervisory Board raises the issue of insufficient 
control over the enterprise, while good relations with trade unions contribute 
positively to employees' performance. It seems evident that the issue of control 
(who controls, by which means and for which reason) was not analysed in depth. 
4. Government's influence is perceived as affecting almost half of the strategic 
decisions. 
5. There are no loops perceived. 
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6. Organizational performance was perceived in terms of rolling stock reliability. 
6.3.8. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 6 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.6. Strategist 6 is a Boardmember appointed by the 
employees (Employees representative 2). 
6.3.8.1. Chains Involving Strategic Decisions 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
R0115+ETP-LCE ................................................................................................ (negative chain) 
R0115+ETP-LOS ................................................................................................. (negative chain) 
The more the plan was implemented, the bigger was the emphasis on construction plans. 
This led to a reduction in the level of care for the employees coupled with a reduction in 
the level of quality of services offered. 
Modernization Projects 
QTS-CEGB-RCMP ............................................................................................... (positive chain) 
The better the quality of technical studies of the projects to be implemented, the lesser 
the contractors' efforts to violate forecasted budgets and schedules. This results in an 
increase in the rate of completion of the modernization projects. 
Organizational Structure - Performance Monitoring 
LCTP+ECS+LPM ................................................................................................ (positive chain) 
VOO-ECS+LPM .................................................................................................. 
(negative chain) 
The higher the capacity of top managers, the higher the effectiveness of the 
organizational structure and the higher the level of performance monitoring. 
The larger the vagueness of the enterprise's objectives, the lesser the effectiveness of the 
organizational structure, and the bigger the reduction in the level of performance 
monitoring. 
RoHing Stock Acquisition 
LEBP+ RRSH-JR ................................................................................................. (negative chain) 
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IPTD + RRSH-JR .................................................................................................. (negative chain) 
GVOP+RRSH-JR 
................................................................................................ (negative chain) 
The bigger the inadequacy of the Purchases/Traction Departments, the larger the level 
of the economy generated by some bid proposals, and 
The more pressures Government is exerting to fulfil bilateral trade agreements, the 
higher the rate of rolling stock heterogeneity, resulting in a reduction of service 
reliability 
6.3.8.2. Direct Links Involving Strategic Decisions 
RoUing Stock Acquisition 
RIRSP + RKHA 
The higher the rate of domestic roffing stock production, the higher the rate of know-how 
acquisition. 
Performance Monitoring 
LPC-LPM 
The lack of planning and control reduces the level of performance monitoring. 
6.3.8.3. Conclusions 
Summing up, Strategist's 6 concept of strategy can be described in the foHowing terms: 
The implementation of the Plan until now was only concerned with technical studies and 
construction projects, neglecting the quality of services offered, and personnel's needs. 
Modernization projects are vital for the Plan, though facing difficulties arising from 
incomplete studies and problematic relations with sub-contractors. 
Performance monitoring is affected by dysfunctioning due to bureaucratic phenomena 
and by the organizational structure which is rendered ineffective by the ambiguous 
objectives and the low aptitude of top level personnel. Rolling stock acquisition plays also 
an important role, though there are still constraints that cannot solve the problem of the 
lack of rolling stock standardisation which directly affects service reliability. Domestic 
rolling stock manufacturing and personnel training abroad in relevant issues win enhance 
know-how acquisition. The 5-year State's Development Plan is essential to the degree 
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Figure 6.6: Strategist 6 (Employees' Representative 2) 
Influence Diagram of Strategic Decisions 
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that it incorporates sections of the 15-year Rail Plan providing thus a constant source of 
funding. 
There are some remarks to be made in relation with the analysis of the above influence 
diagram: 
1. The majority of concepts is expressed through chains of secondary order. 
2. There are some direct links between strategic decisions, namely structure- 
performance monitoring, 5-year State's Plan -implementation of the 15-year Rail 
Plan. 
3. There is a relative lack of influences from external constituencies. 
4. Most relationships are straightforward, referring to organizational factors and 
there are no loops expressing dynamic states of variables. 
5. Negative sides in the implementation process were emphasized: construction 
projects were seen as a purpose in their own right and the design work associated 
with them seemed inadequate. 
6. Organizational weaknesses in terms of procurements are perceived, mainly 
problems associated with the procurement processes. This, in turn, affects rolling 
stock reliability. 
7. Goal setting and top managers capacity were seen as integrating mechanisms 
and performance monitoring was positively related to them. 
6.3.9. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 7 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.7. Strategist 7 is a Boardmember appointed by the 
employees (Employees representative 3). 
6.3.9.1. Direct Links of Strategic Decisions 
Modernization Projects 
DNUD+IMP 
The higher the degree of network's underdevelopment, the bigger the importance of the 
implementation of modernization projects (construction works). 
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6.3.9.2. Chains Involving Strategic Decisions 
Rolling Stock Acquisition 
DNUD+NRSA+NKHA ...................................................................................... (positive chain) 
The higher the degree of the network's underdevelopment, the bigger the need for rolling 
stock acquisition (especially domestic manufacturing) which, in turn, increases the need 
for know-how acquisition. 
Annual Budget 
GDPF+CAB-LAIPP ............................................................................................ (negative chain) 
The higher the Government's discretion to provide funding, the more are the changes in 
the annual budgets submitted by the organization and thus a reduction in the level of 
annual investments and purchases budgets occurs. 
Organizational Structure 
PLCOS+DOS+OESR .......................................................................................... 
(positive chain) 
VLCS+MJB-OESR .............................................................................................. 
(negative chain) 
CPIPV+RIRDS+DOS+OESR .......................................................................... (positive chain) 
The more problems arise out of the lack of co-ordination among the different 
operational subsystems (track, rolling stock, and operations), the more deficiencies are 
attributed to organizational structure, and this leads to efforts for organizational 
restructuring. 
The bigger the vagueness of legislation concerning "socialization", the more the Board's 
misinterpretations with respect to its own competencies, and this affects negatively 
organizational efforts to change its structure. 
The bigger the pressures exerted by the General Manager to impose a political view on 
decisions, the higher the rate of informal repeal of the delegation system currently in use 
in the organization, and this increases structural deficiencies that in turn lead to efforts 
to change the existing structure. 
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Careers Development System 
RIRDS-LCDS+LPM 
........................................................................................... (negative chain) 
CIFCWR-LCDS+LPM 
....................................................................................... (negative chain) 
The increase in the rate of the informal repeal of the delegation system reduces the level 
of the career development system and lowers the level of participative management. 
The increase in the complexity of the institutional framework concerning personnel 
relations, careers, and conditions of retirement reduces the level of the career 
development system and diminishes the level of participative management. 
Personnel Training 
LDM+PRC+LOTN .............................................................................................. (positive chain) 
The level of modernization to be attained to is high. Therefore, the required capacities 
of personnel are increased and hence the need for personnel training is enhanced. 
63.9.3. Conclusions 
Overall, the concept of strategy as expressed by Strategist 7 could be described in the 
following terms: 
The degree of the network's neglect is the element that assigns such a big emphasis to the 
modernization projects and rolling stock acquisition programmes. Government has an 
absolute discretion to allocate funds to investment budgets and frequently decides to 
truncate organization's proposals, rendering thus annual investment budgets vital to the 
implementation of the Plan. Efforts to design a new organizational structure, induced by 
various problems of coordination among the different operational subsystems, were 
inactivated due to the lack of clarity of the Socialization legislation. Personnel's career 
development system is negatively affected by the complexity of the institutional 
framework and the informal repeal of the delegation system; therefore, there is no 
cultivation of the spirit of participative leadership and of the distribution of 
responsibilities (decentralisation). 
The following remarks concern the influence diagram analysed above: 
1. Organizational structure is considered as an influenced-only element by either 
the politicality of the General Manager's views and lack of coordination or by 
163 
external constituents. Thus two chains of opposing influence on organizational 
structure exist. 
2. There are no explicitly stated direct links between strategic decisions. 
3. Most strategic decisions are included into chains of second and third order 
where the majority of concepts come from the organizational environment. 
4. Governmental policies are seen as affecting directly only one strategic decision, 
that is funding through annual budgets. 
5. Know-how acquisition is contained as the end-concept into two chains of 
reasoning concerning strategic decisions. 
6.3.10. The Influence Diagram of Strategist 8 
The diagram is depicted in Figure 6.8. Strategist 8 is the Head of the Department of 
Planning. 
6.3.10.1. Chains Involving Strategic Decisions 
Annual Investments Plans 
GPKFL+LDOB+LOB-IAIP ............................................................................. 
(negative chain) 
The bigger the Government's pressures to keep fares low, the higher the level of deficits 
in the operational budgets which, in turn, leads to an increase in the level of borrowing 
necessary to cover these deficits. 
The more the company borrows for covering operational deficits the less able it is to find 
money for the requirements of its annual investments plan. 
6.3.10-2. Direct Links Involving Strategic Decisions 
Annual Investments Plans 
LOB-LAIP 
LOB+LAIP 
LAIP+LOB 
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Figure 6.8: Strategist 8 (Head of the Department of Planning) 
Influence Diagram of Strategic Decisions 
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In the chain described above the increase of the enterprise's deficit increased the need 
for public borrowing (borrowing under guarantee of the Bank of Greece) and 
contributed to the swelling of deficits. In 1986 and later, under the stabilization 
programme, emphasis was placed upon the deficits control and this led to a reduction in 
the level of investments budgets. There are data that advocate for the fact that this 
restrictive policy reduced significantly the deficits level as well as the need for borrowing. 
Implementation of the Rail Plan 
ROM + ROT 15 
RCP + ROI 15 
LOI + ROI 15 
An increase in the rate of implementation of 
1. constructions and procurements, 
2. the operations system and 
3. improvements in work rules and work relations 
led to an increase in the rate of implementation of the 15-year Rail Plan. 
Changes in the Organizational Structure 
NFD+COS 
NIP+COS 
DLI-COS 
The bigger the need for decentralization, the more the changes incurred in the 
organizational structure. 
The more the attempts to improve performance, the more the changes incurred in the 
organizational structure. 
Delays in the implementation of the Socialization Law reduce the efforts for 
organizational changes already been decided upon. 
Personnel Training 
MWPPT+LPT 
REF+LPT 
RPIRS+LPT 
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Increases in the rate of EEC funding, management's interest in personnel training and 
participation in international meetings enhance the rate of personnel training. 
6.3.10.3. Conclusions 
The concept of strategy as expressed by Strategist 8 can be delineated by the following 
terms: 
Acquisition of . nancial resources is a vital issue because of the high level of deficits 
caused by the conformity to Government's pressures to keep fares low. Changes in the 
organizational structure result from a need for decentralization and improvement of 
company's performance and adjustment to legislation. Personnel training is very 
important and is positively influenced by management's will to provide employees with 
upgraded specialized knowledge. 
The following remarks stem from the analysis of the above influence diagram: 
1. There is one positive loop operating as a vicious cycle; the level of deficits in the 
operational budgets press upwards the level of borrowing to cover them which in 
turn increases the level of deficits and so on. 
2. Annual investments plans, organizational structure, performance monitoring, 
personnel training, and the implementation of the 15-year Rail Plan are 
influenced-only variables; they are not articulated in chains. 
3. There are no links explicitly stated between strategic decisions; horizontal links 
and chains are mainly identified. 
4. There is an interesting line of reasoning to highlight, though it is not directly 
concerned with a strategic decision; the number of bilateral trade agreements 
signed by Government leads to an increased lack of rolling stock standardisation. 
Thus, repair/maintenance duties cannot be undertaken properly and, therefore, 
the frequent breakdowns of rolling stock units deteriorate journey times and hence 
the level of services offered. This, in turn, increases Government's pressures to 
keep fares low. 
5. Suppliers of rolling stock appear for the first time in the "external bodies" part 
of the diagram. 
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6.4. ANALYSIS OF MATRICES 
The influence diagrams revealed that certain aspects of the conceptual categories 
(strategic decisions, organizational factors, environmental) seemed to have been more 
salient to some strategists than to others. Furthermore, the strategists' assertions about 
what influenced a strategic decision as well as about what effects/con sequences this 
decision had, sometimes seemed fragmented. Whether this was a limitation of the 
mapping technique used or could be attributed to the type of the elicitation procedure or 
was unknown at that time, necessitated an additional step to be undertaken. 
strategist 
% of strategic decisions 
included in the matrix 
8 (Head of the Planning Dept. 100 
2 (Assistant General Manager) 100 
5 (Employees representative 1) 71 
6 (Employees representative 2) 100 
7 (Employees representative 3) 83 
Figure 6.9: Identified decisions included in the matrix 
Matrices including three sets of elements (strategic decisions, environmental factors, 
organizational factors) were constructed. Of the thirteen decisions defined as strategic by 
all decision -makers, ten where incorporated into the matrices. These decisions 
represented the percentages of the ones included in the strategic decision set of each 
strategist in the influence diagrams, illustrated in Figure 6.9. 
6.4.1. On Extern al Cau ses of An n ual Budget's Levels 
In their interviews, all strategists argued that uncertainty about financial resources 
caused considerable problems. The causes of this uncertainty are highlighted in Figure 
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6.10. As may be seen, there is no shared perception about what strongly affects budget's 
levels. 
Furthermore, while in some causes like economic policy there is a partial agreement, the 
sign of the influence is perceived differently. Total agreement was found only in the 
pricing policy cause, though the magnitude of the influence varied considerably within 
the employees' group, while the managers expressed exactly the same views. The 
employees' representatives stressed the budget's truncation regarding capital investment 
levels, whereas the director of planning recognized its positive impact regarding the 
increasing revenue due to increasing tariffs. Regarding the impact of policies of various 
administrative bodies, the second widest agreement was recorded though this is not 
reflected on the magnitude of influence as well. 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
PRICING POLICY positive (3) positive (3) positive (3) positive (1) positive (2) 
EMPLOYMENT MAINTENANCE positive (3) positive (1) positive (2) 
ECONOMIC POLICY positive (3) positive (1) negative(-3) positive (1) negative(-3) 
ADMINISTRATIVE HETEROGENEITY negative(-l) positive (1) 
PROBLEMS WITH SUPPLIERS negative(-l) negative(-2) 
EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATION IN D-M negative(-l) positive (1) positive (1) 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS positive (2) positive (2) 
POLICIES INCOMPATIBILITY negative(-2) negative(-2) negative(-l) negative(-3) 
Figure 6.10: Direct Effects of Concepts on Annual Budget 
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6.4.2. On External Causes of Rail Plan Implementation 
As displayed in Figure 6.11, the impact of economic policy on the plan's 
implementation was perceived in the same way by all Board-members, although there 
were striking differences regarding the magnitude of its influence. The same applies to 
the influence of administrative heterogeneity, problems with suppliers, and policies' 
incompatibility, though the recorded agreement was slightly less. The employees' 
participation in decision-making deserves some attention, since managers were either 
neutral or stressed its negative impact. However, all employees' representatives assessed 
this influence to be positive, though its low magnitude is notable. 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
ECONOMIC POLICY negative(-3) negative(-3) negative(-l) negative(-l) negative(-3) 
ADMINISTRATIVE HETEROGENEITY negative(-l) negative(-2) negative(-3) negative(-3) 
PROBLEMS WITH SUPPLIERS negative(-l) negative(-l) negative(-2) negative(-3) 
EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATION IN D-M negative(-l) positive (1) positive (1) positive (1) 
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS positive (1) positive (1) negative(-2) 
POLICIES INCOMPATIBILITY inegative(-2) i inegative(-2) lnegative(-l) lnegative(-3) 
Figure 6.11: Direct Effects of External Concepts on the Rail Plan 
6.4.3. On Organizational Causes of Rail Plan Implementation 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENA negative(-l) negative(-l) negative(-2) negative(-2) 
DECISION MAKING SYSTEM negative(-I) negative(-l) positive (1) negative(-2) 
M ANA GEMENT SYSTEM positive (2) negative(-l) positive (1) negative(-2) 
TASK DESIGN positive (1) negative(-I) 
CORPORATE CULTURE positive (1) 
COMPENSATION SYSTEM positive (1) positive (1) 
CAREERS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM positive (1) negative(-2) 
Figure 6.12: Direct Effects of Orpnizational Concepts on Plan 
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It is apparent that this area is sensitive for some of the employees and managers as well. 
The "neutraf' concept of bureaucratic phenomena was mostly perceived to affect 
negatively the plan, as illustrated in Figure 6.12. All other concepts belonging to the 
organizational sector were not mentioned at all by managers. Only one of them referred 
to the negative influence of the decision-making system (the same issue also appeared in 
his influence diagram). Yet, here he did not prefer to score on the corporate culture 
cause, despite the fact that in his influence diagram he referred to the low level of 
organisational belief in the success of the Plan. 
6.4.4. On Organizational Causes of Performance Monitoring 
Figure 6.13 shows that control issues were either left unattended or partially followed. 
The negative impact of corporate culture and management system was stressed by one 
manager, whereas exactly the opposite was perceived by the other. Employees seemed 
unwilling to score on organisational causes. However, when they did so, the causes they 
attributed resembled the ones depicted in the influence diagrams and had the same 
negative sign. In Strategist's 6 rationale, the positive impact of corporate culture is 
notable; it was also defined in his influence diagrams, however as not impacting on 
performance monitoring. 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENA negative(-l) negative(-2) 
DECISION MAKING SYSTEM negative(-I) negative(-l) 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM positive (3) negative(-I) positive (1) negative(-l) 
CORPORATE CULTURE positive (2) negative(-2) positive (1) 
CAREERS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM positive (3) 
Figure 6.13: Direct Effects of Concepts on Performance Monitoring 
6.4.5. On Organizational Causes of Structure"s Inefficiency 
The only identified shared perception (Figure 6.14) concerns bureaucratic phenomena, 
having a negative influence on the structure. Note here the divided views (in terms of 
sign and magnitude) concerning the impact of the management system, and the identity 
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of views of the Assistant General Manager, with respect to his influence diagram. He 
stressed the negative impact of corporate culture on the functioning of the organisational 
structure; however, the perceived strength was low. 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENA negative(-2) negative(-3) negative(-2) negative(-2) 
DECISION MAKING SYSTEM positive (3) negative(-I) negative(-2) 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM positive (3) positive (1) negative(-l) negative(-2) 
CORPORATE CULTURE negative(-l) negative(-2) 
Fo igure 6.14: Direct Effects of Concepts on Orpniz. Structure 
6.4.6. Inter-relation ships Among Strategic Decisions 
CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
RAIL PLAN positive positive 
294 CONTRACT positive 
MODERNIZATION PROJECTS positive positive 
ANNUAL BUDGET positive 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE positive positive 
ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION positive 
PERSONNEL TRAINING positive 
Figure 6.15. - Impact of Performance Monitoring on Strat. Decisions 
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CAUSAL CONCEPTS STRATEGIST 8 STRATEGIST 2 STRATEGIST 5 STRATEGIST 6 STRATEGIST 7 
MODERNIZATION PROJECTS positive positive positive positive 
RAIL PLAN positive positive 
294 CONTRACT positive positive 
ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION positive 
Figure 6.16: Impact of Annual Budget on Strategic Decisions 
An area that was unexplored in the influence diagrams was the investigation of the inter- 
relationships among strategic decisions. Figures 6.15 and 6.16 detect the impact of the 
annual budget on strategic decisions and of performance monitoring on strategic 
decisions (only the strong relationships are included; that is only relationships that have 
values 2 and 3). Thus, concerning the impact of performance monitoring, this impact was 
perceived as strong, concerning the Rail Plan, by both managers; however, employees' 
representatives did not perceive strong influence; to them, organisational structure was 
the factor positively affected by performance monitoring. 
Referring to the impact of the annual budget, only a strong view concerning 
modernization projects was revealed. All other strategic decision-areas either were not 
mentioned or the perceived strength was weak. This finding coincides with the definition 
of annual budgets as a strategic decision and its minimal implications depicted in the 
influence diagrams. 
6.5. SYNOPSIS 
This chapter dealt with the revealing of strategists cognitive structures operationalizing 
strategy. Influence diagrams and matrices were used to depict these structures. The 
following derived from the analysis of those structures illustrated in influence diagrams: 
-A newcomer (the new General Manager) adopts a positive perspective 
in terms of 
strategy. Most of his concepts are located in the environment which influences strategic 
decisions and is, in turn, influenced by them. Strategic decisions concern mainly the 
regulated areas of financing and fares structure. From this one may infer that he sees 
strategy as mainly altering the existing constraining regulatory framework, as something 
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that should be done at another level than that of the firm, in order to ensure survival of 
the firm and benefits to the interested parties. 
- Managers perceive strategy mainly in terms of organizational concepts. Yet, these are 
included in negative chains where the influencing element is either government or the 
institutional framework. In turn, strategy mostly influences organizational areas and in 
some cases does not impact on any factor. 
- There are cognitive maps that mostly belong to outsiders (governmental officials) which 
display a bulk of direct links between the environment and strategy. These links are 
perceived, in many cases, as having an equivocal impact (that is, negative and positive 
signs). Organizational factors are rarely present. 
- Other insiders (not managers) operationalize strategy in different terms. Some of them 
display cognitive structures where strategy is negatively influenced by the environment 
and, in turn, negatively influences the organization. In this category, effects of strategy 
are few. It seems as strategy (apart from the areas related to personnel training and 
hiring) is exclusively denoted by the negative consequences of regulatory policies. Others 
include into their cognitive structures mostly negative links that initiate from the 
organization. When concepts located in the environment are also found, there is no 
connectivity between them and the organizational ones. Here again strategy is defined by 
the negative consequences not only of government's actions but of organizational 
activities as well. 
The cognitive maps derived from matrices, compared to the influence diagrams 
presented similarities as well as differences. 
- The similarities concerned the negative impact of the external environment 
where the government was the prevailing factor for the implementation of the Rail 
Plan. The same also applied to the impact of financing on the modernization 
projects. 
- The differences concerned the case of the employees' representatives, that filled 
scores concerning the organizational causes of performance monitoring and 
organizational structure in an idiosyncratic function (apart from one case which 
exhibited consistency), where the perceived values were low. The managers 
exhibited striking differences between them on causes of performance monitoring, 
while on causes of organizational structure one of them perceived strong positive 
impact and the other perceived no relationship at all. 
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Thus, in terms of a first assessment, the strategists' cognitive structures presented both 
similarities and differences, both in terms of the concepts belonging in their chains of 
reasoning and in terms of the influence that strategic decisions were perceived to exert 
or sustain. Yet, in order to evaluated whether these surfaced differences possess 
consistencies, a further step in the analysis was undertaken and is dealt with in the 
following chapter. 
CHAPTER 7 
EXPLAINING INDIVIDUALS'DATA: LOOKING FOR PATTERNS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 presented the strategists' maps at the individual level and depicted the 
structure of the causal assertions used to rationalize about strategic decisions. This 
chapter is concerned with tracing patterns across maps, both influence diagrams and 
those derived from matrices, in order to uncover similarities and spot differences. 
The aim here is (1) To embed the individuals' notion of strategy in context by drawing 
on personal, professional and other characteristics; and (2) To present a deeper 
understanding of these notions by looking into patterns in their structural configuration 
and into the perspective they conveyed. Thus, in terms of the research objective, the 
question of how the members of a Board operationalize strategy would be tackled. 
7.2. EXPLAINING INDIVIDUAL DATA IN CONTEXT 
To describe what strategists think about strategy, the chains of reasoning depicted in the 
influence diagrams were used, as well as the cause-effect relationships derived from the 
matrices. The following section combines these two data sources and illustrates a first 
attempt to go deeper from the stated rationales to the hidden assumptions behind them 
and to understand why some very important issues to some strategists were ignored by 
other. 
7.2.1. Strategist 1: The General Manager 
A 45 years old Mechanical/Electrical Engineer (BSc, MSc, PhD), Assistant 
Professor at the School of Electrical Engineering of the National Technical 
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University of Athens (NTUA), he was appointed as General Manager of the 
Greek Railway in August 1988. He first joined the railway after the 1981 
elections as vice-governor, a post he left in 1983 to take over Olympic 
Airways as General Manager. Two years later he joined Pyrkal, a state- 
owned industry producing army supplies, as General Manager. 
When he first joined the railway he set up two committees to re-evaluate the 
Rail Plan and propose required amendments. The outcome of the work of 
the first committee (strategic planning group) was the 5-Year Rail Plan 
discussed in this study, whereas the second committee (tactical planning 
group) never succeeded in producing a concrete result. 
When he joined the railway for second time in 1988, he assigned a first 
priority to the task of assuring a continuous funding of the railway 
development plan, in order to complete at least the developing engineering 
projects on the Athens to Idomeni main line. He managed to have his 
proposals approved by the European Commission, as discussed in Appendix 
B. He also initiated changes in the organizational structure of the enterprise 
and was the first to stress the service character of the railway, as contrasted 
to the up to that time emphasis on engineering projects. 
He left the railway in June 1989, following the change in Government. 
An extroverted1persuasive view best describes the General Manager's definition of 
strategy. The majority of concepts he used lay in the environmental sector and referred 
to the positive repercussions that railway development, through the implementation of 
the Plan, would have on different aspects of the environment. His chains of reasoning 
either initiated from or concluded to this sector. His rationale concerning annual budget 
and the fare structure was a radical one, because it promoted greater autonomy of the 
public enterprise from the State and brought to its defense the tax-payers who should not 
be burdened by costs of services offered to the users. Related to this was the concept of 
quality of service which was emphasized throughout the interview, though not directly 
related to strategic decisions in the influence diagram. According to his view, the users of 
rail services would be willing to pay increased fares for improved services and thus the 
enterprise would be able to reduce its big deficits. Quality of service (not as the ultimate 
end of the rail plan but as a daily practice including the transformation of existing 
services to meet the passengers' needs) was, according to his view, the means to 
counteract governmental views claiming that there was no need to invest heavily on 
railway development since the services offered by the company were appropriate for the 
income classes to which they were directed. 
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He considered the divestment from time- and effort-consuming activities as a short-term 
task the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by the implementation of the 
294/83 manufacturing contract. This contract would provide domestic industry with 
know-how and technology, thus making it capable of undertaking the biggest part of 
rolling stock periodic maintenance and repair duties. 
Overall, strategy in the General Manager's terms implied a completely new repositioning 
of the firm which would necessitate both the State's new attitude towards railways and 
the enterprise's new perspective of its services. However, what was missing from this 
motivating view was a description of the means to get there, that is the organizational 
systems, processes and values which by being rigid (because of the years of stagnation 
and despair) would probably, at least in the beginning, resist change and condemn it to 
failure. 
7.2.2. Strategist 2: The Assistant General Manager 
A 50 years old Civil Engineer working for the Greek Railway since 1965, he 
was appointed as Assistant General Manager in 1986. He was responsible for 
the Permanent Way function of the enterprise, that is maintenance and 
development of track, track infrastructure, signalling and 
telecommunications. He spent a big part of his career in the railway as an 
Area Engineer, before becoming Regional Chief Civil Engineer and then 
Chief Civil Engineer of the Permanent Way Department. Being a career 
railwayman, he had during the study the rank of the Head-of-Department 
and was considered within the enterprise as an expert in permanent way 
engineering and as a very loyal and dedicated employee. Since 1989, that is 
after the change in Government, he is not an Assistant General Manager any 
more. In some way, he has been placed aside, because he is not assigned any 
duties within the existing organizational structure. 
The Assistant General Manager provided an integrated view of strategy. The main 
issue was government's funding without which there was no future for the enterprise. The 
bulk of his concepts was rooted in the organizational sector. In the environmental sector, 
the government and the supervisory board were both identified as constraints to internal 
decisions. He was concerned with organizational weaknesses (e. g. the need for intensive 
personnel training and the lack of incentives for career development since the existing 
system exhibited distortive phenomena) and articulated the need for the overcoming of 
these weaknesses into his concept of strategy. Both his influence diagram and score 
matrix pin-pointed to the strong negative impact that the corporate culture 
(organizational disbelief in success) had on performance monitoring and on the 
personnel's capability to plan. 
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He assumed that the concentration of the bulk of decision-making on the top of the 
hierarchy was deteriorating organizational performance and that the actual management 
system was falling short of activating the decision-making system throughout the 
enterprise. He also associated the problematic organizational structure with this 
deficiency and stressed that the introduction of the supervisory board had amplified 
problems of managerial accountability. He believed that the new structure (at that time 
starting to be implemented) would lift some of these constraints. Surprisingly enough, 
though he criticized the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board and believed that this 
would increase the scepticism concerning participative schemes, he included this board's 
functioning into his concept of strategy. Whether this may be attributed to his faith in 
the ultimate success of such schemes or to his belief that only the stakeholders' interests 
and pressures could help the railway to survive, was not clear. However, his reasoning 
revealed that this might come true if and only if all constituents were capable to 
understand what the railway's mission is and to work for this mission's accomplishment. 
7.2.3. Strategist 3: Governmental Representative 1 
A 52 years old civil engineer, engaged in private constructions and 
engineering studies. In the past, he has been a lecturer in the National 
Technical University of Athens (NTUA) in the field of Theoretical and 
Applied Mechanics. He has also been a member of the Board of the National 
Union of Civil Engineers and a member of the top management team of the 
Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE). He was appointed by the new 
government in 1982 as a member of the Board of the Railways and he held 
the post of the vice-chairman of the Board until the Government's change in 
June 1989, when he had to leave the Railway. 
The Vice-Chairman's view of strategy can be described as integrated1compliant. All 
strategic decisions were influenced by external factors mostly directly and they covered 
all major areas of organizational activities. He considered the issue of control as related 
only with the top; that is, the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board had essentially left 
the enterprise without auditing; he did not mention the control exercised by this Board 
on the enterprise, unless he implicitly recognized that the lack of the first link inevitably 
results in the lack of the second. The existence of two opposing influences on 
organizational structure and pricing policy depicted the forces in action at that time 
when the enterprise was trying to establish a new way of doing its business, and to 
persuade the Government that after the quality of service had improved (at least in 
terms of speed increases) it was time for fares also to increase. 
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The absence of any perceived effects after the decisions had been made might indicate 
either ignorance concerning their consequences (since the decisions had already started 
being implemented 5-6 months earlier) or acceptance of the fact that since such external 
constraints existed, nothing more could be done in order to overcome obstacles. 
7.2.4. Strategist 4: Governmental Representative 2 
A 40 years old economist, working for the state-owned Industrial 
Development Bank of Greece (ETVA), she participated in the Public 
Enterprises Control Committee (DEKO) at the Department of National 
Economy, and was appointed as member of the Board of the railways, in 
September 1985, following the establishment of the new Board (participated 
by employees representatives) during the period of the implementation of 
the Governmental strict economic policy. She rather acted within the Board 
as a representative of the mentioned Governmental Committee, attempting 
to co-ordinate and control rail policies within the framework established by 
the Department of National Economy. She too left the Railway in June 1989 
and went back to her first job at the Industrial Development bank. 
Her views concerning strategy could be described as officiallformal. The enterprise 
seemed totally unknown to her. Her views rather implied directives than cause and effect 
relationships. The issue of control was only related to deviations, appearing in quarterly 
accounts submitted by the enterprise to the government. It was not demonstrated 
whether the identification of such deviations initiated corrective activity either by the 
enterprise or the government. Though the negative impact of governmental sectors was 
recognized, (for example the Department's of Commerce impact on both rolling stock 
acquisition and pricing policy), she did not mention any effects or consequences for the 
enterprise. 
7.2.5. Strategist 5: Employees Representative 1 
A 60 years old permanent way technician and trade-unionist was one of the 
three employees elected to the Board by the company's personnel after the 
implementation of the socialization law (September 1985). He was the first 
of the two representatives elected under the flag of the governing party 
(socialists). However, he was not elected to that post during the first 
elections (April 1985), when he was elected as an employees' representative 
in the Supervisory Board (ASKE) of which he was the chairman until 1988. 
After the expiration of the three-years term of the employees representatives 
(1988) he was elected as a member of the Board and still holds this post (his 
term expires in Autumn 1991). During the last ten years before his 
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appointment at the Board, he was working as a permanent way technician in 
the P. W. Division of the Athens Regional Department (DPA). 
He viewed strategy as an integrated/'keep off the edgeso concept. Apart from the 
need to acquire new rolling stock units and to update the railway line, he considered that 
strong negative influences were stemming from problems with suppliers (of services and 
rolling stock) and their negative effects upon the Rail Plan. 
Environmental factors and organizational ones were assumed to strongly affect strategic 
decisions. The management and decision-making systems had a negative impact upon all 
strategic areas. On the other hand, when the impact of organizational factors on the 
organization was considered, apart from the bureaucratic phenomena all other concepts 
displayed positive in ter-relation ships. Corporate culture rendered ineffective the 
functioning of the organizational structure. The latter, according to his view, was 
perfectly acceptable in its previous form and there was no need for a major change; it 
would suffice to remove constraints such as structural/fu nct ion al deficiencies of the 
supervisory board and the vagueness of objectives as provided by the State. Trade unions 
were assumed to contribute positively to performance monitoring, though the actual 
experience of employees' participation in decision centres proved that their impact was 
marginally positive. Finally, he stressed the need for more specialized and well- 
compensated personnel to be hired, since the actual impact of the compensation system 
upon all strategic decisions was minimal. 
7.2.6. Strategist 6: Employees Representative 2 
A 35 years old member of the clerical staff, he joined the railway in 1978 and 
used to work at the headquarters of the North Greece Regional Department 
(DPTh). He was also elected to the Board by the employees under the flag of 
the socialist party, both for the first (1985) and the second (1988) term. An 
active trade-unionist, he had also been elected to the leadership of the 
Federation of Greek Railwaymen (POS). He still retains his post at the 
Board; his term expires in Autumn 199 1. 
He viewed strategy as an integratedlunionistic concept. Strategy contained all major 
areas of organizational activities and displayed linkages between some of them. He 
stressed constraints stemming from the organizational and the environmental (the 
majority of strong influences) sectors that affected negatively the strategic areas. 
However, though he recognized the organizational weaknesses (inadequacy of the 
Procurement Department, poor quality of technical studies, lack of will to solve the 
rolling stock problem), he argued about the strong positive influence of employees 
participation in decision centres upon all organizational factors such as the decision 
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making system, the task design system, the career development system. Furthermore, he 
argued about the strong positive impact of the supervisory board's functioning upon the 
majority of strategic decisions and the culture of the company, whereas in his influence 
diagram he pin-pointed to the negative impact of inexperienced employees participating 
in the supervisory board's functioning. He seemed to attribute the causes of 
organizational ineffectiveness mainly to the enterprise's top management, eventhough, in 
his matrix, he assigned low but positive values to the impact of the actual management 
system on task design, corporate culture, compensation system and career development 
system. Personnel training was a contradictory concept in his reasoning. He perceived a 
strong positive impact on the technical aspect of modernization projects and rolling stock 
acquisition as well as on task design, corporate culture, and career development system 
(how then do the incompetent managers find their way up the organizational 
hierarchy? ). Yet, he perceived a marginal impact on the employees participation in 
decision centres. This might imply that other criteria applied for the election to these 
posts. 
7.2.7. Strategist 7: Employees Representative 3 
A 38 years old mechanical and electrical engineer, he joined the railway in 
1978 and had mainly served within the road vehicles division of the company 
(YA). He was elected as a representative of the employees affiliated to the 
party of the opposition (conservatives) both in 1985 and in 1988. Before his 
election, he had been an active unionist within the Professional Engineers 
trade-union. His term too expires in Autumn 1991. However, after the 
political change in 1989, being an employees representative to the Board he 
was assigned the post of the acting General Manager of the enterprise which 
he still retains. 
He viewed strategy as a resource depen den t1politically constrained concept. Apart 
from the need to acquire the means of production for the offering of railway services 
(such as modernized line, new rolling stock and specialized labour), which need was 
strongly stressed because of the network's under-development, he considered 
administrative controls and problems with suppliers as the external factors that strongly 
influenced negatively the development of the Rail Plan and the progess of the 294/83 
contract. 
Interestingly enough, he perceived all strategic decisions to affect positively all 
organizational factors, particularly the organizational structure that had the stronger 
perceived impact. This opposed to his view expressed in the influence diagram, i. e. that 
the until 1988 General Manager blocked the delegation system and thus led to 
deficiencies in the organizational structure. The new organizational structure was 
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starting being implemented at that time; hence, its perceived impact upon the 
organization was minimal. Consequently, his views referred mostly to the existing one. 
The focus on this issue, in his influence diagram, might be attributed to political 
opposition. The same applies to the career development system. He perceived the 
autocratic leadership of the ex-General Manager as one of the causes of this system's 
ineffectiveness. In his matrix a very low negative impact was perceived, while the positive 
impact of the organizational structure was again identified. 
7.2.8. Strategist 8: The Head of the Department of Planning 
A 60 years old civil engineer, he joined the railway in 1963 and has almost 
exclusively worked within the Department of Planning and Organization, 
either as a junior engineer, or as a Chief Civil Engineer, or recently (since 
1988) as the Head of the Department. He was one of the group of engineers 
which worked with Sofrerail during its extended consultancy in Greece 
(1966-1977) and thus, in many respects, he must be held accountable for a big 
part of either the success or failure of the railway's Planning Department 
since its establishment (1970). He is retiring in 1993. 
His views might characterize strategy as an externally inducedl*helpiess-and- 
hopelesso concept. Environment burdens organization by either limiting budgets or by 
keeping fares low as a punishment to the enterprise, which is not capable of promoting 
the quality of services. The bad financial position of the railway is part of a vicious cycle 
and there is not a counteracting force to release the situation. The complex chains of 
reasoning regarding rolling stock reliability and consequently service reliability seemed 
themselves to contribute negatively to the company's financial performance. 
Organizational structure, he argued, was affected by delays in the implementation of the 
law and by the need to improve performance, while in his cognitive map, deriving from 
the matrix, structure was perceived to affect positively performance monitoring and all 
organizational systems (apart from the compensation one). 
Eventhpugh, in the interview, he stressed the fact that the supervisory board could not 
fulfil its mission and wondered whether this was due to the members' indifference in 
defining a transport policy for the company within an integrated national transport 
system, in the matrix he scored strong positive values on the effects of the functioning of 
the supervisory board upon A strategic decisions as well as upon the management and 
decision-making systems of the company, probably this reflecting an ideal situation (or a 
"would if' statement). 
He considered that the management and decision-making systems contributed positively 
to corporate culture and career development system, the latter being also positively and 
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strongly affected by all organizational areas (apart from the existence of bureaucratic 
phenomena). It seemed strange that such a well-managed, controlled and democratic 
organization (positive influence of strategic decisions upon organization as wen as 
organizational factors on organizational ones) could not find its "way out of the tunnel". 
7.3. PATTERNS 
This section aims at identifying: (1) patterns in the structural configuration of influence 
diagrams, and (2) the perspective conveyed by the notion "strategic", based on the 
positioning of strategy concepts in the chains of reasoning as well as on the links among 
them. 
7.3.1. Patterns in Structural Configuration of Influence Diagrams 
Figure 7.1 shows the patterns revealed in the strategists' individual maps (influence 
diagrams). As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the six categories on the left-hand side of the 
table refer to the structure of the maps, the number, type and distribution of the 
cognitive elements involved and the type of their interrelationships. For each strategist, 
the issues involved by category were sorted and then presented in the appropriate 
columns of the right-hand side of the table. 
- The first category includes the total number of concepts belonging to the environmental 
sector and its distribution according to sub-categories emerging from the data. 
- The second category refers to concepts pertaining to organisational issues. These issues 
were also divided into sub-categories emerging from the data. 
- The third category indicates the total number of strategic decisions. 
- The fourth category denotes the strategic decisions found in horizontal chains, that is 
chains of concepts cutting across the three sectors illustrated in the maps (environment, 
organization, strategy). 
- The fifth category refers to the vertical links/chains found in the strategy sector of the 
influence diagrams. Thus, they involve only strategic decisions. 
- Finally, the sixth category refers to the number of cycles (loops) identified in all sectors 
of the diagrams. 
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Assistant Goverment Goverment Epployees bp 1 oyees Employees Head of 
C0ncepts General General Represent- Represent- Represent- Represent- Represent- Planning 
Manager Manager ative ative ative ative ative Department 
concepts in the 
environ. sector (no) 10 9 8 5 11 7 4 9 
distribution 
Goverment 30 % 56 % 38 % 100 % 36 % 43 % 100 % 56 % 
Trade Unions 11 % 12 % 9% 
Supervisory Board 33 % 25 % 28 % 29 % 
Public Sector 13 % 14 % 
Suppliers 10 % 18 % 14 % 11 % 
Competitors 10 % 
Users 10 % 
General Public 20 % 
EEC 10 % 12 % 11 % 
Conferences 11 % 
Freight Market 11 % 
other 10 % 9% 
concepts in the 
organis. sector (no) 8 14 9 3 13 is 15 20 
distribution 
Financ. Management 25 % 22 % 22 % 33 % 15 % 7% 9% 
Structure/Processes 38 % 50 % 22 % 46 % 47 % 67 % 28 % 
Corporate Culture 12 % 7% 
Corporate Image 12 % 8% 5% 
Divestment 13 % 8% 
Rewards/Incentives 14 % 22 % 15 % 
Comnunication 7% 
Operatns Management 22 % 13 % 33 % 
Rules/Regulations 12 % 13 % 5% 
Hunan Resources 33 % 13 % 
Organis. Development 34 % 13 % 
Equip. Acquisition 8% 27 % 10 % 
Nunber of 4 7 9 5 7 7 6 4 
Strategic Decisions 
Strategic Decisions 100 % 71 % 78 % 80 % 100 % 86 % 100 % 100 % 
in Horizontl Chains 
Strategic Decisions 87 % 67 % 40 % 57 % 
in Vertical Chains 
Nunber of Cyc les none none none none none none none two 
Figure 7.1: Patterns in the Diagrams-' Structural Configuration 
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The General Manager's concepts about the environment fell into six sub-categories. 
30% of the concepts were directly related to Governmental issues while concepts 
pertaining to suppliers, competitors, users and the European Community contributed 
with the same value (10%). The General Public was second in overall importance (20%), 
whereas some concepts such as the quality of mass transport in the country were 
classified as "othee' and represented the 10% of the overall environmental category. 
Organizational issues involving eight concepts in the General Manager's maps were 
second in overall importance. Structures and processes represented the largest sub- 
category in this category, followed by financial management issues. All other issues 
(corporate culture, corporate image, and divestment from activities) received equal 
attention. 
The General Manager's whole set of strategic decisions were included into horizontal 
chains linking concepts from the environment and the organization in two-way links. No 
vertical links were identified among strategic decisions. This analysis showed that 
environment had a slight importance in his definition of strategy and much diversity 
(seven sub-categories involved), while the importance of the concept of the "general 
public" indicated his will to "create new allies" in the name of the advantages that a 
public profitable enterprise would offer to the wider community, apart from the low fares 
to certain users. The General Manager divided his concepts equally between the 
organization and the environment. 'nough strategic decisions were partly articulated, it 
was difficult to trace a consistent pattern. What could be said, is that his concepts 
revealed a "creative balance" expressed in both the variety of the environmental sub- 
category and the innovative content of the organizational ones. The inclusion of the 
strategy concepts into only horizontal chains probably indicated his efforts to shape 
important issues by drawing on new and diverse environmental and organizational 
concepts. 
The Assistant General Manager's concepts about the environment fell into three sub- 
categories. Governmental issues came first, with a 56% of the total concepts in this 
sector. Assessing the functioning of the Supervisory Board, he generated concepts which 
represented the 33% in this category, while the activities of the trade unions represented 
another 11%. 
Organizational dimensions were of greater importance. Structures and processes clearly 
dominated this category and attracted 50% of the concepts involved. Rewards issues 
attracted a 14%, while financial matters reached a 22%. Corporate culture issues and 
issues of power based on specialized knowledge each attracted 7% of the total concepts. 
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71% of the Assistant General Manager's strategic decisions were included in horizontal 
chains while 57% were linked with vertical links. From the classification offered it can be 
said that the Assistant General Manager's diagram was mostly centred on the 
organizational sector, while the notion of strategy was included in horizontal and vertical 
chains. This indicated that, holding certain conditions, the organization could trigger off 
strategic change by following a sequence of actions. His view may be described as an 
Ppanalyticaf' one. 
The First Government Representative's concepts about the environment generated 
five sub-categories. Governmental issues stood for 38% of this category, while the 
stakeholders' activities attracted a 25%. Trade Unions, other public sector firms, and 
EEC policies accounted almost for 13% of the total of concepts within this category. 
Sorting concepts in the organizational category generated five sub-categories. Financial 
matters, rewards and incentives, structures and processes, and operations management 
received the same attention which accounted for 22 % of the total, in each case. Rules 
and regulations attracted 12%. 
Strategy concepts were mostly (78%) incorporated into horizontal chains, but a quite 
high percentage (67%) referred to strategy concepts involved in vertical links. The 
pattern revealed by this analysis may be described as "methodicaf'. The division of 
concepts among categories of equal importance as well as the existence of sub-categories 
which accommodated almost the same amount of concepts led to this definition. The 
existence of a quite high percentage of horizontal and vertical chains further advocated 
for this. 
The classification of the Second Government Representative's concepts about the 
environment generated only one category. AJI concepts (100%) referred directly to the 
Government's discretion to inaugurate policies, impose restrictions, or control, through 
various administrative bodies, the firm's activities. 
Organizational issues generated three sub-categories of equal importance. Financial 
management, acquisition of human resources, and the organizational need for 
development were equally important, each with a 33% percentage. The very limited 
number of concepts involved in the categories is characteristic and worth accounting for 
in the concluding part of this chapter. 
Strategic decisions were mostly included into horizontal chains (80%). 40% of these 
decisions were also linked with vertical links. It was difficult to find a consistent pattern 
because the analysis suffered from a lack of concepts. However, it should be stressed that 
polarisation and poverty best describes the pattern of this strategist. 
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The classification of the First Employees Representative's concepts created four sub- 
categories in the environmental category. Thus, governmental issues concerned the 36% 
of the total of concepts involved. Supervisory Board's issues were second in overall 
importance (28%), while other issues (trade unions, etc. ) received the same attention 
(9%). 
The organizational category revealed six sub-categories. Structures and processes 
accounted for 46% in this category. Financial management and rewards and incentives 
were of equal importance (15%). Corporate image, having the meaning of the 
development of a company prepared to compete efficiently and effectively in the 
transport market, accounted for 8%. The same percentage was attracted by equipment 
acquisition, and divestment from activities. 
Strategy concepts were all included (100%) in horizontal chains. No vertical links were 
traced. It could be said that the pattern revealed was mostly centred on the 
organizational sector, partly articulated, and characterised by the predominance of 
structures and processes as well as the rolling stock acquisition. It bore a great 
resemblance with the pattern revealed in the Assistant General Manager's map as far as 
environmental sub-categories and the importance of some of the organizational ones 
were concerned. 
The Second Employees Representative also centred his interest on the organizational 
category. In the environmental one, the concepts involved were classified into four sub- 
categories. Government's issues represented the largest sub-category with 43%, while 
Supervisory Board, other public sector firms, and suppliers attracted respectively 29%, 
14% and 14%. 
In the organizational category, the leading sub-category referred to structures and 
processes with 47% of the concepts. Next came the acquisition of resources, both 
permanent way construction and acquisition of rolling stock, with 27%. Employees 
(13%) and operations (13%) made for the balance. 
Most of the strategy elements were articulated in horizontal chains (86%). A significant 
part of strategic decisions was also included in vertical links (57%). The pattern 
identified can be described as centred on the organizational sector and quite balanced, 
with great emphasis placed on structures and processes as well as on the acquisition of 
resources. The lack of considering financial matters should be noted. 
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The concepts about the environment of the Third Employees Representative were 
classified into one single category, that is the Government policies, practices, and 
legislation, which attracted 100% of his concepts in this area. 
In the organizational category, four sub-categories were created to accommodate the 15 
concepts involved. Structures and processes represented the largest sub-category with 
67%. Rules and regulations, and corporate image followed, each with 13%. Finally, 
financial matters attracted 7% of the concepts identified. 
All the strategy elements were included in horizontal chains. There were no vertical links 
between the elements involved. The pattern identified can be described as polarised, 
organisationally centred, and partly articulated, since strategy elements were not linked 
at all. 
The influence diagram of the Head of the Planning Department generated nine 
concepts faffing into the environmental category. Of those, 56% were directly referring to 
governmental issues, while concepts related to suppliers of spares and rol-ling stock, the 
European Community, the freight market, and international conferences were of equal 
importance and each accounted for 11 % of the total concepts involved. 
The organizational category was divided into six sub-categories. Operations management 
(pricing, accounting, operating) was of greater importance with 33% of the concepts 
mentioned. Next came structures and processes with 29% and third, with equal 
importance, financial matters, and acquisition of resources, with 10% each. Corporate 
image, and work rules and conditions represented each a 5% of the total concepts 
involved in this category. 
Strategy elements were all included in horizontal chains (100%). No vertical links were 
present in the diagram. The pattern revealed may be described as mostly organisationally 
centred and partly articulated, with operations management, and structures and 
processes attracting the larger importance. 
To summarize, the eight strategists presented certain similarities in patterns concerning 
structural properties of their influence diagrams. Thus, for those who placed the bulk of 
concepts in the organizational category, structures and processes played the most 
important role, whereas for those that presented more balanced categories (that is, 
environment and organization generated almost the same number of concepts) the 
organizational sub-categories tended to be, in most cases, of equal importance. 
In terms of the research objectives, the strategists' rationalizations exhibited the 
following charactreristics: 
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1. Government's importance (in terms of the concepts involved referring to it) was great, 
in all rationales. Managers especially, shared the same scheme with others (one 
employee representative, one governmental official) and defined all concepts in this area 
in terms of government's powers and/or policies. This finding differs from the findings 
of other studies that pointed to a governmental influence weaker and lesser than the one 
exerted by customers or clients (Hickson et al., 1986). 
2. Systems and structure attract a large part of the interest of those who centre their 
notion of strategy on the organizational side. As evidenced in the maps, rationales about 
them reveal difficulties in assessing performance of subordinates; management selection 
on a non-performance basis also creates conflict between employees and managers. 
Control issues, as stated, indicate that most of the strategists abdicated their 
responsibilities (A. Hison, 1983; Rainey, 1989). 
3. Strategic decisions in half of the cases examined were discrete and independent of one 
another. Thus, assumptions used to develop theoretical models which stress that strategic 
decisions are steps in an overall process designed to move the organization towards a 
goal (Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989) do not hold true, in the specific case. 
7.3.2. The Perspective Revealed in the Influence Diagrams 
While the previous section dealt with structural properties of the concepts involved in 
the influence diagrams, this section is concerned with the perspective each strategist 
attributed to the identified strategic decision. The aim is to investigate the ways in which 
actors addressed a rather open-ended management situation that had strategic 
implications. This could probably result in understanding the way in which actors made 
sense of ambiguous situations, which may ultimately lead in understanding strategic 
thought. 
Figure 7.2 attempts to reveal the perspective given to strategy by the decision -makers. 
For this purpose, interpretative guide-lines referred to in Chapter 6 were utilized. 
Figure 7.2 contains on the left side the set of strategic decisions identified as such by 
each decision-maker. 
- The first column contains a number that defines the average length of causal chains that 
include the strategic decisions under consideration, in order to depict whether strategic 
chains have same lengths that are related to specific concepts. 
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- Thus, strategic decisions extracted from the accounts as positively influencing-only 
elements (or positively-influecing elements) faU into the second column which contains 
the decisions seen as having positive repercussions in the environment. 
- The third column includes the strategic decisions seen as ends, that is influenced-only 
elements in a chain (or chains) of reasoning. These chains of reasoning have either 
positive or negative influence on the identified end. When positive influence is depicted, 
then the chain of reasoning can be assessed as condition (CD), whereas when negative 
influence is perceived the chain of reasoning can be assessed as a constraint (CT). 
- The fourth column contains the strategic decisions that were seen as means 
(influencing and influenced concepts in chains of reasoning). 
- The fifth column is related to the previous one and contains the strategic decisions seen 
as means in strategy chains of reasoning, that is chains (or links) that comprise concepts 
belonging strictly to the strategy sector of the influence diagrams. This will highlight 
whether achieving one decision is instrumental to achieving another. As McCrimmon 
(1988) has stated, this concept of instrumentality, where the attainment of one goal 
directly contributes to the attainment of another, is very important in strategic analysis. 
- Finally, the sixth column shows whether the strategic decisions depicted on the left- 
hand side of the table were seen as having an impact on organisational performance. 
Figure 7.2 revealed that the strategists had different perspectives of strategy. 
- The General Manager's average length of causal chains varied from 2 to 3.5. All 
decisions were seen as means in the causal chains and all impacted positively on the 
environment. 
- The Assistant General Manager's strategic decisions fell mostly into the fourth 
column, seen as means when favourable conditions existed and constraints were relaxed. 
Two decisions were perceived as ends, namely the Rail Plan and the Supervisory Board 
when constraints are relieved. The average length of causal chains was in the interval I to 
5, performance monitoring and organizational structure having the highest values, while 
organizational structure, personnel training and rewards system were perceived as 
impacting on organizational performance. 
- The First Government Representative's average length of causal chains including 
strategic decisions varied between 1 and 3. Three of the decisions were seen as ends 
when favourable conditions hold and constraints are relaxed, while five other as means. 
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average positive decision decision 
length reper- decision decision perceived as having 
strategist strategic decision of cussions perceived perceived "ends" or "means" impact 
causal in the as "end" as "means" in strategy chain on 
chains env i ronment performance 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
- The Rail Plan 3.5 yes CD 
General - Fares Policy 3 yes CD 
Manager - Financial Budgeting 3 yes CD 
- The 294/83 Contract 2 yes CD 
- The Rail Plan 3 CT end 
- The Business Plan I CD means 
Assistant - Structure 4.5 CD, CT end yes 
General - Personnel Training 3 CD yes 
Manager - Performance Monitoring 5 CD, CT means 
- Reward Systems 4 CD, CT mans yes 
- Supervisory Board 4 CT 
- The Rail Plan I CD end 
- Modernization Projects mans 
- 294/83 Contract 1 CD means 
Government - Financial Budgeting 1 CD means 
Represent- - Supervisory Board 1 CT means 
ative 1 - Performance Monitoring end 
- Organizational Structure I CT 
- Reward Systems 3 CD, CT CD 
- Pricing Policy 2 CD, CT 
- Financial Budgeting 3 CD, CT means 
Government - Modernization Projects 2.5 CD end 
Represent- - Performance Monitoring 3 CD 
ative 2 - Pricing Policy 1 CT 
- Rolling Stock 1 CD 
- The Rail Plan 2 yes 
- Financial Budgeting 1 CD 
Employees - Divestment from Activities 5 CT yes 
Represent- - Pricing Policy 2 CT 
ative I - Supervisory Board 2 CT 
Specialised Personnel Hiring 2 CD 
- Personnel Training 1 CD 
- The Rail Plan 2 CD end 
- The Business Plan mans 
Employees - Modernization Projects 2 CD 
Represent- - Organizational Structure 2 CD. CT mans 
ative 2 - Performance Monitoring 1.5 CT end 
- Rolling Stock Purchase 2 CD, CT 
- Rolling Stock Production 1 
- Modernization Projects 1 CD 
Employees- - Rolling Stock 2 CD 
Represent- - Personnel Training 2 CD 
ative 3 - Investment Plan 2 CT 
- Career Development System 2.7 CT 
- Organizational Structure 2.2 CT, CD 
Head of - The Rail Plan 3.2 CD, CT yes 
Planning - Investment Plan 2 CD, CT 
Department - Organizational Structure 1 CD, CT 
- Personnel Training 1 CD 
jriavirc I-z-- , Ymc amrategy Perspective of Cognitive Maps 
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In his concept of strategy, decisions were linked in the way presented in the sixth column 
of Figure 7.2. 
- The Second Government Representative's average length of chains of reasoning lied 
in the interval I to 3, the highest values being assigned to chains including budgets and 
performance monitoring. Four of the five decisions were perceived as ends, when mostly 
conditions concerning Governmental policies were holding. Only one decision (budget) 
was seen as means in a causal chain, while the strategy chain included two decisions: 
annual budget influenced modernization projects. 
- The First Employees Representative's average length of causal chains exhibited a 
great dispersion. Values varied from 1 to 5, the highest values assigned to the decision 
related to the divestment from rolling stock maintenance and repair activities. Budgets 
and personnel training showed the lowest value (1). The Rail Plan was seen as impacting 
positively on the environment, while budgets, and personnel hiring and training were 
perceived as ends. Three other decisions were perceived as means when constraints were 
relaxed. Finally, the divestment from rolling stock activities was perceived as impacting 
on organizational performance. 
- The Second Employees Representative had the shortest interval within which the 
average length of causal chains laid (I to 2). Two of the strategic decisions were seen as 
ends, three as means, and one as having positive repercussions in the organization. The 
strategy chain included two separate links. The Business Plan was perceived as impacting 
on the Rail Plan, and the organizational structure as impacting on performance 
monitoring. 
- The Third Employees Representative's average length of causal chains varied from 1 
to 2.7. Most of the decisions were perceived as ends, while two (rolling stock acquisition 
and career development system) as means. Strategy concepts were totally inarticulated . 
- Finally, the Head of the Department of Planning showed an average length which 
laid between 1 and 3.2. Organizational structure and personnel training were perceived 
as ends, while the Rail Plan and the investment programmes were seen as means, when 
both conditions exist and constraints are relaxed. The Rail Plan was considered to 
influence directly and positively the financial performance of the enterprise. The 
described decisions were not articulated in strategy chains. 
To summarize, decisions perceived as having positive repercussions in the environment 
were rare. Some strategists mostly perceived their decisions as means when some 
conditions existed and constraints were released. Some others balanced their views. 
Their decisions were split between the two categories, that is ends and means. 
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Furthermore, the minor importance attributed to strategic units in the environment, as 
measured by the number of concepts used (Figure 7.1), was partly associated with the 
perception of strategic decisions as ends. Though to some strategists the high average 
length of causal chains including strategic decisions seemed to be related to the 
perception that these decisions impacted on organizational performance, this did not 
pertain to others. 
It should be stressed that constraints and conditions were not the same in strategists' 
rationales. Some strategists argued about the negative impact of some governmental 
policies while others viewed them as conditions (assigned total discretion to 
Government's decisions). Thus, though a constraint could be perceived as a stimulus 
leading to shaping a problem and developing solutions, a condition might involve a 
longer process of giving rise to problem awareness and it did not necessarily imply that 
some actions were to be undertaken and their implications to be measured. This was 
reflected in the average length of chains of reasoning which were longer when constraints 
were the "triggering points" initiating the strategic decision, and shorter when 
conditions were involved. 
As far as impacts on organizational performance were concerned, the maps revealed that 
this was not an issue of major importance. Strategists seemed to take for granted the 
organization's poor financial performance despite the goal set in the Plan to reduce 
deficits. Only one strategist articulated training, structure and career pathing and argued 
about their combined impact on performance, while another one saw divestment from 
rolling stock activities as the most influential factor upon it (as a subject matter, though 
never included in the agenda). It seemed that control concepts and their positioning as 
ends in chains of reasoning and not as means for achieving a new state of affairs played a 
crucial role for this. 
7.3.3. Patterns in Cognitive Maps Derived from Matrices 
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the type of matrix used could be divided into nine sub- 
sectors. Four of those were selected to be presented and further analysed in this section, 
and were the ones denoting: (1) the impact of strategic decisions on a strategic decision, 
(2) the impact of environment on strategy, (3) the impact of organization on strategy, 
and (4) the impact of strategy on environment. The following indices were considered: 
- Sector Density, which is the number denoting the percentage of identified relationships 
over the potential relationships of the sector. 
- Sector Strength, which is the number denoting the percentage of strong relationships 
(2,3 values) over the overall number of identified relationships of the sector. 
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- Number of cycles. As described in Appendix F, when the structural matrices (that is, 
matrices derived from scores matrices when all cells that contain a value change by 
placing in the cell a unit, indicating that a relationship exists) are squared, the new 
squared structural matrix contains in its diagonal the number of loops (cycles). 
As evidenced from Figures 7.3 and 7.4, though the sectors density of the strategists 
matrices did not vary very much (so one could say that strategists attained 
approximately to almost equal cognitive variety), the sectors strength exposed a large 
diversity. Thus, one might assume that the strength of the perceived relationships was 
based on personal grounds. 
On the other hand, Figures 7.5 and 7.6 do not present a similar sector density, and this 
also applies to sector strength. The decision -makers, as far as the influence of the 
organization on strategic decisions and the influence of strategy on the environment are 
concerned, perceived different and idiosyncratic patterns. This contrasts with the 
influence diagrams' concepts that were mostly placed on the organizational side. One 
would assume, that since the interest stemmed from the inner environment, some issues 
could have been perceived as having the same strength in their in ter-relation ships. This 
did not prove to be the case. 
potential identified strong 
entries relationships relationships 
i l strateg st oops 
(no. ) no. 
J % 
(density) 
no. % 
(strength) 
Engineering Projects 9 
Assistant G. M. 90 36 40 15 42 Rolling Stock 7 
294/83 Contract 7 
Rail Plan 5 
Head of Planning 90 37 41 21 57 Organizational Structure 4 
Annual Budget 11 
Employee Rep. 1 90 39 43 14 36 Rail Plan 9 
Business Plan 10 
Organizational Structure 8 
Employee Rep. 2 90 44 49 29 66 Rail Plan 7 
Business Plan 6 
Annual Budget 18 
Employee Rep. 3 90 48 53 17 35 Rail Plan 14 
294/83 Contract 14 
Figure 7.3: Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
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potential identified strong 
entries relationships relationships 
t t i t s ra eg s loops 
(no. ) no. % no. % 
(density) (strength) 
Government's Economic 
Assistant G. M. 80 31 39 10 32 Policy 7 
Administrative Controls 4 
Head of Planning 80 29 36 18 62 
Policies Incompatibility 11 
Employee Rep. 1 80 39 49 29 74 Employment Maintenance 10 
Government's Policy 8 
Employees Participation 8 
Employee Rep. 2 80 36 45 15 42 
Administrative Controls 16 
Employee Rep. 3 80 41 51 10 24 Problems with Suppliers 14 
Figure 7.4: Environment on Strategic Decisions 
potential identified strong 
entries relationships relationships 
l strategist oops 
(no. ) no. 
J 
% 
(density) 
no. % 
(strength) 
Corporate Culture 7 
Assistant G. M. 70 22 31 2 9 Bureaucratic Phenomena 7 
Decision-making System 8 
Management System 10 
Head of Planning 70 22 31 13 59 Decision-making System 7 
Task-design System 7 
Employee Rep. 1 70 37 53 20 54 
Decision-making System 6 
Employee Rep. 2 70 18 26 5 28 Management System 6 
Bureaucratic Phenomena 20 
Employee Rep. 3 70 41 58 6 17 
Figure 7.5. - Organization on Strategic Decisions 
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t t i t 
potential 
entries 
identified 
relationships 
strong 
relationships 
s ra eg s 
(no. ) no. % 
(density) 
no. % 
(strength) 
loops 
Assistant G. M. 80 22 28 8 36 
Head of Planning 80 9 11 5 55 
Employee Rep. 1 80 18 23 6 33 
Employee Rep. 2 80 17 21 6 35 
Employee Rep. 3 80 46 58 12 26 
Figure 7.6: Strategic Decisions on Environment 
The number of loops seen as an index of measuring dynamic effects and cognitive strain, 
varied considerably in the decision -makers' matrices. Sometimes, the concepts involved 
(expressing the highest number of loops) coincided with the identified strategic decision. 
Other times, they were just concepts only included in the influence diagrams. There were 
also instances when the concept exhibiting the highest value was not mentioned at all in 
the influence diagram. 
7.4. SYNOPSIS 
The first part of this chapter provided the definition of strategy according to each Board- 
member and brought into the stage the members' characteristics such as tenure, 
profession al/function al experience, age, and representativeness. 
These strategy definitions exhibited variety; there were perspectives directed to the 
environment; there were other perspectives that took this environment as given and 
complied to it; there were also perspectives which, while pin-pointing to organizational 
problems, stressed that the environment was the main source of these problems. They 
197 
also noted that these problems would disappear as soon as the environment becomes 
certain and stable. 
The second part dealt with patterns derived from both influence diagrams and matrices. 
This was attempted in order to investigate similarities and/or differences in structural 
configurations as well as in the perspective conveyed by the notion of strategy. 
In summary, all concepts in the environmental sector tended to balance in importance, 
with the exception of the government which was perceived as playing the more crucial 
role in defining strategic decisions. 
Regarding the organizational concepts, the managers tended to value structure and 
processes, and to put financial matters in the second place. In the organizational sector, a 
great diversity of factors received minor importance on the part of each Board-member. 
The majority of strategic decisions was located in horizontal chains, initiating from or 
leading to the environment. In ter-relation ships between strategic decisions were only 
found in half the number of the cases examined, and they concerned different decisions. 
Also, the reasoning addressing strategic thought was short. Organizational performance 
rarely was a constituent part of the Board-members' rationale; however, in the rare cases 
it was addressed, it tended to be associated with the longest chains encountered. 
Another major finding concerned the differences attributed to the meaning of several 
factors. Some Board-members attributed negative meaning to them; thus, these factors 
were identified as constraints; other Board-members perceived the same factors as 
conditions; thus, they assigned to them a positive meaning. 
The analysis of the matrices' indices proved that the strategists' cognitive maps derived 
from matrices often illustrated a different reality from the one depicted in the influence 
diagrams. This may be explained by the fact that the strategists, when asked to score on 
matrices, thought for the first time about some relationships. This has also been pointed 
out by other researchers who employed this technique in order to map the strategists' 
cognitive frames (Stubbart and Ramaprasad, 1988). 
The cognitive maps derived from matrices revealed some similarities with the influence 
diagrams, though these similarities were limited. Overall, scoring in the matrices 
followed an idiosyncratic way and an agreement on the impact of financing on 
modernization projects as well as on the impact of annual budgets on the implementation 
of the Plan was traced. 
CHAPTER 8 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study was to enhance our understanding of how strategies evolve in 
public organisations, by looking into the role of the members of the Board and their 
impact on strategy development. To accomplish this, firstly, documentary evidence 
concerning decisions made by the under study Board, was collected and analysed in 
Chapter 5. The outcome of this phase was concerned with (1) the classification of 
decisions across different categories, termed decision-areas, and (2) the detection of 
patterns illustrating frequencies across the identified decision-areas. Secondly, empirical 
evidence based on interviews with the Board-members was collected and analysed, using 
a cognitive mapping approach to understand their perception of the strategy concept; 
this was presented, in detail, in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter synthesizes the two streams of evidence collected and analysed so far, with 
the aim of assessing the degree to which the Board-members' perceptions about strategy 
influenced the patterns of decisions that occurred in the organisation, and thus to 
highlight the role of a Board in a public setting in terms of its influence on strategy 
formation. 
The chapter is organised in seven sections. FoRowing this introduction, 
Section 8.2 introduces the concept of strategy across the Board-members and 
highlights the characteristics that pertain to it; these characteristics exhibit some 
differences from the ones discussed in the literature. 
Section 8.3 is concerned with the Board's attributes and focuses on problems 
deriving from its composition, structure and processes. 
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Section 8.4 illustrates the role of the Board-members in the strategic areas studied, 
in terms of their involvement, commitment and consensus to change. 
Section 8.5 derives a typology of the relative roles of Board-members and the 
patterns of decisions within the strategic areas; this typology suggests that most of 
the Board-members perform a legalistic role and do not seem alert to the 
organizational signals that come up as proposals for decisions. 
Section 8.6 addresses the role of the General Manager as the enterprise's powerful 
strategist (in the sense that he had the capacity to bring about the outcomes he 
desired) and argues about the way strategies do form in this public firm. 
Section 8.7 concerns a more detailed discussion of the findings that are considered 
different and in a way new (compared to the ones found in the literature) and 
builds on them in order to propose lines for further inquiry. 
8.2. THE STRATEGY CONCEPT 
Several important findings about the strategy concept emerge from the construction and 
analysis of cognitive maps. Evidently, maps were not the same across the Board- 
members; yet, there were some similarities that accounted for a social reconstruction of 
reality and social intercourse (Eden et al., 1992; citing Berger and Luckmann, and 
Kelly). A summary of findings on the strategy concept is presented in this section and 
interpreted in the following one. The subsequent sections will deal with findings on 
Board attributes. All findings will be interpreted by drawing on findings of the literature 
in the strategic management field. Finally, the evaluation of findings will indicate their 
contribution to the existing literature, be it additive, or confirmatory, or generic of a new 
perspective. 
8.2.1. Key Findings on Strategy 
(i) Strategy was conceived by the majority of Board-members as something that 
happened outside them, something over which they had little control. 
(ii) A cognitive view better describes this ingrained way of perceiving the world, that is 
the way in which events were interpreted by the decision -makers. The interpretation and 
meaning of strategy derives from the analysis and exploration of cognitive structures of 
individuals. The nature of concepts depicted, their location in the sectors identified, the 
number of links and the value they attributed to their chains of reasoning leading to 
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strategic decisions, all were significant to outline some of the thought -processes the 
Board-members in this public organization used, in order to make sense of strategy. 
(iii) Strategies tended to be associated with the environment either directly or indirectly 
through organizational sub-systems. The environment consisted only of few concepts, the 
prevailing one being the government. Strategies tended to be fragmented (rare links 
between them existed), and arguments about them differed in terms of the way in which 
issues involved were addressed (in a negative or positive sense). Consequences of 
strategic decisions were rarely traced. 
(iv) Detailed arguments exhibiting long chains of reasoning were detected, mostly in the 
managers' accounts (especially those involved in the change process, working for it also 
outside the boardroom) and concerned only few strategic decisions. Officials and some 
of the employees' representatives used in their reasoning short paths. The weight the 
Board-members assigned to strategic decisions and on factors influenced by, or 
influencing them was based on idiosyncratic grounds. 
(v) In the cognitive maps, loops were absent. That is reasoning processes displaying 
reciprocal causality were not traced in the maps. 
(vi) Overall, cognitive maps succeeded in making the connections between sets of factors 
explicit (the factors themselves having been defined by the Board-members). The Board- 
members' cognitive structures were characterised by fragmentation, variety, brevity of 
reasoning and lack of inclination to confirm reality with their peers on the Board; in 
each member's map, there was little or no mentioning of any of the other groups of 
stakeholders that participated in the Board. 
The next section, by drawing upon the literature on cognition and strategic management, 
builds on the above findings, in order to generate explanations that would account for the 
cognitive schemes of the Board-members with respect to strategy. 
8.2.2. On Strategic Management Decisions Processes 
This section sets out to appraise the concept of strategy as revealed by the members' 
definition. The richness of theory in the field of strategic management may benefit the 
research findings which when articulated within it may offer a deeper insight or open up 
a new perspective. 
The literature review on strategy formulation /formation (presented in Chapter 2) has 
shown a diverse and large number of approaches dealing with the definition of strategy. 
First, there are the ones that treat strategy as a process of analytical design and formal 
201 
planning (Ansoff, 1965,1979), stressing the importance of financial objectives and the 
definition of the competitive strategies (Porter, 1980) and adopting a normative stance. 
Second, there are the approaches that examine the impact of behavioural and political 
factors on strategy-making and focus upon the dynamics of the interactions among 
individuals and organizational sub-units as they endeavour to influence strategic 
decisions (Allison, 1971; Pettigrew, 1973). Others look at strategy as an a posteriori 
process (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Quinn, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Pettigrew, 1985; 
Pettigrew et al., 1992); they rely on descriptions rather than prescriptions and stress 
important aspects of strategy formation, including incrementalism and emergent 
strategy, the influence of existing structure on strategy, and the full participation of 
actors other than the General Manager (Mintzberg, 1990). Among them, the cognitive 
school (Daft and Weick, 1984; Huff and Schwenk, 1985; Pondy and Huff, 1985; 
Mason and Mitroff, 1988), focus on the reasoning processes of key organizational 
actors concerning organizational change and adaptation. 
Strategy is defined as the pattern or plan that integrates an organization's major goals, 
policies and actions sequences into a cohesive whole. A well formulated strategy, by 
means of resources allocation, positions the organization into a unique and viable 
posture based on internal strengths and weaknesses and anticipated changes in the 
environment (Ansoff, 1984; Quinn, 1980). The major element in this definition of 
strategy as a unified, integrated plan, ensuring that the strategic objectives are achieved, 
creates an idea of positive, purposeful, tightly controlled process of conscious human 
thought (Mintzberg, 1990). 
8.2.2.1. On the Structure of the Maps 
In terms of the individual's cognition about strategy, if this was to follow the definition 
offered above (which is one of the most cited definitions in the literature), then the 
influence diagrams, in general, would display a structure in which strategic decisions 
would be positively influenced (1) by key success factors stemming from the environment 
and (2) by distinctive competences stemming from the organization. Strategy, in this 
sense, can locate an organization in a niche (Mintzberg, 1990); thus, one may assume 
that expressions of strategic decisions would be also stated in positive sense. 
Furthermore, the choice of strategy (since the case in this study deals with an 
implementation process) would lead to ramifications ensuring the effectiveness of the 
enterprise (Quinn, 1980). Finally, because strategies should be explicit to those who 
make them and, if possible, articulated in such a way that others in the organization can 
understand them (Christensen et al., 1987), this would mean that top decision-makers 
would share a set of strategic decisions supported by a similar reasoning, since 
explicitness helps in the building of a trusty and consentious atmosphere in social 
interactions (Argyris and Schon, 1980), and integrated into a comprehensive scheme. 
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The influence diagrams in this study displayed an hierarchical structure that was most 
often in the form of a means/end graph (Eden et al., 1992). Meanings attached to 
strategic decisions were derived from the content of factors included in the cognitive 
structures as well as from the linkages among them (Silverman, 1985). The majority of 
Board-members perceived the environment as consisting of legal/political entities, and, 
to a lesser extent, of suppliers, competitors and trade unions. Thus, environmental 
complexity was low, especially when adding that perceived relationships did not exist 
among the environmental elements (Tung, 1979). Also, the rate of change referring to 
the frequency and magnitude of turbulence (caused by the new institutional 
arrangements and governmental policies) influenced the amount of perceived 
uncertainty and initiated negative causal chains. 
The decision-makers operationalized strategy in terms of the perceived environmental 
uncertainty. To cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, the organization uses the 
strategies and seeks to approach some degree of rationality (Thompson, 1967). Yet, 
decision-makers kept feeling "unsure" about the environment; the formulation of 
strategy did not considerably reduce the level of uncertainty. Apart from a few examples, 
strategic reasoning was associated with a "threat' category, denoting a negative situation 
in which loss was likely and over which decision-makers had relatively little control 
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987). Since uncontrollability is a key element of a threatening 
stimulus (Mintzberg et al., 1976; Tung, 1979; Nutt, 1984; Fredrickson, 1985), 
strategies viewed in this sense could be described as driven by the environment, thus 
imposed. In Mintzberg's (1988) definition, this occurs when the environment dictates 
patterns in actions, either through direct imposition or through implicitly pre-empting or 
bounding organizational choice. 
Since the environment was described as negative, and the organization needed to 
function during this period of unpredictability, strategists felt not sure, and thus they 
could not articulate any viable strategy. This may explain the adoption of this reactive 
and disconnected stance (Mintzberg, 1990). 
Strategic decisions did not lend themselves to aggregation into a single massive decision 
matrix where all factors could be treated simultaneously, or in a sequential order, in 
order to arrive at a holistic optimum. This coincides with similar findings in the 
literature (Quinn, 1980). In this case, apart from the individual's capacity to handle 
complexity and ambiguity (Simon, 1958; March and Olsen, 1963), the key importance 
was attributed to the "management process limits". While studies note that this process 
can be managed incrementally by a successful executive who guides the pattern of 
escalated or accepted proposals to suit his own purposes without getting prematurely 
committed to any rigid solution set (Quinn, 1980), this research focuses on the 
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participation of other top decision -makers, and treats them as intrinsic and interactive 
parts of the process of strategy formation (Mintzberg, 1988; 1990). The interesting and 
new finding, in terms of the articulation of decisions, is that all decision -makers, 
including the General Manager, presented no articulation among the strategic decisions, 
despite the fact that the direction of influences in the graphs was opposite. The next 
section deals in detail with the perspective revealed in Board-members' maps and 
accounts for this difference. 
Finally, cognitive maps displayed some other similarities. Feedback loops were, in 
general, absent. Although this finding has also been reported by other researchers 
(Fahey and Narayanan, 1990), this study explicitly links the absence of loops to a 
dysfunction of organizing. Theorists have noted the importance of such loops and 
proposed that organizations are established not on hierarchies of influence but on loops 
of influence (Weick, 1969; Roos and Hall, 1980; Bougon and Komocar, 1990). In 
this respect, change is the result of deviation -amplifying loops and organization the 
result of deviation -countering loops which stabilize the growth of a system. The absence 
of loops may indicate that the organization is static and solid and does not possess the 
mechanism to activate change. 
8.2.2.2. On the Perspective Conveyed (assumptions about the nature and sources of 
change) 
One additional shared characteristic of the maps was that the decision -makers' 
perceptions treated strategy as a dependent variable. Most of the chains of reasoning 
looked inwards and strategic decisions were conceived as ends, and as having been 
driven by the environment (Fahey and Narayanan, 1990). Only one notable exception, 
the strategy concept of the General Manager, changed this perspective. Strategies, in his 
map, were aggressive pace-setters (Mintzberg, 1988) that aimed at influencing the 
environment, establishing a new identity for the firm, and enhancing the company's 
effectiveness. Instead of looking at strategy as an outcome of a more or less definite 
process, the General Manager's perspective, that stood in sharp distinction with that of 
the majority, revealed a commitment to ways of acting and shaping the environment. 
The analysis of the maps revealed that the average length of the chains of reasoning lay 
between very limited and low levels. One would expect that strategic reasoning dealing 
with issues that are more complex, unstructured, fuzzy, with socio-political 
considerations, would exhibit long chains of reasoning, because such issues would pose 
greater cognitive challenge to top decision-makers (Diffenbach, 1982). Also, an 
interpretive view of meaning and action that attempts to link individual cognition to 
organizational action (Daft and Weick, 1984; Schwenk, 1984; Chaffee, 1985) asserts 
that top decision-makers receive a continuous stream of ill-defined events and trends. 
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Some of these events and trends represent possible strategic issues for the organization 
because they are perceived as having the potential to have an effect on achieving the 
organizational objectives (Ansoff, 1984). Under such conditions, and also because 
strategic issues do not appear in pre-packaged forms (Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan, 
1983), one would expect the associated reasoning to be extensive, with vague 
assumptions and perplexing contradictions (Diffenbach, 1982). Though these 
assumptions refer mostly to strategy formulation and not to post rationalizations about 
it, it seems that they would apply in this case as well, since major difficulties were 
experienced and strategy reformulation might be needed. 
However, the net and short chains of reasoning could be explained by (1) The lack of 
information and communication, since concepts involved were used by strategic 
decision-makers to store information and aid communication with others about 
ambiguous strategic issues (Dutton and Jackson 1987); (2) The fact that errors of 
memory occurred; or (3) The fact that the method of elicitation of cognition was 
problematic (Eden, 1992). Although the second explanation cannot totally be rejected, 
since the study deals with an a posteriori narrative of events, the interview process 
(length of interviews, open-ended data collection and interviewee interest and 
collaboration) accounted for the above mentioned likely to occur distortions. 
Concluding, probably when resources uncertainty and/or interferences by 
political/institutional forces are still experienced, the notion of strategy in post hoc 
rationalizations of events lacks the well-structured format advocated in the literature, 
where strategy is defined as a unified, comprehensive and integrated plan. 
Strategies may be either fragmented, or loosely coupled, or even perceived differently by 
key decision -makers; this may last for a significant period of time. The assumptions that 
strategy is formulated and then implemented with organizational structures, control 
systems and other systems following behind did not hold true. Formulation and 
implementation were intertwinned as complex, interactive processes in which political 
activity, values, assumptions about roles, organizational culture and management styles, 
all determined or constrained particular strategic decisions. 
8.3. THE BOARD ATTRIBUTES AND BOARD ROLES 
8.3.1. Introduction 
The empirical evidence of the studied Board provided several findings in terms of Board 
attributes and Board-members' involvement in strategic decision -making. The key 
findings in this area were: 
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1. The new composition of the Board, after the appointment of employees' 
representatives, did not affect the balance of power within it. This was either due 
to the poor socialization process of the newcomers or to the unwiffingness of the 
majority of the employees' representatives to assume a Board-member's role. 
2. The inefficient structure of the Board caused perceived deficiencies: (i) The 
Board functioned on information provided mainly by the General Manager; the 
nature of this information was assessed by the employees' representatives as 
problematic. (ii) Also, for a considerable period of time, the Chairman of the 
Board served himself as the General Manager of the enterprise. (iii) Committees, 
in which Board-members would participate between meetings, in order to evaluate 
or propose new decisions, were not established. 
3. Expertise on the Board was mainly conceived as familiarity with the company's 
operations and, especially, with the knowledge of the legal and complex procedures 
that derive from the legislation of public works. Familiarity with the industry 
operations was totally missing. In terms of professional background, the strong 
majority of the Board-members had an engineering degree. 
The literature, as far as the contribution of Board-members in strategy-making is 
concerned, remains inconclusive. There are studies reporting that the Board-members 
are increasingly involved in determining and monitoring the strategic direction of the 
firms (Heidrick and Struggles, 1990). However, there is also evidence demonstrating 
that some organizations are resisting increased Board's involvement in strategic 
decisions, either because Board-members are constrained from getting more involved 
(Lorsch, 1989), or because "the rules of the game" define that Boards should not get 
too much involved in setting strategy (Whisler, 1984), unless faced with a crisis (Mace, 
1986). A few studies that have directly examined Board involvement in strategic 
decision-making (Tashakori and Boulton, 1983; Pearce and Zahra, 1991) surveyed a 
single rater in each organization, studied by means of a questionnaire instrument. It 
seems, however, that much remains to be done, especially when recent researchers 
acknowledge that "researchers simply do not know what Board's roles are in the 
strategic decision making process, nor do we know what influences that involvement" 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; p. 768). 
Board involvement is a complex phenomenon since it is influenced by both internal and 
external contingencies (Zahra and Pierce, 1989) and deserves further investigation. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence of this study will be interpreted along two lines which 
are not to be considered as separate; on the contrary, they are interrelated in the sense 
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that the first one informs the second; that is, it functions as the context against which the 
second line of interpretation unfolds. These two lines of interpretation refer to: 
(1) The Board's attributes, that is Board characteristics (or demographics), Board 
structure and processes and 
(2) Decision-making and strategy formation, in relation to the Board-members' roles, in 
the strategy-areas identified in this study; namely, (i) growth strategies, including the 
modernization projects decision-area; (ii) management control strategies, consisting of 
organizational structure and control strategies; (iii) financing strategies, containing 
budgets, loans and purchases strategies; and, finally, (iv) organizational capabilities 
strategies, referring to rewards/ incentives and personnel training strategies. 
8.3.2. Board Characteristics: Composition 
What was important in this study was the representativeness of the groups participating 
in the Board. From a composition aspect, state officials, senior managers and employees' 
representatives were the three groups on the Board. The traditional dichotomy that most 
studies have used, that is the one of outsiders vs. insiders (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 
1990; Rosenstein, 1987; Tashakori and Boulton, 1983; Hill and Snell, 1988), cannot 
apply in this case, since the insiders cannot be treated as an homogeneous group, because 
they have opposing interests, and due to the system of their appointment (elected by 
employees through the system of proportionate representativeness) may wish to confront 
management on a political basis. Therefore, disaggregated analysis seems more 
appropriate to meet the purposes of this study, and to account for the decision-making 
processes on the Board. 
Additionally, when a change in the composition took place, that is the number of Board- 
members from the inside increased due to the establishment of the law, one may assume 
that this would signal a new era, characterised by active interest in internal matters and 
by more initiatives in making strategy work (Zahra and Pierce, 1989). Yet, as revealed 
by the respective strategy graphs, this change in the Board did not influence any of the 
strategic areas identified. This may have occurred because the newcomers felt rather 
weak and were absorbed by the values and orientation of the old Board. Characteristics 
such as educational background and professional expertise played an important role in 
the way the other groups treated the newcomers, and this was manifested in the 
rationales of both, managers and officers. It seems that insiders can contribute valuable 
insights and information to Board-room discussion and hence allow Board to be more 
involved in the strategic decision process (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990) only when 
they are seen as peers from the other Board-members, at least on the basis of those 
characteristics. 
207 
Concerning the Board-members from the outside of the enterprise, the literature is 
inconclusive as to whether Boards dominated by outsiders perform better than the ones 
that are not (Kesner et al., 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). Yet, the normative 
literature stresses that outside Board-members are essential for ensuring an effective 
system of checks and balances (MoIz, 1988). In this case, outside Board-members were 
all state officials; therefore, their appointment indicates that they should protect the 
government's interests. However, the lack of control over the enterprise and its 
implications were not contained in their rationales. If control was not the government's 
scope, one may question the way in which this control was exercised in reality. On the 
other hand, if control was not exercised, then what was the role of these Government 
representatives? 
Concluding, if the Board's composition mirrors the characteristics of the firm' s 
environment, then this proved also to be the case in this study, since all of the Board- 
members (with the notable exception of the General Manager) perceived the 
environment only in terms of governmental policies and trade unions. The resource 
dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), stressing that Board composition 
reflects the characteristics of the firm's environment and helps the firm to acquire 
resources vital to survive and grow, applies in this case only in half: As Board-members 
have considerable fiduciary responsibilities, they find it more prudent to stick to 
government's grants and loans. 
8.3.3. Board Structure 
Structure is one of the most important Board attributes. It influences the Board- 
members' decision-making style as well as their interactions with the General Manager. 
Its constituent elements were: 
8.3.3.1. Information 
The Board functioned on information provided exclusively by the General Manager. 
Only one employees' representative (the one affiliated with the trade union supporting 
the political party of the opposition) had information from different sources. The flow of 
information between the Board-members and the General Manager was assessed as 
problematic by the employees' representatives because it was excessive, unprocessed and 
inadequate, since it did not include alternative courses of action. Most of the times, it 
resulted just in one proposal, that is the one the hierarchy submitted to the Board (Aram 
and Cowen, 1983). Having no other data to rely on, Board-members felt incapable to 
challenge the analyses and recommendations of the General Manager (Tashakori and 
Boulton, 1983). The only Board-member that openly confronted the ex-General 
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Manager was the afore mentioned employees' representative; however, his intentions 
were perceived as political on the part of some managers. 
8.3.3.2. Agenda - Board Leadership 
When considering the fact that the ex-General Manager served also as Chairman of the 
Board for a considerable time of the plan's implementation, then it seems evident that 
control over the agenda was absolute. Evaluating executive performance became a thorny 
issue and rendered the Board more submissive to the General Manager's demands. 
Instead of being a partner in governance, the Board, in majority, simply ratified the 
managerial choices (Nader, 1984; Perham, 1983). 
8.3.3.3. Internal Committees 
No decision concerning the internal organization of the Board was traced. The Board 
functioned as a monolith, since there were no interactions on committees which could 
work out more thoroughly specific issues (Chitayat, 1981). It seems that the 
homogeneity in the professional backgrounds of the majority of the Board-members 
created the impression that the Board as an entity could deal with the most essential 
issues (the modernization projects). The literature argument that Board-members with 
different expertise and education are likely to serve on committees that benefit from 
these characteristics (Kesner, 1988) was not supported in this study. The internal 
contingency of the plan's implementation may have played a role too. The need to 
implement it quickly (because delays were perceived as causing problems) may have led 
the creation of these committees to be considered as an unnecessary delay. 
8.3.3.4. Internal Process 
Process usually refers to the approach the Board adopts in making its decision. In this 
study, the following elements were considered, as extracted from the Board-members' 
interviews: (1) Involvement, that is the degree in which the Board-members were active 
in performing the activities within each strategy-area. (2) Consensus, that is the level of 
agreement among Board-members on issues at hand. The literature supports that these 
variables affect the Board's performance of its strategic role. (Zahra and Pierce, 1987; 
Mueller, 1979) but it stresses that the low number of empirical investigations into 
Board processes is due to the difficulty in securing access to Boards, to observe over 
time. In the beginning of this chapter, this study argued about the way it dealt with 
process. The following section will examine which were the decision-making processes 
this Board employed and whether they were different across the strategy-areas studied. 
Finally, the Board-members' involvement and consensus are to be inferred, as well as the 
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degree to which they influenced the patterns associated with the strategy-areas. 
Ultimately, the way strategies were formed is to be highlighted. 
8.4. BOARD ROLES AND STRATEGY-AREAS 
8.4.1. Introduction 
The central argument of this research was that by focusing on the individual member of a 
Board and by understanding his/her perception about strategy, then his/her influence on 
the strategic actions could be assessed. This can be achieved, if their role and the actual 
corporate governance practices are traced, and consequently account for the way in 
which strategies are formed in a public firm. 
The legalistic perspective and agency theorists (Chapter 2 Sections 2.6.2.1 and 2.6.2.3) 
have not documented the extent to which Board-members perform their different roles 
and how they make decisions. Though the agency perspective emphasizes the crucial 
importance of the Board's strategic role, on the one hand, little documentation of this 
role exists, and, on the other, critics note that even if this contribution exists it is too rare 
to make a difference. These critics further stress that poor Board-members' selection and 
ineffective decision-making processes handicap Board-members' strategic contribution 
(Zahra and Pierce, 1989). 
The following sections concern decision-making and Board-members' involvement in the 
strategy areas identified and infer the Board-members' impact on the patterns traced. A 
summary of key findings in these areas is presented below: 
8.4.2. Key Findings in Board Roles within the Strategy-Areas Studied 
(1) Growth strategies, seen as an outcome, exhibited a high degree of stability in 
patterning and this coincided with the shared perception of Board-members about their 
strategic significance, in relation to the company's phase of life cycle. 
(2) External uncertainty concerned government's funding. Internal weaknesses dealt with 
the organizational capacity to cope with the increased technical requirements derived 
from this type of strategy and from the dysfunctions of systems and structure caused by 
this uncertainty. 
(3) Decision processes followed legal procedures. Excessive information usually 
accompanied the one proposal that arrived on Board. Employees' representatives were 
210 
seen as incompetent by powerful managers, because of their lack of expertise. The latter 
were the ones that set the pace for change in this area. 
(4) Management control strategies, seen as an outcome, exhibited cyclical patterning. 
Board rationales associated with them seemed fragmented and disconnected, invoking 
diverse causes. Implications derived from this area were absent. 
(5) Decision processes on the Board revealed only employees' involvement (only in 
terms of organizational structure) in shaping this outcome. Yet, politicisation occurred, 
because of mismanagement of this process, and this change was not realised. 
(6) Control strategies were left unattended by the majority of the Board-members; the 
absence of loops in their rationales may be associated with it. No intention was traced to 
effect a certain change into this domain. 
(7) Financial strategies, in a regulated organization, are all imposed by the government. 
The variety in patterns of organizational outcomes, especially some emerging ones, 
denoted an accentuated issue, yet, not to the degree to challenge the Board-members' 
convenient cognitive frames and to trigger their involvement. 
(8) Organizational capabilities strategies which concerned personnel policies received 
minimal attention in the context of this Board. Surprisingly enough, the employees' 
representatives did not show specific interest in altering the established policies. Some 
narrow initiatives taken were all attributed to powerful managers. 
Next section builts upon these findings and provides explanations in the light of the 
literature review. 
8.4.3. Growth Strategies and Board Roles 
The goal to be achieved in this area was growth, by means of the geographical expansion 
of facilities. The motive of decision can be described as reactive, since proposals were 
formed in the organizational departments, following a strict process fully described by 
law. Most of the time, the Departments formulated one proposal and this was submitted 
to the Board for ratification. Probing questions were only asked by the employees' 
representative affiliated with the opposition and they did not lead to revisions of 
strategic proposals, (1) because the confrontation was coloured by politicality and this 
could not encourage others to adopt his views, and (2) because a strong majority 
supported the organizational proposals because of lack of other information. 
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The lack of interactions among the Board-members, the poor structure of the Board, the 
rigid agenda, the prevailing perceptions of the Board-members having a technical 
background that monopolized the meetings, and also the sense that delays in the making 
of decisions could cause problems because dead-lines for the technical projects should be 
met and the organizational departments should function, all contributed not to making 
strategic decisions with top management. The Board-members' contribution seemed 
rather to be in the ratification of proposals. Furthermore, since they perceived the 
environment as uncertain, they were pressed to effect as many decisions as they could 
when resources were found. The size of moves was then bold and the decisions made and 
actions taken were forwarded to organizational units for immediate implementation. 
Strategy in this area drew upon a schema that was part of the organizational culture as a 
whole. Since the organization has experienced a long history of consistent decision- 
making around this area (as the pattern of decisions manifests), one might suggest that 
this consistency molded also schemata which were drawn upon by actors involved, to 
rationalize particular organizational tasks. As researchers have noted, these schemata 
"survive and are passed on to new members not only through organization stories, 
myths and so on but because they are stored in standard operating procedures of the 
organization" (Huff, 1988; p. 16). 
Another explanation about the stability of decision patterns and Board-members' 
schemata draws on the concept of institutionalization. According to it, much 
organizational action reflects a pattern of doing things and becomes legitimated within 
an organization and its environment (Pfeffer, 1982). This perspective places great 
emphasis on environmental norms and the weight of the company's history as wen as on 
the nature of organizational actions. In this study, this was reinforced by the fact that 
growth strategies were legally mandated activities and the Board itself was a legal entity; 
thus, there might be exposure to legal action if such strategies did not fulfil their legally 
mandated processes. Therefore, organizational actions can be predicted and explained by 
examining the nature of the firm and the nature of the decisions, in relation with the 
phase of the company's life cycle. 
8.4.4. Management Control and Board Roles 
The aim of this section is to bring together (1) the findings of the patterns associated 
with decisions falling into the organizational structure and control areas and (2) the 
Board-members' rationales, and to account for the involvement and commitment of the 
latter in shaping those patterns, as well as for the initiators of change within this area. 
Clearly, the arguments presented here will draw also on the findings of the previous 
section on growth strategies, since they are conceptually interrelated. 
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8.4.4.1 Organizational Structure Patterns and Board-members' Roles 
A central debate in the strategic management literature is whether restructuring of the 
Board is required for better governance and managerial oversight (Hoskisson and 
Turk, 1990), or whether restructuring is a strategic move by top management which 
usually follows changes in strategy in order to meet growth and profit objectives 
(Chandler, 1962; Scott, 1973; Andrews, 1987). Others attempted to look at strategy 
and structure from a more multi-dimensional point of view (Miles and Snow, 1978; 
Miller and Friesen, 1984; Quinn, Mintzberg and James; 1988). Using unique 
definitions for the firms or the concepts of archetypes and contexts, they all examine 
common adaptive strategies and their structural and environmental correlates. In these 
two latter approaches, actors receive no attention at all. Mintzberg (1990), in his 
critique of the rational view of strategy formation, which in his view makes a sharp 
distinction between the formulation of strategies on the one hand and their 
implementation on the other, thus separating thinking from acting, asserts that the 
premises of that model deny important aspects of strategy formation, including 
incrementalism and emergent strategy, the influence of existing structure on strategy and 
the full participation of actors other than the General Manager. 
If the focal organization is seen as a machine bureaucracy with a powerful 
technostructure (Mintzberg, 1983), associated with an environment that is both simple 
and stable, then the following attributes characterize its structure: It has highly 
specialized, routine operating tasks, very formalized procedures, and large units in its 
operations. The basis for grouping tasks throughout the structure is by function, and co- 
ordination is effected by rules and hierarchy. Rules and regulations permeate their 
activities and indeed reflect an obsession with control; formal communication is 
favoured at all levels and decision-making tends to follow the formal line of authority. 
Only at the very top of the hierarchy are the different functional responsibilities brought 
together; therefore, only at that level can the major decision be made. 
Thus, there can be strong resistance and conflict to innovation and radical change, given 
that organizational structures are designed to deliver given products/services in stable 
environments, rather than to create flexible and innovative structures for unanticipated 
needs, that is the ones that a growth strategy would cause (MiHer, 1986). Under such 
conditions, it would be expected that the pattern of decisions concerning changes within 
this area would be highly incremental in nature, exhibiting a constant shape (lagged, 
probably, in relation to growth strategies), reflecting the mutual adjustments the 
organization makes, as a plurality of actors is involved in the decision-making arena 
(Mintzberg, 1983; 1990). This incrementalist perspective may also reflect a purposeful 
muddling through activity to achieve strategic change, through a continuous, evolving 
and consensus-building approach (Quinn, 1980). 
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However, this was not the case. Strategic change in this area exhibited a periodical 
tendency to converge and later to diverge; as Quinn, Mintzberg and James (1988) put 
it, this was "the cycling into and out of focus" (p. 623). These cycles were not followed 
afterwards either by a constant shape (indicating a constant flow of decisions) or by a 
complete lack of decisions (indicating that a new order was institutionalized, thus 
decisions concerning restructuring were no more needed). 
Yet, this patterning was not perceived by the Board-members as an emergent strategy 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) which would alert them to the inefficiency of the 
existing structure and make them contribute to a major restructuring. General Managers, 
in both instances, were the initiators of the strategic change in this area. Board-members 
remained passive and simply ratified their proposals, with the exception of the 
employees' representatives who undertook the role of unionists and brought the case on 
the Court. 
The goals to be achieved for the major restructuring on the part of the two General 
Managers were in both cases the same. However, the structure proposed differed 
considerably, as also did the process to effect them. The first change in structure, 
building on the opportunity of the Socialization Law, aimed at reducing the importance 
the Department of the Modernization Works had, and at enhancing the Department of 
Operations through which the main goal of the firm, that is the delivery of reliable 
services, could be achieved; thus, it looked as a redistribution of power and status which 
those in control were determined to upset (Child, 1969). The second change in 
structure, building on EEC proposals, used a financial concept, the transaction cost 
concept, to account for the new choice in structure. Thus, the central argument was 
whether a given transaction (a transaction being an exchange of goods and services from 
one party to another) can be undertaken at a lower cost via a market or within the 
hierarchy (firm), since the purpose of a transport firm was to produce services; all other 
activities were supplementary. If the costs of undertaking transactions via the market 
were lower, then the firm could gain economic benefits by divesting from these activities, 
otherwise it could continue internalizing these transaction within its own organization 
(Jones and Hill, 1988). The structure proposed and approved separated the functions of 
track maintenance and construction as well as that of rolling stock maintenance and 
procurements, in order to account for costs incurred and, if found appropriate, to further 
proceed to divestment. 
Corporate structure was thus seen in different terms by these two top managers and 
additionally the process to gain consensus differed sharply; in the first attempted change, 
an authoritative style was used and confronted by trade unions possessing at that time an 
increased power, due to the recently established Law, while in the second, actions 
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perceived by the employees positively were taken in advance. This probably has 
contributed to the final result of adopting this second change given also the non 
involvement of outsiders and insiders alike. 
To summarize, the Board's involvement in the shaping of this strategy was minimal, even 
when signals were received from within continuously; yet, when some involvement 
occurred, this effected in a negative means. Top management's initiatives clearly 
followed growth strategy, though the existing structure once stopped the implementation 
of the change, and when change at last got implemented this was in relation to a 
rearticulation of strategy, that is the new structure might affect strategy through the 
anticipated divestments (Ansoff, 1985; Andrews, 1987). 
8.4.4.2. Control Strategies and Board-members' Roles 
Control was also a legally mandated activity, periodically undertaken by the board, and as 
such its patterning should exhibit a consistency. According to the law governing the 
Board's functioning, every trimester, or earlier if judged necessary, the Board is 
informed by the General Manager about the execution of its decisions, concerning the 
entire progress of the Strategic Plan, as well as about market figures, concerning the 
effectiveness of services offered. The cyclical appearance of strategies in this area 
reflects that at times decisions/actions showed a definite propensity to converge, that is 
to exhibit patterning. Yet, this periodic convergence tended rather to stabilize itself into 
reiterating cycles. Which was then the Board-members' role in the shaping of these 
activities, given that (1) their rationales seemed disconnected, diverse and addressed in 
negative terms, and (2) the Board characteristics and structure posed several problems? 
The goal to be achieved in this area was rather unclear. Board-members seemed not to 
know whether control referred to the evaluation of the activities of the General Manager 
or to those of the organization's as a whole. Within this area, "choices" made seem as 
conforming to a ritual. Given these rationales, the patterns revealed were rather 
emergent and circumstantial in nature, whilst the involvement of the Board-members was 
reduced to a formality. 
The literature has argued that emphasis on strategic controls by managers was found to 
be negatively related to Board involvement in restructuring (Johnson, Hoskisson and 
Hittq 1993). Other studies concluded that most Boards are involved in oversight of 
strategy and managerial monitoring rather than in strategy formulation (Harrison, 
1987). Yet, studies relying on Board demographics, Board structure and processes have 
produced opposite results where the majority of Boards perform a rubber stump role for 
the managerial proposals (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
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Theorists dealing with the public sector note that the first issue inhibiting a move from a 
bureaucratic to a managerial control system is a cultural one. Control philosophy in 
public enterprises suffers from its adherence to budgetary line item limits and not to the 
accomplishment of results. Also, managerial orientation inhibiting the delegation of 
responsibility, the absence of market forces, personnel policies all are barriers that 
render ineffective the control system (Young, 1988). However, it was also noted that 
public managers have weaker authority over subordinates and lower levels due to 
institutional constraints (e. g civil service personnel system, purchasing and procurements 
system usually with an oversight agency administering them); external political alliances 
of subunits and subordinates (Rainey, 1989); the influence of the press and the short 
tenure of top executives (Affison, 1983). 
The empirical evidence in this study revealed that the issue of strategic control in a 
public enterprise's Board in which many stakeholders participate resembled the one 
described in public management literature. The absence of implications in the cognitive 
rationales concerning control and the absence of a linkage between control and structure 
fit to the above assertions. Board-members from the outside seemed to refer to a 
bureaucratic system of control (either mentioning their accountability to the Supervisory 
Board, or to the government) while inside Board-members only stressed the dysfunctions 
of the organizational control system, evidently as an explanation to their non- 
involvement in this area. Evaluating managerial performance would be in such case a 
paradox, since the majority of Board-members ratified, most of the time, the General 
Manager's proposals, without questioning them. Also, independence from management 
cannot occur given the information problems and this further reduces control (Molz, 
1988). Thus, involvement in shaping control strategies was absent on the Board, and 
strategies in this area seemed rather perfunctory (Fleischer et al., 1988; Loevinger, 
1986). 
Finally, one could stress an additional explanation for this lack of control, and its 
association, in rationales, with negative concepts. If control is perceived as a threat issue, 
then Board-members would be likely to construct or generate an organizational response 
that includes taking actions directed at the internal environment (Dutton and Jackson, 
1987), since internal activities are easier to access and manipulate. Yet, this choice is 
also a function of the societal culture in which the organization is situated (Child, 
1981). If societal culture at that time was immune (as judged to be the case) of such 
considerations, then control issues would delay to be tackled with. When the focal firm is 
a public firm as well (where issues are more sensitive to public opinion), then this 
argument takes on an additional weight. 
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8.4.5. Financing Strategies and the Board-members' Roles 
Strategies in this area were all imposed by the government. In this case, the environment 
had total discretion over the enterprise (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) and dictated the 
patterns in actions by pre-empting or bounding organizational choice. These strategies, 
as imposed, were internalised and made deliberate by the majority of the Board- 
members. The service role of the Board-members emphasized by the legalistic 
perspective (Chapter 2 Section 2.6.2.1) seemed not to pertain in a case of a public 
firm. Board-members, outsiders and insiders alike, were not conducive to funds raising. 
The exception of the General Manager revealed (through his successful initiative to 
apply for EEC grants) that however narrow some margins might took there are always 
lines to be pushed further. 
Financial pressures seemed not to have forced a strategic redirection within this area. 
Moreover, whether a financial crisis is labelled as a threat or as a given is an unclear 
factor. State officials perceived it as related to the public character of the firm, while 
managers felt constantly threatened and considered that if a financial stability is 
achieved, then the organizational weaknesses should be tackled with. Only the General 
Manager perceived it as an opportunity for radical change. He used the financial crisis to 
accelerate the process of rationalization, to drop the seeds for the necessity of a new 
organization (the issue of divestments) to implement a new structure and systems. It 
seems here that personality is important and personal skills are the building blocks in 
conceptualizing, integrating and managing change (Pettigrew et al., 1992; Pettigrew 
and Whipp, 1991), in an area where all participants feel uncertain or passive. 
8.4.6. Organizational Capabilities' Strategies and Board-members' Roles 
The goal to be achieved in this area was the smooth functioning of the rewards and 
incentives systems within the organization; they included the career development system, 
the pay system, and personnel training. Yet, the career development system had not 
changed in all these years and the decisions falling into this area concerned only the 
appointments to the post of head of Department. The pay system changed almost in the 
middle of the plan's implementation just a few months before the new Board took tenure 
and was mainly the outcome of the Assistant General Manager's initiative, though no 
association with performance was made in it. Personnel training received a little 
attention; decisions in this area referred to rare instances where Board's permission to 
grant educational leaves was needed. Personnel training programmes were designed 
outside the boardroom by the two powerful change agents, the General Manager and the 
Assistant General Manager. 
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The choices within this area were mostly made by consensus. The size of moves within 
this area can be described as circumstantial, since appointments occur when posts 
become vacant due to retirement and the applications for leaves of absence are very rare. 
Thus, the pattern of activities was arranged by internal contingencies; the Board- 
members' role was not active in shaping the manager-strategy alignment. The long-term 
objective to insure the availability of skilled managers by specifying the sequence of 
training and development experiences needed by designated individuals to realize their 
potentials (Kerr and Jackofsky, 1989) escaped their attention. 
The question that arises is why Board-members, especially the insiders, failed to address 
this issue. It may be that management development may entail significant costs to the 
organization. Apart from the resulting cohesion and pressure for conformity it can also 
serve as a basis for excessive control and manipulation (Janis, 1972). 
Another possible explanation could be attributed to the public nature of the firm since it 
has been argued that public firms show more highly structured, personnel policies which 
most of the times resist change. especially when there is no relationship between 
performance and extrinsic rewards (Rainey et al., 1986; Rainey, 1989). 
Finally, another plausible explanation is that the effectiveness of a development system is 
heavily dependent on other subsystems, such as control systems. When such systems 
malfunction, this lowers the credibility of the development effort and the willingness of 
senior managers to participate (Kerr and Jackofsky, 1989). 
8.5. A TYPOLOGY OF STRATEGIES AND BOARD ROLES 
So far, it was shown that strategic decision-areas (growth, management control, financing 
and organizational capability) were associated with distinct patterns in organizational 
activity. However, the discussion about the Board-members' roles and attributes revealed 
that themajority of them performed rather a duty. Instead of being actively involved in 
strategy, control or service roles, the majority of them only discussed internal and 
external causes generated on an idiosyncratic basis, which were perceived as negatively 
affecting strategy. Board-members seemed not to receive the kind of information that 
would help them to understand the organization's general situation and possibly lead 
them to re-assess their sense of this situation. As a result, decisions made were probably 
biased, suffering from the representativeness heuristic (Huff and Schwenk, 1985). 
Figure 8.1 substantiates the main points discussed so far in this chapter. It shows the 
four identified strategy-areas with the associated Board-members' rationales and the key 
Board attributes within them. The x axis illustrates the Board's roles in each of these 
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strategy-areas while the y axis refers to internal/external contingencies that shaped the 
strategy-areas. Thus, 
- In the growth area, strategies were associated with short rationales, building on the 
urgent need to develop the infrastructure. Consensus was built around it. The Board- 
members' role concerned ratification of decisions forwarded through the hierarchy at a 
constant pace. Associated information was seen as excessive since it contained all 
evidence as the proposal was coming up through the various organizational levels. 
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Fj, gure 8.1: A Typology of Organisational Strategies and Board Roles 
- In the management control area, strategies were associated with cognitive structures 
which, on the part of insiders, exhibited more links between concepts. Overt conflict 
between insiders seems to have been generated by the lack of consensus on the causes of 
the structure's ineffectiveness. Cyclical patterns in the structure and control areas did not 
trigger Board-members' intervention; thus, they did not assume a more active role. 
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- In the financing area, strategies were associated with shared cognitive styles. The 
Board-members' involvement concerned the fulfilment of their legally mandated 
responsibilities when they had to submit budgets and requests for loans to a higher 
authority. 
- In the organizational capabilities area, strategy was disconnected between the reward 
and incentive system. Consensus in the making of those decisions did not indicate that 
there was involvement at least on the part of the insiders, to effect change. The 
patterning of decisions seemed rather coincidental. 
In summary, the typology of Board cognitive styles, roles and patterns of strategic areas 
highlighted the importance of adding cognitive styles to Boards' characteristics. What 
other scholars stressed in a theoretical sense (Hambrick, 1989), it has been empirically 
shown in this study; that is, the interpretation systems of individuals affect the 
performance of their roles and through them the decision outcomes. 
The new finding that emerged from this research was that cognitive styles can be 
considered as an operation alization of Board variables. In all the cases analysed, the 
cognitive structures of Board-members captured the inter-relation ships among a variety 
of concepts, and cognitive maps depicted them in a manner that provided hints for the 
subsequent analysis/interpretation. Cognitive structures were used to gauge Board 
dimensions to the direction of revealing Board's role. It can be said that when the Board 
size is not large, the cognitive technique can be appropriate for studying the impact of 
individuals on organizational outcomes. 
8.6. THE GENERAL MANAGER AS THE FIRMS STRATEGIST- HOW 
STRATEGIES ARE FORMED IN THIS ORGANIZATION 
The General Manager proved to be the only real strategist on the Board. First, he 
performed his service role and ascertained the funding rate for the continuation of the 
project in the growth strategy-area. He acted as a boundary-spanner who had access to 
vital information. His efforts centred on enhancing the firm's legitimacy, and by giving it 
a new vision he helped it to achieve goals of effectiveness (Provan, 1980; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The core of his vision focused on service and new organization; its 
circumference involved the rhetoric and metaphor of persuasion, using positive sense 
and exhibiting an outward structure (Westley and Mintzberg, 1989). Second, in the 
management control area, he introduced strategic change via the major restructuring. 
Control strategies were left unattended, though one may argue that the re-examination of 
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the strategic plan that he realized and which proved its ongoing validity was a kind of 
strategic control (Schreyogg and Steinmann, 1987). 
His manipulation of symbols and actions has given him a support-elevator role. This was 
first observed by Young (1988) who noted that a public sector manager must convince of 
the importance of the organization's activities in order to assure the continued support 
of governmental agencies as they set their budgetary priorities (Roos and Hall, 1980). 
Also, as Norburn (1989) pointed out, it is upon the General Manager's skills that 
strategic success is largely determined. Beyond that, Norburn (1989) has noted that 
many researchers view the role of the General Manager as changing. Strategic choice and 
performance accountability are not the only interests of his role. The latter, and this 
proved to be the case here, has expanded to include that of an internal focus for 
employee corporate identification and that of an external diplomat who negotiates with 
trade associations and with government. 
In terms of the study's purpose, cognitive maps offered a first approximation to thought 
structures (Eden, 1992) located in the mind of the strategist, in the collective context of 
a Board. In this sense, they were much closer to strategy formation than other 
approaches dealing exclusively with outcomes. Cognitive maps in this study were rather 
simple; concepts included in them were different and idiosyncratically weighed. The 
analysis of the specific strategy-areas in relation with the role of Board-members 
presented the firm as a relatively submissive, simple-minded and single-minded 
strategizer. 
If the strategy perspective revealed in this research is taken as a basis, then "defective" 
strategy is the major cause of the Board's passive role and of the absence of involvement 
and commitment in performing a strategist role within the organizational areas studied. 
Bringing together, the Board's cognitive maps illustrated a picture of an organization 
that had an un-coordinated strategy over a considerable period of time, and which was 
submissive to environmental demands since it felt threatened by them. On the opposite, 
what was seen as a vicissitude by the majority of Board-members it was perceived as a 
challenge by the new General Manager who reversed the "existing logic" of fatality and 
introduced change. 
Drawing an analogy with the well known typology of organization s/strategies proposed 
by Miles and Snow (1978) and enhanced by Daft and Weick (1984), the cognitive 
styles of the Board-members could be described in the following terms: 
(1) The General Manager was a prospector with a high degree of initiative with 
regard to the environment. The environment was seen as changing and as 
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containing opportunities. This is consistent with the enacting mode of 
interpretation. 
(2) The Assistant General Manager was an analyser, concerned with maintaining a 
stable core of activities, but with occasional innovations, when the environment 
permitted. He was studying the environment and moving ahead only in a careful 
and constrained way. His views refer to a discovering orientation. 
(3) Governmental officials were defenders. To them, the environment was 
analysable and stable and the organization was concerned with maintaining what it 
had already achieved and waiting for the government's directives. Their attitude 
was passive and related to a conditioning viewing mode of interpretation. 
(4) Finally, the employees' representatives were reactors since more or less they 
accepted whatever was coming. 
Before the arrival of the new General Manager, strategies were formed rather 
incrementally whilst, under his leadership, they were formed in a gestalt manner (a 
coordinated set of actions applying to most organizational areas), following the 
redefinition of the initial goal. As portrayed in his map, in order to introduce change the 
concept of the goal must be redefined and embrace new concepts and new conditions. If 
it can be said that the global goal was growth, then the discovered goal was the one 
defined after the constraints, their consequences and the new role this enterprise could 
play were articulated (Allison, 1983). The General Manager treated this redefinition as 
a social process in which the causal texture linked objectives, constraints and imperatives 
with benefits assigned to all the parties involved (the enterprise, the government, the 
general public). 
8.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
In explaining strategy formation in a public firm, the alternative of a cognitive 
orientation to account for the way principal actors shape strategy was demonstrated. 
Cognitive maps, their content and structure, as well as their inter-relation ships may be 
one way in which explanations about actions, their nature, their interconnectedness, the 
involvement and commitment of key actors, may all be inferred. Such an approach, by 
centring on the individual strategist and by being informed by the unfolding of outcomes 
and specific actions, offers a much needed counter-balance to the proliferation of studies 
which have focused only on outcomes and used cross-sectional designs. Understanding 
strategy needs to bring to the central stage both content and process and the individual 
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strategist. Especially, in the study of a public enterprise, all these three elements should 
receive due attention. It is not enough to prescribe appropriate solutions for remedying 
problematic situations if the reality these firms confront is not fully understood. 
In terms of the lines of inquiry that future researchers in the domain of Boards and 
strategic roles may wish to follow, one may cite the following: 
(1) The Board-members' appointment and development need to be further 
explored. Related to this is the question of how Board-members are willing to learn 
and enrich their cognitive frames. In this area, of specific interest would be the 
application of cognitive mapping as a learning experience by an outsider analyst, 
who then could evaluate the degree in which changes have been incorporated into 
the Board-members' schemes. 
(2) The processes by which some General Managers inspire and energize entire 
organizations. Also, the specific contexts that breed such changes need further 
exploration. As was the case in this study, the change of the ex-General Manager 
was not triggered by negative organizational outcomes or Board intervention. 
Rather it was due to his own wish to select another more prestigious post. Thus, 
the strategic change that was initiated in the firm was rather a haphazard event 
than a planned action. 
(3) The absence of interconnectedness in the maps between concepts in the 
environmental sector and the strategy elements may be a cause for the distinctive 
facets of change in this public firm. More research is needed, in order to account 
for the way top decision makers in public firms conceive their environments, and 
the way they obtained information about them. 
(4) This study highlighted the need for Board-members to develop an explicit 
approach for Board development. Although, in a public firm, the selection of the 
Board-members' majority rests in government's hands, Board committee structure, 
decision making style, the search for more accurate, pluralistic, and timely 
information are domains within the purview of a Board, and their impact on 
strategy making deserves further investigation. 
(5) Trade unions need to re-examine the widespread notion that the role of the 
employees' representatives in the Board is to challenge the General Manager or to 
tolerate the perceived deficiencies since their role does not include control. 
Assuming, on the other hand, full responsibilities for their posts means adopting 
selection criteria for the unions appointees possibly different from the ones 
prevailing so far. 
223 
(6) Related to the spirit of the previous paragraph, as the competitive pressures 
will mount in the future, Board input into the strategic process win become a 
necessity. General Managers may need information about the industry as a whole 
or, especially, the task environment of the firm. If Board-members (appointed by 
government) possess such expertise, then this can induce better quality decision 
processes and will assist management. Conformity to directives or policies should 
be balanced against the need to operate viable public firms. 
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APPENDIX A 
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A brief history of the enterprise studied is provided in this appendix as wen as a 
balanced coverage of all major components of the railway, in order to properly weigh an 
factors involved, accounting for its performance. The appendix unfolds along these two 
guide-lines, and its constituting parts are the following: (1) a description of the stages the 
Greek Railways went through, until they reached their present state; (2) the state 
ownership and control; (3) the environment surrounding the organization; (4) the 
components of the enterprise; and (5) the performance of the enterprise. 
A. 2. A SYNOPTICAIL HISTORY OF THE ENTERPRISE 
Railways in Greece have a history of approximately 135 years. They comprised a mature 
industry during a period of drastic change, especially during the period which followed 
World War 11. Demands for their services were greatly reduced by the rapid development 
of other transport modes such as highways and air transport. The country's economic 
activity and the geographical distribution of the population with the creation of two 
massive connurbations in Athens (population almost 3.5 million) and Thessaloniki 
(population over 1 million), caused broad changes in the mix of commodities to be 
transported as well as in the demand for various passenger services. Changes in the 
parameters of labour, material, and governmental policies an had a big impact on the 
supply side and the character of these services. Moreover, the inputs to produce them 
were altered drastically as a result of technological advances which occurred in Western 
Europe in the late 70s, and were the reference points for the modernization of the 
network, undertaken since that time. 
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A. 2. I. The 1835-1970 Period 
In 1835 Greece was again an independent country. The 13-year Greek Revolution against 
the Ottoman Empire, and the assistance provided by the Allied Forces of England, 
France and Russia led to the formation of a country with almost half of its present size. 
Though since that time proposals to set up railway lines were submitted to the Greek 
government, it was not until twelve years later that the need to operate a transport mode 
using the steam power was strengthened. In June 1855, the Parliament passed 
unanimously, the TZ/28-12-1855 Law "On the Foundation of Railways from Athens to 
Piraeus", concerning the connection of the capital with the port of Piraeus, a distance of 
10 km. In 1896, the first train ran on the line which later was electrified and extended to 
include several suburban towns located in the north of Athens (OSE, 1984b). 
During the same period new regions were incorporated to the country. In 1879 the plain 
of Thessaly is attached to the north borders, and three years later a project for the 
construction of railway lines was initiated. A private owned company constructed and 
operated a narrow gauge (1000 mm) single-tracked tine which connected all major towns 
in the area with the port of Volos on the eastern coast. In 1886, the 160 km of the line 
were opened to traffic. 
In the mean time, by the Law AWME'/7-4-1889, the English company Eckersley started 
the construction of a railway line from Pireaus to the then Greek-Ottoman border at 
Papapouli. Various constraining factors such as the unfavourable economic position of 
the country, and the inability of the company to complete the project because of the lack 
of its own capital, considerably delayed the project. However, the Greek-Ottoman War of 
1897 boosted the interest in the continuation of the construction of this railway line, and 
thus in 1902 a new private company under the name of the "Company of the Greek 
Railways" was founded to implement the initial project. The 394 km long standard gauge 
(1435 mm) single-tracked line opened in July 1909, providing the country with a much 
needed south-north transport corridor, which had yet to be extended to join with the 
Macedonian network, if a connection with Serbia (and via it with the rest of Europe) was 
to be established. Two small branches connecting the line with important ports on the 
eastern coast were also constructed. A 20 km branch to Khalkis on the island of Euboea 
and a 22.5 krn branch to Stylida on the Maliakos Gulf, facilitating the trade with 
countries of the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. 
After the victorious Balcan Wars of 1912-13, and the attachment of Macedonia to the 
Greek State, the Greek Government bought off the "Company of the Greek Railwaye 
and proceeded to the construction of the railway link (Papapouli-Katerini) between the 
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Greek line and the Macedonian network which was consigned by the Ottomans to three 
different companies, but came now under Greek control. 
The World War I and the Asia Minor Catastrophe which followed in 1922, where the 
Greek army was completely defeated in the Middle East by the Neo-Turks of Kemal 
Ataturk (1 500 000 Greek refugees living until then along the Aegean coast of Asia 
Minor, came to settle in Greece), caused serious damages to the railway network. Heavy 
locomotives of the allied forces destroyed the line to such a degree that in 1923 a safe 
movement of a train on the line from Athens to Thessaloniki was not guaranteed. 
Government's grants though, made possible the renewal of the track infrastructure and 
the purchase of new rolling stock. In 1918 the Greek network was linked to the Serbian 
one and through it to the European. 
While in the mainland the efforts to build an integrated network were enhanced, in the 
southern part of the country, the Peloponnese region, a company representing a group of 
banks under the name of "Railways of Pireaus, Athens, Peloponnese" (S. P. A. P) started 
in 1882 the construction and, after its completion, the operation of a narrow-gauge (1000 
mm) single-tracked railway line. This line passes over the Korinth Canal and after 
arriving at the city of Korinth diverges into two branches; the first one follows the 
northern and then the western coastline, while the second being directed towards the 
south then is oriented to the centre of the region, arrives at Tripolis and merges with the 
first branch at Zevgholatio. From there, a 33 km branch provides a connection with the 
port of Kalamata located at the southern end of the region. In 1902 the line was 
completed but the company confronted bankruptcy because of externally defined 
overwhelming factors. The generous remuneration received by the State as well as some 
successful financial negotiations with banks helped it to carry on its operations. In 1918, 
S. P. A. P. was requisitioned until a six month period after the war's end. 
In 1920, there were in the country two independent state-owned railway companies, 
S. P. A. P. and the "Company of the Greek Railways". The Government introduced a 
unified administrative scheme so their management was assigned to a separate 
administrative unit under the name "Greek State Railways" (S. E. K). 
The network continued to increase in size. In 1920 S. E. K. bought the Thessaloniki to 
Alexandroupolis tine which was part of the railway tine from Thessaloniki to 
Konstantinople. In 1922, S. P. A. P. was parted from the state railways and formed a 
separate private company. In the network remaining under the State's control, efforts 
were now centred on upgrading the tracing of the existing line, on terminal and stations 
facilities, as well as on inaugurating attractive pricing policies for passenger services. 
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At the end of World War 11 the railways were found in a very difficult position. Although 
the railwaymen' accomplishments were astonishing (only in the S. E. K. 's network the first 
month of the war 2525 trains were on the move), what was left behind was merely a 
shadow of the pre-war enterprise. In the network of S. E. K., 93% of the steam 
locomotives, 98% of the coaches, and 84% of the cars were destroyed. From the bridges 
of below 10 meters span, 50% were demolished, while the destruction in bridges over 10 
meter span as well as in tunnels, reached the 100%. 
Alexandroupolls 
Figure A. 1.: The Greek Railway Network 
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From the 2679 km of railway tine, only 680 km were in operation. The Greek Civil War 
(1946-1949) that followed rendered more difficult the restoration works. The aid 
provided to the Greek Government through the Marshall Plan helped to restore the 
network in its pre-war state, though proposals for its modernization were also expressed. 
Prevailing interests lead the country to invest in highways and airports. Railways seemed 
to be left aside in the advent of a new era (Efstratiades, 1954). 
In 1954, S. E. K. bought the French-Greek Railways (Alexandroupolis to Ormenion) and 
incorporated them into its network which was now extended to the Bulgarian border. 
Modernization works were undertaken by S. E. K. itself in an attempt to reduce the 
limitations caused by the operations of two different gauges into the network, since in 
1955 a merger with the Thessaly Railways occurred, as a result of railwaymen' pressures. 
In 1962, S. E. K. took over S. P. A. P. and the new scheme operated as a governmental 
administrative department (OSE, 1984b). 
In the 1960s, the enterprise undertook some major projects concerning its development. 
New terminals, connections with industries, new passenger services, automatic level 
crossing guarding, a partial doubling of the main line in the sections Athens-Inoi and 
Plat i-Thessalon iki, the completion of the introduction of diesel traction, all constituted 
efforts to hold its market share and to try to regain the lost one. In 1966, Sofrerail a 
french consultancy company (subsidiary of the French Railways) undertook a study of 
Greek Railways on behalf of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (O. E. C. D. ), and made a number of proposals concerning, amongst other, 
the organizational structure where emphasis was placed upon the creation of a new 
department with responsibilities over short- and long-range planning (including costing, 
investment, statistics, computer applications, personnel education) and the recognition 
of the significance of the marketing function which should be separated from the 
Operations Department and form a distinct department with important competencies. 
Moreover, recommendations to increase the manpower of headquarters were made with 
the pointing out of the avoidance of any trend of these units to intervene in regional 
administration issues, which might result from the increase in their manpower (OECD, 
1966). 
A. 2.2. The 1971-1983 Period 
The Greek Railways Organization (O. S. E. ) was now a "public enterprise operating for 
the public interest in accordance with the rules of private economy, in the form of a 
joint stock company, enjoying administrative and economic autonomy and which is 
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subject to all legal provisions stemming from the legislation of this sort of companies" 
(Act 674/70). 
Though the decision to alter the company's legal status belonged to the then government, 
one can logically assume that the impact of the Sofrerail's study was decisive, since the 
report it produced was taken as a basis for the design of the new enterprise 
(Paradissopoulos, 1989). In 1971, a contract was signed between the Greek State and 
Sofrerail. The latter took on the designing of studies and the formation of an investment 
programme for the application of the latest international developments. This programme 
was incorporated into the 5-Year National Development Plan for the period 1976-1980 
(KEPE, 1976). 
O. S. E. started compiling the new rules and regulations concerning its new legal status. A 
new organizational structure was implemented, alike the one proposed by Sofrerail some 
years ago. The headquarters manpower increased considerably, and 896 new posts were 
created increasing the existing number at headquarters by almost 300% 
(Paradissopoulos, 1989). 
In 1975, all the previous long-term plans of the enterprise were unified into a new 15- 
year modernization plan budgeted at 37 billion drachmas (OSE, Annual Report 1975). 
One year later, the Ministries Economic Committee approved a minimum investment 
programme of 6.2 billion for the period 1976-1980 (OSE, Annual Report 1976). In 
1977, a loan was contracted with a group of German banks mounted at 100 million 
marks. The aim was to fund the larger part of the expenditure required for the doubling 
of two sections of the Athens to Thessaloniki main line (Inoi-Tithorea and Domokos- 
Larissa), the improvement of the tracing of the line and the introduction of electrical 
signalling in the above sections (OSE, Annual Report 1977). 
While the company was undertaking its modernization plan, a 2.15% reduction in the 
railway traffic was reported in 1979, caused by the immobility of the rolling stock units, 
the intense competition in the freight market from ships, and the currency regulations 
that affected the imports of goods which in their majority were transported by train 
(OSE, Annual Report 1979). The entrance of Greece in the E. E. C. in 1981 accentuated 
this loss. Grain shippings were not any more the State's responsibility; the shippers were 
free to choose the carriers according to their own criteria and, as it proved, railway 
services did not meet them (OSE, Annual Report 1981). This reduction trend in both 
passenger and freight services ceased to exist in 1983, when the first increase in 
passenger services by 8.5% and in freight services by 14.4% (the percentages refer to 
comparison with the previous year) were reported (OSE, Annual Report 1983). 
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A. 2.3. The 1983-Until Today Period 
The general elections in 1981 brought in power for the first time in the history of the 
country, a Socialist Party, with a strong public support (48% of the votes), which support 
was renewed in the next general elections in 1985 (45% of the votes). Concepts such as 
self management and the central role of the trade unions as the sole representative of the 
working class were very popular, though not well defined in the party's electoral 
programme. A central tenet of this programme was that of the "socialization" of basic 
sectors of the national economy. What was meant by this term was that the management 
of the enterprises was to be widened by the inclusion of more stakeholder groups into it. 
Though no one knew whether such a scheme was to be applied to the private sector as 
well, the three biggest state-owned enterprises, Public Electricity Corporation (D. E. H), 
Greek Railways Organization (O. S. E. ), and Organization of Greek Telecommunications 
(O. T. E. ), first introduced in 1985 the following innovations concerning their 
administrative structure (Act 1365/83). 
1. Employees' representatives in the Managing Board: They were elected by all 
enterprise's employees, through an electoral system based on proportional 
representation. Of the nine members of O. S. E. 's Managing Board three were 
employees while the remaining were appointed by Government. The General 
Manager was also elected by the Board. 
2. Social Control at Corporate Level: A Social Control Representative 
Assembly (A. S. K. E. ) was established, consisting of 27 members. Nine of these 
members were appointed by the Government, nine were elected by the employees 
and nine were appointed by various stakeholder groups such as local governments, 
the trade unions confederation, export organizations, chambers of commerce, 
technical chamber, economic chamber, chamber of small businesses, association of 
Greek industries, and confederation of agricultural co-operative societies. 
3. Social Control at Regional Level: Regional assemblies (P. E. S. K. E. ) were set 
up to provide for social control on a decentralized basis. They comprised the 
members of the Regional Council, an enterprise's delegate appointed by the 
General Manager, and an employees' representative elected by the employees 
working in the region. Nine major regions were created within which regional 
committees discussed and decided upon the proposals made by the enterprise on 
issues concerning railway development and activities in the region. P. E. S. K. E. s' 
functioning caters for and enriches that of A. S. K. E. and contributes to a better 
understanding of local needs and opportunities. 
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4. Work Councils: A central work council (K. E. S. ) was formed at the company's 
headquarters, consisting of nine members all elected by the employees. It was 
concerned with issues related to personnel's rules and regulations, working 
conditions, and sanitary and safety conditions. Regional work councils were also 
elected at a local level. 
Though the enterprise, at the time of this study, had only a four year functioning under 
the new structure, some remarks should be made in relation to the way this change was 
introduced and managed on the part of all interested parties. 
At first, emphasis was placed upon the outcomes of the electoral confrontation, whereas 
the institution itself, its strengths and weaknesses were rarely openly discussed. It is not 
irrelevant that the trade unions enthusiasm was considerably reduced after the 
employees' representatives had been elected (and the power of political parties with 
which the unions were affiliated had been measured). Things such as the role of 
employees on the Board, what issues should they look after more closely, who is going to 
assist them in their job, to whom they must report, were left unanswered. Whether the 
stakeholders' representatives in all bodies serve personal, party's, railway's or other 
interests remains an open question. A major challenge facing this thesis is to provide an 
answer to this issue through their views (MNO, 1987). 
Secondly, the socialization of the public sector was not strongly supported by either the 
personnel of the enterprise or the public opinion formulators. The main reason was an 
article (the fourth article of the Law) which was imposing restrictions on the industrial 
action in the public sector, and which became immediately active whereas the remaining 
ones waited for three more years in order to get implemented. Social upheaval occurred 
and this partly distorted the meaning of participatory schemes and created discomfort to 
the majority of employees (Para dissopo ulos, 1989). 
Finally, in 1895 a major economic crisis was under way in Greece. In order to cover the 
big public deficit and reduce inflation, the Government asked for a loan from E. E. C., 
which was granted under restrictive terms. The severe economic policy that followed led 
to an average reduction of the buying power of the working class by 16%. The trade 
unions opposed this policy; even unionists supporting the party in power voted against it 
and formed a majority in the General Workers Confederation. Government intervened 
and this led to a split up of the Confederation, which lasted for almost three years. The 
institution of socialization was left aside. Government withdrew its interest since other 
more important issues had arisen, and the other political parties did not consider it as 
worth fighting for, probably associating the concept with the negative context that 
surrounded it. Socialization as an idea was ruined even before it reached maturity. 
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During this period the enterprise continued to implement its modernization plan. 
Economic policy affected it as well, since public expenditure was considerably limited, 
and there were no other funding resources. Though the doubling of the line along the two 
sections of the main line was completed, the installation of the electrical signalling and 
telecommunications was delayed. The widening of the narrow-gauge Thessaly line was 
progressing slowly and in the Peloponnese network, apart from routine maintenance 
works, no other project was undertaken (OSE, Annual Reports 1985-1989). 
The intriguing question concluding this section, concerns the capacity of the company to 
implement on time the plan in an environment where a great deal has changed and still 
changes, causing constant re-examination and revision of key strategic issues. Though as 
Wyckoff (1976) remarks "the railroad situation is incredibly difficult because of the 
magnitude of the momentum of years of rigWity in practice, reinforcement of 
behaviour, on-the-job training, and large number of participants", an attempt to 
provide an answer to this question is worth making. Contributing to this aim, the 
following sections will provide some helpful insight on physical and operational 
characteristics of the Greek Railway and on issues of regulation, labour practices, and 
competitive development. 
A. 3. STATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
The Greek Railway as already stated is an independent company through which the State 
runs the national railway network. Many administrative departments have supervisory 
powers over the enterprise. Within the terms of these supervisory powers, a number of 
management decisions is dependent upon the authorization of various bodies. Figure 
A. 2 provides information on the different areas that are under administrative control. 
The Government controls the overall level of grant aid and investment at will. There is 
no indication that the Government sets broad objectives for various sectors of rail 
activities. The total of investment requirements is covered by the State and with the 
Government's approval from the national and international money markets. Interest is 
paid according to the rate negotiated between the enterprise and various banks. Since 
many banks in Greece are controlled by the Government, the interest rates applied are 
lower than those raised in the free market. Other types of financial support include 
public service obligations for the coverage of the operational deficit because of tariffs 
control and the State's participation in the expenditure for the track maintenance and 
the manning of the level crossings (Act 674/70). 
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Though the above compensation payments are fully described in the enterprise's 
Foundation Law that governs the economic relations between the State and the company, 
usually, because of the State's interest in investing elsewhere, the payments obtained are 
lower than those needed (expenditure for infrastructure costs was for railways 9.3% of 
total transport expenditure in the period 1975-1984 whereas for motorways was 71.8% in 
constant ECU prices) (ESYE, 1986). Thus, the Government's financing as an 
investment contribution and as an aid to liquidity does not appear to be related to the 
annual accounting requirements. The maintenance of a high level of gross investment, 
because of the construction of the double line, accentuates the cash- flow problem year by 
year. In recent years the cash requirement which was raised on the market and which had 
to be subsequently serviced exceeded 23 billion drachmas in 1988 (OSE, Annual Report 
1988). Thus the prevailing arrangements have resulted in an accumulation of capital 
indebtedness stemming from past deficits. 
Concluding, the present system of control involves a wide area of the enterprise's 
activities. There is the absolute discretion to allocate investments grants, contracting 
loans and defining fares as well as selecting suppliers with ministerial approval. In 
reality, there are more controls that though informal are quite essential. They refer to 
the appointment of personnel, the transfers of employees, the life-long appointment of 
temporary personnel especially in pre-electoral periods (without knowledge of real needs 
this is done in exchange of political support for government). The railways, being a 
labour intensive and geographically dispersed organization, find themselves in difficult 
conditions when trying to initiate new policies. It is not unusual some new policies not to 
get implemented at all; very few people in the organization believe that the above 
constraining conditions could be relaxed, since all governments in power have used the 
same system of controls, at least during the last twenty years (Paradissopoulos, 1992). 
Supervision and Control Ministry of Transport 
Approval of Investments 
Programnes and Budgets 
Ministries of Transport, Finance, and 
National Economy 
Pricing Policy Approval Ministry of Comnerce 
Supplies Approval Ministry of Comnerce/Ministry of Industry 
Appointment of Board Merrbers 
I 
Prine Minister and Ministry of Transport 
Figure A. 2: The State's control over the Railway 
According to the Socialization Law, the enterprise aims at the five following broadly 
defined objectives (Act 1365/83): 
262 
(1) to serve the national interest and the society in general; 
(2) to facilitate the active participation of the employees in decision -making; 
(3) to co-ordinate the organizational functions with the national, regional, and local 
programmes of economic and social development, as well as, with the natural, social and 
cultural environment; 
to save to the utmost the country's financial resources; and 
(5) to increase its productivity and efficiency to the benefit of its employees and to 
improve the services offered to society. 
It is evident that the above objectives are amenable to a variety of interpretations since 
no quantifiable statements are included and some concepts as efficiency and productivity 
are not easily defined, especially under the framework of control described in the 
previous section. Though the environment and regional development are mentioned, the 
latter is left aside since the country's difficult physical terrain renders some parts of 
Greece severely disadvantaged (as measured by the cost associated with infrastructure 
development) and the existing population density does not allow for big investment in 
the periphery (bigger pressures are put on improving the quality of life in the large 
cities). 
Despite the mentioning of the proper use of the national financial resources, there is 
nothing aimed at returning the enterprise to financial equilibrium, through establishing a 
long term investment programme or suppressing some formal and informal ministry 
interventions. Furthermore, the elimination of the massive residual deficit is not 
included into the primary objectives of the enterprise. It seems that the enterprise does 
not see itself as an entity that can negotiate with government and achieve at the end 
some agreed upon objectives compatible with the interest of both (Paradissopoulos, 
1989). 
A. 4. ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING THE RAILWAYS (TRANSPORT 
INDUSTRY) 
In the period after World War II, railways all over the world found themselves operating 
in an environment which had three significant aspects that shaped drastically the 
enterprises' performance. 
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The first one was the tremendous expansion of other modes of transport as their 
technology improved, capital investment improved and their networks and operations 
grew, in response to increased demand. Especially the increase in motor cars numbers, 
primarily because of the flexibility, comfort and low cost of energy at that time of the new 
mode, resulted in the neglect of the mass transit systems, especially in countries where a 
railway industry (in terms of suppliers) did not exist to counterbalance this trend. In 
Greece the railway market share started declining and overall fell from a 50% in the pre- 
war period to a recent 4% for passenger traffic and 8% for freight traffic (OSE, Annual 
Report 1989). 
The second reason was associated with the increase in and distribution of the country's 
economic activity and the lack of a planned transport network (incorporating all modes) 
that could accommodate the arising needs to the best interest of the National Economy. 
Costs, of course, should play an important role in the design of such a system, since 
infrastructure costs of all modes (in terms of tracks and terminals) are enormous. The 
existence or construction of competing transport corridors between massive urban 
centres should be carefully evaluated, when the contribution of transport facilities to 
regional development was well known. 
The third reason was related with the Government's regulation over and ownership of 
transport enterprises; because of its significance, this issue constitutes a separate section 
in this appendix. 
The figures that follow refer to the development of the other modes of transport such as 
road vehicles, ships and aeroplanes. The increasing traffic trends are easily identifiable, 
though in some cases the disaggregated nature of data is chosen to provide an idea of the 
potential size of the market when the railways would reach the design speed and the 
quality of service of their modernization plan. 
Figure A. 3 provides the development of road vehicles by category over a period of 13 
years. 
Figure A. 4 shows the choice of transport mode in terms of import-export activities for 
the year 1985. 
The numbers and the traffic of inter-urban buses (operated by private enterprises) are 
depicted in Figure A. 5. As may be seen, between the years 1982 and 1986, despite the 
constant number of buses, the total number of passenger-km has increased that is, the 
offered seats per bus have increased and possibly the operating costs reduced. 
Figure A. 6 shows the arrivals of ships at ports where railway linkages also exist. 
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RoadVehicIes 
year tota1 
Buses Motor cars Freight 
1975 650 053 13 352 438 553 198 148 
1976 750 046 14 139 509 334 226 573 
1977 900 308 14 538 620 755 265 015 
1978 1 050 022 15 680 728 161 306 181 
1979 1 195 531 17 464 822 034 356 033 
1980 1 264 560 16 338 858 845 389 377 
1981 1 370 833 17 367 912 385 441 081 
1982 1 510 546 17 701 996 256 496 589 
1983 1 624 472 17 591 1 069 343 537 538 
1984 1 743 857 17 841 1 154 937 571 079 
1985 1 882 558 18 237 1 263 366 600 955 
1986 2 004 889 18 485 1 359 173 627 231 
1987 2 107 469 18 748 1 432 577 656 144 
Figure A. 3: Road vehicles in operation by category (1975-1987) 
ships trucks raway p1ane 
ALL GOODS 
Imports 87.5% 10.1% 2.3% 0.1% 
Exports 91.6% 6.5% 1.70A 0.2% 
Total 89.3% 8.5% 2.1% 0.1% 
ALL GOODS 
EXCEPT MINERALS 
AND FUEL 
Imports 77.2% 16.4% 6.2% 0.2% 
Exports 90.4% 7.5% 1.9% 0.2% 
Total 85.6% 10.7% 3.5% 0.2% 
Figure A. 4: Greek Imports-Exports. Choice of Transport Mode (1985) 
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year 
Passenger-km 
in inter-urban 
lines 
(thousands) 
Buses operating 
in 
inter-urban lines 
Passengers 
Transported 
(thousands) 
Kilometres 
Ran 
(thousands) 
1975 4 749 751 3 440 184 810 
1976 4 766 203 3 460 191 018 300 274 
1977 4 957 127 3 480 194 140 307 654 
1978 5 200 199 3 531 194 346 306 975 
1979 5 782 572 3 604 187 414 309 843 
1980 5 817 693 3 677 177 228 305 002 
1981 5 788 342 3 862 174 073 307 807 
1982 5 915 894 3 910 165 750 311 940 
1983 5 424 783 3 886 151 332 289 748 
1984 5 673 748 3 880 162 928 304 803 
1985 5 788 611 3 872 164 591 298 223 
1986 5 006 898 3 871 161 134 292 294 
1987 4 812 442 3 861 153 236 288 464 
Figure A. 5. - Volume of road passenger traffic (1976-1987) 
Ports 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Volos 3 502 3 444 3 639 3 713 3 757 3 998 5 089 
Eleusis 14 154 15 525 16 167 16 735 14 733 10 114 11 340 
Thessaloniki 6 092 5 210 5 011 4 774 5 473 5 851 6 441 
Kavala 870 872 782 1 121 1 234 1 386 1 528 
Megara 1 494 2 575 3 294 4 331 4 097 3 853 4 346 
Patras 6 281 6 882 5 410 5 658 5 020 4 914 3 752 
Pireaus 27 118 26 255 24 142 25 259 
- 
26 560 
I 
27 092 29 778 
Figure A. 6: Ships' arrivals in selected ports (thousands net registered tonnes, 
1979-1985) 
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I 
Passengers 
i 
Passenger 
Freight (tons) 
Tota 1 Embarked Disern- 
barked 
km 
(1000s) 
Tota 1 Loaded Unloaded 
Athens-Alex/polis-Athens 183 464 94 255 89 209 69 532 933 
1 
610 323 
Athens-Thessaloniki-Athens 865 813 432 422 433 391 258 013 12 284 8 057 4 227 
Athens-Kavala-Athens 123 007 62 468 60 539 42 314 573 346 227 
Athens-Larisa-Athens 3 190 11 644 1 546 1 714 15 6 9 
Figure A. 7. - Air Traffic in Selected Lines (1986) 
Finally, Figure A. 7 illustrates the air traffic at selected lines parallel to the railway axis. 
As deriving from the European experience, these lines will be mostly affected by the 
development of high-speed railway lines; thus, their size indicates the existing demand 
for this type of services (pricing also is to be considered). Source of the data presented in 
these figures is the National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE, 1986). 
A. 5. THE COMPONENTS OF THE GREEK RAILWAY 
A. 5.1. The Track and Related Functions 
The functions of construction and maintenance of permanent way and structures are 
generally referred to as engineering. Their purpose is to provide the facilities on which 
the railway operates as a supply or service activity. This includes initial construction, 
ongoing maintenance, and improvements or betterments of the physical plant of the 
railway. 
The engineering function of the railways is more or less unique within the transportation 
companies. Railways are the only mode that traditionally have provided their own guide 
paths. On the contrary highways used by truck lines and private cars are constructed and 
maintained from general tax and specific user-tax revenues, and the airlines make use of 
State-operated and maintained airports. 
The role of the engineering function and the engineering officers is central when the 
railway is in a stage of development that puts an emphasis on tasks such as construction 
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of new lines, doubling or improvement of existing ones. Activities designated as 
improvement projects usually include installation of new or improved signals, 
electrification, improving level crossings by the installation of automatic signalling or 
construction of bridges, or upgrading track to higher standards (such as changing to 
heavier rail, changing from jointed or bolted rail to welded rail), straightening road-beds 
to reduce curvature. As part of the activities just described, the railway has substantial 
procurement and subcontracting activities. The purchases of ballast, ties, and rails are in 
themselves a major activity which in the Greek Railway is not closely related, in the 
organizational chart, with the engineering function, but forms a separate function in the 
Procurements and Stock Department. 
The engineering function is organised along the following three lines (Act 674/70): 
(a) A Permanent Way Department headed by a civil engineer is responsible for creating 
design work, for setting specifications and standards for safe operations, and advisory 
activities. 
(b) Permanent Way Divisions belonging to the three Regional Departments execute all 
the activities related with projects concerning either construction or maintenance. 
(c) A New Projects Department is responsible for the technical projects related to the 
modernization plan, projects that are mainly related to road-bed design as well as to 
bridges and tunnels design and to supervision of these works after subcontracting. 
The railway line has a linear form; only in some sections in Peloponnese and Thessaly 
regions emulates the form of a network. In its largest part it is single-tracked. It has 
already been doubled in the following sections: Athens-Inoi (61 km), Inoi-Tithorea (95 
km), Domokos-Larisa (60 km), Platy-Thessaloniki (38 km) and Athens-Elefsis (22.5 km). 
The second and third sections concern implementation works of the modernization plan 
while the remaining ones had been already completed when the plan was initiated. 
Figure A. 8 summarizes some of the main characteristics of the railway line. 
Concerning the railway line, the Greek network has two basic unfavourable 
characteristics. The first one as illustrated in Figure A. 8, is that the one third of its lines 
is narrow-gauged; in this category belong, the whole Peloponnese network as well as the 
bigger part of the Thessaly railway line (except for the section Volos-Larissa). The 
second one is that the tracing of the line is by and large mountainous with small 
curvature and big gradients. Though the modernization works in the Athens- 
Thessaloniki line being already undertaken (with the construction of a second track, and 
the upgrading of the existing one) have increased the maximum speeds on several 
sections of the network, the final operational has not yet reached the anticipated speed 
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of 200 km/h. Figure A. 9 depicts the maximum and average speeds allowed over the 
network under the present conditions (OSE, 1990b). 
Width of the Athens Thessaloniki Peloponnese Network Total 
Railwa Line Re ion R i R i y g eg on eg on 
(D. P. A. ) (D. P. Th. ) (D. P. P. ) 
(rrm) (km) (km) (km) 
km % 
Standard (1453) 585 980 - 1 565 63 
Narrow (1000) 162 - 730 892 36 
Narrow (750) - - 22 22 1 
Total 747 980 752 2 479 100 
Figure A. 8: Principal Characteristics of the Greek railway network 
P i i lS ti 
Speed (krrVh) 
r nc pa ec ons 
of the Line Maximun Average 
Patras-Athens 90 53 
Athens-Thessaloniki 120 (160) 65 
Thessaloniki-Alexandroupolis 100 55 
Note: The value in parenthesis indicates the speed reached at 
the inproved sections with new rolling stock, recently. 
Figure A. 9: Speed Levels in Principal sections of the Network 
A. 5.2. The Rofling Stock and Maintenance of Equipment 
Apart from track maintenance, the other part of the maintenance function is equipment, 
the fleet of locomotives, coaches and wagons. Rolling stock repair and maintenance work 
is undertaken in the network's workshops and depots. Greek Railways have assigned 
locomotives to specific workshops. Thus, heavy repair and maintenance work for 
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standard-gauge trains originating from Athens and the bigger part of Peloponnese 
narrow-gauge locomotives is undertaken in the network's biggest workshop in Piraeus. In 
Thessaloniki, the major shop work is performed at a local workshop which serves the 
trains that originate from there and are directed either eastwards to Alexandroupolis or 
westwards to Kozani and Florina. Finally a small workshop in Volos serves the 
locomotives for the narrow-gauge trains operating in the Thessaly network, and the 
machinery for track maintenance. 
Locomotives are inspected and serviced daily in the network's three major depots: (1) 
Aghios loannis depot near Pireaus serves the Athens originating standard-gauge trains; 
(2) Piraeus depot serves the Athens originating Peloponnese network trains; and (3) 
Thessaloniki depot serves the trains originating at Thessaloniki. Smaller depots can be 
found in other locations too, with responsibilities over branch-lines trains maintenance 
and servicing. 
Most maintenance operations are measured by equipment availability and percentage of 
equipment in "ba d- ordee' condition. However, the Equipment Maintenance Department 
does not possess substantial inventories of supplies and parts necessary to support 
maintenance and repairs. Purchases are organized centrally by the Procurement and 
Stock Department while purchases of the Public Investment Programme are subject to 
the Trade Ministry approval, a process that is time consuming and complicated since the 
legal procedures that have to be followed are usually very long. It is not unusual for a 
purchase to extend over a period of years. The acquisition in 1989 of 20 locomotives 
from Germany and Yugoslavia was the result of a process that was initiated in 1985. 
Training in this area is primarily performed on an on-the-job, apprentice-master basis. 
Some specialized training is also provided by equipment suppliers, especially locomotive 
manufacturers. Figures A. 10-A. 13 set out information on the number of rolling stock 
units of the Greek Railways. Figure A. 10 provides information for a specific year (1987) 
on the number and type of diesel and diesel electric locomotives while Figure A. 11 
provides the same type of information for the diesel multiple units (rail-cars). Figure 
A. 12 depicts all rolling stock units over a time span of ten years, either they are in 
operation or under repair. Finally, Figure A. 13 gives details on rolling stock units 
ordered through the big contract 294/83 which aims at renewing this major component 
of the railway system. 
As seen in the above tables, railway equipment has a long life. Under normal 
maintenance, locomotives may have an economic life span of 20 to 30 years whilst cars 
have even longer lives of 30 to 40 years. Though this holds true mostly when preventative 
maintenance programs are involved, the conditions that the enterprise faces are quite 
constraining (with the shortage of spare parts, the multiplicity of rolling stock units, the 
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delay of deliveries since the time of the expressed need to purchase) that the poor ratio 
of the production of the rolling stock main ten ance/ repair system does not seem very 
striking (Paradissopoulos, 1990). 
Type serial 
no. 
construction year HP units % out of 
service 
standard gauge 
KRUPP V60 A. 100 R GERMANY 1963 650 30 33.0 
ALCO A. 200 U. S. A. 1963 1 050 8 31.2 
ALCO A. 300 U. S. A. 1964 1 950 8 45.0 
ALCO A. 320 U. S. A. 1966 2 150 6 46.7 
ALSTHOM A. 350 FRANCE 1967 2 400 26 62.7 
SIEMENS A. 400 FR GERMANY 1966 2 000 10 94.0 
FAUR A. 150 ROMANIA 1973 700 12 100.0 
FAUR A. 170 ROMANIA 1979 750 7 84.7 
MLW A. 450 CANADA 1974 2 700 20 32.6 
MLW A. 500 CANADA 1975 3 600 10 46.0 
GENERAL ELECTRIC A. 220 U. S. A. 1974 1 050 13 80.0 
ELECTROPUTTERE A. 550 ROMANIA 1982 3 600 10 41.0 
GANZ-MAVAC A. 250 HUNGARY 19&3 1 800 11 22.7 
1.0 m gauge 
ALCO 9.100 U. S. A. 1965 1 350 12 31.6 
ALSTHOM 9.200 FRANCE 1967 1 600 10 56.0 
MITSUBISHI 9.400 JAPAN 1967 640 20 24.5 
Figure A. 10: OSE, 1987. - Diesel and Diesel Electric Locomotives 
Type serial construction year HP units % out of 
no. service 
standard gauge 
FIAT 11-26 ITALY 1949 650 30 33.0 
FIAT 27-36 ITALY 1957 1 050 8 31.2 
FERROSTAHL 71-90 FR GERMANY 1962 1 950 8 45.0 
GANZ-MAVAC 91-101 HUNGARY 1976 2 150 6 46.7 
1.0 m gauge 
BREDA 2 500 ITALY 1952 390 13 83.0 
MAN 2 100 FR GERMANY 1937 201 6 70.0 
MAN 4 200 FR GERMANY 1937 420 7 91.4 
DE DRIETRICH 6 400 FRANCE 1952 640 13 50.0 
ESSLINGEN 6 000 FR GERMANY 1959 1 000 7 45.7 
GANZ-MAVAC 6 450 HUNGARY 1977 1 140 4 45.0 
GANZ-MAVAC HUNGARY 1985 1 140 11 00.0 
750 mn gauge 
BILLARD 3 000 FRANCE 1959 350 3 25.0 
DE CAUVILLE 3 000 FRANCE 1967 500 3 25.0 
Figure A. 11: Greek Railways, 1987. - Diesel Multiple Units 
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In Operation In Stock or Under Repair 
Year 
Passenger Wagons Buses Trucks Passenger Wagons Buses Trucks 
coaches Coaches 
1980 365 10 903 45 155 85 379 9 23 
1981 363 11 057 117 170 105 220 11 18 
1982 367 10 289 109 185 100 986 19 8 
1983 385 9 838 122 212 85 1 093 24 8 
1984 373 9 023 123 211 96 2 019 23 9 
1985 339 9 501 90 97 129 1 090 56 117 
1986 438 8 283 83 114 29 2 478 44 61 
1987 433 7 975 98 112 34 2 610 41 63 
1988 436 8 082 112 113 34 2 610 32 62 
1989 347 7 978 106 114 165 2 857 38 61 
Figure A. 12: Greek Railways: Other Rolling Stock Units 
Type country manufacturer year motive 
power 
units max. speed 
(kmlh) 
standard gauge 
1. Suburban Multiple W. Gerynany/ MAN/ diesel 
Units Vehicles Greece GREEK SHIPYARDS 1989 25 120 
2. Intercity East SF/A. E. G/SIEMENS 1989 diesel/ 12 160 
Quadruple Trains Germany electric 
1.00 gauge 
1. Twin Multiple W. Germany/ MAN/ diesel 
Units Vehicles Greece GREEK SHIPYARDS 1990 10 100 
2. Triple Intercity W. Germny/ MAN/ 1992 diesel 10 120 
Multiple Units Greece GREEK SHIPYARDS 
Figure A. 13: OSE: Rofling Stock Concerning the 294183 Contract 
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A-5.3. The Personnel 
Labour has been by far the most important among the broad categories of the company's 
inputs. It has amounted to some two thirds of operating expenses and is double the 
amount of railways revenues (OSE, Annual Report 1987). The legal position of the 
enterprise's employees differs partly from what is known in the administration (civil 
servants). Typical features of this status are life-long appointment, remuneration granted 
on the basis of laws (not on salary agreements) though recently the first salary agreement 
was signed between the management and the trade unions. 
Despite the overwhelming impact of labour wages on the company's expenditure and the 
technological environment that was providing increasing opportunities for the reduction 
of labour (machinery for track laying and maintenance, automatic signalling, level 
crossings elimination and automatic crossing protection e. t. c. ), the Greek Railways have 
not diminished this kind of workforce. Figure A. 14 shows that in the years 1984 and 
1985 increased employment occurred. This was due to (1) increased establishment to 
compensate for a reduction in working hours (from 48 hours/week to 40 hours/week in 
the 1st of October 1983); (2) the introduction of the 5-day working week apart from the 
headquarters personnel for all the enterprise's employees; and (3) since May 1982, the 
paid holidays were 22 days per year on the completion of one-year full time employment. 
Until then this was realizable in about ten years after the beginning of the employment. 
y e a r 
l personne 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1. pemanent 
adninistrtn 1 383 1 355 1 325 1 310 1 287 1 234 1 238 1 226 1 180 1 184 1 171 1 322 
operations 2 951 3 011 2 904 2 851 2 980 2 873 2 775 4 074 3 926 3 848 3 811 3 675 
roll. stock 3 225 2 849 3 055 2 791 2 859 3 039 3 237 3 695 3 659 4 028 4 252 4 313 
perm. way 3 394 3 301 3 169 3 085 2 995 2 974 2 779 3 062 3 244 3 328 3 496 3 396 
other oprtn 330 589 350 565 345 356 313 335 350 346 323 375 
perm. total 11 313 1 
11 105 10 803 10 602 
1 
10 466 10 476 
1 
10 342 12 392 12 359 12 734 13 053 13 081 
2. seasonal 1 670 1 367 
1 
1 337 1 516 1 400 1 708 3 074 2 669 2 237 1 791 1 156 889 
total 12 983 12 472 12 140 12 118 11 866 12 184 13 416 15 061 14 596 14 525 14 209 13 970 
Figure A. 14: Greek Railways: Staff Employed (1978-1989) 
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As technological change strengthened its pace, the company initiated training programs 
for its personnel. Figure A. 15 provides the numbers of employees per type of 
occupational class trained from 1981 to 1987. It appears that technical training was the 
target of these efforts since no other areas of interest are depicted on the Table. 
A. 5.4. Management 
The design of an appropriate managerial structure was at stake since the last decadel 
when the modernization plan was initiated. The Greek Railways originally viewed their 
primary task as management of large-scale construction projects. In most respects this 
was a derivative of the high status and authority the professional engineers enjoyed 
within the company. It is not irrelevant that all General Managers chosen by the State 
were themselves engineers too. Engineers were also the majority of the Assistant 
General Managers (3 out of 4) and of the Heads of Departments (11 out of 19). This was 
not to be easily confronted by the other occupational classes in the organization, since 
the whole country was in a development phase, where construction was a major 
component, and the role of the engineer was central and decisive (Paradissopoulos, 
1989). 
year 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
l personne 
in a- in a- in a- in a- in a- in a- in a- 
com- broad com- broad ccrn- broad com- broad com- broad com- broad com- broad 
pany pany pany pany pany pany pany 
professnl 
engineers 12 13 21 59 56 
locos' 
mechanics 268 250 241 
track nintn 
ance staff 15 107 73 53 41 40 
en gine 
drivers 83 461 105 81 53 
sttnmsters 
switchnen 109 1432 123 55 47 
other 352 250 
Figure A. 15. - Greek Railways: Personnel Trained (1981-1987) 
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As the financial situation of the enterprise was getting worse, the engineers were found 
to fall short in ability to manage operations. They were often accused of being 
incompetent to manage the commercial activities of the enterprise which were vital 
because of the intense inter-modal competition and the continuing loss of market share, 
especially in the freight sector. 
The engineers themselves, though they recognized that a negative climate against them 
had been formed within the company, rejected these accusations and claimed that the 
difficult position of the Greek Railways was primarily due to the inadequate funding (for 
over a 35-year period) which stemmed from political decisions. Every year the requested 
funding was cut by 50% at least, and this affected the efforts to alter the enterprise's 
fortunes. Moreover, they argued that there was a "myth" that the engineers were the 
"employers" or "the companys status quo". Top management (the General Manager and 
his Assistants) made all important decisions, most of the times in spite of the office 
holders' introductory accounts, and engineers took the blame because a scapegoat had to 
be found, to be the target of the personnel's disappointment (TEE, 1989). 
While these two opposing views were widely diffused in the organization and created 
polarity among the various occupational groups, the two following points should be 
stressed to help clarify the situation: 
(1) In civil engineering works (construction works, earth moving, e. t. c. ) the allowable 
deviations are of centimetres range whereas in the construction of high speed railway 
line are 
of millimetres range. It is questionable whether the Greek railway engineers possess such 
detailed knowledge and experience, since in the Greek Technical Universities Railway 
Engineering is not a fully developed course. Therefore, superior technical knowledge that 
in other circumstances would justify assignment of management posts to engineers is not 
present nowadays. 
(2) The need to proceed with a quicker pace to the completion of the construction phase 
of the modernization plan was generally acknowledged. However, operations (with a 
greater emphasis in the commercial function -selling, pricing, customer services, market 
research and development, advertising and promotion) should develop in parallel. The 
success of the introduction of new passenger services in 1988 between Athens- 
Thessaloniki and Athens-Kalamata, on exclusively couchette-cars and sleeping-cars in 
night journeys pin-pointed to this need. Customers return to the railway when the 
services offered meet their needs. 
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The trend to balance construction with operations begun with the advent of a new 
General Manager in summer of 1988. Though his tenure in office was short (he resigned 
in June 1989 when the government that appointed him lost the electoral battle) he 
introduced major changes in the timetables. As a consequence, intercity services every 
hour were initiated covering all big cities on the Athens to Thessaloniki main line. He 
also reorganized the bus services (owned by the company) so as the departure times of 
trains and buses would not coincide. Despite him being too an engineer, he introduced to 
the organization a strong market orientation emphasizing the importance of the quality 
of services to be offered (TEE, 1989). 
The challenge of managing the geographical dispersion and complexity of a co-ordinated 
operation is as great as the financial challenge to cope with the big deficits and the 
inadequacy of funding. The following section highlights the steps taken to structure the 
organization in an appropriate way, serving its present phase of development and 
contributing to the accomplishment of its strategic plan. 
A. 5.5. Organizational Structure 
The newly founded, in 1970, autonomous railway enterprise (O. S. E. ) was organized 
according to proposals made by the French consultancy company Sofrerail. The structure 
that Sofrerail proposed was similar to that of the French Railways, and as it was already 
described in the first section of this appendix, the most significant changes concerned: 
(1) an increase in the manpower of the headquarter units; (2) the recognition of the 
significance of the commercial function of the enterprise; (3) the creation of a new 
department responsible for long-term planning; and (4) the retention of the 
decentralized organization of S. E. K. (three regional departments) which was "fufly 
compatible with the physical layout of the network and corresponds to distinct 
geographical units, having specific characteristics regarding the transport economy in 
the country (OECD, 1966). 
Figure A. 16 shows the organizational chart of the enterprise implementing the above 
concepts. This type of organization integrated all operating departments (maintenance of 
equipment, maintenance of way and structures, and transportation) on a regional (or 
geographical divisional basis) while the same functions retained the departmental 
relationship. Thus, for example, the regional main ten ance-of-way officer was responsible 
to the regional manager for repair and structures, but received staff direction in matters 
pertaining to standards and practices from the chief officer of maintenance of way and 
structures. In a similar way other similar operating officers had line responsibility to the 
regional manager and staff relationships to their respective chief officers. 
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New Departments were further formed, increasing gradually the number of 
Headquarters Departments from four to fourteen. Thus, apart from the creation of the 
Planning Department (DOMP) and the split of the Operations Department into 
Commercial Operations (DEM) and Technical Operations (DET), the following 
modifications occurred: 
A New Projects Department (DNE) was created with responsibilities over the 
design and planning of technical projects concerning the implementation of the 
modernization plan. 
Two separate Departments, the Purchases Department (DIP) and the Stores 
Department (DAP) took over responsibility for materials from the Traction and 
Materials Department (DEL). 
The handling of financial affairs was assigned to two new departments; the 
Financial Control Department (DOE) and Receipts Control Department (DEE). 
Administration and personnel issues were assigned to the Administrative Affairs 
Department (DD) and Personnel Department (DP) respectively. 
Co-ordination was achieved at a lower than the executive level (then called the 
Governor) by the appointment of three General Managers responsible for personnel and 
finance, permanent way and rolling stock and materials. 
This structure remained active until the late 1988. However, small alterations took place. 
In 1981 the then CEO (appointed by the new Government in power) following an 
administrative law abolished the posts of the three General Managers, in the spirit that 
their holders were proponents of the old political system. Five years later Socialization 
Law re-introduced this top hierarchical level and made provision for four posts of 
assistant to the CEO General Managers. Figure A. 17 illustrates the organizational chart 
in the period 1986-1988. 
During the same period, a major effort to overall reorganize the enterprise was 
undertaken. The working team that designed the new organization, pointed out, amongst 
other, to the great power that the staff departments had acquired over the years which 
resulted in an increase in bureaucratization and an indifference towards the line 
departments. The organization proposed was based on departmental units able to 
execute -as much as possible- activities concerning specific goals of the enterprise, 
avoiding thus interventions and competencies resulting in delays and reductions in 
responsibility. As shown in Figure A. 18, the structure proposed was a strict 
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departmental structure where line authority was flowing from the chief officer of a 
functional department directly to the field group without significant integration with 
other departments at less-than-the-executive level. The creation of the Operations 
Department (the most important in competencies and biggest in size) with marketing 
responsibilities too was an attempt to take out of the shadow the commercial functions of 
the company. 
The above described organizational structure was never implemented. Though it passed 
from the Managing Board, on its way to the final approval it was blocked by the Supreme 
Court. A section of Appendix B provides a detailed picture of the arguments used. It 
should be noted here that the trade unions opposed strongly to it, fearing that the power 
structure within the organization would alter significantly. The employees' 
representatives debated that the new proposal, completely prepared by "technocrate, 
was in reality a strongly centralised scheme couched with decentralisation arguments 
(M. N. O., 1987). The trade unions used several legal arguments to prevent its 
implementation, thing that at the end was achieved. 
The new General Manager that took office in the Summer of 1988 proceeded to some 
alterations of the existing organizational structure which still was the one proposed by 
Sofrerail. Because these were alterations and not a major rearrangement, ministerial 
approval was not needed. The new structure designed by the General Manager was 
implemented immediately after its approval by the Managing Board. Figure A. 19 
depicts it. 
However, the period over which the organization operated under the new scheme did not 
exceed one year. In June 1989, the new elections brought a new political party in power 
and the appointed new General Manager altered again the organizational structure back 
to its old and known form. 
A. 6. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
A. 6.1. The Passenger Market 
There does not seem to be a clear policy with regard to the development of passenger 
services, apart from the desired development of high-speed passenger services in a yet 
unknown time horizon. Between some cities, regular hourly express services exist. 
However, the extension of this kind of services is considered to be constrained by the 
limited infrastructure capacity and the rolling stock availability. 
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As far as suburban services are concerned, they simply do not exist and the organization 
lacks any planning to develop them in the near future. Thus, a potential source of 
revenue is lost and rail transport corridors traversing high density suburban areas are left 
unexploited. 
As far as local and rural services are concerned there is a general predisposition to 
maintain the existing levels of service but tittle evidence exists for the adoption of 
commercial or operating strategies designed to meet the customers' new demands. For 
the past decade, there have been few changes in timetables and rare initiatives to 
introduce new services. 
Passenger fares are determined by the State. Though every year the enterprise requests a 
certain fare level increase at least equal to the inflation rate, usually the increase 
approved falls well below it. Thus, over the years the price of passenger services falls 
consistently, in real price terms. 
A. 6.2. The Freight Market 
There is no policy in the Greek Railways to develop specific categories of freight traffic, 
such as full-train-load traffic, contain erization of shipment and so forth. What exists is 
the company's discretion to grant discounts on the total level of traffic consigned by one 
customer. This of course does not help the company to distinguish preferred traffic and 
commit to the development of policies that would target economicaffy more attractive 
types of traffic. 
Freight takes second place to passenger traffic. Train loads and speeds are severely 
limited by the load-bearing characteristics of the track's subgrade and structure and of 
some bridges. Maximum speeds for freight services do not exceed 80 km/h. Furthermore, 
the following characteristics inhibit the placement of stronger interest in developing the 
freight market: 
(1) The geographical position of the country does not generate transit traffic. The 
proportion of freight transit transport is 17% of the overall freight transport 
whereas in central European countries this represents a percentage from 25.66% in 
Austria to 47.3% in Switzerland. (in 1981). However, this trend was reversed in 
1985 where the transit traffic exceeded the 43% of the overall traffic (OSE, 
Annual Report 1983). This was primarily due to a contract signed between 
Greece and Yugoslavia for fuel transport from the port of Thessaloniki to the 
Greek-Yugoslavian border and to the parallel reduction of inland transport due to 
a shift of major shippers (mainly state-owned enterprises) to other carriers. 
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(2) The great length of coasts and the existence of organized port facilities renders 
competition with ship very intense, and usually ship wins out because of the lower 
tariffs offered when, of course, the duration of the journey is not considered as very 
important. 
(3) The majority of minerals of the country are not appropriate for massive railway 
transport, and the ones that are, are usually transported by ship since mines are 
located by the sea (bauxite mines). 
(4) The perishable agricultural commodities which constitute a considerable part 
of country's national economy favour the motor carriers because of the flexibility 
offered (door to door transport) and speed. 
Rail maximum rates are defined by the enterprise itself, but the majority of goods 
carried are on contract or at discount on the published maximum. 
Rail freight marketing is achieved with the local station -masters, but in the case of 
discount rates and long term contract rates, these are determined centrally. When private 
sidings are requested to provide rail connections with industries, the costs of installation 
and use are a matter of negotiation between the enterprise and the customer. 
A. 6.3. The Traffic 
Figure A. 20 shows the traffic (both passenger and freight) carried by the Greek 
Railways during a period of 20 years (1970-1989). After a period of continuous decline 
traffic volume has started increasing slightly since 1985 but nevertheless it still fluctuates 
around the values of the early 1970s. However, considering the increase in overall traffic 
in the country over this period, one can easily infer that the market share of the company 
is steadily decreasing. The company evokes that there are several reasons very difficult to 
cope with, in the present stage, which lead to this stagnation. Thus, 
(1) The. single-tracked line (double line now exists in only 270 km, that is 11% of the 
whole network) causes a considerable increase in journey times because of the need for 
consecutive train meets (OSE, Annual Report 1987). 
(2) The low population density of the country, apart from the two major urban areas of 
Athens and Thessaloniki, does not generate satisfactory demand at the regions (OSE, 
Annual Report 1988). 
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(3) The immense number of level crossings (there are approximately 2 400 guarded and 
non-guarded level crossings) considerably reduces speed levels (OSE, Annual Report 
1988). 
(4) The frequent breakdowns of locomotives (because of bad maintenance in poorly 
equipped depots and workshops) in combination with the mountainous tracing of the 
larger part of the network cause delays which do not allow to schedule reliable timetables 
(OSE, Annual Report 1988). 
(5) Eventhough rail freight facilities exist to accommodate wagon-load or smaller 
consignments, some of the most important users have withdrawn their preference from 
rail transport. Despite the substantial investment made in rail freight infrastructure (e. g. 
sidings) and a contract obligation to provide annually a minimum volume of freight 
traffic, this traffic never came into the network (OSE, Annual Report 1988). Though 
reasonable explanations of this outcome might be provided from both sides, the difficulty 
associated with the fact that these customers were state-con trolled enterprises should be 
stressed 
A. 6.4. Financial Performance 
The three following tables provide some information on the financial performance of the 
enterprise. Figure A. 21 illustrates the revenue over a period of thirteen years in 
constant prices base year 1977). Figure A. 22 shows the percentage changes in total 
revenue, in constant prices, in comparison with values of the previous years. Figure 
A. 23 presents the operational deficits over the same period in both, current and constant 
prices. 
As evidenced from the above tables, the company faces a bad financial situation and 
claims that its deficit would have been considerably lower, if the State had fulfilled the 
terms of the "Economic ABreement". Under these terms, payments of interests, 
operations on non-viable lines, and imposition of low fares, should be fully compensated 
by the State. Moreover the investment grants for the implementation of the company's 
strategic plan are considered inadequate. A key question concerns the viability of the 
company as its future seems uncertain. Moreover, are the financial factors so 
overburdening as considered, or there are other features that substantially reduce 
innovation and flexibility by reinforcing old values and practices? 
The unfolding of the enterprise's strategic plan which is being assessed vital for its 
survival in the highly competitive inter-modal arena, is discussed in detail in Appendix 
B. 
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Current prices Constant prices 1977 
year 
amount 
(million 
drs. ) 
% change in 
comparison with 
previous year 
amount 
(million 
drs. ) 
% change in 
comparison with 
previous year 
1977 1 239 - 1 239 
1978 1 677 + 35.40 1 382 + 11.50 
1979 1 872 + 11.60 1 109 - 19.80 
1980 2 323 + 24.10 1 116 + 0.60 
1981 3 224 + 38.80 1 339 + 20.00 
1982 5 154 + 59.80 1 646 + 22.90 
1983 6 232 + 20.90 1 595 - 3.10 
1984 7 853 + 26.00 1 486 - 6.80 
1985 11 252 + 43.30 1 623 + 9.20 
1986 13 946 + 23.90 1 301 - 19.80 
1987 16 909 + 21.20 1 314 + 1.00 
1988 22 983 + 35.90 1 746 + 32.90 
1989 26 733 + 16.30 1 565 10. 
Figure A. 23: Operational Deficits (1977-1989) 
Rail business is a complicated one. Railways are capital intensive and labour intensive 
companies. They operate in business sectors (and sub-sectors) which have different 
characteristics and are affected by complex factors which cannot be controlled by the 
enterprise itself. The State ownership which results in regulation of important aspects of 
the business and in major interventions in organisational life has to be carefully assessed 
in relation with the company's financial results and the will to overcome the difficulties 
and strive for growth. 
APPENDIX B 
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC PLAN 
B. 1. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains the foffowing: 
(1) A brief outline of the planning efforts that led to the shaping of the long-term 
development plan, seen by the company as its strategic direction. 
(2) A! description of the short-term (5-year) Rail Plan 1983-87 and its objectives, as well 
as a definition of the inter-related strategy-areas and an account of the progress 
concerning its implementation till the time of the study. 
(3) A first evaluation of the plan, based on organizational reports on its progress and on 
changes introduced in structures and policies, as well as a first attempt to trace internal 
relations and processes concerning the specific areas of strategic interest. 
B-2. THE RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
B. 2. I. Post-War Planning of the Future of the Greek Railway 
B. 2.1.1. The Early Stage 
According to Efstratiades (1957), an overall plan for the development of the Greek 
railway network had never existed. He refers to the old Mutrecy (1879) proposal and to 
the study of Economou (1924), depicted in Figures B. 1 and B. 2. 
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However, he argued, the former was just a private proposal for a minimum network 
limited to the territory of old Greece (i. e. before the Balkan Wars) and the latter, though 
expanding to all mainland Greece and attempting to tackle the issue systematically, was 
adopting secondary branch lines. However, neither of these two proposals was ever 
officially adopted or became a national plan. During this early stage of the Greek 
Railway, that is from the construction of the first lines up to the World War 11, various 
detailed studies, feasibility studies and proposals were published concerning the 
construction of railway lines. All these studies and proposals were meant to serve a 
specific goal which did not derive neither could be assessed in a nationwide context 
(Efstratiades, 1957). 
OTrOMAN EMPIRE 
LARI 
tam 
Kerpwkl 
Lamle 
Agdole Khaft 
Koflnlh 
Tf%wik 
Spell 
a 
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B. 2.1.2. The End of the War 
Soon after the World War 11 which (as mentioned in Appendix A) resulted in an almost 
totally destroyed railway network, a committee was set up at the Department of 
Transport, in order to globally examine the issue of railway development. Efstratiades 
(1957) believed that the work produced by this committee was the first up to that time 
systematic attempt to form and study the details of a nationwide railway network. 
However, the then government decided to rebuild the network with almost its pre-war 
characteristics instead of adopting the proposals of the committee. Later, in 1954, a new 
committee was set up at the Department of Transport, in order to prepare a plan for the 
construction of new lines and the extension of existing ones. This plan was assumed to 
form the basis of a national railway policy. During the meetings of this committee, 
Efstratiades (1957), the then General Manager of the Peloponnese Railway (SPAP), 
presented a study, which by examining (1) the physical layout of the existing network, (2) 
the traffic capability of each existing or proposed line as well as its technical 
configuration, and (3) the track gauge of each branch, proposed an overall national 
network plan, depicted in Figure B. 3, the principal characteristic of which was the 
pursuit of the development of both the standard- and narrow-gauged lines. He argued 
that there was no reason for converting the narrow-gauged lines to standard-gauged ones. 
According to his view, rail transport in Greece could be fully handled by the existence of 
two assisting each other networks, the standard-gauged of which should cover Central- 
East and North-East mainland Greece (Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace) and the 
narrow-gauged should serve West Greece (Epirus, Akarnania), Thessaly, and the 
Peloponnese. 
B. 2.1.3. The Automobile Era 
However, during the first twenty years of the post-war period, as far as land transport is 
concerned the State's interest was totally directed towards road transport. Provided that, 
as already stated, for the railways the decision made was to merely reconstruct to the pre- 
war condition, over this period the focus of attention were attempts to tackle financial 
problem as well as to re-examine the overall framework of relations with the State (Sinis 
and Andreakos, 1958; Trikoupis, Sinis and Momferatos, 1959; Marinos, 1960). It is 
characteristic that the 5-Year National Development Plan 1966-1970, which made 
provision for highway constructions at a projected expenditure of 16.6 billion drs. 
(excluding land acquisition) was stating that according to temporary assessment the 
modernisation and the reorganisation of the railways would require investment of 3.5 
billion drs. over the same period. The temporality of the assessment was attributed to the 
fact that the whole issue of railway development was still under study, carried out in the 
context of a study of the national transport system undertaken by OECD (KEPE,, 1965). 
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Figure B. 3: Proposed layout of the national railway network (Efstratiades, 
1957) 
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The railway part of the OECD study was prepared by Sofrerail, a consultancy subsidiary 
of the French railway (SNCF). Task of the OECD (1966) study was to prepare a 
programme along the following two lines: (1) measures to be adopted for the 
improvement of the capacity, productivity and quality of the services offered by SEK 
(that is legal matters, rules, regulations, management and organisation methods and 
techniques, pricing and marketing policy, etc. ), and (2) preparation of an investment 
programme for the modernisation of the fleet and installations, in order to improve 
productivity and obtain the traffic capacity required in order to meet the future transport 
demand. The proposals of the OECD (1966) study on theses issues briefly were: (1) 
greater autonomy of the railway from the State-owner; and (2) renewal of the Pireaus to 
Larissa line, renewal of the North Greece lines, improvements in installations, depots 
and workshops, and completion of the introduction of diesel traction. 
Over the same period, SEK were undertaking the projects of doubling two branches of 
the Athens to Thessaloniki main line (that is Athens-Inoi and Platy-Thessaloniki) and 
converting to standard gauge the Larissa to Volos narrow-gauged line. Moreover, steam 
traction was being gradually replaced by diesel traction; this replacement was completed 
by 1970 (OSE, 1984). At the mean time, SEK (Greek State's railways) had become a 
nationwide company by the amalgamation with the ex-private Peloponnese railway 
(SPAP) and other local railways (SVDE, SPYK). As a result of Sofrerail's proposals, in 
1970 SEK were transformed from a Government department into an autonomous 
organization which "should function for the pursuit of public interest under 
commercial criteria" (Act 674/70). The name of the new company (retained until now) 
was OSE which stands for Greek Railways Organisation. 
Sofrerail was again hired in order to assist in the setting up of the new enterprise. The 
biggest part of the consultancy's services was completed by 1975 whereas the last French 
consultants left the country in 1977. 
B. 2.1.4. The Oil Crisis 
The continuing degradation of the national railway network as a result of the delays in 
making decisions concerning its overall future as well as the first indications of 
environmental problems in the connurbations (traffic congestion, air pollution) initiated 
attempts for the formation of a long-term railway development plan. Thus the company, 
assisted by Sofrerail, prepared a 15-year programme for the modernization and the 
development of the railways which made provision for a new double line between Athens 
and Idomeni, allowing for train speeds of 300 km/h. The programme made also 
provision for a new, double, standard-gauged line between Athens and Patras for speeds 
of 200 km/h, for the upgrading of the other branches of the network (speeds 150-160 
krn/h), and for the construction of rail links towards the west coast (Figure BA). 
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Figure B. 4: The lon&term development of the railway 
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The 15-year plan was submitted to Government for approval in 1972 (OSE, 1972). 
However, in 1974 the planning orientation within the railway once again changed. Thus, 
both because the government was still delaying to decide upon the approval of the 15- 
year plan and because the oil crisis had already started, the railway was forced to 
abandon major development plans and to concentrate in short-term, limited 
improvements (renewals, alignments) of the existing lines (OSE, Annual Report 1974). 
In 1975, a new 15-year development plan was prepared, to allow for both a new 
estimation of the associated costs (as the older plans had not yet been approved by the 
Government) and a new estimation of the period required for the completion of the 
projects. This new plan which will form hereafter the basis of any future development 
scenario, made provision for two segments of double track in the Athens to Thessaloniki 
line (Athens-Tithorea and Domokos- Thessaloniki), separated by the existing single- 
track mountainous segment Tithorea-Domokos (121 km). The new double line should 
allow for speeds of 200 km/h. A similar double line of the same configuration was 
projected for the Athens to Patras (Peloponnese) route. The projected cost of the new 
15-year development plan was 37 billion drs (OSE, 1975). In 1976, an investment fund of 
6.2 million drs was approved and provided by the Government, to allow for the funding 
of renewal projects on the existing single-tracked main line (OSE, Annual Report 
1976). In 1977, OSE contracted a loan with a group of German Banks for an amount of 
DM 100 million in order to finance the construction of the infrastructure projects 
(earthworks, bridges, etc. ) for the alignment and the doubling of the main line (OSE, 
Annual Report 1977). A second loan, for the same purpose, was contracted in 1978 with 
a Greek Bank for 500 million drs (OSE, Annual Report 1978) and a third one in 1980 
with the European Investment Bank (21 million ECUs) (OSE, Annual Report 1980). 
Thus, by the time the country entered the European Community (January 1981) and a 
first major change in Government occurred (Socialist Party, October 1981) the 
construction projects for the upgrading of the Athens to Thessaloniki (and Idomeni) 
main line were under way (OSE, Annual Report 1981). 
B. 2.2. The Developing Rail Plan 
B. 2.2.1. Introduction 
The arrival of the new Government in 1981 resulted in the appointment of a new Board 
and top executives in the Enterprise. The new management did not abandon the existing 
long-term development plan (that is the new 15-year development plan prepared in 
1975). However it felt necessary to revise it in order to incorporate both the renewal of 
the company's fleet and an emphasis in the social character of the enterprise which 
should be reflected both in the level of services and in the type of relations the company 
maintained with its employees. Thus, in 1983, a Group for Strategic Planning and 
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Programming (OSSP) was set up at the headquarters of the Greek Railway and was 
requested to prepare a 15-year long-term plan for the development of the enterprise over 
the period 1983-97. This plan should also contain a short-term (5-year) programme of 
activities to be undertaken within the period 1983-1987 (OSSP, 1983). 
It was believed that for a nation-wide railway enterprise where the engineering function 
constitutes the basis of operations a long-term plan for construction and modernisation 
projects should always exist, from which a short-term programme could derive at any 
time. By the end of each year, the accomplishments could thus be assessed and result in a 
new short-term programme for the next five years which would incorporate either 
projects which did not manage to be completed on time or further projects from the long- 
term plan. Thus, the various organisational units would always have the time to properly 
prepare to confront the requirements and difficulties associated with the projects to 
develop over a 5-year time horizon and not to be overwhelmed by requests to reorganise 
in order to carry out the tasks of completing a programme of which they had no idea 
even a few months ago. This preparation should refer to all units and cover all functional 
areas of the enterprise (operations, personnel, rules, regulations, procurement). To this 
end, apart from an always existing 5-year constructions programme, a 5-year activities 
programme should also be prepared, in order to assist both the completion of the 
engineering projects and their incorporation into the operations (OSSP, 1983). 
The 15-year, long-term plan prepared by the Group for Strategic Planning and 
Programming (OSSP, 1983) consisted of two parts: (1) a diagnostic study of the 
transport sector and the factors which affected the technological, commercial and 
economic dimensions within this sector which arrived at certain conclusions concerning 
the weakness and ineffectiveness of rail transport in Greece. The study contained also a 
forecast of the modal distribution of land transport by examining the yearly 
developments and by assuming the progress expected over this period both for road and 
rail. (2) Based on the conclusions of the diagnostic study it proceeded to examine, design 
and plan the projects and the activities to be undertaken by the enterprise, within the 
short-term period. 
B. 2.2.2. The Diagnostic Study 
(i). Land Transport Development 
At first, the study examined the inter-city road traffic (passenger and freight) by 
transport mode and its development over the period 1967-1981, i. e. the volume of traffic 
undertaken either by inter-urban buses of private regional bus companies (KTEL), or the 
enterprise's own buses (OSE), or by coaches, motor cars and trucks. 
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Concerning passenger transport the following were concluded: (1) there was a 302% 
increase in the number of motor cars in operation over the period 1970-1981. The 
average annual rate of increase over the period 1961-1981 was 15.9%; (2) there was a 
165% increase in the numbers of inter-urban buses and coaches over the period 1961- 
1981 and a 75.4% increase over the period 1970-1981; and (3) there was a 327% percent 
increase in the numbers of trucks and lorries over the period 1970-1981. Concerning the 
traffic transported by mode it was shown that: (1) though the number of inter-urban 
buses of the regional private companies (KTEL) remained unchanged over the period 
1967-1977, the passenger journeys increased by 52% over this period (and the passenger- 
krn by 20%). Thus, an increase of seats available per bus was assessed, an improved level 
of service in terms of frequency and a reduction in the average journey length; (2) the 
passengers transported by the company's own buses (OSE) increased by 66% (176% in 
terms of passenger-km) which implied a significant increase of the average length of the 
journey (approx. 65%) over the period 1967-1977. However, after 1978 these rates of 
increase were much lower; (3) it was indirectly assessed that private (not scheduled) 
coaches gained over the period 1967-1981 a significant market share by increasing both 
the numbers of vehicles and the passengers transported by 280%; (4) there was a 
tremendous increase in the number of motor cars which resulted in losses of traffic for 
both the railway and the bus companies. Over the period 1967-1981, the number of motor 
cars was increased by 552%; there was a proportional increase in the number of 
passenger traffic of this type (OSSP, 1983). 
In road freight transport, it was assessed that over the period 1967-1977 traffic increased 
by 364 % for the licensed trucks and by 284% for the private trucks. That is, road fright 
traffic doubled in the five years from 1967 to 1972 and doubled again from 1972 to 1977 
(OSSP, 1983). 
(ji). Environmental Reasons Constraining Rail. way Development 
The diagnostic study assumed that the external (environmental) reasons constraining the 
development of the railway were (OSSP, 1983): 
(1) Physical: Because of the location of the country at the southeastern end of the 
continent, transit freight traffic was exceptionally small and accounted 
for only 9% of 
total traffic, whereas in central European networks it accounted for 25-50%. 
On the 
other hand, passenger transit traffic virtually did not exist. 
Further, the enormous length 
of coastline and the associated big number of ports and port 
facilities were favouring sea 
freight transport. 
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(2) Demographic: Almost half of the country's population was concentrated in two cities 
(Athens and Thessaloniki). That is, outside these two metropolitan areas the population 
density was very low which again did not favour the development of rail transport. 
(3) Structural: Agricultural production accounted for a substantial part of national 
production. However, the agricultural products, being in most cases sensitive, favour 
road transport which provides greater speed, flexibility and accessibility. On the other 
hand, industry and especially heavy industry had developed in areas not properly served 
by the existing railway network. The country's mineral production (quarries, bauxite 
mines, cement factories, etc. ) was in most cases located next to a port, that is there was 
not any serious possibility for rail transportation of these products. 
(4) Institutional: There wasn't any kind of State's control over road transport. For 
example, truck drivers were allowed to work for 14-18 consecutive hours and thus 
competition rules were violated. Further, administrative or pricing rules as well as tax or 
other incentives that could assist in promoting the transport mode most preferable for 
each type of shipment did not exist. 
(M). Internal Sources of Ineffectiveness 
The following internal source of ineffectiveness were also identified (OSSP, 1983): 
(1) Technology: the network was the result of amalgamations of various independent 
companies; thus it incorporated two narrow-gauged parts, far from each other 
(Peloponnese and Thessaly). On the other hand, a large part of the line developed over 
mountainous areas and this had resulted in an unfavourable layout (many curves with 
small radius and steep gradients). 
(2) Character: The public enterprise character of the railway implied that both its 
operation and its development was dependent upon Government's funding. On the other 
hand, contrary to the users of the road network, the railway enterprise, owning the 
railway line, had also the obligation to spend large amounts of money in permanent way 
maintenance. 
(3) Personnel productivity: Since 1972, personnel's productivity was steadily decreasing. 
However, the exact rate of this decrease should be calculated after taking into account 
institutional changes such as: (1) the reduction of the working hours per week, (2) the 
introduction of the five-working-days week in 1981, (3) the increase of the annual leave 
per employee to four weeks (1982), and (4) the 
introduction of additional employee- 
welfare measures (maternity protection, etc. ). On the other 
hand, it should be noted that 
the period which followed the fall of the dictatorship (1974) was marked 
by an increased 
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mobility of the trade unions and resulted in substantial industrial action which inevitably 
affected the railway. 
(4) Rolling stock reliability: The number of locomotives' breakdowns was very high when 
compared to international standards and could not be justified neither in terms of the 
age of the units nor in terms of their overall haul. However, it was recognised that the 
multiplicity of types of units within the company's fleet was a factor seriously 
constraining the proper rolling stock maintenance and repair. 
(5) Costing and pricing policy: There was a disproportionate increase of the cost of the 
services offered respectively to fare increases. Thus, over the period 1971-1984, while 
wages (which constituted the 70% of the annual operations expenditure) and other 
expenses went up eleven times, fares went up only six times. There were not commercial 
criteria in railway's operations. For example, passenger fares in 1977 were covering 
63.5% of the general transport cost whereas in 1983 they only covered 38%. Under these 
conditions, attempts to increase the traffic volume would not result in the improvement 
of the financial position of the enterprise, unless they were complemented by attempts to 
reduce the operating costs. 
B. 22.3. The 5- Year (Short- Term) Plan 1983-1987 
The study concluded that in order to overcome the internal causes of ineffectiveness a 
short-term plan should be implemented over the period 1983-1987. This plan (Figure 
B. 5) incorporated both a 5-year constructions and engineering programme and a 5-year 
operations programme; the latter should assist both the completion of the engineering 
projects and their incorporation into the operations. 
(i). The 5- Year Constructions Programme (1983-1987) 
The short-term constructions programme placed emphasis upon the completion of the 
developing projects for the doubling and electrification of the Athens to Thessaloniki 
(and Idomeni) main line, as well as on the installation of electromechanical signalling 
and new telecommunications. 
Within this corridor, two single-tracked segments should also continue to exist at this 
stage. The first referred to the Thessaloniki to Idomeni (Yugoslavian border) line (76 
km) where the volume of the traffic transported did not justify the doubling of the line. 
The second referred to the Tithorea to Domokos (121 km) mountainous part of the main 
line where, in future, a possible abandonment of this route and a construction of a 
coastal route parallel to the motorway should be considered. The construction projects 
associated with it are summarised in Figure BA 
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Thessaloniki-ldomeni (76 km) 
- Alignments and track renewal 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification 
Platy-Thessaloniki (38 km) 
- Alignments and track renewal 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification 
I 
Larissa-Platy (134 km) 
- Track renewal and doubling 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification LARIS 
Serres 
THESSALONIKI 
Domokos-Larissa (61 km) --N 
- Track renewal and doubling Paleof . tarsalos 
- Electromechanical signalling installation .......... 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification DO M-, O,:: 
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Tithorea-Domokos (121 k" 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification 
Inoi-Tithorea (95 km) 
- Track renewal and doubling 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification 
Athens-Inoi (61 k 
Lamia 
- Electromechanical signalling installation 
- New telecommunications 
- Electrification 
KCnn"tý'h- 
Argos Nafp 11 lio in 
............ 
Khalkis 
Drama Xanthi 
-10 ............. *.. 
I 
0 
Figure B. 6: The Athens-Idomeni infrastructure development project 
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The 5-year constructions and engineering programme made also provision for the 
acquisition of new rolling stock, the development of containerised freight transport, the 
construction of new freight terminals, the construction of new sidings to industries, as 
well as for limited improvements in other parts of the network. 
(i . i). The 5-year Operations Programme (1983-1987) 
Apart from the constructions and procurement the second part of the 5-year rail plan 
dealt with organizational changes and innovations which should be implemented over the 
same period, in order to provide the environment within which the under completion 
engineering projects should be optimally exploited. The following organizational changes 
were proposed (OSSP, 1983): 
(1) Organizational Structure 
It was assessed that the organizational structure of the enterprise, consisting of 22 
Departments and autonomous Units, was ineffective. The need was stressed to adapt 
structure both to the requirements of the 5-year Rail Plan as well as to further 
facilitation of the developing rail activities. A new structure was proposed, which 
amalgamated all headquarters units into four departments and left intact the three 
regional departments. Figure A. 18 (Appendix A) illustrates the proposed changes, the 
most significant of which was the formation of a Transport Department, accountable for 
the organization and carrying out of passenger and freight trains operations. The same 
unit should define the qualitative and quantitative standards of operations (personnel, 
installations, rolling stock and tractive units), the safety rules, the organization of 
transportation and the traffic control. Within this Department, the formation of 
Informatique, Operational Research and Marketing units was proposed. 
(2) Rules and Regulations 
The exploitation of the projects incorporated in the 5-year Rail Plan and the 
improvement of the effectiveness of the enterprise were assessed to imply either revision 
of the existing rules and regulations or the creation of new ones. The following activities 
were assessed essential and were incorporated into the operations programme: (1) 
Revision of the Signalling Regulations as a result of the introduction of 
electromechanical signalling, new telecommunications systems and the electrification of 
part of the network; (2) Adaptation of the Traffic Regulations to the new traffic 
conditions; (3) Preparation of new Safety Rules, corresponding to the introduction of 
high speeds; (4) Preparation of technical manuals for the construction, operation and 
maintenance of electrified lines and new telecommunications systems as wen as for the 
maintenance of electric locomotives; (5) preparation of operation rules for the 
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introduction of new transportation systems (combined passenger-motor car journeys, 
combined freight transportation on lines of different gauge); and (6) revision of various 
existing rules, regulations and directives concerning rolling stock maintenance, level 
crossings manning, procurement, personnel, etc. 
(3) Personnel Welfare 
The essential issues related to the human element of the enterprise, concerning the 
implementation of the development plan referred to the planning of new recruits, 
personnel training and the revision of rules and regulations. A "social programme" was 
incorporated into the Operations Programme and made provision for a number of 
actions to be taken in order to improve work conditions and human relations within the 
enterprise (i. e. the socialisation, the revision of the rules and regulations, refurbishment 
and improvements in the job's environment, the improvement in the safety conditions, 
the modernisation of work conditions and of the organisation of the operations, the 
creation of workers' self-controlled rest and recreation halls within the company's 
premises). The proper planning of new recruits and personnel training were assessed as 
primarily related with the broader goals of the development plan, that is deficit's control 
and the improvement of services offered. 
(4) Personnel Training 
Personnel training was assumed as consisting of two parts: (1) training of new recruits, 
and (2) training-education of employees on new issues arising from the desired 
modernisation of the enterprise. It was decided that the Personnel Department should 
prepare training programmes by personnel level; each of these programmes should be 
undertaken during the period exactly before the exploitation of any completed project. 
The functional departments in cooperation with the regions should prepare training 
programmes to be sent to the Personnel Department for execution. 
(5) Procurement Policy 
The procurement policy was assessed as one of the building blocks of the smooth 
development of railway activities. However, the great variety of locomotives and rolling 
stock had resulted in increased needs to stock-control and substantial inventories of 
spare parts. This control was becoming difficult because of the lack of any computerised 
system. On the other hand, the need to import the majority of spare parts and the delays 
associated with the cumbersome State's import policy had resulted in a difficulty to 
properly plan the equipment maintenance and repair. The Operations Programme was 
suggesting changes in the State's import policy which, however, could not be decided by 
the railway itself. On the other hand, concerning stock control, it was believed that a 
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proper estimation of the annual requirements through a study of the past periods would 
facilitate the timely preparation of specifications, standards and tender documents. Thus, 
the Operations Programme contained: (1) the coding of the stocked material, especially 
the one that accounted for the biggest part of purchases, and (2) the preparation and 
introduction of a computerised stock control system. 
B. 2.2.4. The Financial Dimension of the 5- Year Plan (1983-1987) 
(1) Investment: In 1984, the Government passed the 5-year national development plan 
(1983-1987) which incorporated a long-term railway development plan of projected cost 
of 93 billion drs (1982 prices) from which 45 billion referred to the 5-year period 1983- 
1987 (KEPE, 1983). Figure B. 7 provides the projected distribution of this funding over 
the 5-year period. 
annual investment (million drs 1982 prices) period 
l f ti ona area unc 1983- 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987 
1 Operations Installations 40 850 1 767 2 143 960 5 760 
and Equipment 
2 Permanent Way and 1 820 4 740 8 915 8 775 6 700 30 950 
Signalling Projects 
3 Rolling Stock Acquisition, 1 220 780 2 520 17 603 2 170 8 450 
Workshops and Depots 
Annual Totals 3 080 6 370 13 202 12 678 9 830 45 160 
Figure B. 7. - The approved by the Government 5-year investment Plan 
(2). Revenue: 'llie plan forecasted a 22% increase in passenger traffic over the period 
1983-1987, that is average annual increase 4.4% and a 61% increase of freight traffic 
over the same period (average annual increase 12%). It also projected an annual average 
increase of fares per passenger-km of 19.1 % (that is a 95.5% increase for the whole 
period) and a 13.7% annual average increase of freight tariffs per tonne-km (67.5% 
overall increase). It also forecasted that completion of the projects should result in the 
reduction of transport costs by approximately 20%. Thus a reduction of the operations 
deficit by 18% in constant prices should be expected in 1987, in comparison with the 
1983's deficit (OSSP, 1983). 
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B. 2.2.5. Financing the Plan from Communitys Funds 
During the 1980s, as a result of significant projects for the revival of the railway industry 
in the principal European networks (France, Germany, Italy, etc. ), a discussion started 
on the feasibility of the formation of a European High-Speed Network (EHSN). This 
network would not be studied or constructed centrally. Each national railway should be 
responsible for the study and construction of its national part, according to common 
principal standards (double track, 200 km/h speeds, minimum curvature 2 000 m, 
maximum slope 14/000, minimum axle load 22 tonnes). 
It should be noted that the main intention of the EHSDN project was to provide a high- 
quality passenger service among the cities of central Europe, by allowing for the 
completion of journeys within few hours (e. g. London-Paris 2h58, Paris-Koln 2h55, 
Amsterdam-Brussels 1h28) and for the achievement of overnight connection between any 
pair of the cities incorporated into the network (excluding Athens and Dublin), as 
illustrated in Figure B. 8. It was recognised that in the case of Greece "in all events, the 
distance is so long tha t priority will na turally go to night services. Yet, even if major 
improvements to speeds are made in Yugoslavia, the distance between Athens and 
Europe's other capitals will remain too great for the journey to be completed 
overnight' (Community of European Railways, 1989; p. 14). 
However, the Greek Railway decided to include into the EHSN the principal axis of the 
network, i. e. the line from Patras to Athens, Thessaloniki and Idomeni (Lalakakis, 
1989) mainly in order to ascertain the constant flow of funding required in order to 
complete the upgrading of the main line. Thus, a feasibility study for this project was 
prepared and submitted to the Commission of the European Communities (Economic 
Research Centre, 1989). 
The study concluded that the project was worth undertaking for three reasons: (1) 
because both the pre- and after-tax internal rates of return were, in general, comparable 
to those realised by investment in Greek manufacturing; (2) because the calculated 
internal. rates of return exceeded the current cost of borrowing for long-term investment; 
and (3) because their range was failing within the internal rates of return which had been 
reported in other European networks. The study indicated that the earlier the new line 
gets into commercial operation and the closer the fares are to a triple fare scheme the 
more profitable the investment would turn out to be (Economic Research Centre, 
1989). Thus, it suggested a 6-year construction scenario the cost of which was almost 185 
billion drs (1989 prices), from which 95 billion referred to the construction of the Athens 
to Patras new line. 
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use 
Figure B. 8: Future high-speed night rail services in W. Europe 
In 1990, the Commission of the European Communities decided to assist in the 
implementation of the projects on the Athens to Idomeni part of OSE's proposal. Thus 
142 million ECUs of the projected cost of 300.5 million ECUs (1989 prices) would be 
provided by the European Regional Development Fund over the period 1989-1993. A 
constant annual investment flow should thus be guaranteed for a part of the constructions 
programme (Commission of the European Communities, 1990). 
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B. 3. ASSESSMENT OF THE RAIL PLAN 
The primary area of interest concerning the improvement in quality of services was the 
increase of passenger train speeds through the construction of a railway line allowing for 
speeds of the range of 200 km/h. However, the same track should also accommodate 
slower passenger trains as well as freight trains. The slow rate of completion of the 
constructions programme as recognised throughout the internal reports had been 
dictated by the allocated rate of funding which was considered not to be satisfactory, 
especially when comparing the existing situation with the desired level to be attained. 
B. 3. I. Government's Obligation for Funding 
The only stated obligation on the part of the Government was included in the "Economic 
Agreement between the State and the Greek Railway' which was signed in 1972 and 
defined the Government's contribution to financial expenses concerning track 
maintenance and renewal and level crossings signalling and manning. This contribution 
varied from 50% to 80% of the respective expenses. As for projects for new line 
construction (doubling or significant improvements of the road-bed) the expenditure did 
not burden the railways. The relevant Board's decision had to be ratified by the 
Departments of National Economy, Finance and Transport which would decide the level 
of funding and hence the magnitude of projects to be undertaken within a year. 
Organizational records did not provide evidence that the company had ever achieved to 
ascertain a funding rate for the completion of the Rail Plan. Though the Plan had been 
approved both by the Board and the supervisory board (ASKE) and incorporated into 
the State's 5-year Development Plan in 1984, the Government never managed to 
maintain a constant flow of investment funds during the years that followed. On the other 
hand, in the past, vague declarations of governmental officials in the 1970s Oust after the 
oil crisis) did not result in creating a strong impulse to get involved into an extended 
development plan. Road constructions and car-ownership policies kept on attracting the 
massive portion of infrastructure investment (Technical Chamber of Greece, 1989). 
B. 3.2. Rate of Investment 
The claims that the rate of funding was never adequate to cover the enterprise's 
investment needs appears to be strong. Figure B. 9 shows the level of investment over the 
studied period. As a member of the Board commended, if this level of funding was to be 
maintained, the time of completion would extend to a 50-year horizon. 
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year Railway's 
l 
State's 
investment absorbed (million drs. ) 
proposa s approvals 
Public Investment 
, BEI and Gerrian EEC Regional Total 
current (1978 Banks Loans Development Funds Investment 
prices prices) 
1978 2 760 1 880 * 1 181 (1 181) 500 - 1 681 
1979 1 400 1 170 * 1 153 (969) 260 - 1 413 
1980 - 1 426 * 1 410 (949) 770 - 2 180 
1981 - 1 781 * 1 412 (763) 70 - 1 482 
1982 2 750 2 150 * 2 126 (950) 600 - 2 726 
1983 - 2 925 * 2 985 (1 110) 285 620 3 890 
1984 10 350 9 000 4 402 (1 381) 482 566 5 450 
1985 13 500 11 000 4 390 (1 155) 3 015 45 7 450 
1986 16 900 10 500 3 540 ( (757) 3 287 3 227 10 054 
1987 17 000 16 785 9 846 (1 809) 3 013 1 845 14 704 
1988 26 500 15 000 7 872 (1 274) 4 068 1 335 13 275 
1989 46 000 18 000 9 955 (1 400) ? 17 350 
*: Since 1984, the interest charges of the investment loans are incorporated in the investment programme. 
Figure B. 9: Investment in Railways (1978-1989) 
B. 3.3. Deficit's Control 
One of the main strategy-areas is related with the improvement of the bad financial 
position of the enterprise. "The only means to achieve it is to accelerate the 
completion of several construction projects and rolling stock purchases which, in 
relation with institutional, organizational, commercial and financial policies will 
relieve the unfavourable position of the enterprise in the transport market. If this is 
not achieved by 1992, year of the completion of the European market, the Greek 
railway will be cut off from the other networks" (OSE, 1989b). 
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The period examined exhibited a steady yearly increase of the operational deficit. 
Though this was not completely covered by the State (as mentioned previously) and, 
instead, borrowing was chosen to alleviate the situation, it should be stressed that 
attempts to decrease costs associated with rail services could not be identified. Wages, 
fuel, materials/spares, administrative expenses and labour- force, all throughout the 
implementation period either increased or remained constant. Though the labour costs 
were the highest cost incurred, the Plan stressed the need for more personnel to be 
recruited during the implementation phase. Personnel reduction and, possibly, allocation 
of personnel to new posts via an intensive training were not considered. Moreover, the 
discretion the Government had over employment, either through restrictions on hiring 
(in periods of strict financial policy such as the period 1985-1988) or through the 
imposition of recruitments, especially during pre-electoral periods (note the peak in 
personnel number in 1984) was not considered as an important origin for the 
reconsideration of the situation. However, cost control could not be achieved when its 
most significant component was not under control. Therefore, the statement contained in 
the 1989 Annual Report, according to which "personnel hiring should be independent 
of the State's supervision and should be only confined into the limits of the approved 
budget', may only be considered as a wish, with no real impact on the company's 
fortunes. 
B. 3.4. Procurement Policies 
Within this strategic-area, improvements were seen as contributing to cost decreases and 
to efficient operations. Yet the organization over this time tried without success to tackle 
the problem. Internal reports pointed out to serious deficiencies in the existing system; 
these deficiencies were caused by external factors (OSE, 1987). Materials required in a 
specific year usually arrived two years later, as a result of both the requirement for 
consecutive ministerial approvals and of the time consuming system of abjudication of 
the lowest bid. Furthermore, because procurement is directly related to the level of 
funding, when the latter was constrained (currency restrictions, Central Bank's policies to 
cut off commissions, etc. ) the difficulties to drive bids forward were increased. 
Within the organizational context, the lack of a prioritized and concise planning that 
would operate as an integrating mechanism accentuated the problem. The centralised 
structure of procurement activities had rendered inflexible and rigid the whole process. 
When adjustments were required to provide for the satisfaction of the actual needs of the 
Production Units after the governmental amendment of the proposed Annual Purchases 
Programme, the Procurement Department consulted only the headquarters functional 
Departments, without asking the production managers to work out new proposals. "A 
spi . ri .t of ineffectiveness is cultivated as far as the proving of these initial proposals is 
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concerned and this increases the ineffectiveness of the process and burdens it with a 
bulk of non-productive activities" (OSE, 1987). 
Facing a modernization project which incorporated a high technological level in all areas 
(sophisticated new machinery, modern tractive units, etc. ) the organization lacked the 
ability to issue technical specifications concerning the purchase of some required spare 
parts or materials. This lack of expertise coupled with the previously mentioned problem 
(which resulted in usually assigning procurement activities as a secondary job to different 
employees in different time periods) rendered the procurement process a vicious cycle. 
Finally, the transitory stage of the institutional framework was considered to add more 
problems to an already complicated situation. For example, before the passing of the 
Socialisation Law the enterprise had to submit its Annual Purchase Programme for 
approval to the Department of Transport. Later this procedure changed and, concerning 
imported supplies, the programme had only to be submitted to the Department of 
Industry. However, the latter Department objected this process and argued that since the 
details of the new legislation had not yet been elaborated the Department's of Transport 
approval was still required. The company's solicitors submitted to this view; thus the bids 
had to be approved by both Departments, a process that added considerable delays. 
B. 3.5. The Bottom-Up Process 
The approved Rail Plan was never communicated to the Regional Departments in order 
to result in functional 5-year plans based upon their forecasts and on the guidance they 
had received. This resulted from the fact that the proposals of the Strategic Committee 
(OSSP) were the ones approved by the Board (15-year development plan, 5-year plan) 
and no contingency plans were incorporated nor risk analysis included. Neither the 
Strategic Committee nor the Department of Planning and Organization asked for such a 
process to be followed. The same pertained to the functional Departments as well. Plans 
were always imposed from the top. By not getting involved into the planning process, 
local production managers responsible either for providing essential information or 
undertaking action plans felt alienated and treated the plan as a second rank issue (the 
attitude towards procurement substantiates it). Such an issue as the one just mentioned 
draws attention on the lines of authority and communication between the different 
organizational units and on the information and data that flow between them. 
Organizational structure and goal setting are two inter-woven concepts. Thus, the 
following section, based on organizational evidence, traces the changes in this structure 
and highlights the rationale behind them. 
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B. 3.6. Organizational Structure 
As mentioned in Appendix A, in 1986 the enterprise attempted to introduce a new 
structure. The reasons for this change, as described by the group that produced the new 
design, were: 
(1) The disproportionate increase in authority of the headquarters Departments which 
resulted in bureaucratic distortions and indifference for the outcome on the part of the 
production units. HQ Departments functioned independently with little horizontal 
collaboration; thus, the production units in order to act were bound to ask all of them. 
(2) Alternative modifications of this structure over the years had resulted in the creation 
of Units to handle new issues arisen. However, the functioning of these units was not 
properly integrated into the design of the organisation (e. g., the organizational unit 
supervising the 294/83 contract for rolling stock acquisition and domestic 
manufacturing). 
(3) The existing procurement system had a negative impact on basic activities within the 
company. The increased centralization had led to a misconcept that the procurement's 
role "was essential and purposeful on its own". 
(4) The difficulty to identify the manager(s) responsible when the reason behind 
deviations was sought. This stemmed from vague descriptions of accountabilities or 
overlapping responsibilities in the existing structure. Delays in the making of a decision, 
the making of conflicting decisions or no decisions at all were the main negative 
consequences. 
(5) The need to strengthen the mission of the enterprise- as a transportation firm. 
Therefore, market research and services development had to be accentuated. Closely 
related to this was the introduction of the Socialisation Law which stressed the need for 
the enterprise to improve its performance in both social and financial terms. 
The new organizational structure, being the proposal of an internal group whose 
principal members were the Head of the Department of Planning and one of the 
Assistants to the General Manager, inaugurated changes in the following areas: (1) The 
functional Departments should have a Procurement and Stock Division for their own 
needs; (2) Training should be understood as a major activity and be incorporated into 
each Department's area of responsibility; (3) information flows and statistical data 
analysis had to be produced by the Departments in order to measure some performance 
indices defined at a higher level; (4) the Department of Planning should acquire a new 
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role as the scientific "brain" of the enterprise; and (5) a Transportation Department 
should be set up containing the duties of the existing Operations and Traction 
Departments, the Regional Operations Divisions as well as the rolling stock Depots; the 
same Department should also be responsible for marketing. cost structure, relative 
procurements and stocking. 
The report concluded: "A central unified planningis needed; this now can be achieved 
by the employees. With planning, few decision centres, and relative autonomy, the 
Departments will be in a position to make the decision-making system efficient and 
to produce a positive outcome". 
However, legal obstacles arose after the approval of the new structure both by the Board 
and the responsible Government Departments. The Superior Court responsible for 
ratifying the Act (that is, the legal form that introduced the new structure) required a 
detailed description of the duties of each department, division or unit as well as the 
numbers and distributions of occupational posts, and matters concerning its 
implementation. It judged that unpermitted over-authorization was introduced by a 
paragraph which stated that the Board of the enterprise could decide in future upon 
further restructuring of the organizational units and upon the redistribution of 
competencies among them or the cancellation of some units. The solicitors of the 
enterprise suggested that the proposed structure required to be ratified by an act only to 
the extent that included statements adjusting the enterprise to the spirit of the new 
legislation (socialisation). Such statements were the ones describing the relations of the 
company with the new bodies introduced by the Socialisation Law and the identification 
of matters that pertained to their competencies. When the organizational structure did 
not contain such statements but referred only to the internal functioning of the 
enterprise, there was no reason for the new structure to take the form of an Act. In this 
case, a ministerial approval would suffice for its ratification . Therefore, the proposed 
structure had to be recompiled and the appropriate parts to be submitted to the court's 
ratification. This work, as suggested by the solicitors, should better be undertaken after 
the new foundation law (adapting the enterprise to the socialisation legislation) had been 
established, because in this case some additional problems of ministerial jurisdiction 
(concerning the ratification of institutional documents) would have been clarified. 
The enterprise considered that it was difficult to assess when the new foundation law was 
about to get established and decided to pass through an intermediate stage. The existing 
organizational structure was enriched with sections of the proposed one (except for the 
sections referring to socialization). The arrival at that time of the new General Manager 
influenced strongly the process of change. Asserting publicly that the development plans 
are merely "exercises on paper" unless they have ascertained an adequate funding rate, 
he commenced the process to obtain Community's grants for railway development. The 
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Rail Plan was re-assessed in view of its financial viability (as described in a previous 
section) and the feasibility study being adopted by the State was finally accepted by the 
Commission and included in the Structural Funds. The new General Manager 
understood the changes to be introduced into the organizational structure by the 
submitted enriched version of the structure as an opportunity to strengthen the service 
character of the enterprise. By seeking centralization of control at this stage, he believed 
that in the long run a separation of the supporting sub-systems from operations could be 
achieved (either through sub-contracting track or rolling stock maintenance activities or 
by passing permanent way ownership to a State's agency). The enriched structure was 
approved by the Board and started immediately to get implemented. 
B. 3.7. The Context of Labour Participation 
Apart from the constructions and the operations programmes, the 5-year Rail Plan 
incorporated a social programme, the main goal of which was the improvement in the 
relations between the company and its employees. Participation of employees in decision 
centres (main Board, supervisory Board) and the guidance of enterprises with strategic 
importance for the national economy by a group of representatives of principal 
stakeholders were considered as means to promote the development of the public sector; 
this would lead to the improvement of services offered to the community. 
However, the new scheme, though established by a law in 1983, was only implemented by 
the end of 1985, in a period where severe economic restrictions were imposed. The 
Government, attempting to reduce the big deficit of the Budget, increased the rates of 
the public utilities, restricted recruitment in the public enterprises and truncated the 
public investment. It is interesting to assess the progress of the new participatory scheme 
by reference to a meeting organised in June 1987 by the Department of National 
Economy, participated by the top management of public enterprises and other officials 
(Department of National Economy, 1987). Criticising the plans of the public 
enterprises, the Minister of National Economy stated that "they are produced at the 
top, without the participation of the implementation units. The annual action-plans 
and the annual reports are descriptive, without quantitative information and 
reference to the required level of funding. The arising problems are tackled in a 
fragmented way, not within a framework or a programme. Budgets are followed-up 
onlyat the top of the enterprise and not at departmental level or lower". 
These deficiencies were expected to be removed by (1) the personnel's activation at all 
hierarchical levels, (2) the creation of the missing link between planning and 
implementation, (3) the top management's capability to specify the mission of the 
enterprise and to motivate the labour-force towards the fulfilment of this mission; and 
(4) the participative schemes in planning and implementation processes. If public 
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enterprises succeeded in introducing effective planning and improving their financial 
results, the government, as stated by the minister, was oriented towards granting them 
greater autonomy. 
The minister argued that the successful introduction of innovative planning systems in 
public sector firms depends upon the top management's wish to promote them. "There is 
a need for a change in top management philosophy. They have to be encouraged and 
involved in such an activity, not because this is required by the Government but 
because, in a short time, they will witness a considerable improvement in their 
organization". In his own words, "management is the art of motivating and developing 
personnePs capabilities". 
The Government admitted that after two years of the new scheme's implementation 
"nothing or very little has changed and, on the other hand, some new problems have 
arisen. The debate between the Government and the parties of the opposition has 
been transferred into the boardrooms and this renders the functioning of the scheme 
more difficult". 
The governmental officials recognised that "the Acts defining the duties of the new 
bodies of socialisation, their organization and functioning do not provide answers in 
major areas of interest, such as the enterprise's objectives and the way the 
Government's control is to be exercised Indeed, the scheme started being 
implemented under an inverted order of Priorities". However, they stated that "now a 
parallel process has started, in order to define programmes for public firms 
indicating their objectives". 
They also considered that some changes would facilitate the implementation process. 
Thus, the roles of the General Manager and the Chairman of the Board should be 
assigned to the same person because "there is evidence that the Chairman tends to 
intervene into operational matters. A restatement of the Board's competencies 
should also follow, to bound interventions in administrative matters which should 
exclusively be the General Manager's responsibility'. 
The employees representatives stressed some negative points seen as "heritage from the 
old times". They argued that interventions in day-to-day administrative matters or 
bureaucratic delays especially in procurement approvals needed not to exist. The 
enterprise could be controlled (by both the State and the supervisory Board) on the basis 
of quantitative goals and performance evaluations. 
They rejected the view that political debate was the prevailing feature of the Board's 
meetings. They stated that "the meetinSs of the socialisation bodies should be a place 
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where a synthesis of views should be achieved There are not an environment were 
opinions are recorded There is a work to be done, directed towards achieving a 
certain result; according to the legislationj we are the ones responsible to accomplish 
it. Each stakeholders' representative brings in the views and decisions of the group 
(s)he represents. After that, after one has expressed his (her) own interest, (s)he is 
obliged to listen to the views and the interests of the other representatives; then, all 
together, we should provide a result, should do something'. 
Further, the employees' representatives stressed that they should not confuse their role 
and behaviour with that of the trade unions. They had a different but equally important 
role to play. If the unions imposed on the employees' representatives their daily practice, 
the bodies of socialization would become political arenas. This was not in the interest of 
neither the unions nor the employees. 
They also claimed that problems were arising when they were dealing with the 
organizational hierarchy. The organizational structure of the enterprise as well as 
personnel's rules and regulations had not yet been adapted to the new scheme. This 
resulted in a "strong opposition against the new scheme on the part of bureaucratic 
cliques which refused to cooperate, fearing the loss of organizational power" 
They opposed the proposed identification of the roles of the Chairman of the Board and 
the General Manager in the same person and predicted that this would lead to a further 
minimisation of the roles of both the main and the supervisory Board. They claimed that 
this solidification was against the spirit of the new law which advocated for the 
distribution of power and the participation of all interested parties. They argued that 
"when a person is granted such a power he will attempt to make sure that everyone 
satisfies his wish. Especially the hierarchy will urge to satisfy this wish even before it 
has been expressed'. 
The employees' representatives pin-pointed to the urgent need for internal training. 
"The enterprise has to submit strategic plans to the Board and the latter to the 
supervisory Board The problem is that the organization does not have the ability to 
prepare rational plans. Tackling macro-level issues is something it never attempted 
during all these years. Specialised people are needed but they cannot be employed 
because of the Government's restrictions. However, we all know that even under 
these restrictions the public enterprises are fraught with temporary, unqualified 
staff'. 
Negatively influenced by the introduction of the new scheme in a difficult period, the 
employees' representatives felt trapped into a peculiar situation. As one representative 
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put it, "the scheme has been introduced as a means for the facilitation of the 
implementation of Government's economic policy. 
The section may conclude with the questions posed by an employees' representative 
during his speech: "How can we request from this new scheme to bring in new ethics, 
when the same perceptions prevail? How can it deem worthy when it is forced to co- 
exist with bureaucracy, with patronage, with employment without the "value" 
element? Finally, what weighs more? The care for the new scheme, even when 
stemming from an alternative interpretation or the results? Is it impossible to link 
the care for the scheme and the results and to pursue both through information 
sharing, consensus, and acceptance?... We arrived at a point where people question 
the credibility of the new scheme, at a point where scepticism is dominant, not 
because of functional weakness that exists, nor because of internal confrontations 
that are justified, but because of wrong actions of those responsible to express the 
political will. This should not be allowed to continue, if Government is really 
interested in the viability of the new scheme". 
APPENDIX C 
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
C. 1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to clarify the decision -makers' view on why a set of decisions were defined as 
strategic, which were the arguments that justified them, and which were the 
interdependences among all the concepts involved, an analysis of the interview data 
followed, soon after the interviews had been completed. These perceptions were traced 
individually, not on an aggregate level representing a shared group perception, and their 
simulation in form of a cognitive map has been constructed. The strategists' causal logic 
was depicted using a specific kind of cognitive maps. The following section describes the 
type of the map used and demonstrates the way in which causal associations between 
concepts are discovered and established. 
The factors that influenced the "strategic" decisions, in the participants own terms, were 
reflected upon a variety of economic, technological, and sociopolitical factors external to 
the enterprise, as well as they included terms such as training of personnel, availability of 
financial resources, system of rewards and compensation, originating from within the 
firm. 
C. 2. BASIC COMPONENTS 
An influence diagram consists of four components These are factors, links, chains, and 
loops. A brief description seems to be necessary, since Chapter 6, in which the analysis 
of data is presented, makes extensive use of them. 
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C. 2.1. Factors 
A variable expressed as a level or rate of something constitutes a factor: for instance the 
rate of resource acquisition, the level of satisfaction with the management system are 
distinct factors and are denoted by a capital letter. In Figure C1 the factors are A, B, C, 
D, E. 
C. 2.2. Links 
A link represents two factors related such that a change in one influences or exerts 
pressure on the other to change. A link is depicted graphically, as a line connecting the 
two factors with an arrow pointing to the influenced factor. 
Links have also signs. They are either positive or negative. If a direct relationship exists 
between two factors, i. e an increase in one factor leads to an upward influence upon the 
other, or a decrease leads to a downward influence, then is said that the link is positive. 
A negative link represents an inverse relationship, i. e an increase in one factor has a 
downward influence on the other and vice versa. In Figure C1 links are A+ B, and C+D. 
When the signs are unknown, or uncertain, then, a notation that simply includes factors 
separated by a period is used, Le A. B or C. D . 
C. 2.3. Chains 
A chain consists of three or more factors connected in series by links having the same 
direction. Chains, too, are either positive or negative. A positive chain is one with zero 
or even number of negative links. Conversely, a negative chain, is one with an odd 
number of negative links. In Figure C1, A. B. C. D is a negative chain and C. D. A is a 
positive one. 
C. 2.4. Loops 
A loop is a set of factors connected in series by links of same direction that form a closed 
loop in which no factor appears more than once. It can be view as a chain that cycles back 
to meet itself. Loops, also, are positive or negative. As with chains, positive loops consist 
of a zero or an even number of negative links, while negative loops have an odd number 
of negative links. In Figure C1, A. B. C. D. A is a negative loop, B. C. E. D. B and 
B. C. D. A. E. B are positive ones. 
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Figure Cl: An Influence Diagram 
APPENDIX D 
CODING INFORMATION FROM THE BOARDS MINUTES 
D. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Information on the Board's functioning was extracted from the Board's minutes and was classified. 
Figure DI displays the aggregation of the initially recorded 98 categories of topics discussed in the 
Board into 49 decision-areas. Figure D2 provides the frequency per year of each area's appearance 
in the minutes over the period 1980-1988. Finally, Figures D3 to D20 provide graphical illustration 
of distributions for the 18 decision-areas which were the ones strongly mentioned by the strategists 
during the interviews. 
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D. 2. AGGREGATION OF CATEGORIES INTO DECISION AREAS 
no. AGGREGATED DECISION-AREAS (49) old 
no. 
IDENTIFIED DECISION-AREAS (98) 
I 15-YEARS STRATEGIC PLAN 1 15-YEARS STRATEGIC PLAN 
2 ACCIDENTS REMUNERATION 20 ACCIDENTS REMUNERATION 
2 80 REMUNERATION FOR DAMAGES (OTHER RAILWAYS) 
3 ADAPTATION TO STATE LEGISLATION/PLANS 30 ADJUSTMENT TO STATE LEGISLATION 
3 91 SOCIALIZATION LAW 
4 ANNUAL PURCHASES PROGRAMME 80 ANNUAL PURCHASES PROGRAMME (PROPOSALS, APPROVAL) 
4 76 PROPOSALS TO STATE'S ANNUAL PURCHASE PROGRAMME 
5 ANNUAL REPORT 90 ANNUAL REPORT (DISCUSSION, APPROVAL) 
6 BOARD'S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING 11 BOARD'S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING 
7 CAPITAL BUDGETING 50 ANNUAL BUDGET (DELIVERY, ALTERATION, APPROVAL) 
8 CAPITAL INVESTMENT 70 ANNUAL INVESTMENT PLAN (PROPOSALS, MODIFICATION) 
8 75 PROPOSALS FOR STATE'S ANNUAL INVESTMENT PLAN 
9 CONSTRUCTORS/SUPPLIERS OBJECTIONS RESOLUTION 16 CONSTRUCTORS/SUPPLIERS OBJECTIONS RESOLUTION 
10 CONSULTANT'S RECRUITMENT 17 CONSULTANT'S RECRUITMENT 
11 CONTROL BY THE STATE 40 MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT PROPOSALS: APPROVAL 
11 48 MODERNIZATION: GOVERNMENT MEETING 
12 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 18 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY SYSTEM 
12 19 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE G. M. 
12 20 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: CASH LIMITS 
12 21 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: RELTNS WITH TRADE UNIONS 
13 EMERGENCY PROJECTS 22 EMERGENCY PROJECTS: APPROVAL 
14 FACILITIES 13 BUILDINGS-HOTELS HIRE 
14 74 PROPERTY (EXPLOITATION, INSURANCE, SALE) 
15 FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 24 EXPENSES APPROVAL 
15 25 FINANCIAL AFFAIRS (BANK ACCOUNTS) 
16 GENERAL MANAGER APPOINTMENT 26 GENERAL MANAGER APPOINTMENT 
17 INDUSTRIAL ACTION 27 INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
18 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 28 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
18 29 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
19 LAND/EQUIPMENT DONATION/SALE 51 OBSOLETE MATERIAL/EQUIPMENT DONATION/SALE 
19 81 RIGHTS GRANTING FOR COMPANY'S LAND USE BY OTHERS 
20 LAWSUITS 31 LEGAL MATTERS: OSE VS. THIRD PARTIES 
20 32 LEGAL MATTERS: THIRD PARTIES VS. OSE 
21 LOANS 33 LOAN'S NEGOTIATION 
21 34 LOAN'S APPROVAL (COMMERCIAL BANKS) 
21 35 LOAN'S APPROVAL (INVESTMENT BANKS) 
22 MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 36 MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 
22 55 P. W. MATERIALS: MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 
22 56 PARTS MANUFACTURING POLICY 
22 87 ROLLING STOCK: MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 
22 88 ROLLING STOCK: OUTSIDE MAINTENANCE/REPAIR 
23 MARKETING 12 BOOKING OFFICES 
23 37 MARKETING 
23 38 MARKETING: ENVIRNMNT SCANNING EXPENSES INCREASE 
23 77 PURCHASES POLICY 
24 MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT PURCHASE 23 EQUIPMENT PURCHASE 
24 39 MATERIAL PURCHASE 
25 MODERNISATION PROJECTS 41 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: CONTRACTS 
25 42 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: DEVELOPMENT MONITORING 
25 43 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: INVESTMENT ALLOCATION 
Figure DI: Aggregated List of Board's Decision-Areas (continued) 
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no. AGGREGATED DECISION-AREAS (49) old 
no. 
IDENTIFIED DECISION-AREAS (98) 
25 44 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: LAND ACQUISITION 
25 45 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: STANDARDS APPROVAL 
25 46 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: STUDIES 
25 47 MODERNIZATION PROJECTS: TENDERS 
25 49 MODERNIZATION: SHORT TERM PLAN: DISCUSSION 
26 MODIFICATIONS IN PAY PLANS 65 PERSONNEL: ADDITIONAL EARNINGS: READJUSTMENT 
27 NEW SERVICE INTRODUCTION 50 NEW SERVICE INTRODUCTION 
28 OFFICE AUTOMATION 52 OFFICE AUTOMATION 
29 ORGANISATION-WIDE PAY PLANS 72 PERSONNEL: SALARY INCREASES 
30 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: MODIFICATION 53 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: MODIFICATION 
31 P. W. MATERIALS: KNOW-HOW ACQUISITION 54 P. W. MATERIALS: KNOW-HOW ACQUISITION 
32 PERFORMANCE MONITORING 14 CONDITION OF THE NETWORK: ACCIDENTS 
32 15 CONDITION OF THE NETWORK: DISCUSSION OF OPTIONS 
32 57 PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
32 58 PERFORMANCE MONITORING: ANNUAL PLAN 
32 59 PERFORMANCE MONITORING: BUDGETARY CONTROL 
32 60 PERFORMANCE MONITORING: PERIODICAL STATIST. DATA 
32 61 PERFORMANCE MONITORING: PRODUCTIVITY 
32 62 PERFORMANCE MONITORING: ROLL. STOCK RELIABILITY 
33 PERSONNEL EDUCATIONAL LEAVE OF ABSENCE 63 PERSONNEL EDUCATIONAL LEAVE OF ABSENCE 
34 PERSONNEL: ACQUISITIONPIRING 64 PERSONNEL: ACQUISITION 
34 68 PERSONNEL: FIRING 
35 PERSONNEL: WORKING CONDITIONS 71 PERSONNEL: SAFETY RULES 
36 PRICING POLICY 30 INTERNATIONAL TARRIFFS 
36 73 PRICING POLICY 
36 78 READJUSTMENT OF GENERAL FARES 
37 RELATIONS WITH TRADE UNIONS 79 RELATIONS WITH TRADE UNIONS 
38 ROAD VEHICLES ACQUISITION 82 ROAD VEHICLES ACQUISITION-LEASING 
38 83 ROAD VEHICLES: SPARE PARTS PURCHASE 
39 ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION 84 ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION 
39 85 ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION: STANDARDS APPROVAL 
39 86 ROLLING STOCK HIRE 
39 89 ROLLING STOCK: SPARE PARTS PURCHASE 
40 SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS: MODIFICATION 90 SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS: MODIFICATION 
41 SHAREHOLDERS 04 ANNUAL BALANCE SHEET (PREPARATION, APPROVAL) 
41 06 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING (CALL FOR) 
41 10 ASKE (ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING, SOCIAL AUDIT) 
42 SIDINGS: CONTRACTS 93 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, FREIGHT (SIDINGS CONTRACTS) 
43 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, FREIGHT 92 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, FREIGHT (CONTRACTS, FARES) 
44 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, PASSENGER 94 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, PASSENGER (OFFERS) 
45 STATE'S 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 95 STATE'S 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN: PROPOSALS FOR 
46 SUBCONTRACTED SERVICES: CONTRACTS 96 SUBCONTRACTED SERVICES: CONTRACTS 
47 SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES SET UP 97 SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES SET UP 
48 TASK DESIGN/DUTIES MODIFICATION 66 PERSONNEL: DUTIES DESCRIPTION REGULATIONS 
48 67 PERSONNEL: DUTIES MODIFICATION 
48 69 PERSONNEL: PROMOTION RULES MODIFICATION 
48 70 PERSONNEL: RULES AND REGULATIONS MODIFICATION 
49 TOP PERSONNEL PROMOTION 98 TOP PERSONNEL PROMOTION 
Figure Dl: Aggregated List of Board's Decision-Areas 
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D. 3. ANN-UA-L FREQUENCIES OF DECISIONS 
decisions per year % decisions per year 
d no ecision-area 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
1 15-YEARS STRATEGIC PLAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
2 ACCIDENTS REMUNERATION 7 4 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 
3 ADAPTATION TO STATE LEGISLATION/PLAN 2 4 3 1 0 0 4 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 
4 ANNUAL PURCHASES PROGRAMME 4 4 5 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 
5 ANNUAL REPORT 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
6 BOARD'S INTERNAL FUNCTIONING 4 1 1 2 0 1 6 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 1 
7 CAPITAL BUDGETING 2 3 7 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 
8 CAPITAL INVESTMENT I 1 1 0 0 1 7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 
9 CONSTRUCTORS/SUPPLIERS OBJECTIONS 4 3 4 12 12 9 4 2 1 2 1 2 4 4 4 2 1 1 
10 CONSULTANT'S RECRUITMENT 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
11 CONTROL BY THE STATE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 4 7 9 4 6 2 8 2 3 2 3 4 1 2 1 4 1 2 
13 EMERGENCY PROJECTS 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 FACILITIES 1 3 5 6 3 1 5 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 0 
15 FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 3 3 2 2 5 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 4 
16 GENERAL MANAGER APPOINTMENT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
17 INDUSTRIAL ACTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
18 INTERNATIONAL BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 2 1 3 2 1 4 5 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 
19 LAND/EQUIPMENT DONATION/SALE 11 12 10 8 8 4 4 7 2 5 6 4 2 3 2 2 4 1 
20 LAWSUITS 17 6 6 23 24 24 5 15 4 8 3 2 7 9 11 2 8 3 
21 LOANS 4 2 0 0 1 2 7 9 17 2 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 12 
22 MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 0 1 0 6 4 1 10 9 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 5 5 0 
23 MARKETING 0 1 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
24 MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT PURCHASE 9 17 28 69 39 39 3 1 1 4 8 11 21 14 18 1 1 1 
25 MODERNISATION PROJECTS 25 47 38 38 34 20 16 29 20 12 22 15 11 13 9 8 15 14 
26 MODIFICATIONS IN PAY PLANS 10 13 20 7 8 8 10 6 15 5 6 8 2 3 4 5 3 11 
27 NEW SERVICE INTRODUCTION 3 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
28 OFFICE AUTOMATION 4 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
29 ORGANISATION-WIDE PAY PLANS 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE: MODIFICATION 9 4 3 2 5 8 15 4 4 4 2 1 1 2 4 7 2 3 
32 PERFORMANCE MONITORING 5 9 4 4 9 4 9 10 5 2 4 2 1 3 2 4 5 4 
33 PERSONNEL EDUCATIONAL LEAVE 8 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
34 PERSONNEL: ACQUISITION/FIRING 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 
35 PERSONNEL: WORKING CONDITIONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
36 PRICING POLICY 4 2 4 6 7 2 6 10 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 5 2 
31 P. W. MATERIALS: KNOW-HOW ACQUISITION 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 RELATIONS WITH TRADE UNIONS 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
38 ROAD VEHICLES ACQUISITION 0 1 2 9 5 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 1 1 0 
39 ROLLING STOCK ACQUISITION 9 5 36 64 29 34 11 7 9 4 2 14 19 11 16 5 4 6 
40 SERVICE REGULATIONS: MODIFICATION 0 1 2 6 2 2 0 4 3 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 
41 SHAREHOLDERS 3 4 6 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 
42 SIDINGS: CONTRACTS 3 1 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
43 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, FREIGHT 16 22 21 21 20 6 12 15 13 7 10 8 6 7 3 6 8 9 
44 SPECIAL CUSTOMERS, PASSENGER 6 7 5 6 3 3 2 1 0 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 
45 STATE'S 5-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
46 SUBCONTRACTED SERVICES: CONTRACTS 11 7 8 12 9 8 7 5 1 5 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 
47 SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES SET UP 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
48 TASK DESIGN/DUTIES MODIFICATION 10 9 8 5 17 12 7 14 6 5 4 3 2 6 6 3 7 4 
49 TOP PERSONNEL PROMOTION 8 2 2 7 2 3 11 6 5 4 1 1 2 1 1 5 3 4 
tota1s 214 216 257 333 271 213 211 196 139 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Figure D2: Distribution of Board's Decisions (1980-1988) 
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DA. DISTRIBUTIONS OF DECISIONS OVER THE PERIOD EXAMINED 
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APPENDIX E 
RATIONALE FOR LINKS 
E. I. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE GENERAL 
MANAGER 
R0115 + QMSG: 
QMSG + PROE: 
"I will speak in favour of the railways not because I am the General Manager of the 
enterprise but because I believe that a modernized railway can playa veryimportant 
role in the future, in terms of the importance of high-speed rail transport that has 
developed at the end of this century and will be the principal means of transport for 
distances uo to 1 000 Km in the advent of the next century. Environmental 
protectiony will also substantiafly benefit from the development of the railways, in 
terms of reduced pollution. This factor should be seriously taken into account when 
designing transport systems". 
ROEF + R0115: 
"European Community, through the Regional Development Programmes, is partly 
funding the infrastructure development plan. The very limited financial resources 
, granted 
by the State during the last years, make E. E. C funds vital for the 
continuation of the project. " 
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QMSG + RTI: 
RTI + LUC: 
RTI + LNE: 
"M . gh-speed railways can prevent road traffic congestions. As you know, there are 
construction projects developing in the Athens to Thessaloniki motorway, However, 
if we are going to have the rate of increase in car ownership that other European 
countries have experienced -and the forecasts show that we tend to similar figures- 
then in 6- 7 years time this motorway will again be congested By attracting a certain 
amount of freight traffic from the motorway, we do not only help the National 
Economy but the car users as well, in terms of convenience of those who will st. 11 wish 
to travel on the motorway, Thus, primarely, we don't see our role as competitive to 
the other modes of transport but as supplementary. 
ERECT + DOA 
CPRS + DOA : 
RIRSPC + CPRS: 
CCAQS +ERETC: 
"What are today the activities the enterprise is engaged in? Whilst the enterprise is a 
transport company, it is mostly engaged in activities such as permanent way 
construction and maintenance. This is not a characteristic of a railway company. 
Beyond these activities the enterprise is engaged in the maintenance and repair of 
rolling stock (coaches, wagons, locomotives). It is evident that the organization 
operates either as a contractor or a workshop, repairing or refurbishing rolling stock. 
As you understand, these two main- stream activities are unprofitable, unrelated to 
the company's principal role, i. e. that of producing and selling quality transport. 
Consequently, there is a vague attitude towards "what we stand foil'. We get confused 
of operating the workshops, which could be run by either a private company or 
another public enterprise, completely different and independent from the Railways. 
Here I have to say that we are now in the process of clearing things up. By 
implementing the contract 294193, we are going to provide the network with rolling 
stock manufactured in Greece (Athens area shipyards). Thus, potentially, we could 
have refurbishing/manufacturing bids in the future. With the railway promoting 
these sorts of contracts, we do not only assist the survival of these two enterprises 
(nationalized shipyards) but we also promote a sort of divestment from activities 
which, in any other case, would have been undertaken by the Railway'. 
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"... The principal business of this company is transport and transport does not belong 
to the industrial sector; it belongs to the sector of services. it necessitates a totally 
different attitude. The problem we face is not to safeguard trains movement. The 
problem is to provide the customer with the best possible services and this should be 
our first aim". 
LOPT + CCAQS: 
"Personnel training will help us to possess this new attitude of a service company and 
these services could range from intercity services to suburban services". 
RGIIMP + LAB 
LAB -LOD : 
LOD +LOGS: 
RGIIMP + R0115: 
"There is an obligation on the part of the Greek State to cover the deficits that derive 
from the Railways operations; and this State's contribution is huge. Every year the 
Greek State pays 30 billion drachmas to cover the railways operational deficit. When 
the State is not in a position to cover the deficit, then it allows us to borrow under its 
guarantee. It is more preferable to direct a portion of this amount to investment in 
modernization which, as shown in the recent feasibility study, is highly 
remunerative". 
CIOS + CCAQS: 
LOPT + CCAQS: 
UOIS + CCAQS: 
LOEG + UOIS: 
LOEG +LOPT: 
"By organizational restructuring of the operations according to the guidelines I just 
mentioned, by making the most of information systems use and training programmes, 
promoted and financed by the Community, we can implant in the enterprise the spirit 
required in order to put itself at the service of a customer enjoying a pleasant 
voyage". 
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FDETU + IFS: 
IFS - LOD: 
LOD - LNE: 
QMSG +LNE: 
"There is also the law of value regeneration. In our case, this should be reflected into 
the fare structure. When we say that today we have the lowest fare in the market, this 
means that as the company is subsidized, a big part of this fare is being paid by the 
taxpayer, not the user. I believe that, except for some social groups which have to be 
assisted, the users must pay for the value of services they use. Gradually, we have to 
reach the point where the larger part will be paid by the user and our society through 
clear arrangements will grant rights to certain users to use transport modes at a 
reduced fare. This also means that the companies will get in return subsidies 
equivalent to the transport cost'. 
"Based upon a recent study, we argue that even if rail fares are doubled, traffic 
volume is going to triple on the Athens to Thessaloniki "commercial" axis. 
Consequently, if today we collect 5 billion from it, the combination of fares increases 
with the traffic volume increase could give us encashments of 30 billion. Yet the 
current operational deficit is less than 15 billion. Thus the modernization project is 
highly repaying'. 
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E. 2. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE ASSISTANT G. M. 
DGWPR - DBA 
DBA + DCSF: 
DCSF - R0115: 
DGATR + LISL: 
LISL - DAMA: 
DAMA +DOS: 
DOS +CDTH: 
GPRDI + DAMA: 
" We are now in April 1989 and we don't know which is the level of financial resources 
approved by the Government for this year. We know our proposal, we know 
approximately what is going to be gýven, but this isn't reafly approved because we 
haven't even found the sources of financing. Would they be public investments, would 
they be borrowing? We have to negotiate with banks on the rate of interest and the 
terms of the loan. At the end, you feel like the runner who never touches the finishing 
line". 
"This is a difficult period for there have been many changes in the way we operate 
and in the government's interest in the railway development. Socialization, emphasis 
on the railways, retreat because of weaknesses, emphasis on inland industrial 
development. All these are new, first- experienced issues. Thus, an entanglement in 
the organizational structure has occured because the managers, being uncertain 
about their responsibilities, push decisions up to the higher echelons. Therefore, a 
bulk of decisions, that under other circumstances would have been made at lower 
levels, are made at the to#'. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
QCDS +LOP: 
QCDS - RDS : 
IMP + DBEAC: 
DBEAC-QCDS: 
RDK + QCDS: 
"A big percentage of our failure today is owing to the fact that nobody in the past 
cared about succession. You choose someone for a post and you train him for it. This 
has never been contemplated When the time for promotions comes, all are graded by 
347 
their superiors at 58 or 59 on a scale with a maximum of 60 points. Yet if all are so 
exceptional, why the organization stands at the brink? Thus, a degradation of 
structures and a degeneration of institutional laws occurred, within an atmosphere 
characrerised by indifference. " 
QGAIB + LCB: 
QEAB + LCB: 
LCB-NFPM: 
"The Board does not have the status an executive board should have. That is of a 
Board aware of railway matters and devoting time to their study. The appointment to 
the Board, both on the part of the Government and the employees, is coincidental. 
The limited capacity of some Boardmembers to understand economic issues leads to 
the employement of bureaucratic processes; the more ignorant you are, the more you 
want to avoid responsibility, the more you want to secure your decision, the more you 
pull back the discussion. " 
DGWPR + R015: 
DGWPR - UALF: 
R015 + ROI 15: 
"The primary concerns of the Board should be performance monitoring, and the 
following up of the 5-year business plan which consequently affects the lonkterm 
development plan. Unfortunately, all such decisions have been arrived at within 
minutes. Why is it so? I have to give the Board some right. Nobod feels certain y 
about funding and everyone knows that after the approval of the 15-year plan there 
was no answer for the second 5-year business plan submitted recently... In 1983, there 
was an emphasis on railway development. Thus, we employed new engineers to study 
and supervise the development projects. We had an initial governmental approval for 
a 45 bifflon funding concerning the first 5-year business plan for the period 1983- 
1987 The new engineers arrived but the organization never received even half of this 
funding". 
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UALF-LCHL: 
"The Board can exert control onlyatter the rate of fundingis ascertained'. 
DBA - CLTP: 
LOB +CLTP: 
"We are not used to look into the future and plan for it. There is a lack of hope, a 
disappointment. Yet, what plan can one design when he asks for 30 and he gets only 
14 ?P 
QGAB DPOM: 
QEAB DPOM: 
DPOM + RAGED: 
RAGED + CDDCG: 
CDDCG + IOSB: 
"You establish a Law for the 'Socialization of Public Enterprises'. The people you 
appoint to the Board must be capable of understanding their role. You appoint a 
workshop worker to the Supervisory Board What policy will he approve, what 
direction will he give? In A. S. KE. (the Supervisory Board), there were government's 
representatives as well who didn't understand what railway's are, how an enterprise 
should operate. Thus we only had a political confrontation. As a result, the 
government inactivated A. S. KE. 's essential competences, in which, by the way, 
governmental representatives never participated According to the legislation, 
A. S. KE. submits medium-term and lonkterm policy proposals to the government; 
Has the government ever, during these three years, invited A. S. KE. to discuss with? 
Never. The General Manager directly communicates with the government. Whenever 
a matter involved governmental approval, we always had a formal approval, no matter 
how important the issue was. Is anybody in the Government capable of deciding for 
(other than financial) amendments to the companys's proposals? " 
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UAILF - LPT: 
"The lack of a constant rate of funding was the reason behind the negligence of 
personel training. Our planning efforts are not time wasted over drawings. I believe 
that if we had a constant rate of funding we would act differently. In that case, we 
would be controlled by A. S. K. E. in the sense 'you have asked me for 20, you did only 
10'. Then, we could also discuss the General Manager's responsibilities... " 
LCHL + QCDS: 
"We have a formal system of promotions based on the evaluation of six different 
characterististics; managerial, professional, mental, moral, physical, and psychic. 
They are measured on a 10-point scale. It strikes badly to mark someone with a7 or 
8. You find a whole Department coming up with a list of 50 people, 46 of which have 
marks 56 to 57 at a maximum of 60. Thus, subordinates get used to high marking, and 
when someone gets a 52, that is a8 to 9 on average with maximum 10, (s)he is hurt. 
Every year, lists of candidates for promotion are examined by the respective 
committees. They have a rank let's say 58,57,54 out of 60; that is, they are all 
recommended by their superiors to be promoted by selection, which means that they 
are exceptionally good What can the promotions committee do under these 
circumstances? It promotes the first in the list and then you catch your breath. How 
could this employee be promoted in this way? Who really ct)ntrols, who have the guts 
to do it?.. Shouldn't we ask 'Who is the one that marked? Is he perhaps someone 
marked himself for 30? And is it that when he judges someone better than him marks 
for a 57? ' 
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E. 3. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL 
REP. I 
RGF + R0115: 
AIASF + R0115: 
RCNTC + R0115: 
RDCRS + R0115: 
RDNOS + R0115: 
ROEF + R0115: 
NRSP + R0115: 
"In 1983, a tech nico- economic stud prepared by the Department of Planning and y 
Organization indicated that the cost of the modernization plan was 200 billion at 
1983 prices. This is the plan whose basic lines we are following. Certainly, it has to be 
adjusted to the prevailing conditions and the annual cash flows. We make efforts to 
-vescape'from the State's tundingand to consider other sources such as the E. E. C. We 
have recently submitted to one of the Regional Programmes, concerning 
improvements in transport systems in the E. E. C. countries, a request for funding. If 
this request is granted, then the rate of implementation of the Rail Plan will be 
accelerated This Plan incorporates all the company's goals which, being 
materialized, the whole project will also do. We basically have to modernize both the 
permanent way, the rolling stock, and the operations sptem by improving our 
services". 
" We need specialized railway engineers. It will accelerate the modernization plan 
because the engineers we now have are engaged in day-to-day operations and neglect 
lonkterm planning'. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
RDCRS + RCNTA: 
RDCRS+ RKHA: 
RGF + LAB: 
LAB + RDCRS: 
"As far as rolling stock is concerned, its replacement is accelerated by the big 294183 
contract which is now progressing. It was signed in 1987 between a consortium of 
German industries and the Athens area shipyards. By the end of 1991, all the units 
ordered will be ibtroduced into the operatione. 
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"The organization pays for this project and supervises its implementation. Thus it 
obtains a certain level of know-how. The problem in this contract as wefl is funding. 
At todays prices, the estimated cost of the contract is approximately 40 biflion. To 
guarantee its funding, we are considering, apart from Government's funds, 
alternative sources such as borrowing or leasing". 
SIED + VSC: 
VSC + LESB: 
LESB + LOPM: 
"A. S. K. E. (the supervisory Board) should play the role attributed to it by the 
'Socialization LaW'. Social control is an issue which, through critique and 
formulation of solutions to problems on the part of the stakeholders' representatives, 
could not only lead to the modification of the Board's structure but also promote the 
development plan. ". 
"The Supervisory Boards competencies are not such as to impede the enterprise's 
functioning. We would not stop operating if there wasn't a supervisory Board. 
A. S. KE. 's interest is in strategic planning issues, and in operational matters at a level 
of overall principles. There was no chance of course for A. S. KE. to see an annual 
balance sheet materializing some of these things, so that we could discuss about 
performance monitoring. A. S. KE. 's not proper functioning is a problem. But we are 
not stuck into some issues just because of this; simply, we don't have approvals of our 
proposals or actions". 
LSRPE + SPI: 
SPI + PAFB: 
PAFB + CAOG: 
" We established a new pay-scheme. O. S. E. 's employees have alway's been the less paid 
among those of the public sector. Because of this, some more money were gfven to 
them? P. 
"CertainlyI don't claim that it is the perfect system. Some problems appeared during 
the implementation of fringe benefits, and this has created problems among some 
occupational groups. Nevertheless, it is now better than it was in the pastff. 
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CDPP + DR : 
GPKFL + CDPP: 
RINPO + CDPP: 
"By improving our means of production -new rolling stock, operational 
improvements, new or upgraded track- and by incorporating them graduafly into the 
operations, we can ask for bigger fare increases. Yet the government insists to keep 
them low. We know that if we could implement our views the enterprise's deficits 
would disappear". 
CSL + COS: 
CSL + CWRC: 
TUI - CWRC: 
TUI - COS: 
"The Socialization Law set the need to restructuring the enterprise. 's activities and to 
adjust its legislative framework concerning work rules and regulations to the new 
philosophy ina ugura ted by it. PP 
"Work rules and regulations and organizational structure have to be changed because 
of the Socialization Law, but the Trade Unions had different views and managed to 
block them at some Auditing Bodies. " 
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E. 4. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL 
REP. 2 
NFRM + NOGF 
NFRM + R0115: 
"Any one could see that modernization was vital for the enterprise. This renders 
government sensible to the enterprise's investment needs. " 
DEGCR + LPM : 
DPQRDF - DEGCR: 
"Certainly, the enterprise's operations could be improved. Deviations showing up in 
the quarterly reviews between the budgeted figures and the ones actuafly produced is 
an indicator of how well we (Department of National Economy) and O. S. E. did our 
J b- if 
GEP - LAIP: 
GEP - ]LAB: 
GEP - ROEH: 
"This policy launched in 1985 restricted public enterprises from hiring employes, and 
set severe limitations to their expenditure... Of course this has affected the flow of 
investment as well; sometimes the boundaries of certain definitions become blur". 
LAIP + RIMP: 
GPKFL-DPP: 
"Without money afl the projects slow down. " 
"It is a governmental policy to keep fares low to allow for people who do not have 
much to spend to use the railway.. Every year, proposals for fare increases take their 
way up to the Department of Transport, the Department of Commerce, and the 
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Department of National Economy. At the end, a fare policy is agreed upon which 
never could go beyond government's limits, no matter how strong organizational 
arguments there existed". 
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E. 5. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE EMPLOYEES'REP. I 
DRSP + NEG: 
R0115 + LRC: 
LRC + NEG: 
"In the introductory report of the 15-year Rail Plan, it was clearly described how the 
railway would benefit from the implementation of this plan, by becoming competitive 
and profitable. However, it would not only directly contribute to profits for the 
National Economy. Domestic rolling stock manufacturing should also be considered; 
it has a significant domestic added value and a relatively decreased need for 
impor 11. 
RGF + LAB : 
LOB + LAB : 
"The level of the annual budget is defined by the government and some modifications 
that may arise are also determined within the framework that has been set". 
"The part of the annual bydget concerning investment is covered both by borrowing 
and Government's funding". 
IRTU + LEP : 
IRTU +LA 
LA + LSO 
LSO + LSSP: 
"It is self-evident that the better relations the enterprise maintains with the trade 
unions the better the employees perform. Especially during this year, our relations 
with management were the best ever. For the first time a labour agreement, 
independent from the overall governmental public service policy, was signed.. It 
provides solutions to demands of alternative occupational groups. Beyond this, the 
most important is that top management was bound to make alterations to the 
organizational structure and to different rules and regulations concerning the 
employees". 
A 
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"O. S. E. is a service organization. It needs specialized employees in market research, 
in information technology. Having only a perfect structure is not enough. You owe to 
have people to provide you with the work you need. Unfortunately, O. S. E. wants to 
hire these people by offering salaries which make them flee away. " 
NBTA + GPPRS: 
GPPRS - RSH 
RSR + LOP 
LTCA + RSH 
LTCA + RDRSM: 
"Bilateral agreements are not signed by O. S. E., they are signed by the government. 
The government guides the enterprise in way that a part of its procurement is 
chanelled through bilateral agreements. This is a very important factor that 
influences the quality of our services. Let's talk about rolling stock. There is a big 
difference in reliability between Canadian or American locomotives and locomotives 
manufactured in Eastern European countries. Definitely, technical experience of the 
staff should also be considered However, this procurement policy affects negatively 
our performance". 
"In my view, procurements that concern the railways modernization and 
development should not be subject to the State's trading policy. In such a case, the 
company could buy more reliable products. Finally we could also solve the problem of 
multiplicity in types of rolling stock. At the moment, we have 40 different types of 
locomotives. It is out of anylogic". 
"By satisfýing our needs with lonkterm agreements for rolling stock manufacturing 
and maintenance we could lessen the problem of multiplicity of types and prepare the 
grounds for a gradual divestment from these activities". 
LOT + DOPT: 
NSEC- DOPT: 
"We need continual training, especially in issues related both to the technological and 
the operations functions of the railway. It is not enough to compile a training 
programme. You should create trainers with the proper knowledge. There have been 
some efforts towards this end; we are building a Training Centre which is not ready 
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yet; on the other hand, people are sent to be trained abroad in countries such as 
Switzerland, France, England" 
GPKFL-DPP: 
DPP - PDRSB: 
GDRM + DPP : 
"At the moment, the railways passenger services tarrifs are not only below cost but 
also below competition, because of government's wish to exercise social policy. By 
keeping fares low, the organization's operational deficit significantly increases year 
by year. If for example we have an annual deficit of 10 billion, charging with 
increased fares we would have a deficit of 8 billion. This difference is not granted by 
the government in its own right. Although last year we compiled a social budget and 
submitted it to the supervisory Board, this budget was not discussed I imagine that 
when A. S. K. E. will function properly this deficit will appear separately in the 
operational budget not as it is today within the operational expenses but as State's 
social policy. 
"In order to have a precise pricingpolicy, the State should define what it expects from 
the railway'. 
NOP + IOSB: 
IOM + IOSB: 
NIBE + IOSB: 
IOSB + LOC: 
"A. S. K. E. cannot function efficiently because it is a large board (27 members) and 
cannot convoke in frequent meetings. Thus, when the understand the significance of 
performance monitoring gets and when they do convoke, there are so many preceding 
subjects that they don't have the time to discuss them all. To me, the most important 
function that A. S. K. E. should perform is control. 
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E. 6. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE EMPLOYEESREP. 2 
R0115 + ETP: 
ETP - LOS: 
ETP - LCE: 
"There has been an over-reliance on technical projects; the rail plan has only been 
perceived as investment in construction works. The new General Manager has 
changed this attitude. Now the emphasis is put on both the delays 
reduction/passengers comfort and on the employee. The plan, as being materialized 
by the former General Manager, had placed the engineering projects at the centre of 
the enterprise and the customers and employees at its periphery. This is reversed 
now". 
LWSRP - JR 
RRSH - JR 
IPD + RRSH: 
GVOP + RRSH: 
LEBP + RRSH: 
"There are many explanations for the rolling stock problem. On the one side, we have 
the inadequacy of our units to indicate what they want and how they are going to get 
it. On the other side, we have the very economical bid proposals coming from the 
Eastern countries and the bilateral commercial agreements that put obstacles in the 
process because the Department of Commerce has the final say on any international 
trade agreement. " 
"The problem of service reliability has nothing to do with the single-tracked parts of 
the network. It is a traction and rolling stock problem; no one faced it as such. 
Obviously, rolling stock issues have been discussed for a long time. However, after 
the change in top management, they are now in the way toward a solution". 
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CEGB-RCMP: 
QTS - CEGB: 
"This is one of the biggest problems. According to the old legislation concerning 
Public Works, the revision of a project's budget, up to a 5090' increase of the initially 
estimated cost, was within the authority of the operating departments. For the 
approval of further budget increases up to an unlimited amount, the responsibility 
lied within the Board. This had resulted in poorely prepared studies, as far as the 
financial dimension of the project was concerned; candidate contractors made thus 
significantly cheaper offers (than the estimated expenses) in order to get the job. As 
soon as they did so, they started inventing problems to allow for supplementary 
compensation... The new legislation tried to remedy this situation by imposing an 
upper limit of overal/ 5096, for any revision of aproject's budget. Beyond this limit, 
the legislation provided mechanisms for the dissolution of the contractn. 
ECS + LPM: 
LCMP - ECS: 
VOO - ECS: 
BP - LPM: 
"Anything discussed here today has to do with the organizational chart. Anything, 
especially performance monitoring. Certainly, neither the organizational structure 
we had until 1985 was solving the problem nor the one proposed in 1986 by the 
former General Manager. The latter, after two years of discussions, was finally 
approved by the Board but dismissed by the Supreme Court... " 
"... There are two weaknesses concerning the actual organizational structure; the 
vagueness of organizational objectives, and the limited managerial capacity at all 
organizational levels. The upper managerial structure within our company is below 
th ea vera ge le vel... What I say has nothing to do with politics or whatever; it has to do 
with their personal capacity'. 
"There is no function such as performance monitoring; neither on the part of service 
reliability nor on the part of Rail Plan implementation. Whenever I asked for 
information concerning reports and Plan reviews I got the answer: 'we are preparing 
it, as soon as it is ready we will bring it to you'. The enterprise operated and operates 
as a skirmisher". 
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RIRSP + RKHA: 
RPTT + RKHA: 
"The only means we have to obtain know-how is the 294183 contract, concerning the 
domestic construction of rolling stock. There are also programmes funded by the 
E. E. C for engfneers and other technicians to be sent abroad and trained in track 
construction and maintenance". 
361 
E. 7. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE EMPLOYEES'REP. 3 
DNUD + IMP: 
DNUD + RSA: 
"I would see as strategic decisions related to the railway development plan either 
those referring to permanent way development projects or to rolling stock 
acquisition. In my view, the technological ineffectiveness of the enterprise is the 
main reason which makes such decisions so vital for the future of the network. " 
CAB - LAIPP: 
TUESL + CAB 
RSVAB + NDRP: 
DLCPD + NDRP: 
GDPF + CAB : 
"We have issues related with funding, procurement, personnel matters. According to 
the legislation, our Board is totally responsible to decide on economic matters; 
however, in real life this doesn't happen because of the framework of tight controls 
imposed by the State which, by 'paying all the bills', has the final say on budgets' 
approval. I've been on this Board for four years; it never happened for an investment 
or procurement budget to be sent for approval and to be approved by the government 
without modifications. There has always been a significant truncation". 
PLCOS + DOS : 
DLCPD + NDRP: 
VLCS + BMC 
DCIPB - BMC 
IGIS - DCIPB: 
CPIPVD - DCIPB: 
CPIPV + RIRDS: 
RIRDS + DOS 
DOS + OESR: 
SRISL + DOS : 
RSVAB + NDRP: 
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"There is the problem of coordination between the different organizational sub- 
systems, namely employees, track construction and maintenance, rolling stock, and 
operations, the latter seen as a transport company's operations, and this problem 
leads to pressures over organizational structures... The main reason of having so 
many decisions related to personnel is that many of our employees come from 
different railway firms (public and private ones) that have merged over the years to 
form the present organization. These companies had different rules governing 
personnel issues (career development, age of retirement e. t. c) and it's obvious why 
such issues arise now. The various requirements set by the controlling governmental 
departments render the problem concerning personnel decisions more acute. " 
"The majority of these problems could easily have been resolved at lower 
organizational echelons but there exists an intense concentration of decision making 
at the top of the hierarchy -I mean the Board and the General Manager- and, to a 
lesser degree, at head of department and head of division levels. We have an informal 
repeal of the delegation system which results in the plethora of decisions I have 
mentioned.. 
"The organization tried to design a new structure also concerted with the requisites 
imposed by the Socialization Law. Unfortunately the proposed model was outside the 
logic of this institutional framework. " 
"The Presidential Decree 59186, on the details of the implementation of the 
Socialization Law in the Railway, was so vague and so general that led the Board to 
misinterpret its evaluations about its own competencies in restructuring the 
organization. " 
"The way the Board functions is questionable. Though it is the dominating body, it 
doesn't have access to information sources, in order to compare, to analyse the 
different elements of the organizational introductory accounts. This results in the 
raise of the General Manager as dominating figure even above the Board, by 
possessing the mechanism to shape the accounts. This Law has a disadvantage; 
according to the old institutional framework, the responsibility for accounts was 
assigned to the Heads of Departments whereas now it is the General Manager that 
has this responsibility. But the General Manager is a political figure, subject to 
dismission, and has a political attitude... This attitude is also the reason of this silent 
repeal of the delegation sptem we were discussing earlier". 
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RIRDS - LCDS: 
LCDS +LPM: 
"The concentration of decision making on the top of the hierarchy destroys the 
foundations of the careers development system which would cater for managers 
cultivating the spirit of both participative leadership and distribution of 
responsibility. " 
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E. 8. LINKS AMONG CONCEPTS EXPRESSED BY THE HEAD OF 
PLANNING DEPT. 
ROM + R0115: 
RCP + R0115: 
ROI + R0115: 
"The lonkterm development plan is the most strategic decision of all. It is an all- 
includingplan; it is concerned with the network's development in physical terms, with 
rolling stock acquisition, with operations improvements, and with personnel's 
welfare. To the extend that all those sectors are materialised in parallel, we can argue 
that we have a satisfactorily rate of the Rail Plan's implementation. " 
IOP + IOSB: 
IOSB + VCRS: 
IOSB - LOC: 
VCRS + NTC: 
NTC + LORR: 
"We cannot evaluate the conduct of this Supervisory Board since it never achieved a 
proper functioning. The 1987 Annual Report, we are now in 1989, was never 
approved, because A. S. K. E. never convened an assembly over this period In its 
theoretical conception, this institutional body is o. k. but finally it didn't work. It may 
be the indifference of its participants, I don't know.. Although A. S. K. E. 's inefficiency 
does not affect the enterprise's daily operations, it does affect the shaping of a 
railway mission within the transport system. A. S. K. E. could press the government for 
a study to be undertaken, concerning the coordination of the alternative transport 
modes. This coordination study would lead to the optimum utilization of everysingle 
mode; that is to say each mode should transport people/products for which it is the 
most economical, from a National Economy viewpoint. There is no need to have 
competing corridors among transport modes but supplementary... This should be, 
A. S. K. E. 's one role; the second should be performance monitoring, which, in reality, 
never occurred over this period'. 
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RFPI + LAIP: 
REEC + LAIP: 
LOB + LAIP: 
"The investments plan has three sources of funding; the public investment 
programme, borrowing and the Communitys contributions". 
GPKFL - LOFI: 
QSO -GPKFL: 
LUT + QOS: 
"There is a decision made by the Board concerning fare increases and the 
government, for social policy reasons, approves only a part of the proposed increases 
or sometimes, even no increases at all. There were years when, besides inflation, 
fares remained at the same level.. In the future, we have to be able to define by 
ourselves the company's pricing policy. We have to persuade the government to look 
at the problem from a different perspective... The main reason we cannot persuade 
them now is the quality of services offered. Although the journey times are 
improving, the rate of improvement is not satisfactory; thus we can only ask, we 
cannot demand'. 
LDOB +LOB: 
LOB + LDOB: 
GPKFL + LDOB: 
"O. S. E. has an operational deficit, because of the imposition of social policy and this 
deficit is covered by borrowing. Thus, the enterprise is caught into a vicious circle; it 
borrows money to cover its deficits and next year the deficit increases because 
interests are added, and the following year it will increase much more because of 
regular installments. " 
"The State has the obligation, in terms of the Economic Agreement, to cover every 
year the enterprise's deficits. Due to its weakness to cover the whole amount of these 
deficits, allowed borrowing which in turn leads to the mounting of the deficit. I wil/ 
say it again: it's a vicious circle when the enterprise is a problematic one. " 
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NFD + COS: 
NIP + COS: 
"Recently, we had a reorganization of some divisions -the permanent way sectors 
constitute now part of the Assistant General Manager's competencies, whereas 
previously belonged to the regfonal departments- because there has been a need to 
improve performance and a need to decentralize some of our functions. " 
MRSS + LPSP: 
HRSR + LPSP: 
HRSR - LIJT: 
HRSR + PAM: 
PAM + ECAS: 
EIKHA + ECAS: 
LPSP + ECAS: 
"We do take into consideration the possibility of know-how acquisition whenever 
purchases of rolling stock units or spare parts are required Because we have made 
procurements of different types of rolling stock and because there is a monopoly state 
in parts supply we have to buy at very high prices. We cannot afford being under the 
suppliers' total control. Government's promotion of the industrial economic 
development defines a framework which, coupled with our wish for know-how 
acquisition, led to the formation of a different policy. The 294183 contract 
implements exactly this policy. " 
NBTA + HRSR: 
LPSP + LIM 
"We are not a wealthy country and ever time we have bid proposals we have to y 
choose among them the ones that came from countries with which Greece had 
bilateral trade agreements. This led to rolling stock heterogeneity which keeps on 
causingproblems to maintenance and to the overalI railway operations. This mixture 
of rolling stock types creates the big problem of locomotives break-downs which 
directly affects service reliability; and this displays vividly the weakness of not 
producing these products in Greece. We don't have spare parts -lack of money, 
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delays- and, in order not to have two locomotives immobilized, we take off parts from 
one and put them on to the second until the orders from abroad arrive". 
APM + LPM: 
RABP + LPM: 
DNU + WCON: 
LBT + WCON: 
WCON - APM: 
ERTP-APM: 
"The quality of performance monitoring is related on the one hand to the rate of 
auditing the annual business plan, that is to say if the rate of the progress been made 
is the same as the one forecasted, and on the other hand to the definition of 
productivity measures... We cannot easily compare our network with other European 
ones for we have certain peculiarities. First, the position of our country in the 
periphery of Europe does not provide for transit traffic. Second, our modernization 
has been delayed for a number of years, because governments were payýng more 
interest to the development of the road network. Third, we don't have bulk 
commodities transport; the present design of the network doest intercept the major 
productive areas of thq country... The issue of productivity is being presently studied; 
the productivity level has been quite low compared to other means of transport, for 
we are obliged to have staff working independently of the traffic transported 
Nevertheless, we have to introduce productivity measurements in order to assess if 
the numbers of our employees are excessive or whatever in terms of the job we are 
undertaking. " 
RFC + LPM: 
RPIC + LPT: 
MWUPT + LPT: 
"There is a training programme funded partly by the E. E. C and partly by the 
enterprise, and also participations in international conferences and committees that 
contribute to the effort of personnel training. The encouragement on the part of top 
management of personnel to continuing training is a factor we cannot ignore. " 
APPENDIX F 
SCORES FROM MATRICES 
F. 1. INTRODUCTION 
This appendix contains: 
(a). The matrices produced by the five strategists who participated in this part of the field research 
(Figures FI, F5, F8, F13, and F19). 
(b). The squared matrices of the above five (Figures F2, F6, FIO, F14, and F18). 
(c) Five structural matrices (Figures F3, F7, F11, F15, and F19). (d) Five squared structural 
matrices (Figures F4, F8, F12, F16, and F20). 
The notation used concerning the rows and columns of the matrices (strategic-areas) is as follows: 
A: The 15-Year Railway Development Plan. 
B: Domestic Rolling Stock Manufacturing (the 294/83 Contract). 
C: The Annual Budget. 
D: The Engineering Projects. 
E: Rolling Stock Acquisition. 
F: Performance Monitoring. 
G: THe Annual General Assembly of the Supervisory Board (ASKE). 
H: Organizational Structure. 
1: Personnel Training. 
J: The Railway's Proposals to the State's 5-Year Developmant Plan. 
K: The Pricing Policy. 
L: Employement Maintenance / Employees Welfare. 
M: The Government's Financial Policy (imposed restrictions). 
N: The Administrative Controls. 
0: Problems with Suppliers. 
P: Employees Participation in Decision -Making. 
Q: Bilateral State's Commercial Agreements. 
R: The Incompatibility of Policies of the Government's Departments. 
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S: The Bureaucratic Phenomena. 
T: The Decision-Making System. 
U: The Management System. 
V: Task Design and Job Definition. 
W: The Corporate Culture. 
X: The Rewards and Compensations System. 
Y: The Career and Management Development System. 
The appendix also contains: 
(e). Tables of identified strong relationships deriving from the strategists' scoring on the matrices 
(Figures F21, F227 F23, F24, and F25). 
(f). A table of direct and direct consequences (Figure F26), according to the Stubbart and 
Ramaprasad (1988) methodology. 
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F. 2. MATRICES OF STRATEGIST 2 (ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER) 
A B C D E F G H J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U 
A 2 3 2 1 -1 -1 -1 
1 -3 
2 2 3 
3 2 3 1 3 
1 3 2 2 
2 2 2 
-1 -2 
3 3 3 
3 2 2 
-3 -2 1 -1 -1 -1 -2 1 -1 
-2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -2 -1 -1 3 -1 -1 -2 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -2 
-2 -1 -1 
Figure FI: Score matrix of Strategist 2 (Assistant General Manager) 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q RS T U V W X Y 
A 13 6 2 8 5 7 5 7 12 6 4 -2 -2 4 -4 -2 1 5 -1 2 
B 17 15 -1 15 8 3 3 7 10 -2 6 6 -2 3 5 1 2 1 1 4 2 
c 1 13 5 2 3 -1 1 -1 6 3 -1 14 1 -7 -4 -1 -4 -6 2 3 -4 -1 
D 4 13 5 22 4 7 -3 6 1 4 -1 -10 -8 -1 -15 -15 -7 1 
E 2 3 5 16 4 2 5 6 7 3 -1 -1 -7 1 4 -4 -5 2 7 3 2 2 
F 14 14 3 16 3 7 2 10 9 10 3 7 7 -5 -9 4 -6 -4 6 6 2 3 6 
G 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
H 6 6 4 8 5 5 2 2 6 1 2 -2 5 7 2 6 10 5 3 5 2 5 
1 6 6 3 2 1 2 1 1 5 1 5 -3 -1 1 -2 -2 2 2 -1 1 
J 10 11 10 17 2 7 1 13 10 12 2 8 5 -2 -11 1 4 -6 -6 6 8 1 1 8 
K 5 6 6 10 2 8 1 3 3 1 11 -1 21 -12 -2 -2 -5 -5 3 6 1 4 3 
L 2 2 2 -1 -2 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 -1 -5 -4 -3 1 2 -2 1 
M -10 -15 3 -11 2 1 -8 -3 -3 -5 2 -2 10 4 -1 10 11 2 3 2 -2 
N -6 -8 -2 -2 4 -3 1 -7 -3 -9 -2 -3 -7 -8 15 3 8 13 3 -5 1 -2 
0 -1 -1 -1 2 3 -1 1 -1 -4 -2 -8 -3 6 1 4 5 1 -1 
P -3 -2 1 -5 -1 1 -3 -1 -4 -2 -2 -3 -1 7 9 8 9 3 -1 5 3 
Q -1 -3 -2 -1 -2 2 -1 1 1 -1 
R 
S -11 -11 -1 -8 -3 -4 -5 -1 -6 -4 -6 3 5 6 -1 -1 2 -4 1 
T -4 -5 2 -4 1 3 -1 -5 -3 -2 -7 9 4 9 11 3 -1 4 2 2 
u 3 2 4 4 6 3 -1 2 -4 -2 -1 -5 -5 12 6 1 15 13 5 8 2 3 
v 
w -1 -1 1 -1 2 1 1 3 -1 2 2 9 8 6 2 1 8 1 5 
x 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
y 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure F2: Squared score matrix of Strategist 2 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G 1 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q 1 
R 
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 
w 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
x 1 1 
Y 1 
Figure F3: Structural matrix of Strategist 2 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 4 4 2 6 5 2 2 4 3 3 3 2 5 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 
B 5 7 3 8 8 2 2 5 3 2 4 3 2 7 3 3 6 5 4 3 4 4 
c 4 4 5 5 5 3 2 2 5 1 2 3 1 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 
D 5 6 4 9 7 2 2 4 3 2 3 3 2 6 4 3 8 7 2 4 6 3 
E 5 5 3 8 7 1 2 6 3 3 4 3 2 7 2 4 6 5 2 3 4 2 
F 8 8 4 8 5 5 2 5 8 4 2 4 5 2 9 4 3 7 8 5 6 4 3 6 
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 2 4 2 4 
3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 
7 7 6 8 5 2 4 7 6 5 4 2 7 2 5 7 6 4 4 4 4 
K 5 5 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 5 2 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 
L 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 4 1 3 3 4 4 4 3 1 4 2 1 
m 6 7 4 10 9 4 4 6 5 2 4 7 2 9 4 4 6 6 4 7 3 2 4 
N 5 5 3 6 4 3 1 4 6 4 1 4 4 2 7 2 4 5 5 4 6 3 2 4 
0 4 4 2 3 4 3 1 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 5 1 2 2 4 3 5 2 2 2 
p 6 6 3 8 6 5 1 4 7 4 1 4 3 2 7 6 2 6 7 6 5 7 2 7 
Q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 
s 6 7 5 8 7 3 3 5 4 3 4 2 8 2 3 7 5 2 7 4 4 
T 7 7 4 9 6 6 2 5 7 3 2 4 5 3 8 3 4 7 8 4 7 5 3 5 
u 8 8 6 10 7 5 2 5 7 5 1 4 4 2 8 3 4 8 8 6 7 7 3 5 
v 
w 4 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 5 5 4 4 1 7 1 5 
x 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
y 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure F4: Squared structural matrix of Strategist 2 
372 
F. 3. MATRICES OF STRATEGIST 5 (EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATIVE 1) 
A B C D E F G H J K L N 0 P Q R S T U V 
A 3 3 2 
B 3 1 2 
2 2 
3 3 2 
3 3 2 
2 
-2 3 
-2 
2 2 -2 
-2 -2 
2 2 2 2 1 -2 -1 -2 
-3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -2 -2 1 -1 2 -3 
-3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -1 -2 -2 2 2 1 -2 -3 -1 
-3 -2 -2 -2 
-2 -2 2 2 1 -2 
-3 -2 -3 -3 3 1 -3 -3 
-2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -3 -2 -1 -2 
-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 
-2 -2 1 -2 -2 -2 -1 1 2 
-1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 -2 1 2 
1 1 2 
-2 2 -2 -2 2 
Figure F5. - Score matrix of Strategist 5 (Employees representative 
A B C D E FG H I J K L M N0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A -24 -14 -12 -19 -8 -9 -3 -4 2 3 6 10 4 -13 -8 -3 -2 4 1 
B -18 -21 -5 -18 -9 3 1 10 4 2 6 16 3 -12 -8 -4 -2 4 1 
C -2B -1 -28 -13 4 -9 6 -2 -13 -3 -18 -10 10 -2 6 -8 7 -16 -10 -4 -1 1 1 
D -12 -18 5 -1 -17 -9 5 1 12 5 1 6 18 3 -12 -8 -5 -2 3 
E -12 -21 6 -3 -18 -9 5 3 14 6 6 20 3 -12 -8 -4 -2 4 1 
F 5 17 -16 -5 8 6 -10 -5 -3 -12 -5 4 2 -14 -2 2 2 -3 
G 4 4 4 4 4 -2 -2 -2 -4 -2 2 -4 -2 
H 2 3 6 7 -1 -2 6 -3 -3 -3 4 2 3 -5 1 -2 -2 -2 
1 -18 15 -26 -9 15 6 -7 -8 -2 -21 -10 7 -20 3 -6 1 -2 
J -5 -16 -18 -4 -9 -8 -2 -2 1 -1 3 2 6 2 -8 -5 -2 -1 2 1 
K -5 -3 -9 -5 -5 -9 4 -6 -8 -5 -5 -6 7 6 -2 2 -9 -6 -2 
L -14 -4 -8 -16 -9 2 -6 -1 -1 15 4 -2 2 6 14 -7 -1 -5 -1 2 1 
M -13 27 -30 -8 14 -6 10 -12 -22 -5 -31 -21 15 6 -32 1 -9 -7 -3 -1 -5 -2 
N -19 20 -31 -15 8 -6 6 -14 -27 -2 -23 -19 11 1 6 -28 -4 -1 -7 -4 -2 -5 -2 
0 -23 8 -34 -19 1 -6 -2 -11 -14 -2 -21 -14 11 6 -20 2 -10 -7 -2 
p 1 -5 5 2 -8 -6 4 7 1 5 3 -1 6 5 -6 1 2 
Q -16 13 -28 -10 5 4 -8 -12 -2 -25 -14 11 6 -20 3 -6 -8 -1 -1 -1 1 
R -8 26 -30 -2 19 6 10 -4 -26 2 -24 -24 12 -30 -2 4 1 1 -7 -1 
S -2 15 -15 17 2 -3 -15 -14 -11 3 -2 -16 -3 5 -1 1 -4 -3 
T -23 1 -20 -10 7 -4 -6 -13 -19 -11 7 -2 -16 2 -3 -2 1 -1 -1 
U -24 -18 -5 13 2 -11 1 -13 -8 2 -2 -10 2 -5 -2 2 -1 
V -1 2 -5 -2 1 2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -1 -1 1 1 
W -1 -10 12 7 -1 2 3 5 2 -3 -2 8 -6 -4 -3 1 1 
x 2 -7 8 6 -3 3 7 4 -3 8 -6 -2 -3 1 1 
Y -3 9 -8 2 9 8 2 -5 -4 -2 -2 -4 -2 -1 -1 -1 
Figure F& Squared score matrix of Strategist 5 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X V 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G 1 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 1 1 1 
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 
X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure F7. - Structural matrix of Strategist 5 
A B C 0 E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X 
A 9 6 8 8 6 2 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 1 7 2 3 2 2 2 
B 9 8 8 9 7 2 3 7 8 3 7 7 6 1 8 3 4 2 3 2 
C 11 9 11 11 8 2 2 9 10 2 8 9 6 1 1 9 5 6 3 3 2 1 
D 6 7 5 7 6 2 3 6 5 3 5 5 4 1 6 3 4 2 2 1 1 
E 8 8 7 8 7 2 3 6 7 3 6 6 5 1 7 3 4 2 3 1 2 
F 5 3 5 5 4 1 5 6 1 6 6 4 1 5 1 1 1 1 
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H 12 10 10 11 9 2 6 10 9 2 10 7 9 8 3 4 3 3 2 4 
1 8 6 5 7 6 2 8 7 1 6 6 5 6 2 3 1 1 
J 10 8 9 10 8 2 2 8 10 3 8 8 6 1 1 8 4 5 3 3 1 2 
K 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 
L 12 11 8 11 11 2 5 11 11 3 10 6 8 1 1 5 6 7 3 2 3 
M 10 8 10 10 8 1 4 8 8 2 8 9 7 1 9 4 3 2 3 1 2 
N 14 12 12 13 11 1 5 12 11 1 10 9 8 1 1 8 8 8 4 4 2 2 
0 8 6 6 7 7 1 3 8 6 1 8 6 7 1 5 3 3 2 1 
p 5 5 4 6 4 3 6 6 1 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 
Q 12 10 10 12 10 2 5 10 10 3 10 9 9 1 10 4 5 3 4 1 2 
R 13 11 12 13 11 1 6 11 11 3 11 9 10 11 5 6 2 4 1 3 
s 11 9 9 10 9 4 9 8 8 7 6 1 7 6 5 2 3 1 2 
T 8 6 7 8 6 2 6 8 6 6 4 1 6 3 4 3 4 1 1 
U 12 10 8 12 9 5 10 10 1 9 8 7 1 8 5 5 3 4 2 2 
v 5 4 4 6 5 2 5 5 5 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 1 
w 7 6 6 7 7 3 6 6 7 5 5 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 
x 7 6 5 7 6 4 6 6 6 4 5 4 2 2 1 2 1 
y 6 4 6 6 5 2 5 5 6 5 5 5 1 1 1 
Figure F8: Squared structural matrix of Strategist 5 
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F. 4. MATRICES OF STRATEGIST 6 (EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATIVE 2) 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P R S T U V w x Y 
A 2 3 1 1 3 2 
B 2 3 3 3 1 
2 
2 3 2 2 
2 1 1 
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 
2 2 2 3 2 3 2 
-1 1 -1 -2 
2 2 2 3 3 2 
3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
3 
-1 -2 -3 -2 -1 -1 -3 -3 -2 
-1 -2 -1 -1 -3 -3 -3 -2 -3 -2 -3 -1 -1 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 3 
1 2 3 3 1 
-2 -2 -3 -1 -2 -3 -3 -1 -3 
-1 -1 -2 -1 -3 -3 -1 -3 -2 -2 -2 
-1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 
2 1 1 
3 
3 
-2 -2 
Figure F9: Score matrix of Strategist 6 (Employees representative 2) 
A B C D E F G H I J K L MN 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 21 16 4 14 18 -2 -1 8 11 14 9 8 1 -1 4 1 4 4 18 16 10 9 
B 18 19 2 15 11 1 4 14 19 7 9 8 3 2 3 2 15 12 6 7 
c 2 2 5 2 1 1 1 1 2 
D 14 4 3 25 17 7 24 9 9 7 3 2 4 3 6 7 4 1 
E 10 12 9 11 1 3 8 8 6 7 -1 -1 6 1 2 1 6 4 3 3 
F 10 11 2 10 6 -2 -2 -1 9 13 4 8 -8 -1 4 3 -2 -5 -6 2 8 8 
G 11 14 9 19 19 -1 7 12 23 12 20 20 -6 -1 3 6 -3 10 -3 13 13 10 18 
H -3 -5 -4 -4 -1 -3 -1 -4 -7 -1 -1 5 3 -1 -2 8 3 9 -1 -2 -1 -4 
1 11 4 18 13 1 5 5 27 7 11 15 -3 13 2 4 2 2 5 
J 11 19 10 14 8 -1 5 17 19 9 14 -8 -1 2 3 2 -4 -7 13 12 10 12 
K 3 6 3 3 
L -1 -1 -1 1 2 2 -2 2 -1 -1 -1 -3 -3 2 3 
M -11 -8 -11 -13 -14 1 -7 -18 -8 -13 -7 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -4 -5 -11 -7 
N -3 1 -14 -1 3 1 -10 -2 -3 -12 14 2 -6 -1 3 12 10 4 2 -8 -7 
0 -6 -7 -11 -9 -1 -7 -6 -4 -2 1 1 -1 1 -1 -3 -2 -2 
P 10 16 12 10 6 -1 -2 18 21 6 8 13 -6 -7 -3 13 1 3 -10 2 12 13 17 
Q 14 12 3 17 16 2 12 14 9 7 1 4 2 3 3 10 8 6 1 
R -13 -10 -4 -10 -14 -4 -9 -12 -19 -10 -10 -7 1 1 -2 -1 -6 4 -7 1 -11 -10 1 -11 
S -3 -6 -4 -4 2 2 1 -4 -13 -1 2 -4 8 6 -5 -2 -2 14 7 20 2 4 -4 -7 
T -10 -8 -4 -14 -13 -4 -4 -12 -14 -8 -10 -11 2 -8 -1 -2 1 -5 -3 -9 -12 -5 -9 
u 3 2 9 9 2 7 8 4 6 6 1 2 5 2 3 5 7 4 8 6 9 
v 7 7 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 7 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 12 13 4 10 
w 5 5 5 5 3 4 9 10 6 4 11 9 3 6 10 3 7 10 1 10 
x 1 2 1 -1 1 -4 -2 -1 -1 -4 -1 -1 1 1 -1 
y -2 -6 -4 -8 -2 
Figure F10: Squared score matrix of Strategist 6 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 1 
L 1 1 1 1 1 
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 
w 1 1 1 1 
x 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 
Figure F1 1: Structural matrix of Strategist 6 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 7 3 2 5 5 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 2 1 5 1 3 3 4 7 7 5 4 
B 4 3 2 3 3 1 2 4 4 3 5 4 1 3 2 2 5 4 2 
.2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 
3 1 3 4 3 3 5 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 4 5 2 1 
4 4 3 4 1 2 3 3 4 5 1 1 4 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 
6 4 3 5 6 3 4 3 3 6 3 5 3 1 5 1 4 4 4 9 8 5 5 
7 4 2 6 7 3 4 4 6 5 7 6 1 1 4 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 5 5 7 7 4 3 8 3 5 5 4 2 2 3 1 4 7 6 7 10 4 6 
3 3 2 5 5 1 3 4 5 3 4 5 1 4 1 2 4 4 6 6 1 3 
6 5 4 5 6 4 5 5 4 6 3 7 3 1 6 1 1 4 5 4 7 7 5 7 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 
5 2 4 5 6 2 1 4 6 5 5 5 1 1 3 1 3 3 3 7 7 5 3 
6 3 4 5 6 3 4 4 3 3 2 6 3 1 6 2 3 4 5 8 8 4 5 
4 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 
10 5 5 8 8 4 3 6 7 8 8 7 1 3 1 8 1 6 6 5 8 10 8 7 
4 3 1 5 5 2 3 5 4 3 1 2 2 2 1 4 3 3 1 
5 4 4 6 7 2 1 5 5 6 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 4 6 4 7 5 5 4 
7 3 3 6 6 5 4 4 4 7 5 7 2 2 5 1 1 3 5 4 8 8 5 5 
7 6 3 7 7 3 2 6 6 5 6 7 1 4 2 1 4 6 3 5 6 3 4 
4 2 2 5 4 2 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 2 5 1 3 4 6 6 8 5 7 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 
2 2 3 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 4 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 
1 1 2 2 1 
Figure F12: Squared structural matrix of Strategist 6 
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F. 5. MATRICES OF STRATEGIST 7 (EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATIVE 3) 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V w x Y 
A 3 2 2 2 2 2 -1 -3 
B 3 2 1 1 1 1 -2 
c 2 2 2 
D 3 -1 2 
E 2 3 2 -1 
F 2 1 -2 -2 
1 
-1 -2 2 
-1 -2 
1 -2 -1 -2 -2 
-1 -1 
-3 -2 1 1 1 -1 -1 -2 3 -3 -2 
-2 -3 -2 2 1 -1 -2 3 -3 -2 2 2 -2 -1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 1 1 3 
1 2 2 2 1 -1 -1 -3 -1 -1 -2 1 2 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 -2 2 -1 -1 -1 -2 
-2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 2 2 -1 -2 1 -2 -1 2 -1 
1 2 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 
1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
1 1 1 -1 1 -2 -1 1 -1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 1 -1 1 2 -1 -2 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 -2 1 1 -1 -2 1 1 1 
Figure F13: Score matrix of Strategist 7 (Employees representative 3) 
A B C D E F G H I JK L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 12 2 10 14 14 4 4 -3 7 10 7 -1 18 13 -1 8 -12 12 -6 -2 11 13 2 
B 12 23 18 18 13 1 7 -5 11 7 7 -2 13 17 4 5 -17 7 -4 9 6 3 
C 11 7 24 15 21 -2 4 -6 11 8 -4 10 10 7 5 -18 5 -5 10 8 3 4 
D 7 23 17 9 9 3 4 -3 8 3 4 13 12 2 -17 -2 4 6 9 6 5 3 
E 17 9 21 19 26 -1 5 -6 11 6 8 -6 8 10 3 1 -20 3 -3 6 12 10 2 5 
F 11 8 3 9 3 10 4 4 12 9 1 2 -5 -6 6 8 -7 -4 16 9 4 17 8 9 
G 9 7 6 8 2 1 -1 1 2 3 -1 -1 -6 6 3 -4 -2 6 3 4 7 4 4 
H 16 17 8 2 -2 9 1 4 12 7 1 3 -14 -4 14 15 -5 -15 22 12 3 10 9 8 
1 13 14 10 5 5 6 3 11 7 3 6 -7 2 13 15 -11 -5 15 12 -3 10 6 6 
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 5 -1 1 2 13 9 6 4 10 4 4 -7 -10 2 6 -11 -14 11 14 8 20 9 9 
L 1 -1 -2 -2 2 9 4 2 5 6 2 1 -2 -4 3 1 -7 -7 7 9 3 11 5 5 
m 7 3 -2 -8 -6 4 -2 -2 2 -1 6 -2 4 6 5 -3 8 2 -1 1 1 
N -6 -20 -20 -5 -11 2 2 4 -13 4 -3 -3 12 -6 -19 -8 19 -2 -11 -5 11 7 1 1 
0 -14 -21 -6 -11 -8 -11 -3 1 -12 -12 -2 -8 7 6 -8 -7 14 12 -24 -19 1 -16 -7 -6 
P 11 7 15 -1 8 11 -1 -1 12 4 4 3 -6 22 18 -12 -12 16 12 9 12 8 10 
Q 28 16 6 3 5 9 5 -2 13 13 6 9 7 1 7 19 -5 3 16 10 -3 9 4 5 
R 7 -1 -5 4 -3 4 -5 3 4 23 11 -14 -7 4 13 -12 -7 1 -1 -4 -4 
s 1 -9 -7 4 12 -2 8 -3 3 6 5 -4 35 17 -18 -11 -2 39 -21 -10 -3 -3 -2 -4 
T 8 2 2 8 10 -9 4 -5 -3 3 -4 16 7 -20 -14 -3 15 -14 -7 -6 -6 -6 
u 9 7 5 11 10 -9 3 -4 2 -5 13 6 -16 -12 -4 13 -13 -7 2 -6 -5 -5 
V 10 16 15 12 9 -4 -5 7 1 2 -5 1 13 4 -4 -9 -1 2 8 3 1 
W 16 12 5 6 3 2 2 2 7 7 4 7 10 11 -6 -2 11 6 8 8 7 
X 10 9 4 8 6 8 4 3 12 9 3 1 1 5 9 -9 12 9 1 13 9 7 
y 8 6 -1 3 5 9 3 3 9 8 2 2 -4 4 7 -5 -7 14 10 2 10 7 8 
Figure F14: Squared score matrix of Strategist 7 
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A B C D E E G H I J K L II N O P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
J 1 
K 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
x i i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure F15. - Structural matrix of Strategist 7 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 14 13 12 11 10 9 6 5 9 7 4 6 12 12 7 12 13 13 11 11 8 12 8 8 
B 11 14 13 11 12 8 8 4 9 5 3 8 13 11 9 11 13 14 11 11 7 9 8 8 
C 14 12 18 10 12 7 7 5 8 7 5 7 15 13 12 15 13 15 11 14 9 12 9 9 
D 13 11 13 9 11 8 5 4 8 6 4 7 12 10 9 10 11 13 11 12 6 10 8 6 
E 12 12 13 9 13 8 6 4 8 5 4 8 1.2 10 9 10 12 13 12 13 8 9 5 7 
F 14 12 13 9 10 10 7 4 8 7 1 7 13 12 9 10 11 13 10 10 9 11 9 10 
G 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 4 6 3 1 4 10 7 6 6 8 10 6 8 6 7 7 7 
H 15 14 14 11 11 10 8 6 10 8 3 7 14 14 7 11 14 15 11 11 10 12 10 10 
1 13 13 14 12 11 8 6 5 9 7 3 6 13 13 9 11 13 14 9 11 6 12 9 8 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 13 10 11 10 7 9 7 5 7 9 4 5 10 12 5 11 10 10 7 8 8 11 7 7 
L 8 8 9 8 7 7 6 7 6 6 2 4 8 9 5 9 8 9 6 9 7 7 7 7 
m 5 7 5 7 6 5 4 2 3 3 1 5 6 5 3 5 7 7 6 6 2 3 3 3 
N 13 13 16 12 11 8 9 5 10 7 4 8 16 14 11 12 14 15 10 11 9 11 8 8 
0 12 11 12 12 8 8 8 6 8 9 4 6 12 14 6 12 12 12 7 9 8 11 8 8 
P 14 14 19 12 14 9 7 6 9 5 4 8 16 14 13 15 15 17 13 16 10 13 10 11 
Q 11 10 12 11 8 7 7 5 7 8 4 6 11 12 7 12 11 11 6 8 7 10 7 7 
R 12 11 14 12 10 8 10 6 9 7 4 7 16 12 9 13 13 14 8 11 8 10 9 9 
S 17 16 20 14 14 10 9 6 11 8 5 8 19 17 13 17 17 20 14 16 11 15 12 12 
T 13 13 17 12 14 9 7 4 10 5 4 9 15 13 13 13 14 16 13 14 9 13 9 10 
U 14 13 16 11 14 9 6 5 10 6 4 8 15 14 11 13 14 16 14 15 10 13 10 11 
v 9 10 9 8 7 7 7 4 9 5 2 5 10 10 6 6 10 10 8 7 6 8 8 7 
W 13 10 12 8 6 7 6 5 7 7 2 4 12 12 8 11 11 11 9 9 9 12 11 10 
X 13 12 13 11 10 9 8 7 9 8 3 6 13 12 8 12 12 14 9 11 8 11 11 9 
y 10 10 10 9 10 8 6 6 7 7 2 6 10 10 6 9 10 11 9 11 8 8 7 8 
Figure F16: Squared structural matrix of Strategist 7 
378 
F. 6. MATRICES OF STRATEGIST 8 (HEAD OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT) 
A B C D E F G H J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V 
A 3 3 2 
2 
3 3 3 3 3 2 
3 3 
1 3 
2 1 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
2 3 3 3 3 
2 3 
3 3 2 2 
3 
3 
-3 -3 3 -3 -3 -3 -3 1 -2 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 2 3 -3 -3 
-1 -3 -1 -3 -3 
3 3 3 3 
2 2 
-2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -3 3 -3 -3 -2 
3 2 1 3 -3 3 3 -3 -3 3 2 
2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 -1 3 3 1 3 3 3 
2 3 2 1 
2 2 2 
2 3 
3 3 3 
Figure F17. - Score matrix of Strategist 8 (Head of the PlanningDept. ) 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y 
A 22 11 25 16 13 2 6 10 11 2 1 2 3 3 3 7 2 2 4 
B 6 6 3 9 7 1 3 8 5 1 
C 18 3 49 20 9 3 6 9 12 5 3 1 
D 9 9 9 18 12 3 6 15 9 3 
E 10 10 9 16 12 1 5 11 9 1 
F 1 11 6 2 15 2 2 4 2 2 6 21 18 18 9 9 
G 29 9 50 33 12 11 21 13 16 24 9 15 -11 20 18 -6 3 12 12 18 23 22 26 
H 6 -4 7 5 -6 16 12 18 12 3 12 6 6 -3 24 15 -6 10 21 18 42 30 30 
1 5 3 6 3 3 3 6 12 3 2 3 6 6 5 12 14 11 
J 21 9 27 14 10 1 4 13 9 3 3 1 
K 12 9 3 9 9 3 9 6 
L 9 9 5 12 10 3 2 1 7 11 7 4 2 6 9 9 6 7 
M -11 6 -49 -8 -3 -5 -6 -9 -2 -14 -3 -2 -8 
N -20 -4 -37 -23 -6 -12 -25 -12 -18 -22 -12 -6 -30 21 -18 -24 6 -24 -24 -25 -12 -16 -20 
0 -9 -27 -3 -1 -1 -1 -5 -10 -1 -3 
P 15 3 12 18 3 30 21 6 15 21 6 15 -9 24 18 -6 9 33 33 24 18 15 21 
Q 5 5 6 7 5 1 5 3 -1 2 3 -3 -3 
R -9 3 -54 -21 -2 -9 -20 -1 -4 -30 1 -18 12 -18 -18 -9 -15 -12 -9 -15 
S -18 -11 -28 -18 -12 -16 -4 -19 -13 -9 -15 -8 -15 10 -26 -27 -15 -6 -13 -31 -31 -27 -33 
T 16 9 34 20 9 26 13 24 13 15 18 5 9 27 -9 19 27 9 27 38 39 34 39 28 28 
U 21 12 36 17 13 18 15 14 12 5 19 7 -3 3 21 9 -5 6 6 33 34 54 31 39 
v 9 2 14 9 2 24 6 11 3 8 8 7 2 -1 3 3 1 3 21 33 31 27 13 16 
w 8 2 6 6 6 12 4 4 8 4 10 -8 12 12 -4 6 6 10 14 14 16 
x 7 3 6 9 3 21 6 6 14 7 6 5 4 -2 12 6 2 6 12 18 15 24 24 15 
Y 12 3 12 9 15 6 9 15 6 6 6 6 -3 15 9 3 9 15 15 18 36 27 36 
Figure F18: Squared score matrix of Strategist 8 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L N N O P O R S T U V W X Y 
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 1 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D 1 1 
E 1 1 1 1 
F 1 1 1 1 1 
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
K 1 1 
L 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
N 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
p 1 1 1 1 1 
Q 1 1 1 
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
U 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w 1 1 1 
x 1 1 1 1 1 
V 1 1 1 1 1 
Figure F19: Structural matrix of Strategist 8 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P R S T U V W X Y 
A 5 2 6 3 2 1 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 
B I 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
c 4 1 7 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 
D 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 
E 2 2 3 4 3 1 3 2 3 1 
F 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 
G 7 3 7 5 3 2 3 4 4 6 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 
4 3 3 3 2 4 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 7 5 7 6 6 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 
4 1 6 3 2 1 2 3 3 2 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 
6 2 9 4 3 1 4 3 4 2 1 3 1 1 3 
8 2 11 6 3 2 4 5 5 6 5 1 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 5 2 4 5 
3 5 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 
2 1 2 2 1 4 3 1 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 
2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
6 4 7 7 5 1 3 6 5 8 5 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 
10 5 9 6 5 3 1 3 7 5 7 6 2 3 4 3 3 4 3 6 7 7 7 8 
6 3 7 6 3 5 2 3 5 4 4 4 1 4 3 3 3 2 3 7 9 6 6 6 6 
9 6 10 8 6 4 2 4 7 5 7 6 1 4 3 3 3 2 3 6 10 7 7 7 8 
3 1 5 2 1 4 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 4 3 4 
2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 
2 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 2 4 3 4 
Figure F20: Squared structural matrix of Strategist 8 
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F. 7. IDENTIFIED STRONG REIATIONSHIPS 
potential identified strong Strategist 2 (Assistant General Manager) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Iq)acts 
90 36 40 15 42 Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Rail Plan affects positively Modernization Projects (+3), 294 Contract (+2) 
and Organisational Structure (+2) 
b. Annual Budget impacts positively on Modernization Projects (+2). 
C. Modernization Projects influence positively the Rail Plan, and Proposals for 
Stae's Plan (+3) and Perfonmance Monitoring (+2). 
d. Rolling Stock Purchase affects positively the 294 Contract (+3) and the Annual 
Budget (+2) 
e. Perfonmance Monitoring impacts on the Rail Plan, the 294 Contract and 
Modernization Projects (+2). 
f. Proposals for State's Plan affect positively the Rail Plan, the 294 Contract and 
Modernization Projects (+3). 
80 22 28 8 36 Strategic Decisions on Environment 
a. Contract 294 impacts negatively on Economic Policy (-3). 
b. Annual Budget iq)acts positively on Economic Policy Policy (+3) and on Pricing 
Policy (+2). 
C. Rolling Stock Purchase influences positively the Economic Policy (+2) and 
negatively the Problems with Suppliers (-2). 
d. The Supervisory Board impacts negatively (-2) on Employees Participation in 
Decision-Making. 
e. The Proposals for State's 5-Year Plan affect positively the Economic Policy (+2). 
70 26 37 2 8 Strategic Decisions on Organizational Context 
a. Organizational Structure impacts negatively on Bureaucratic Phenomena (-2) and on 
positively on the Management System (+2). 
80 31 39 10 32 Environment on Strategic Decisions 
a. Pricing Policy influences positively the Annual Budget (+3), the Modernization 
Projects (+2) and the Proposals for the State's 5-Year Plan (+2). 
b. The Economic Policy impacts negatively on the Rail Plan (-3), the 294 Contract 
(-2) and the Proposals for the State's 5-Year Plan (-2). 
c. The Administrative Controls influence negatively the Rail Plan (-2), the 294 
Contract (-2), the Modernization Plans (-2) and the Rolling Stock Purchases (-2). 
56 11 20 1 9 Environment on Environment 
a. The Pricing Policy affects positively the Economic Policy (+3). 
70 22 31 2 9 Organizational Context on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Bureaucratic Phenomena impact negatively on the Modernization Projects (-2). 
b. The Corporate Culture impacts negatively on Perfonmance Monitoring (-2). 
Figure F21: Strategist 2: Identified Strong Relationships 
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potential identified strong Strategist 5 (Employees Representative 1) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
90 39 43 14 36 Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Rail Plan affects negatively the 294 Contract (-3), and positively the 
Modernization Projects (+3). 
b. The 294 Contract affects positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+3). 
C. The Annual Budget affects positively the Modernization Projects (+2). 
d. The Modernization Projects impact on the 15-Tear Rail PLan (+3), and the Annual 
Budget (+3). 
e. The Rolling Stock Purchase impacts positively on the 15-Year Rail Plan (+3) and 
the Annual Budget (+3). 
f. Performance Monitoring affects the Organizational Structure (+2). 
g. The Supervisory Board influences Annual Budget (+2), and Performance Monitoring 
(+3). 
h. Organizational Structure impacts on Personnel Training (-2). 
i. The Proposals for the State's Development Plan influence Rolling Stock Purchase 
(+2), and the Organizational Structure (+2). 
80 18 23 6 33 Strategic Decisions on Environment 
a. The 15-Year Rail Plan influences positively the Maintenance of Employment (+2). 
b. The 294 Contract affects the Maintenance of Employment (+2). 
C. The Annual Budget, Modernization Projects and Rolling Stock Purchase impact on the 
Maintenance of Employment (+2). 
d. The Proposals for the State's Plan affect negatively Policies Incompatibility (-2) 
80 39 49 29 74 Environment on Strategic Decisions 
a. Pricing Policy impacts on Annual Budget (+2). 
b. Employment Maintenance influences the 294 Contract (+2) and the Annual Budget (+2) 
C. Econanic Policy affects negatively the Rail Plan (-3), the 294 Contract (-3), 
the Annual Budget (-3), Modernization Projects (-3), Rollimg Stock Purchase (-3), 
the Supervisory Board (-3), Personnel Training (-2) and the Proposals to the 
State's Development Plan (-2). 
d. Problems with Suppliers influence negatively the Rail Plan (-3), and particularly 
the 294 Contract (-2), Modernization Projects (-2) and Rolling Stock Purchase (-2) 
e. Administrative Controls affect negatively the Rail Plan (-3), 294 Contract (-3), 
Modernization Projects (-3), Rolling Stock Purchase (-3), the Supervisory Board 
(-3), Personnel Training (-2), and Proposals to the State's Development Plan (-2). 
f. Bilateral Trade Agreements impact negatively on the Rail Plan (-2), and on the 
Rolling Stock Purchase (-2). 
g. Policies Incarpatibility impacts negatively on the Rail Plan (-3), Annual Budget 
(-3), the Supervisory Board (-3), and on the 294 Contract (-2). 
Figure F22: Strategist 5. - Identified Strong Relationships 
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potential identified strong Strategist 5 (continued) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
56 13 23 8 61 Environment on Environment 
a. The Pricing Policy has a negative impact on Policies Incoripatibility (-2). 
b. Employwt Maintenance affects positively Policies Incompatibility (+2). 
C. The Economic Policy influences Policies Incompatibility (+2). 
d. Administrative Controls affect Problems with Suppliers (+2) and Policies 
Incompatibility (+2). 
e. Bilateral Trade Agreements impact on Problems with Suppliers (+2) and Policies 
Incompatibility (+2). 
f. Policies Incompatibility influences Bilateral Trade Agreements (+3). 
70 37 53 20 54 Organizational Context on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Bureaucratic Phenomena affect negatively the 15-Year Rail Plan (-2), the 294 
Contract (-2), the Rolling Stock Purchase (-2), and the Organizational 
Structure (-2). 
b. Decision-Making System influences the Rail Plan (-2), the 294 Contract (-2), 
Modernization Projects (-2), Rolling Stock Purchase (-2), and the Organizational 
Structure (-2). 
C. Management System impacts on the Rail Plan (-2), the 294 Contract (-2), 
Modernization Projects (-2), Rolling Stock Purchase (-2), and the Organizational 
Structure (-2). 
d. Career Development System affects the Rail Plan (-2), the 294 Contract (-2), 
Modernization Projects (-2), and Rolling Stock Purchase (-2). 
Figure F22 (continued): Strategist 5. - Identified Strong Relationships 
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potential identified strong Strategist 6 (Employees representative 2) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Iq)acts 
90 44 49 29 66 Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Rail Plan affects positively the 294 Contract (+2), the Modernization Projects 
(+3), Personnel Training (+3), and Proposals for State's 5-Year Development Plan. 
b. The 294 Contract affects positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+2), Modernization 
Projects (+3), Personnel Training (+3), and Rolling Stock Purchase (+3). 
c. The Modernization Projects impact on the 15-Year Rail Plan (+2), the 294 Contract 
(+3), Rolling Stock Purchase (+2), and Proposals for State's 5-Year Plan (+2). 
d. Performance Monitoring impacts on Rolling Stock Purchase (+3), Modernization 
Projects (+2), Organizational Structure (+2), and Personnel Training (+2). 
e. The Supervisory Board affects positively the Organizational Structure (+3), 
Modernization Projects (+2), the 294 Contract (+2), and the Rail Plan (+2). 
f. Proposals for the State's 5-Year Plan affect positively the Rail Plan (+3), 
Modernization Projects (+3), Rolling Stock Purchase (+3), Organizational Structure 
(+2), and Personnel Training (+2). 
80 17 21 6 35 Strategic Decisions on Environment 
a. The Annual Budget influences positively the Pricing Policy (+2). 
b. The Supervisory Board impacts positively on Pricing Policy (+2), and on Employees 
Participation in Decision-Making (+3). 
C. Organizational Structure affects negatively the Administrative Controls (-2). 
d. Proposals for the State's 5-Year Development Plan affect positively the Pricing 
Policy (+2) and Eniployment Maintenance (+2). 
80 36 45 15 42 Environment on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Economic Policy impacts negatively on Annual Budget (-3) and on Modernization 
Projects (-2). 
b. Administrative Controls impact negatively on Rolling Stock Purchase (-2). 
C. Employees Participation in D-M influences the Supervisory Board (+3), the 
Organizational Structure (+2), and Personnel Training (+2). 
d. Bilateral Trade Agreements affect positively Modernization Projects (+3), Rolling 
Stock Purchase (+3), and the 294 Contract (+2). 
e. Policies Incompatibility affects negatively Modernization Projects (-3), Annual 
Budget (-2), the Rail Plan (-2) and Proposals for State's 5-Year Plan (-2). 
56 16 29 10 67 Environment on Environment 
a. The Economic Policy impacts on the Pricing Policy (-3) and on Employment 
Maintenance (-3). 
b. Administrative Controls impact negatively on Employment Maintenance (-3). 
C. Employees Participation in D-M influences positively the Pricing Policy (+3), 
Employment Maintenance (+2), and Policies Incompatibility (+2). 
d. Policies Incompatibility affects negatively Pricing Policy (-3), the Economic 
Policy (-3) and Epployees Participation in D-M. 
Figure F23: Strategist 6: Identified Strong Relationships 
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Strategist 6 (continued) 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
70 18 26 5 28 Organizational Context on Strategic Decisions 
a. Bureaucratic Phenomena impact negatively on Rolling Stock Purchase (-2), and on 
Organizational Structure (-3). 
b. Decision-Making System impacts negatively on Rolling Stock Purchase (-2). 
C. Management System impacts on Rolling Stock Purchase (+2). 
d. Task Design/Job Definition System impacts positively on Personnel training (+3). 
Figure F23 (continued): Identified Strong Relationships 
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potential identif ied strong Strategist 7 (Employees representative 3) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct lapacts 
90 48 53 17 35 Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Rail Plan affects positively the 294 Contract (+3), the Annual Budget (+2), 
the Rolling Stock Purchase (+2) and Personnel Training (+2). 
b. The 294 Contract affects positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+3), the Rolling Stock 
Purchase (+3) and the Annual Budget (+2). 
C. The Annual Budget affects positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+2), the 294 Contract 
(+2) and the Modernization Projects (+2). 
d. The Modernization Projects affect positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+3), and the 
Annual Budget (+2). 
e. The Rolling Stock Purchase influences positively the 15-Year Rail Plan (+2), the 
Annual Budget (+2), the Modernization Projects (+2) and the 294 Contract (+2). 
f. Performance Monitoring influences positively the Annual Budget (+2). 
80 46 58 12 26 Strategic Decisions on Environment 
a. The 15-Year Rail Plan influences positively the Administrative Controls (+2) and 
the Problems with Suppliers (+2) and negatively Policies Incompatibility (-3). 
b. The Annual Budget affects positively the Pricing Policy (+2) and the Problerm with 
Suppliers (+2). 
C. The Rolling Stock Purchases affect positively the Problems with Suppliers (+2) and 
the Bilateral Agreements (+2). 
d. Performance Monitoring affects positively Employees Participation in D-M (+3) and 
negatively Policies Incompatibility (-2). 
e. The Supervisory Board influences Employees Participation in D-M (+2). 
f. Organizational Structure affects negatively Administrative Controls (-2). 
70 41 59 7 17 Strategic Decisions on Organizational Context 
a. Performance Monitoring affects negatively Bureaucratic Phenomena (-2) & positively 
the Decision Making system (+2). 
b. Organizational Structure influences positively the Management System (+2), 
Corporate Culture (+2), and Career Development System (+2), and negatively the 
Bureaucratic Phenomena (-2). 
c. Personnel Training impacts negatively on Bureaucratic Phenomena (-2). 
80 41 51 10 24 Environnent on Strategic Decisions 
a. Administrative Controls impact negatively on Rail Plan (-3), and on the 294 
Contract (-2). 
b. Problem with Suppliers influence the rail Plan (-2), the 294 Contract (-3), 
the Annual Budget (-2) and Modernization Projects (+2). 
C. Bilateral Trade Agreements affect the 294 Contract (+2), the Annual Budget (+2), 
and Modernization Projects (+2). 
d. Policies Incarpatibility impacts on Performance Monitoring (-2). 
Figure F24: Strategist 7. - Identified Strong Relationships 
386 
potential identified strong 
_7 
Strategist 7 (continued) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
56 36 64 12 31 Environment on Environment 
a. The Pricing Policy has negative impact on Policies Incompatibility (-2). 
b. The Economic Policy impacts negatively on Problem with Suppliers (-2). 
c. The Administrative Controls impact positively on the Problem with Suppliers (+2). 
d. The Problem with Suppliers affect negatively the Economic Policy (-2), the 
Bilateral Agreements (-2), and the Employees Participation in D-M (-3), and 
affect positively the Administrative Controls (+3) and the Policies 
Incompatibility (+2). 
e. The Employees Participation in Decision-Making impacts negatively on the Policies 
Incarpatibility (-2). 
f. Bilateral Trade Agreements impact negatively on the Problem with Suppliers (-3). 
g. The Policies Incompatibility affects negatively Bilateral Trade Agreements (-2). 
70 41 58 6 17 Organizational Context on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Bureaucratic Phenomena affect negatively the 15-Year Rail Plan (-2), the 294 
Contract (-2), the Annual Budget (-2), the Performance Monitoring (-2) and the 
Organizational Structure (-2). 
b. The Decision Making System impacts positively on the 294 Contract (+2). 
Figure F24 (continued): Stra tegfst 7. - Identified Strong Relationships 
387 
potential identified strong Strategist 8 (Head of the Department of Planning) 
entries relati onships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
90 37 41 21 57 Strategic Decisions on Strategic Decisions 
a. The Rail Plan impacts positively on the Annual Budget (+3) and on Proposals for 
the State's 5-Year Development Plan (+2). 
b. The 294 Contract influences positively the Annual Budget (+2). 
C. Annual Budget affects positively the Rail Plan (+3), the 294 Contract (+3), 
Modernization Projects (+3), Rolling Stock Purchase (+3), and the Proposals for 
State's 5-Year Development Plan (+3). 
d. Modernization Projects affect positively the Rail Plan (+3) and Annual Budget (+3) 
e. Rolling Stock Purchase impacts on the Annual Budget (+3). 
f. Performance Monitoring influences the Rail Plan (+2). 
g. Supervisory Board affects the Rail Plan (+3), Modernization Projects (+3), 
Performance Monitoring (+3), and the Proposals for State's 5-Year Development Plan 
h. Organizational Structure affects Perfonmance Monitoring (+2). 
i. Proposals for State's Plan impact on Modernization Projects (+3), Annual Budget 
(+3), and Rolling Stock Purchase (+2). 
80 9 11 5 55 Strategic Decisions on EnvironTent 
a. Annual Budget impacts on Pricing Policy (+2). 
b. Supervisory Board affects Pricing Policy (+3). 
C. Organizational Structure impacts on Employees Participation in D-M (+2). 
d. Personnel Training affects Employment Maintenance (+2). 
e. Proposals for State's Plan influence Pricing Policy (+2). 
70 14 20 12 86 Strategic Decisions on Organizational Context 
a. Performance Monitoring impacts on Corporate Culture (+3), Compensation System (+3) 
and Career Development System (+3). 
b. Supervisory Board affects Decision-Making System (+3) and Management System (+3). 
C. Organizational Structure affects Bureaucratic Phenomena (-3), Decision-Making 
System (+3), Management Systan (+3), Task Design (+3), Corporate Culture (+2), and 
Career Development System (+2). 
d. Personnel Training impacts on Task Design (+3). 
Figure F25. - Strategist 8: Identified Strong Relationships 
388 
potential identified strong Strategist 8 (continued) 
entries relationships relationships 
no. no. % no. % Direct Impacts 
80 29 36 18 62 Environment on Strategic Decisions 
a. Pricing Policy affects the Annual Budget (+3). 
b. Employment Maintenance influences the Annual Budget (+3). 
C. Economic Policy affects negatively the Rail Plan (-3), the 294 Contract (-3), 
Modernization Projects (-3), Rolling Stock Purchase (-3), and Personnel Training 
(-3), and positively the Annual Budget (+3). 
d. Problems with Suppliers impact negatively on 294 Contract (-3), and Rolling Stock 
Purchase (-3). 
e. Employees Participation in D-M influences the Supervisory Board (+3) and 
Organizational Structure (+3). 
f. Bilateral Trade Agreements influence positively the Annual Budget (+2). 
g. Policies Incompatibility affects negatively the Rail Plan (-2), Annual Budget (-2) 
Modernization Projects (-2), and Proposals for State's Plan (-3). 
56 12 21 7 58 Environment on Environment 
a. The Economic Policy influences negatively Employment Maintenance (-2). 
b. Problems with Suppliers affect negatively Bilateral Trade Agreements (-3). 
C. Policies Incalpatibility influences negatively Pricing Policy (-3), Econ. Policy 
(-3), Bilateral Trade Agreements (-3), and Administrative Controls (-3). 
70 22 31 13 59 Organizational Context on Strategic Decisions 
a. Bureaucratic Phenomena impact negatively on Organizational Structure (-2). 
b. Decision-Making System impacts on Organizational Structure (+3). 
C. Management System affects positively the Rail Plan (+2), the Annual Budget (+3), 
Modernization Projects (+3), Performance Monitoring (+3), Organizational Structure 
(+3), Personnel Training (+2), and Proposals for State's Plan (+2). 
d. Task Design influences the Supervisory Board (+2) and Personnel Training (+3). 
e. Corporate Culture impacts on Performance Monitoring (+2). 
f. Career Development System affects Performance Monitoring (+3). 
Figure F25 (continued): Strategist 8: Identified Strong Relationships 
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F. 8. DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONSEQUENCES 
Stubbart and Rarnaprasad (1988) introduced a qualitative attribute of cognitive maps being 
derived from matrices. They stated that in a "wefl-behaved' map, high-order consequences mirror 
low-order ones; that is, the indirect effects of a concept should exhibit the same net consequences as 
the ones exhibited in the direct obvious ones. By net consequences they mean that the direction of 
the relationship between two concepts has to be the same for both direct and indirect consequences. 
strategist 8 strategist 2 strategist 5 strategist 6 strategist 7 
A c F A c F A c F A c F A c F 
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s S s 
c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q c q 
0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 0 u 
r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a r a 
e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r e r 
e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 
A 0 22 3 25 0 2 0 8 2 10 0 4 0 21 0 4 0 -2 0 -24 0 -12 0 0 0 13 0 2 0 7 
B 1 6 2 3 0 0 3 12 2 18 0 1 2 18 0 2 0 0 3 -18 0 0 0 0 1 17 0 -1 0 3 
C 3 18 0 49 0 0 2 11 0 24 1 -2 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 -28 0 -28 0 0 0 0 0 13 1 3 
D 3 9 3 9 0 0 3 7 2 17 0 3 2 14 0 3 0 0 3 -12 3 5 0 0 3 4 0 5 2 0 
E 1 10 3 9 0 0 2 17 2 21 0 -1 1 10 0 0 0 0 3 -12 3 6 0 0 1 2 2 5 0 2 
F 2 1 0 6 0 0 0 11 2 3 0 10 1 10 0 2 0 -2 0 5 0 -16 0 0 2 14 1 3 0 7 
G 3 29 1 50 3 11 -1 9 1 6 1 1 2 11 1 9 1 -1 0 4- 2 0 3 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 
H 0 6 0 7 2 16 0 16 1 8 0 9 -1 -3 0 -4 -1 -3 1 2 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 5 
1 0 5 1 6 0 3 1 13 1 10 0 6 2 11 0 0 0 1 0 -18 0 -26 0 0 0 6 0 3 1 2 
J 1 21 3 27 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 3 11 0 10 0 -1 0 -5 0 -18 0 0 3 10 0 10 0 7 
K 0 12 3 3 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 13 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 -5 -2 -9 0 0 0 5 3 6 0 8 
L 1 9 3 5 0 3 1 1 0 -2 0 9 0 -1 1 -1 0 -1 1 0 2 -4 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 
M -3 -11 3 -49 0 0 -1 7 1 -2 0 4 -1 -11 -3 -11 0 0 -3 -13 -3 -30 0 0 -3 -10 1 3 0 0 
N -1 -20 0 -37 0 -12 -3 -6 1 -20 -1 2 0 -3 0 -14 0 0 -3 -19 0 -31 0 0 -2 -6 -1 -2 0 -3 
0 -1 -9 0 -3 0 0 -2 -14 -2 -6 -1 -11 -1 -6 0 0 0 0 -3 -23 0 -34 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 
P 0 15 0 12 0 30 1 11 0 15 1 11 1 10 1 12 1 -1 1 1 1 5 0 0 -1 -3 -1 1 -1 -1 
Q 0 5 2 6 0 0 1 28 2 6 -1 9 1 14 0 3 0 0 -2 -16 0 -28 0 0 0 -1 0 -2 0 0 
R -2 -9 -2 -54 0 -9 -1 7 -1 -5 -2 -3 -2 -13 -2 -4 0 -4 -3 -8 -3 -30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S -1 -18 -1 -28 -1 -16 -2 1 -2 -7 -2 -2 0 -3 0 -4 0 2 -2 -2 0 -15 0 0 -1 -11 0 -1 0 -4 
T 0 16 0 34 0 26 1 8 1 2 -1 -9 -1 -10 0 -4 -1 -4 -2 -23 0 -20 0 0 -1 -4 -1 2 0 1 
U 2 21 3 36 3 18 1 9 1 5 -1 -9 0 3 1 0 1 0 -2 -24 1 -5 0 0 -1 3 -1 4 -1 0 
V 0 9 0 14 0 24 1 10 1 15 0 -4 0 7 0 2 0 1 -1 -1 0 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W 0 8 0 6 2 6 0 16 1 5 1 2 0 5 0 5 0 4 1 -1 0 12 0 0 0 -1 0 1 -2 2 
X 0 7 1 6 0 21 1 10 1 4 0 8 0 0 -1 1 0 1 1 2 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Y 0 12 0 12 3 15 1 8 1 -1 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -3 0 -8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Figure F26: Direct and indirect consequences 
Figure F. 26 shows the relationships according to these five strategists between the causal factors of 
(1) the Rail Plan, (2) the Annual Budget, and (3) Performance Monitoring. It includes direct 
consequences (concept a -> concept b) and indirect consequences (concept a -> concept x -> 
concept b) for all the three concepts examined. In general, strategists perceived direct and indirect 
effects in a quite balanced way. Maps were "wefl-behaving" apart from a few exceptions. When 
external factors were concerned, the indirect consequences did not mirror the direct ones. Also, for 
some rare cases, imbalanced consequences were depicted especially when organizational factors were 
the causal concepts. 
APPENDIX G 
GROUPS: DRAWING COMPOSITE MAPS 
G. l. INTRODUCTION 
As shown in Chapter 6, the individual analysis of cognitive maps revealed some 
similarities in structures of cause-effect relationships between concepts of strategy and a 
variety of stimuli, both organizational and environmental. However, as pointed out by 
Hurst, Rush and White (1989), the actions of an organization are not directly 
impacted by the cognitive preferences of its top managers. It is the behaviours of this 
group and the integration of these behaviours into a pattern of organizational actions 
which impact strategy and performance. 
In order to explain how the mix of strategists' cognitive structures have impacted 
decision outcomes, an attempt will be made in this appendix to synthesize the strategists' 
maps around strategy-areas and across different strategic groups, arising out of the 
strategists' characteristics and the structure of the Board. The method employed draws 
on the framework set forth by Pettigrew (1985,1988) and on relevant guide-lines 
proposed by other researchers (Pinfield, 1986; Etzioni, 1975; Giddens, 1979). It has 
been shown in Chapter 4 that this method concentrates on: (a) the identification and 
description of the frames of references that strategists shared in terms of specific 
changes;. (b) discerning similarities and differences; and (c) providing explanations as to 
what these differences indicate. Further, the way will be explored in which collective 
(group) interpretations influenced the interpretation of others and/or were influenced 
by them. The composite maps, that illustrate the accumulated knowledge structure of 
these groups, will be formed on the basis of the following variables: (1) participants' 
representativeness, (2) educational background, and (3) political affiliation. 
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G. 2. THE SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
Since, as stated, one of the main premises of this research is that participants profoundly 
influence the decision process and do make a difference in defining and solving strategic 
problems (Schendel, 1989), then a research objective concerned with the way patterns 
of organizational activity are shaped by participants' frames of references must draw 
attention to the subject variables (or organismic variables) that a research subject brings 
along to the research setting. Particular backgrounds, interests, experiences, 
competencies, as well as beliefs, actions and interactions may act as catalysts for 
decision -outcomes (Pinfield, 1986) and may provide answers to questions such as: 
- How a convergence in group frames of reference comes about? 
- Are members of different groups predisposed to provide certain aspects of a strategy 
concept and why? 
- Which aspects of their environment as well as assumptions about management and 
their roles account for similarities/differences in the strategy concept? 
- How is a dominant reality developed? 
- What is the individual contribution to group's understanding? 
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Figure GI: Alternative groupings of the strategists interviewed 
392 
In this appendix, a grouping of the strategists' cognitions of strategy-areas will be 
performed, on the basis of the three variables described in a previous section. This 
grouping will also draw on information deriving from the strategists' accounts, 
concerning both the way they made certain decisions and the way they interacted and 
communicated with each other. Thus: 
- Within the groups based on participants' representativeness, an investigation will 
be made as to whether participants acting as agents of certain constituencies 
(management, labour, government) used the same frames to rationalize about 
strategy. 
- Within the groups based on educational background, the impact of knowledge 
symmetry/variation will be detected. 
- Within the groups based on political affiliation, whether strategists placed faith in 
a government's policy about a certain organizational area, simply because they 
were associated with it at a political level, will be investigated. 
Figure GI iflustrates the membership of each of the three groups to be studied. 
G. 2.1. Organizational Demographics 
Hambrick (1989), reviewing research on strategic leadership, argued that some of the 
characteristics of top-management teams such as team heterogeneity and executive 
tenure have been used in prior research, but there are others, such as knowledge skins, 
values and cognitive styles, that have been given little attention. 
Bantel and Jackson (1989) noted that whereas the bulk of empirical evidence from 
psychological research on groups supports the general conclusion that team diversity is 
beneficial for groups engaged in complex problem-solving, organization theorists have 
recently emphasized the potential costs associated with heterogeneity, especially with 
respect to organizational tenure and age. Problems stemming from limited 
communication between people in different cohort groups may limit or inhibit the 
exchange of valuable information. Dess and Origer (1987) noted that executives' 
perceptions of the environment may vary with individual differences, individual 
repertoires and social expectations, and may influence the objectives and competitive 
methods espoused by them. In addition, groups that are heterogeneous in terms of 
functional experiences are likely to differ in their attributes, knowledge and perspectives 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Differences among managers from different functions 
may be due in part to differences in their education but also to work experiences. A 
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person's functional background affects not only which problems (s)he identifies as 
important; it also shapes the whole process followed in problem formulation, solutions 
generation and evaluation, and, more important, defines the degree of involvement 
during the implementation phase. 
G. 3. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF THE GROUP STRATEGY 
CONCEPT 
Classifying individual cognitive maps into strategic groups allows for more precise 
statements to be made about organizational behaviour within and across groups, in terms 
of different strategy-areas. Moreover, analysing the way in which similarities and 
differences are evident in the composite maps of different interest groups, helps shaping 
patterns in the process of change and provides evidence of the dynamic relationships 
among groups and change patterns. As discussed in Chapter 4, the theoretical 
framework used for this classification will be the contextualistic approach set forth by 
Pettigrew (1985,1988). He argued that, in order to study change, three basic concepts 
should be taken into consideration: 
- the context, which is the answer to the "why of the change; 
- the content, which is the answer to the "what" of the change, its substance and 
extensiveness, as well as its articulation with other strategy-areas; and 
- the process, which describes how the change is being driven through, the way things are 
done, either by the use of working parties or external change agents or top-down 
directives. Important areas to be explored here are: 
- Participation: Did the group members participate in the decision 
process? Have changes in the occupants of positions influenced the 
change area? 
- Interaction with other groups: Which were the members' 
performance obligations? What were the roles of other groups? 
- Commitment to Action: Were there apparently incompatible 
(non 
different is not the same as contradicting) interpretations? Was it 
because the outcome of a specific decision was perceived as 
problematic? Which was the value they assigned to the decision? Was 
an impression created that "no change" is a de facto Board's decision? 
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- Intervention: Was there a development of a new perspective since 
the existing situation was perceived unsatisfactory? 
Strategic Group based on Representativeness 
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Strategy Area I Variable A 
THE CONTEXT Q Group I Group 11 Group III 
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Figure G2: Framework for the evaluation of the strategy concept 
The key objective will be to position and establish relationships between these three 
concepts. Pettigrew (1988) emphasized that change in longitudinal research means 
much more than an event. The critical task is to inquiry into the underlying logic that 
gives events meaning and significance; this may be achieved better when comparisons 
are being built into the research design. 
Strategy Area 2 Variable A 
Strategy Area I Variable A 
THE CONTEXT Q Group I Group 11 Group III 
THE CONTENT 
Interest Groups 
THE PROCESS 
Strategic Group based on Educational Background 
395 
Figure G2 substantiates the way in which Pettigrew's framework will be utilised for the 
purposes of this appendix and illustrates its constituent elements. The way in which 
conclusions are to be drawn will be presented in a next section. 
G. 4. CONNECTIVITY OF LEVELS 
GA 1. Connectivity within a Map 
First, the relationship between context-content and process was assessed. In particular, 
attention was drawn on the influence on content of the change on its process, and on the 
receptivity of contexts for change, irrespective of variations in the content of change. 
Within the same map, the way in which strategy-schemes interrelated and interacted and 
the extent to which they were shared between interest groups was investigated. It was 
also examined whether the map revealed activities/exchanges initiated by a focal group 
as it attempted to control, manipulate, or simply influence strategy-areas and the 
environment, through an awareness of the organizational environment created by the 
other groups. Finally, a value was assigned to the decision -outcome according to each 
group's view. 
G. 4.2. Connectivity across Strategy-Areas of Same Strategic Group 
The objective here was to explain how the specific interest groups perceived the need for 
a multiple change agenda, how priorities were set and evaluated, how organizational 
performance was affected by the total change agenda, and, if so, how did its pursuit 
influence the pace of each individual change. 
G. 5. STRATEGIC GROUPS BASED ON REPRESENTATIVENESS 
G. 5.1. Strategy Area: Means Acquisition 
G. 5.1.1. Interest Group 1: Employees' Representatives 
Employees' representatives perceived context in terms of the government's discretion to 
provide funds and to intervene in procurements. They also noted the urgent need to 
acquiring means for producing quality services and enhancing the employees' 
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technological competence. Some of them pointed out to organizational weaknesses that 
handicapped the rate of change in this area. No major comments were made on the 
process followed in these matters. They seemed to consider this activity as a routine- 
based one, set in place long before their entry to the Board. They assigned strategic 
significance to this area because they perceived the desired future state of the company 
as legitimate; however, even in cases where weaknesses were perceived, they could not 
articulate the way to reach this final state. They did not mention any relationships with 
the other groups, nor any performance obligations as to how the development of this new 
perspective should be forwarded to cope with the mentioned difficulties. Yet, they 
believed that their presence on Board made a positive contribution to some decisions 
because they spotted to new alternatives which at last were adopted by the Board. 
G. 5.1.2. Interest Group 2: Managers 
Managers perceived context in terms of government funding. As one of them pointed 
out, the Board usually ratified decisions made at a Departmental level, usually without 
any general guide-lines having been set a priori. Three years ago a decision was made to 
double and update those parts of the network that would help in significantly reducing 
the transit times. Yet, the uncertainty about the flow of funding forced the enterprise to 
bid small segments of the whole project. The big competition among the subcontractors 
resulted in offers substantially discounted, in respect with the budgeted expenditure. 
However, this also resulted in malfunctioning because the subcontractors, having 
squeezed their profit margins to the limit in order to be awarded the contract, were 
afterwards trying to find out ways to increase their profit. Thus, delays and lawsuits often 
occurred. The strategist hoped that after a constant funding rate could be guaranteed 
such phenomena would cease to exist; being able to bid bigger projects, the enterprise 
would have to deal with big companies; these companies would, on the one hand, be able 
to materialize big profits and, on the other hand, to defend strongly their interests, in 
cases when the railway could not fulfil its obligations. However, he did not commend on 
the way in which this could be achieved and he did not relate it to any other strategy- 
area, though he emphasized the low level of the employees' morale and dysfunctions in 
the decision-making system. 
The same manager assessed the employees' representatives as being below expectations. 
To him, they did not possess any particular expertise and because they feared to take 
responsibilities they delayed the discussions on projects' proposals. He identified as the 
only capable among them the representative of the union supporting the opposition. Yet, 
he argued, this employee, despite his capacity, used to spend his time in feeding the 
opposition with inquiries concerning the railway. Such inquiries were taken to the 
Parliament by MPs of the opposition and had to be answered by the Minister. 
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This manager's opinion about the General Manager was that he managed to boost 
modernization projects that were stagnating for more than three years, since, by his own 
attempts, a constant funding rate was ascertained. As he said, though there was an initial 
agreement between the government and the enterprise, the setting up of a committee to 
implement the guide-lines failed, because the people involved (both railway and 
government officials) had their own reasons not to want such an effort to be successful. 
To him, this was only a question of people; he did not identify it as an issue with multiple 
dimensions, where different stakeholders used political mechanisms, in order not to 
loose access to an important resource allocation process. 
Despite their shared belief about the strategic significance of these projects, the 
managers did not seem to share the same knowledge about the events that occurred 
during the process. One may note that powerful actors were involved in separate 
activities while the lack of strategic information allowed for different rationales to 
develop. 
G. 5.1.3. Interest Group 3: Administrators 
Two administrators shared the view that, given the state of the network's infrastructure, 
the modernization projects were important. One of them perceived the General 
Manager's initiative to guarantee, through the Community, a constant level of funding as 
fundamental for the implementation of the Plan. He argued that though government's 
funding was not at all of the expected level, it was greater than the one experienced in the 
past; at the end, he insisted, government had to balance demands made by all transport 
modes. 
He considered that the employees' representatives were delaying decision processes on 
Board. To him, this was not a major issue since they did not have previous experience 
and they faced difficulties in the process of coming to grips with new matters. He 
assessed the initiative of the new General Manager as important for the continuation 
and completion of the modernization projects. 
Strategists in this group shared the view that rolling stock acquisition was a strategic 
issue, though there was no consensus over the perspective associated with it. One of 
them did not attribute any new perspective, apart from that concerning new means for 
the production of services. The second administrator identified the dimension of the 
enhancement of technological competence, because the company would not be dependent 
any more on the power that suppliers had on dictating their own terms. Only the General 
Manager related this issue to the possibility of divesting of these activities now that a 
domestic equipment manufacturing company was developing. 
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G-5-1.4. Conclusions 
The employees' representatives seemed to acknowledge the negative impact of the 
context, beside the positive organizational need to develop in terms of this strategy-area. 
Yet, they did not seem to be much involved in shaping a different process. There was no 
much debate on this issue in their accounts. Even the most qualified among them (in 
terms of technical expertise, and taking into account the opinion expressed about him by 
the Assistant General Manager) shared the same frame. Growth, in this sense, was 
perceived as aa self-explaining strategy concept. 
The managers shared the belief in the importance of the modernization projects but they 
didn't see the process of implementing these projects as burdened to the same degree by 
the same factors. Those involved in negotiations with external constituencies seemed to 
be more "anxious" for a development of a new perspective to overcome the problem and 
welcomed efforts regarding the development of this new perspective; others relied upon 
well-known and spotted frames, such as rolling stock standardisation, and assessed the 
government's impact in this respect as absolutely overwhelming. They doubted the 
General Manager's perspective of divestment, arguing that this new manufacturing 
industry would not be able to survive on its own. 
The administrators' rationales resembled more those of the employees' representatives, 
as far as context and process were concerned. Also, like employees, their views differed 
as to what rolling stock construction projects should be aimed at after the completion of 
the track modernization. They did not seem willing to accept General Manager's views 
about divestment. He was the only one to point out to the new strategic dimension for 
rolling stock activities, implicitly recognizing the inherent difficulties associated with 
government's interventions in public procurements. 
These three Board-groups did not seem to interact at all. The employees' representatives 
either regarded the means acquisition process as outside their interests (or beyond their 
capabilities) or, if they did take it into account, they regarded it rather as a means of 
generating confrontation (probably admitting that political interests were at stake). The 
managers "tolerated' their pressure on Board. Finally, the administrators' overall 
attitude was neutral toward both the managers and the employees. 
G. 5.2. Strategy Area: Management Control 
G. 5.2.1. Interest Group 1: Employees' Representatives 
A wide array of elements in the context were perceived as threats, with little explicit 
connection among them. Though, as reported in previous chapters, the employees' 
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representatives opposed to the structure proposed by the former General Manager and 
managed to block it legally, they voted for the new structure introduced by the acting 
General Manager, without seeming to be convinced about the need for this change. They 
probably understood this change as a move towards the compliance to Community's 
directives concerning the railways. Most of them attacked management either on the 
grounds of limited capacity or on a political basis, by stressing the controlled flow of 
information toward the members of the Board or the manipulation of the managerial 
structure on the part of the former General Manager. There was no report on direct 
interactions between managers and employees' representatives during the development 
of proposals concerning the organizational structure. This may explain why the 
confrontation occurred at a level outside the railway. The employees representatives 
shared the belief that structure had nothing to do with the implementation of the Plan. It 
was the people at the top who should take the blame for the structure's ineffectiveness, 
either because they did not know what to accomplish or because they lacked the 
necessary mechanisms to activate the structure, or finally because they were manipulated 
by a higher authority. 
Though their rationales developed along different lines, the employees' representatives 
perceived their role on the Board in the same way. Control could not be exercised by 
them and nothing could be done to solve the problem (that is, there was no strategic 
significance in this area), either because the General Manager was getting from the 
bottom-up line what he wanted to get (and since he controlled the majority of the Board 
it would be a paradox to discuss control issues), or because the supervisory board was 
ineffective and never controlled the enterprise. The third representative who blamed the 
hierarchy and questioned the General Manager's view to direct the organization through 
the control of the Heads of the Departments, said that control issues never reached the 
agenda. He concluded: "I don't dare raising the issue, because as soon as it gets there I 
have to insist". He seemed not to feel at ease with such an issue on the Board and this 
was probably due to many factors (the dominant role of the General Manager, a majority 
that he felt as being alien to him, etc. ). The certain thing was, as he said, that he could 
voice the management's limited capacity because he was not dependent on their votes for 
his election on this post. Thus, he made quite clear the political character of his 
arguments, by relating a perceived organizational weakness to his political chances of 
being re-elected. 
G. 5.2.2. Interest Group 2: Managers 
The managers shared the belief that organizational structure was an important strategic 
issue, though their rationales differed on whether the issue of control deserved special 
attention. The Assistant General Manager noted that the government's policies affected 
the functioning of the old organizational structure which was over-burdened, especially 
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on the top. The delay of fully implementing the law (that would grant autonomy over a 
wide array of decisions) reduced accountability and consequently resulted in greater 
dysfunctions. Though he commended on , his role in the committee that made the 
proposal for the new structure, he did not, in this case, commend in extent upon the role 
of the trade unions (that, at the end, blocked the decision on court). He seemed to be 
convinced that the quality of people elected posed a severe obstacle on the whole process 
since they were not capable of understanding the rationale for this change of structure. 
He did not seem to interpret it as a misreading of other demands (especially on behalf of 
the trade unions). Those demands, arising out of the new power acquired through 
socialization, would necessitate unions to be consulted or participate, before the decision 
was made. The arrival of the new General Manager and his proposal for a new structure 
(placed in the context of building a new firm where infrastructure costs could be 
allocated more clearly and related to the forthcoming Community policies) that was 
finally approved by the Board made him sceptical as far as control was concerned. He 
seemed doubtful since he believed that the General Manager lacked railway expertise; 
however, he was convinced that the General Manager's enthusiasm was something 
needed by the company at that time, because it motivated people, including himself. 
Control, according to the other manager, was not a strategic issue. Probably he believed 
that managers did as much as they could or as much they were left with. 
The Assistant General Manager believed that the uncertainty about funding crippled the 
control function and, ultimately, the company's performance. He asserted that under 
these conditions long-term planning (even over a 5-year horizon) was becoming an 
utopia. The organization's morale was low because all these drawbacks, cutbacks etc. had 
almost negated beliefs in success. An interesting issue is why under such conditions he 
accepted to participate in the committee for the change in the organizational structure 
which was set up by the former General Manager. Was it something he really believed in 
or was he just complying to a directive, the whole rationalization aiming at couching the 
autocratic and conflict-generating character of this process in a well known frame? 
G. 5.23.. Interest Group 3: Administrators 
The administrator who stressed the significance of the management control strategic- 
area noticed that the changes in structure had to be done in compliance with the 
socialization legislation, beside the fact that the trade unions' intervention called them 
off. He did not commend on whether this intervention had negative implications for the 
enterprise though, indirectly, he noticed that the existing organizational structure (i. e. 
the one that the new General Manager proposed) bore significant resemblance to it. 
Thus, he implied that, ultimately, the firm got over this issue. His knowledge on specific 
changes introduced by this structure or on what this structure wanted to achieve was 
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limited. It might be that since the General Manager designed this structure and since he 
was the one that directed the organization, this meant that he knew better what he 
wanted. If this was the case, then it also explains why the other administrator did not 
mention structure at all. 
The General Manager, rationalising the change in this area (though he did not consider 
it as strategic) stressed its contribution to changing the company's attitude toward the 
quality of service and the move away from a firm preoccupied with implementing 
construction and procurement projects. The new structure was designed to fulfil this aim 
and also to make the organization ready for a proper allocation of costs, in a way that 
would facilitate the separation of infrastructure and operations accounts, in accordance 
with Community's proposals. 
Thus, the administrators (especially the General Manager as the primary change agent), 
though aware that in the past the content of the change and its process had influenced 
the final outcome, managed to make context receptive for change. 
The issue of control remained unanswered. The General Manager did not consider it at 
all. The second administrator only noted that the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board 
posed problems to the enterprise, since control was never exercised over the firm. 
Probably he meant that the lack of control over the firm resulted in a lack of control 
within it. Thus, this area could hardly at that time be considered as strategic. Finally, the 
third administrator pointed to the government's quarterly reviewing of some financial 
indices. The maintenance of their deviation within acceptable limits could constitute an 
effective performance monitoring. However, she did not mention what would happen 
when deviations exceeded the permitted range. Would this imply sanctions on the part of 
the Board, the General Manager, or both? 
Thus, administrators had different views as to what control is, who exercises it, and who 
is responsible. The vagueness of the legislation and its incomplete implementation 
augmented these misinterpretations. The complexity of the context in this area impacted 
the content so much, that in the end nullified the process. 
G. 5.2.4. Conclusions 
The employees' representatives drew on a wide set of context aspects (environmental, 
organizational) but these were not connected between them. The process with which 
organizational structure was driven through seemed to have affected their views about 
content. Content drew on vague concepts such as decentralization or participation in 
decision -making. The control issue reflected the same ambiguity. One could infer that 
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this was either because they were not fully certain about what their role was or, if they 
knew, then this role was concerned with political manoeuvres and argumentation. 
The managers had no similarities in their views about structure and control. 711ey either 
seemed indifferent or disappointed from the process being followed and from the role of 
the employees. They seemed either to accept the General Manager's role as decisive for 
this matter or to look up to it in a future, when other priorities would have been solved. 
The rationalization schemes of the administrators drew on a very limited set of concepts 
belonging to the context. They seemed to delegate authority to the General Manager or 
to the government for this matter. Control processes seemed fragmented and not taken 
to consequences. The value assigned to this area was full of uncertainty; however, this did 
not urge them to develop solutions since no problems were evident in their relationships 
with the other groups. 
Thus, no similar frames were present in this strategy-area, apart from the negative 
influence attributed to the context. Powerful change agents, following different processes, 
reached different outcomes. Yet, the content of the change remained at both times 
unclear. 
G. 5.3. Strategy Area: Enhancing Organizational Capabilities 
G. 5.3.1. Interest Group 1: Employees' Representatives 
Though there was a shared belief among the employees' representatives concerning the 
need to enhance personnel's capabilities through training, they attributed various causes 
which, when linked together, provided an outline of the existing ineffective training 
system. They noted that a programme for technical training abroad was set up. Yet, they 
did not seem to have participated in this process and they were not fully aware of what 
this programme was aiming to accomplish. Rewards and/or incentives were not 
associated to personnel training and most of the employees' representatives did not 
mention the need for specialists to be additionally rewarded or selectively promoted 
within the hierarchical structure. Only one strategist in this group mentioned the positive 
aspect of the recently signed agreement between labour and management, which made 
provision for higher (though not adequate) compensation to extra-qualified personnel. It 
is interesting that the employees' representative who considered incompetent 
management as causing problems to the organizational structure did not attribute any 
strategic significance to this area; he should be expected to stress the need for a change 
in the career development system toward the direction of promoting the occupation of 
managerial posts by the most capable employees. 
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In summary, the shared belief that the existing situation was problematic did not yield a 
shared and well articulated frame of reference. The absence of processes, despite the 
common belief in the technical content, was noticeable. 
G. 5.3.2. Interest Group 2: Managers 
The Assistant General Manager asserted that the lack of the control function affected 
directly the career development system; the latter affected the organizational structure 
because it resulted in the passing of responsibility for making decisions to higher 
hierarchical levels. According to his view, the employees were not encouraged to 
participate in developing solutions for problems; thus, they feared to make decisions, 
even when they were asked to. Furthermore, managers were incapable of ob ectively 
assessing the performance of subordinates because they could not handle the conflict that 
would probably arise if a subordinate would consider the treatment of his case as unfair. 
After all, in a public firm, no one could choose the people he wanted to work with, 
neither could he lay them off in cases of inferior performance. This was a constraint 
which should be kept in mind by everyone dealing with such issues. 
The Assistant General Manager valued personnel's professional training and was the 
first to arrange long, on-site training courses abroad (in railway companies, in suppliers' 
of machinery/equipment installations, etc. ) for employees from different functional 
areas. He expected these groups to form, on their return, the trainers for other 
employees, in a way promoting a continuous training process. He did not believe that 
experts could be hired from the environment of the company because, at first, there was 
no other railway operating in the country, further, the suppliers' manufacturing 
industries were abroad, and, finally, the domestic universities or other educational 
institutions did not provide specialised courses in railwaying. He probably believed that 
technological railway expertise was a prerequisite for a qualified manager. Though he 
was aware that other railway firms in Europe had managers and even top managers hired 
from other private industries, he insisted that this could not be the case for the studied 
enterprise. 
The other manager spoke vaguely about the need for training. He acknowledged top 
management's commitment to enhance personnel's skills but he did not provide clear 
evidence whether training was successfully implemented. He did not commend upon any 
of the other decisions belonging to this area. He probably believed that the existing 
career development system, based on seniority, was appropriate for a public enterprise as 
one may presume by considering that he did not mention control either. 
The managers did not share the same frames of reference concerning this strategy-area, 
apart from their consensus on the content. For the one involved in process, process was 
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assessed as much influenced by the Government's discretion over funding and by the 
public character of the firm. 
G. 5.3.3. Interest Group 3: Administrators 
The administrators did not express any views as to what the enterprise needed in terms 
of personnel's capabilities, in order to implement strategy. Only the General Manager 
stressed that the use of information systems and the promotion of personnel training 
would assist in changing the firm's attitudes. He introduced extensive computer training 
sessions for the employees and made a large purchase of micro-computers that were 
mainly installed at the headquarters. However, at the time of this study, this project was 
at its very beginning, and no evidence could be provided concerning its implications. 
Thus, the adoption of a new mission for the enterprise spotted the importance both of 
information and systems to effectively transmit it, and of setting in motion training 
programmes for the whole organization; however, this would probably have not been 
realised without the new General Manager and without the availability of the 
Community's grants. Hence, the role of context as change receptor needed a new change 
agent to facilitate process, in a new content, related to the company's new mission. 
G. 5.3.4. Conclusions 
The employees' representatives drew on various (though not contradictory) concepts 
from the context, in order to legitimate this change-area. They emphasized the technical 
content and they seemed not to care about the process. Their accounts were devoid of 
linkages with other strategy-areas. 
The managers had divided views. Ile one involved in processes to change things 
rationalized extensively about these processes, though he did not connect relevant 
concepts within this area. The other's attitude could be described as "taking thinp as 
they comeff; since his role was minimal, no participation or commitment to any action 
was stressed. 
The administrators seemed not to consider this strategy-area as important; when they 
considered this area, they did it in order to emphasize its supportive role to other areas. 
In the strategy area of enhancement of employees' capabilities the employees' 
representatives seemed to take the importance of the area for granted. Also, powerful 
change-agents such as the Assistant General Manager and the General Manager, valuing 
in a different way this area's content, had managed to drive change through, beside the 
fact that they perceived context in different ways, as a threat or as a challenge 
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respectively. Their difference also lied in that the first one was doubtful about the final 
worthiness of this area, while the second used it as a lever for the enterprise's new 
mission. 
G. 5.4. Strategy Area: Regulated Finances (Budget, Fares) 
G. 5.4.1. Interest Group 1: Employees' Representatives 
Though the impact of context in this strategy-area was perceived by the employees' 
representatives as negative (because of government's discretion to allocate funds and to 
regulate fares), no alternative solutions were expressed, nor participation in a problem- 
solving process was mentioned. It seemed that the strategic significance of this area was 
primarily derived from this impact. 
G. 5.4.2. Interest Group 2: Managers 
Apart from the Assistant General Manager who was involved in the past in a process of 
negotiations with the government concerning terms of financing the enterprise, the other 
manager seemed to consider the context itself as a primary change-inhibitor. And this 
context, as has proved, negated processes for change. 
G. 5.4.3. Interest Group 3: Administrators 
Though two of the three administrators shared the view that these regulated change- 
areas affected negatively the financial performance of the enterprise, it was the General 
Manager who stressed the view that it was the context that should be changed and not 
taken for granted, meaning that this particular strategy- area required exploration and 
subsequent alteration of the fundamental relationships between the state and the 
enterprise. The tensions between political and managerial judgements should be 
considered and resolved; then, specific services, that the state wanted to offer to the 
public at low prices, should be defined. In this case, it would be the state's responsibility 
to finance the resulting deficits. The rest of the services would be provided by the railway 
at costs defined by the enterprise itself and it was now the firm's responsibility to achieve 
financial viability. 
The same rationale applied to funding. The low rate of government's funding 
necessitated the search for a constant funding source. The financial viability of the Rail 
Plan demonstrated by a study prepared by the Athens Economics University facilitated 
the company's proposal to the Community for funding, and reinforced the paths along 
which future organizational activity could proceed. 
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G-5.4.4. Conclusions 
This was the only strategy-area where employees, managers and the majority of 
administrators shared the same frames of reference, yet reduced to their context 
component. The only exception was the General Manager's rationalization with a new 
context, content and process, indicating that this was enough to introduce change when 
other participants were just waiting for something to happen, considering that this major 
problem facing the enterprise constituted government's initiative. In this sense, the 
General Manager enacted an environment that was more dynamic and promising than 
the ones accounted for by the other administrators (by locating new areas of opportunity) 
and was the creator of change in this respective strategy area. 
G. 6. STRATEGIC GROUPS BASED ON EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 
G. 6.1. Strategy Area: Means Acquisition 
G. 6.1.1. In terest Gro up 1: Engfn eers 
All engineers, either directly or indirectly (through the mentioning of the 5-year business 
plan), stressed the importance of this strategy-area for the implementation of the Rail 
Plan. However, as witnessed by the composite maps presented in a previous section, one 
of them judged differently the context impact and the implications of change. Despite the 
diversity of frames, the engineers seemed to value the engineering projects and, even if 
constraints were experienced along the way, they mostly continued to attribute to them 
strategic significance. As far as interactions with other groups were concerned, the 
engineers that referred to these interactions pointed to the delays to convince the Board- 
members who had no previous experience or expertise on such issues. No other engineer 
apart from the General Manager stressed the divestment aspect. They did not seem 
willing to concede what they considered as most important to them. 
G. 6.1.2 Interest Group 2: Economists 
The only member of this group considered this area as strategic. She stressed the 
government's dominant role in funding; yet, she did not seem to participate in, or to 
influence the process. It may be that the dominant number of engineers on Board caused 
the "setting of rules" by them and covered any other consideration for specifying an 
alternative process. 
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G. 6.1.3. Interest Group 3: Other 
The last two strategists both stressed the importance of this area. One noted the 
government's negative impact on efforts to reduce the diversity of rolling stock units, 
while the other noted the negative impact of the poor quality of studies prepared within 
the enterprise on modernization projects. Yet, the development of a new perspective, 
since the existing situation was assessed as unsatisfactory, was only partly pointed out by 
one of them. The view he adopted concerning the divestment of rolling stock activities 
was rather an echo of the General Manager's perspective, because no other linkages of 
this strategic area with others (or with the company's mission) were identified. Being 
himself a close collaborator of the General Manager during his tenure as vice-governor 
in the early years of the implementation of the plan, the first strategist in this group was 
probably influenced by the General Manager's arguments. 
The second strategist, believing that the low quality of engineering studies was 
responsible for delays in the plan's implementation, provided linkages with other 
strategy-areas, by attributing the reason either to the poor competence of the enterprise's 
engineers or to management's inability to guide the process. In both cases, one may 
argue that an answer is thus provided, concerning the hardships this strategist 
experienced by the engineers, on Board's sessions. Thus, personal considerations negated 
process within this strategy-area, where interactions were absent or problematic. 
G. 6.1.4. Conclusions 
The engineers enjoyed a dominant position on Board, through both their majority and 
specialization (especially in the stage of the development of engineering projects). It is 
the impact of context that resulted in any shortcomings experienced in the process. They 
seemed to be pressed to get as much out of it when funds were made available, given the 
time consuming procedures followed in public works bids, that seemed not to tolerate 
further delays. The economist shared the same scheme as importance of the context was 
concerned, but not in terms of process which did not seem to attract her interest. The 
scheme of the two last strategists resembled that of those already mentioned as far as 
context was concerned; however, probably as a consequence of the dominant group's 
behaviour (and their feeling of being "inadequate" to help), they did not commit 
themselves to action. 
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G. 6.2. Strategy Area: Management Control 
G. 6.2.1. Interest Group 1: Engineers 
Though the engineers mostly agreed upon the strategic significance of the organizational 
structure, they drew on different concepts from the context; however, these different 
concepts were not incompatible (the incomplete implementation of the socialization 
legislation resulted in the concentration of decisions processes on the top of the 
enterprise and thus the former General Manager was free to impose his political or 
personal views on decisions). However, these different lines of argumentation reflected 
that polarization existed and was cultivated. Apart from the General Manager who was 
fully aware of the structure's content (given that he himself had designed it), the other 
members of this group did not seem to know either the content or what was expected to 
be achieved, and they were not involved in the process. 
The same applied to the issue of control. Here, though its significance was noted, no 
consensus on the desired content and process could be detected. Especially the content 
seemed vague. The members of this group did not seem to distinguish what sort of 
control they advocated (control over departmental managers or control over the General 
Manager). 
G. 6.2.2. Interest Group 2: Economists 
The issue of control was mentioned only briefly. As far its content was concerned, control 
was perceived as compliance to the government's accounts, especially when curtailments 
in expenditure were experienced, in periods when the government's economic policy was 
aiming at reducing the public deficit. Nothing was said about how the government 
comprehended such controls or who was held accountable for deviations. 
G. 6.2.3. Interest Group 3: Other 
Consensus was not identified concerning the strategic significance of this strategy-area. 
One strategist mentioned as major problems the limited capacity of the functional 
managers (who, in their great majority, were engineers) and the vagueness of objectives. 
He did not seem to connect these two causes; in other words, that the lack of specific 
objectives rendered managers more submissive to the General Manager's demands. 
Control was again a controversial issue. They attributed different causes to it; yet, no 
development of solutions was evident nor performance obligations were stated. 
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G-6-2.4. Conclusions 
The disparity of views among groups in this change-area was astonishing. Socialization 
legislation or the dominant role of the General Manager were drawn upon, in order to 
explain the "why of change in the engineers' group. However, they remained indifferent 
as far its content and process were concerned. The economist referred to another context 
and content but she too was not concerned about process. The last two strategists drew 
on different concepts in the context, did not rationalize about the content and, despite 
their intervention in the process (when the alteration of the organizational structure was 
attempted for the first time), seemed not interested in developing a new perspective. 
G. 6.3. Strategy Area: Enhancing Organizational Capabilities 
G. 6.3.1. Interest Group 1: Engineers 
Within the engineers' group, most participants attributed strategic significance to the 
personnel's technological training while the second theme, that is rewards and incentives 
systems, received much less attention. However, different but not contradicting aspects 
of context were drawn upon, in order to legitimate this area. The engineers mostly cited 
the ongoing programme (set up by management) as the only means to implement this 
change. Despite this effort, the Assistant General Manager who was the programme's 
initiator believed that uncertainty in funding handicapped its effectiveness; he added: 
"what is the point in hiring experts in planning and have them here sitting down, 
doing nothing". The final value was questionable under such conditions of uncertainty. 
G. 6.3.2 Interest Group 2: Economists 
Not significant aspects were expressed by the strategist in this group. 
G. 6.3.3. Interest Group 3: Other 
The composite map of this group was almost identical to that of the employees' 
representatives group. 
G. 6.3.4. Conclusions 
The frames possessed by the engineers and the other strategists in terms of this change- 
area were similar in the positive value they assigned to the outcome. Most of the 
components of the context were perceived as facilitating change. Content was perceived 
only as professional training. Differences were located in the process of training 
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implementation. While the engineers relied on the Assistant General Manager's 
programme, the other strategists seemed to adopt a different perspective, i. e. that of 
specialists' hiring. 
G. 6.4. Strategy Area: Regulated Finances (Budget, Fares) 
G. 6.4.1. In terest Gro up 1: Engin eers 
All engineers attributed strategic significance in acquiring investment funds through the 
state's investment programme; however, context was not perceived as having the same 
influence. Only the General Manager connected this area to fares' definition and 
articulated a new process described in previous sections; he even took specific steps in 
order to operationalize it. Managers-engineers emphasized the vicious cycle the 
enterprise was operating in, with the increasing deficits and the low culture, whereas 
engin eers-non managers accepted government's discretion to provide funds. 
G. 6.4.2. Interest Group 2: Economists 
Though strategic significance was assigned to both areas and the negative role of the 
context was emphasized, development of process was not mentioned in order to relieve 
the enterprise from these implications. Probably, the overriding importance given to 
Government inhibited any other consideration for change. It seemed as a paradox but 
here the context's negative impact defined strategy. 
G. 6.4.3. Interest Group 3: Other 
Consensus was not found among the members of this group, neither worth-mentioning 
points existed referring to this strategy-area. 
G. 6.4.4. Conclusions 
The engineers and the economist perceived the same components in context as 
negatively influencing this strategy-area. Apart from the new General Manager, they 
were not involved in the process of implementing a new perspective. 
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G. 7. STRATEGIC GROUPS BASED ON POLITICAL AFFILIATION 
G. 7.1. Strategy Area: Means Acquisition 
G. 7 1.1. Interest Group 1: Supporters 
There was a shared belief among the supporters of the party in power about the strategic 
significance attributed to this area, especially to rolling stock acquisition. Two of the 
most significant change-agents that participated actively in shaping new processes (the 
Assistant General Manager and the new General Manager) belonged to this group. The 
remaining supporters perceived context in different terms, that is either as change 
facilitator (via government's funding) or change-inhibitor (via government's 
interventions in procurements). The supporters' majority on Board was so decisive that 
no interactions with others were described, as no need for negotiations or persuasion 
existed. 
G. 7 1.2. Interest Group 2: Opponents 
The strategist belonging to this group stressed himself the importance of the 
modernization projects. In the context, he only emphasized the low technological level of 
the company's infrastructure, while he did not commend at all on his participation in the 
process, though he generally stressed the need to look for other sources of information, 
given that the General Manager was selectively presenting it on Board. One may argue 
that this strategist perceived his role as a "crusadee, trying to uncover top management's 
intrigues and scandals. From the archival evidence, it was found that he was the only one 
who had directly confronted the former General Manager, on matters referring to bids 
approvals, and had publicly demonstrated his objection through a brochure delivered to 
the employees. 
0.7 1.3. Interest Group 3: Neutral 
The importance of modernization plans was stressed and the negative context (that is, 
the government's low levels of funding) was highlighted by the only member of this 
group. No participation in a process for changing things was mentioned. He probably 
believed, from his experience as a senior manager within the enterprise, that the 
government's will was always posed on the railway; thus, nothing could be done to 
overcome this issue. 
412 
G. 7 1.4. Conclusions 
The strategic importance of these projects was stressed by an groups. Context was 
perceived in different terms even within the same group. It was interesting that the rate 
of change was assessed as being inadequate even by supporters. Powerful supporters 
believing that a new process had to be followed, since context proved to slow down 
significantly the pace of change, were involved in negotiations with external 
constituencies. Opponents seemed to generate confrontation in order to use it for their 
political benefits as far as no commitment to any other action was expressed. 
G. 7.2. Strategy Area: Management Control 
G. 72.1. Interest Group 1: Supporters 
The members of this group mostly agreed on the significance of this strategic area, 
though they drew on different aspects of the context (law, government, company's new 
mission). Some spoke of the new structure as a conformity to the law, others as a need to 
improve performance, given the economic uncertainty; still others did not seem 
convinced for the need for this change while there were strategists who questioned the 
reason for this change, on the grounds that, once again, the same bureaucracy would 
occupy the posts. 
The same applied to control. One may argue that because change in this area had been 
twice driven through without participation from the strategists involved, questions still 
existed about its substance and its possibilities to succeed. However, the supporters 
seemed to take the strategic importance in this area for granted, either because they did 
not relate it to other areas or because they believed it was an important issue, since it 
had generated so much conflict in the past. 
G. 722. Interest Group 2: Opponents 
This was the area where there was direct confrontation on political grounds. The former 
General Manager was accused of having caused dysfunctions in the organizational 
structure on two grounds; on the one hand, he had imposed political views on the way 
decision proposals were submitted by the Heads of the Departments; on the other, he 
controlled the information passed to the members of the Board which resulted in 
misinterpretations by them, regarding their jurisdictions. However, the only strategist in 
this group noted that the vagueness of the legislation concerning socialization had also 
an impact on this misinterpretation. What should be stressed is that he did not commend 
at all on the new General Manager's initiatives as far as funding and new structure were 
concerned. Moreover, he did not mention control. Probably nobody in the enterprise 
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could be held accountable when the General Manager was believed to play such a 
dominant role. 
G. 72.3. Interest Group 3: Neutral 
The organizational structure was considered as a strategic area by the strategist in this 
group. However, only legislation and the need to decentralize decision-making were 
mentioned in the context. He did not seem convinced about the need for change since 
nothing on the content/process has been said; as he mentioned, changes in the structure 
to comply with the law should have been limited to the very top (Supervisory Board, 
Assistants General Managers, executive committee) instead of taking place throughout 
the organization. To him, as deriving from his map, the major problem seemed to be the 
rolling stock purchase/maintenance programmes and the influence they exerted on 
operations. Organizational structure was considered as strategic to the degree that the 
Supervisory Board would be able to exercise its duties and the enterprise would be 
granted autonomy to purchase equipment according to its own needs. 
G. 724. Conclusions 
The variety of factors invoked by supporters to advocate the importance within this area 
was surprising. However, no one pointed out to the need to fully implement the 
legislation, to render effective (to the degree they could influence it) the Supervisory 
Board's functioning. The introduction of this scheme was mainly perceived as causing 
problems; nobody perceived it as a challenge to building support with external important 
constituencies and thus to help the enterprise to solve issues of financing, procurement 
and control. On the other hand, because of the difficulties experienced during a transient 
period, the opponents grabbed the opportunity to pin-point to political issues; they 
centred around such issues the whole line of their argumentation. Finally, though the 
neutral were not convinced about the need for this change they felt compelled to stress its 
strategic significance. 
G. 7.3. Strategy Area: Enhancing Organizational Capabilities 
G. 73.1. Interest Group 1: Supporters 
Personnel training was mostly agreed as having strategic significance. Different aspects 
of the context were identified as contributing to it. Some of the supporters, despite the 
positive value they assigned to this area, defined the context as negatively influencing 
this sort of activities (trainers, government's funding). Others stressed the importance of 
process already in place to enhance personnel's abilities; still others emphasized the need 
to hire specialists in planning, in order to assist in the implementation of the plan. Yet 
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reward/incentive systems were not related to this, or to any performance measures. The 
pay scheme, mentioned by one member of this group, was intended to adjust the pay-roll 
of the company's personnel to that of other public sector firms. This pay scheme was 
criticised by another member of the group as not inducing specialists to join railways. As 
he said, only recently the tabour agreement had included specific compensation (though 
not very attractive) for such additional qualifications. 
73.2 Interest Group 2: Opponents 
The career development system and personnel training were considered as strategic 
though they were not connected in any sense. The negative impact of the General 
Manager's manipulation was pointed out; thus, one may infer that if this constraint was 
released then the system could again be effective. Training was seen as being important 
for enhancing personnel's capability to implement the plan (in its technological 
dimension) and especially its rolling stock component. 
G. 73.3. Interest Group 3: Neutral 
The strategic significance of personnel training was noted by the strategist in this group, 
especially that of technical training in rolling stock's standards/maintenance and of 
training in marketing. The context was considered as facilitating the process since 
management induced such efforts. No linkages with reward/incentives systems were 
identified. 
G. 7.3.4. Conclusions 
Supporters did not share the same frames of reference. Context was perceived differently 
and so did the process that any one perceived as most appropriate to be followed. 
Opponents noted its significance but under political terms and without mentioning 
linkages between similar concepts. Finally, neutral strategists perceived context as 
facilitating training processes and pointed out to a new area (marketing) that needed to 
be dealt with. 
G. 7.4. Strategy Area: Regulated Finances (Budget, Fares) 
G. 74.1. Interest Group 1: Supporters 
The importance of this area was noted by all strategists in this group, yet rationales 
differed as to what aspects of the context did facilitate or inhibit it, and to which extent. 
Sharing the same political views with the party in power, one would expect that context 
(when perceived in such terms as non receptive for change and given the importance 
415 
they assigned to it), would initiate processes leading to its resolution. However, as 
evidenced from previous sections, only two of the actors in this group attempted to 
change the way things were done in the enterprise and to intervene in the process of 
acquiring constant funding for the plan; they were the Assistant General Manager in the 
middle of the implementation of the Plan and, recently, the General Manager. However, 
they followed different paths; the first held meetings with governmental officials while 
the other looked for a new source outside government. It looked like context's non 
receptivity for change was perceived by those who had attempted to change it, while the 
others felt secure by adopting a fatalistic attitude for a deterministic environment. 
G. 74.2. Interest Group 2: Opponents 
Here, the negative impact of context (Government) was stressed, though the 
government's discretion to define funding levels was recognised. The strategist in this 
group did not commend on whether the arrival of the new General Manager influenced 
positively this area. His proposal to the Board to submit their resignation when half of 
the investment budget was truncated by the government was indicative of the way he 
thought that the handling of these issues should be done; however, he knew that his 
proposal was never going to be accepted and, by being the only representative of the 
opposition on Board, he considered political confrontation as a way of showing off 
during a highly sensitive pre-electoral period. 
G. 74.3. Interest Group 3: Neutral 
The importance of this area was stressed by the strategist in this group and its negative 
implications, arising out of the way deficits in both operational and investment budgets 
increased, were demonstrated. A comprehensive rationale as to what factors contributed 
to these deficits pin-pointed to the rolling stock problem. Yet nothing was said about the 
process of change. He probably believed that this was something outside his own 
territory and his arguments about organizational structure and the Supervisory Board 
advocated in favour of this assumption. 
G. 7 4.4. Conclusions 
The supporters' powerful change-agents seemed to drive the change through in this area, 
within a new context and with a content articulating both financing and fares policy. 
Opponents seemed more concerned with gaining political advantages out of this process, 
while the neutral considered the impact of context as overwhelming and their role as too 
weak to confront it or develop a new perspective. 
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G. 8. CONNECTIVITY ACROSS STRATEGY AREAS 
The employees' representatives, as may be seen in their cognitive maps, did perceive the 
need for a change agenda though they did not set priorities. The two managers exhibited 
similarities though only the Assistant General Manager's map illustrated the need for a 
well articulated change and demonstrated a way in which organizational performance 
was ultimately going to be positively affected. The administrators exhibited some 
similarities but the strategy-areas were fragmented and not articulated. 
The engineers perceived a multiple change-agenda but in different terms and priorities. 
The same applied to the other occupational groups. 
The supporters did not set the same priorities as far as the articulation of strategy-areas 
was concerned, nor were they interested to the same extent in the way in which the 
organizational performance was affected. The opponents exhibited a change-agenda 
centred on structure and systems while the neutral presumed a set of strategy-concepts 
with little articulation; on the other hand, a well-defined problem, i. e. that of rolling stock 
purchase/main ten ance, had not "found its way to the change-agenda. 
G. 9. CONCLUSIONS 
This appendix aimed at evaluating strategists' cognitive structures in the context of 
various social groups formed on the basis of (a) participants' representativeness, (b) 
educational background, and (c) political affiliation. Its findings in terms of the research 
objectives concerning the mix of cognitive structures and how this affects choices and 
implementation, are summarised below: 
1. Employees' representatives stressed the need for personnel training though they did 
not initiate or participate in a process that would develop appropriate strategies. These 
activities were left within the purview of two powerful change agents (the acting General 
Manager and the Assistant General Manager). 
2. Both managers and employees' representatives perceived the environment as volatile 
and hostile. Though only the General Manager via a new process started creating 
favourable links with external stakeholders. 
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3. Engineers' domination on the Board had resulted in adequate attention to shape 
modernization projects' alternative processes. It also appeared that other members were 
feeling inadequate or indifferenrt to review; they only approved managerial proposals 
comncerning this organizational area. 
4. Opponents argued about the power that the ex-General Manager exercised over the 
managers and stressed the significance of the managAent control area. Also, the flow of 
information between the General Manager and the Board-members was considered as 
inadequate. As it can be seen, opponents were the only ones to commend on the General 
Manager's acts though they only stressed their negative impacts. 
